INDIA – ISRAEL RELATIONS IN POST-COLD WAR ERA; AN ANALYTICAL STUDY

Thesis submitted to
the University of Calicut in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

by

SATHIAN V. T.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT
KERALA-673 635
2024

Prof. (Dr.) Zacaria T. V.
Principal
Amal College of Advanced Studies
P.O Eranhimangad, Nilambur
Pin 679329
Mob: +91 9995042688

CERTIFICATE

      I hereby certify that the thesis entitled 'INDIA – ISRAEL RELATIONS IN POST - COLD WAR ERA; AN ANALYTICAL STUDY' submitted by SATHIAN. V.T, is the result of an authentic work carried out under my guidance. I also certify that neither a part of the work nor the whole of it has been submitted for a degree here or elsewhere. The thesis is hereby submitted to the University of Calicut for examination for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in POLITICAL SCIENCE in the FACULTY OF HUMANITIES.

C.U. Campus
Date: 20-01-20

Prof. (Dr.) Zacaria T. V.
(Supervising Teacher)
Prof. (Dr) ZACARIA T.V
PEN: 470319
Principal
Amal College of Advanced Studies
Eranhimangad P.O., Nilambur - 679329

DECLARATION

I, **Sathian.V.T**, do hereby declare that this Ph.D. thesis entitled **'INDIA – ISRAEL RELATIONS IN POST - COLD WAR ERA; AN ANALYTICAL STUDY'** is the summary of the research work carried out by me under the supervision of Prof. (**Dr.**) **Zacaria.T.V**, Principal, Amal College of Advanced Studies, Nilambur in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. I also declare that neither a part of the work nor the whole of it has been published anywhere except quotations and references which have been duly acknowledged at appropriate places.

C.U. Campus

Date: 20|01|20 24

Sathian.V.T.

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that SATHIAN.V.T is a bonafede Research Scholar (Ph.D) in the Department of Political Science, University of Calicut, Malappuram, Kerala.

C.U. Campus
Date: 20/01/2024.

Dr. Sabu Thomas
Head
Department of Political Science
University of Calicut

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to extend my heartfelt gratitude and deep indebtedness to the many people whose unwavering support and timely encouragement played an indispensable role in the completion of this work. Without their invaluable contributions, I would not have been able to successfully complete this endeavor.

I am profoundly grateful and would like to express my heart full appreciation to my esteemed supervisor, Prof. (Dr.) Zacaria T.V., the Principal, Amal College of Advanced Studies, Nilambur. His valuable guidance, encouragement, and constant inspiration have been instrumental in completing my research journey. I am deeply indebted to him for his dedicated supervision, warm support, generosity, and enduring enthusiasm that sustained me throughout my research tenure.

I convey my sincere thanks to Dr. Sabu John, the Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Calicut, for providing guidance, support and necessary facilities for this research work. I also extend my profound thanks to Prof. (Dr.) K.S Pavithran, Prof. (Dr.) Muhammed Maheen. A, and Dr. N. Sebastian, all are the former Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Calicut, for their support good wishes in the pursuit of my work. Moreover, I wish to acknowledge and give thanks to the staff of Library and office, Department of Political Science, University of Calicut.

I am immensely thankful to my friends Dr. Abdul Nazer. K, Pramod. E.K, Dr. Pradeesh. N.M, Nisanth. T.V, Dr. Suresh Babu. P. A, Radeena. D.N, Dr. Liya.K, Dr. Navya. A.H, and Dr. Priya. P. for their love, support and motivations to carry out my research work efficiently.

I express my gratitude to my late father Thankappan, and beloved mother Sujatha, as well as my sister Jiji and brother Shyjan for their blessings. I am thankful to my wife, Asha, and beloved daughters, Nithya and Nitha, for their unconditional love and support during my entire research work. Without their

blessings, inspiration, motivation, and it would have been impossible for me to finish my research work.

I would also like to thank each and everybody who has been directly or indirectly involved in or has been the part of my research work and who has contributed in any way to completing my work.

Sathian. V.T

ABSTARCT

The research titled **'INDIA-ISRAEL RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA; AN ANLYTICAL STUDY'**; seeks to examine the evolving dynamics of India- Israel relations during the post - Cold War period. The study primarily spans from 1992 to 2022. However, it is also analyse the pre-independence reservations, both at the individual and ideological levels, as they played a pivotal role in shaping the subsequent convergence between the two states.

The study analyse the pre- independence stance of Indian National Congress and nationalist leaders like M.K.Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru towards Zionism, as it played a decisive factor in shaping India's post independence foreign policy. Despite their personal sympathy to the Jewish sufferings, they opposed Israel. Their opposition stemmed from the principled stance against Zionist methods with the support of British imperialism to establish a religious based state in Palestine soil. This opposition became the basis of India's Israel policy during the post-independence period, charactarised by 'diplomatic estrangement' and postponement of diplomatic relation with Israel without any direct conflict of interest. However, amidst this 'estrangement policy', India did not hesitate to seek security and intelligence assistance from Israel during the wars with China and Pakistan.

With the end of the Cold War and subsequent global transformation, India abandoned the policy of estrangement and established diplomatic relations with Israel in January1992.The growing security challenges from India's geostrategic environment and the desire to become a hard power, India was compelled to venture a pragmatic foreign policy within its idealistic framework. This re-defined India's policy options towards global powers, including Israel. In the absence of Soviet Union, a major defence supplier to India, Israel emerged as an attractive partner for security and military modernisation. Beyond strategic and security engagements, the collaboration between India and Israel expanded to research and development, cyber security, agriculture and water management, science and technology and people- to-people contact and wide commercial cooperation. This collaboration became wide

and open during the Narendra Modi period, and during this time India de-hyphenated its Israel policy from Palestine.

This pivotal shift in India's foreign policy towards Israel represents a unique model in the Indian diplomatic history. Through historical and analytical methods, alongside comparative foreign policy analysis, the study incorporates Securitisation Theory, Rational Choice theory, and Defensive Realism to explain this paradigm shift. The research reveals that India initially held ideological differences with Israel, given its status as a Zionist state based on religion and supported by imperialist forces. This stance was rooted in India's ideological footings and also on societal security and economic security concerns. However, as India faced burgeoning security challenges during the post- Cold War period, it was compelled to reorient its engagement with Israel, recognising it as a reliable partner capable of providing assistance across various domains. In this shift, India was eager to preserve its traditional relations with Arabs and Palestine but also seemed as a fruitful attempt to protect India's national security through its collaboration with Israel.

Key Words: Foreign policy, National interest, Post- Cold War, Non-alignment, Cross border terrorism.

സംഗ്രഹം

'ഇന്ത്യ-ഇസ്രായേൽ ബന്ധങ്ങൾ; ശീതയുദ്ധാന്തര കാലഘട്ടത്തിൽ' എന്ന ഗവേഷണം ഇന്ത്യയും ഇസ്രായേലും തമ്മിലുള്ള ചലനാത്മകമായ ബന്ധത്തെ വിശകലനം ചെയ്യുന്നു. ശീതയുദ്ധാന്തര കാലത്തെയാണ് (1992-2022) മുഖ്യമായും പഠനവിധേയമാക്കുന്നതെങ്കിലും ഇതിനെ സ്വാധീനിച്ച ആശയപരവും വ്യക്തിപരവുമായ ഘടകങ്ങളെക്കുറിച്ചുകൂടി പഠനം അനാവരണം ചെയ്യുന്നു. സിയോണിസത്തോടുള്ള ഇന്ത്യൻ നാഷണൽ കോൺഗ്രസിന്റെയും മഹാത്മാ ഗാന്ധി, ജവഹർലാൽ നെഹ്റു എന്നീ ദേശീയ നേതാക്കളുടെയും നിലപാട് ഇന്ത്യ-ഇസ്രായേൽ ബന്ധത്തെ നിർണ്ണായകമായി സ്വാധീനിച്ച ഘടകങ്ങളാണ്. പാലസ്തീൻ മണ്ണിൽ അവരുടെ അനുമതിയില്ലാതെ ഒരു ജൂത രാഷ്ട്രം സ്ഥാപിക്കുന്നതിനെ ദേശീയനേതാക്കൾ എതിർത്തു. ഇത് ഇന്ത്യയും ഇസ്രായേലുമായുള്ള ബന്ധത്തെ നിർണ്ണായകമായി സ്വാധീനിച്ചു. ജൂതൻമാർ യൂറോപ്പിൽ നേരിട്ട കഷ്ടപ്പാടുകളോട് സഹാനുഭൂതി ഉണ്ടായിരുന്നെങ്കിലും സാമ്രാജ്യത്വ ശക്തികളുടെ പിൻതുണയിൽ ഒരു ജൂത രാഷ്ട്രം പാലസ്തീനിൽ സ്ഥാപിക്കുന്നതിനെ ഇന്ത്യ എതിർത്തു. എങ്കിലും പിന്നീട് ഇസ്രായേലിനെ ഇന്ത്യ അംഗീകരിച്ചെങ്കിലും പൂർണ്ണമായ നയതന്ത്ര ബന്ധം സ്ഥാപിച്ചില്ല. എന്നാൽ ഇന്ത്യ അയൽരാജ്യങ്ങളായ ചൈന, പാകിസ്ഥാൻ എന്നീ രാജ്യങ്ങളുമായുള്ള സംഘർഷത്തിൽ ഇന്ത്യയെ ഇസ്രായേൽ സഹായിച്ചു.

ശീതയുദ്ധം അവസാനിച്ചതിനുശേഷം ഉണ്ടായ ആഗോളമാറ്റങ്ങൾ ഇന്ത്യൻ വിദേശനയത്തെയും ശക്തമായി സ്വാധീനിച്ചു. ഇന്ത്യയുടെ ഭൗമരാഷ്ട്രീയ ഭൂമികയിൽ നേരിട്ട വെല്ലുവിളികളെ അഭിമുഖീകരിക്കുന്നതിന് ഇന്ത്യ അതിന്റെ വിദേശ നയങ്ങളിൽ മാറ്റം വരുത്തുകയും ഇന്ത്യ ഇസ്രായേലുമായി നയതന്ത്ര ബന്ധം 1992ൽ സ്ഥാപിക്കുകയും ചെയ്തു. സോവിയറ്റ് യൂണിയന്റെ പതനത്തിനുശേഷം ഇന്ത്യയുടെ സൈനികമായ സുരക്ഷയ്ക്ക് ഇസ്രായേൽ നിർണ്ണായക പങ്ക് വഹിച്ചു. കൂടാതെ ഗവേഷണം, കൃഷി, ഊർജ്ജം, വാണിജ്യം എന്നീ മേഖലകളിലെല്ലാം കൂടുതൽ സഹകരണം ഉണ്ടായി. പ്രധാനമന്ത്രി നരേന്ദ്രമോദിയുടെ കാലത്ത് ഈ ബന്ധങ്ങൾ കൂടുതൽ ദൃഢതരമായി. ഇസ്രായേലുമായുള്ള ബന്ധം പരമ്പരാഗതമായി പാലസ്തീനുമായുള്ള ബന്ധത്തെ ബാധിക്കാതിരിക്കാൻ ഇന്ത്യ ശ്രദ്ധിക്കുന്നു.

ഇന്ത്യയുടെ ഇസ്രായേൽ നയം ഇന്ത്യൻ നയതന്ത്ര ചരിത്രങ്ങളിലെ ഒരു വ്യത്യസ്ത മാതൃകയാണ്. ചരിത്രപരവും, വിശകലനാത്മക രീതിശാസ്ത്രത്തിലൂടെ സെക്യൂരിറ്റൈസേഷൻ സിദ്ധാന്തം, റാഷണൽ ചോയ്സ് സിദ്ധാന്തം, ഡിഫൻസീവ് റിയലിസം എന്നീ സിദ്ധാന്തങ്ങളുടെ സഹായത്താൽ ഈ പ്രശ്നത്തെ വിശകലനം ചെയ്യുന്നു.

ഈ ഗവേഷണം ഇന്ത്യയ്ക്ക് ഇസ്രായേല്യമായിട്ടുള്ള ആശയപരമായി ഭിന്നതയെക്കുറിച്ചും പിന്നീട് ഉണ്ടായ മാറ്റങ്ങളെക്കുറിച്ചും സഹകരണത്തെക്കുറിച്ചും ഇന്ത്യയുടെ ദേശീയസുരക്ഷയ്ക്ക് ശീതയുദ്ധാനന്തര കാലഘട്ടത്തിൽ ഇസ്രായേല്യമായുള്ള സഹകരണം നൽകിയ സംഭാവനകളെക്കുറിച്ചും വിശകലനം ചെയ്യുന്നു.

സൂചക പദങ്ങൾ : വിദേശനയം, ദേശീയ താൽപര്യം, ശീതയുദ്ധാനന്തര കാലഘട്ടം, ചേരിചേരാനയം, അതിർത്തികടന്നുള്ള ഭീകരവാദം

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ABBREVIATIONS

AFRICA	-	Action for Resistance to Innovation, Colonialism and Apartheid
AICC	-	All India Congress Committee
APEC	-	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	-	Association of South East Asian Nations
AWACS	-	Airborne Warning and Control Systems
BINSTEC	-	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BJP	-	Bharatiya Janata Party
BJS	-	Bharatiya Jan Sangh
BRICS	-	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBI	-	Central Bureau of Investigation
CEDAW	-	Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women
CELAC	-	Community of Latin America and Caribbean States
CII	-	Confederation of Indian Industries
CPEC	-	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPI	-	Communist Party of India
CPI-M	-	Communist Party of India Marxist
CTBT	-	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DND	-	Draft Nuclear Doctorine
DRDO	-	Indian Defense Research and Development Organisation
ECOSOC	-	Economic and Social Council
FAO	-	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FDI	-	Foreign Direct Investment
FICCI	-	Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industries
FTA	-	Free Trade Agreement

GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
HAL	-	Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
HRC	-	Human Rights Council
IAEA	-	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAF	-	Indian Air Force
IAI	-	Israel Aerospace Industries
IARI	-	Indian Agricultural Research Institute
IBSA	-	India, Brazil and South Africa
ICBM	-	Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles
ICERD	-	International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination
ICJ	-	International Court of Justice
IDF	-	Israeli Defense Forces
ILO	-	International Labour Organisation
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
IMI	-	Israel's Military Industries
INC	-	Indian National Congress
INCD	-	Israeli National Cyber Directorate
IOR	-	India Ocean Region
IORA	-	Indian Ocean Rim Association
IPCC	-	Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change
ISRO	-	Indian Space Research Organisation
ISS	-	Inter-Services Intelligence
IT	-	Information Technology
LAC	-	Line of Actual Control
LCA	-	Light Combat Aircraft
LEO	-	Low Erath Orbit
LoC	-	Line of Control
LR-SRM	-	Long Range Surface to Air Missile
LTTE	-	Liberation of Tamil Tigers Ealam

MASHAV	-	Israel's International Development Co-operation Program
MEA	-	Ministry of External Affairs
MFN	-	Most Favoured Nation
MIRV	-	Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles
MNC	-	Multi National Company
MOSSAD	-	Agency for Intelligence and Special Operations
MOU	-	Memorandum of Understanding
MSR	-	Maritime Silk Road
NAM	-	Non- Aligned Movement
NASSCOM	-	National Association of Software and Service Companies
NDA	-	National Democratic Alliance
NDFB	-	National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NEP	-	New Economic Policy
NGO	-	Non- Governmental Organisations
NPT	-	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OBOR	-	One Belt One Road
OIC	-	Organisation of the Islamic Co-operation
OPEC	-	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PLA	-	People's Liberation Army
PLO	-	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PoK	-	Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
PRC	-	People's Republic of China
PSLV	-	Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle
RAFAEL	-	Israel's Weapon Development Authority
RAW	-	Research and Analysis Wing
RPV	-	Remotely Piloted Vehicles
SAARC	-	The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAM	-	Surface to Air Missile
SCO	-	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

SIPRI	-	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UAE	-	United Arab Emirates
UAV	-	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UDHR	-	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UF	-	United Front
UK	-	United Kingdom
ULFA	-	United Liberation Front of Asom
UN	-	United Nations
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	-	United Nations Emergency Fund
UNFCCC	-	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	-	United Nations General Assembly
UNO	-	United Nations Organisation
UNOCHA	-	United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC	-	United Nations Security Council
UNSCOP	-	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
UPA	-	United Progressive Alliance
US	-	United States
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WFP	-	World Food Programme
WHO	-	World Health Organisation

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Analysis

In the dynamic world of international relations, nations strategically formulate policies and programme to engage actively with global community. These strategies are articulated through their foreign policies and diplomatic practices, which aims to maximise advantages within the international system (Mwale, 2022). A significant factor in this strategic process is placing emphasis on cultivating robust friendships with other nations (Morgan & Palmer, 2003, pp. 180-203). In addition to this, to achieve foreign policy objectives, the nations must possess a clear understanding of their vital interests, and upon which, they have to conduct a pragmatic assessment of available resources and alliances in fulfilling their national goals (Nuechterlein, 1976, pp.246-266). Therefore, the foreign policy, as aptly expressed by Gibson (1944) 'functions as a comprehensive and well-rounded plan, grounded in knowledge and experience, guiding governmental interactions' to achieve national interests (pp. 09-10). In every context, the national interest is the focal point of foreign policy which revolves around security and survival (Sharma, 2013). It encompassing the preservation of the nation's physical and political identity, coupled with aspirations for economic and technological ascendency (Thomas, 1961, pp. 184-85).

Even though, the foreign policy reflecting a nation's strategic objectives, diplomatic initiatives, and pursuit of national interest and priorities, it undergoes constant redesign, and adjustments to address the evolving challenge, internally and externally (Hermann, 1990, p.4). Therefore, rather than existing as a rigid framework, foreign policy of every national actor is shaped and influenced by multiple factors including 'geographical position, military preparedness, policy for economic development, national prestige, prevailing international order, ideology (particularly nationalism), and the mode of government' (Wazir &Wahdat, 2022, p. 46).

As pointed out earlier, ideology and mode of government have a deep impact on foreign policy operation. Unlike the totalitarian regimes, foreign policy operates with accountability in democratic systems, where decision-makers have to consider both domestic and global dynamics (Beasely & Kaarbo, 2014, pp.729-740). In addition, the electoral salience results in the careful selection of foreign policy choices by political leaders (Moon, 1985, pp. 297- 329). Furthermore, the ideologies of political parties, leadership, and their involvement in political process can influence the foreign policy (Levi, 1970, pp.01-31). Moreover, as noted by Wish (1980), the foreign policy framework incorporates the 'internal environments includes nation's interest groups, and competing elites' (p. 532). This general trend in foreign policy has undergone a shift during the Post- Cold War environment.

During the post-Cold War era, foreign policy choices of every nation were profoundly influenced by two potential factors:

(i)   The collapse of the Soviet Union, and

(ii)   The inauguration of the Globalisation (Brooks &Wolfforth, 2000).

Both these events reshaped the global power structure, national priorities, and economic and technological landscapes (Mazumdar, 2011, pp.165-182). Simultaneously, this shift also posed challenges to the human security, particularly in the domains of economic and strategic security of developing and underdeveloped nations, rendering foreign policy decision-making a complex and challenging task (Ianov, 2013, pp. 49-57). In addition, these dynamics also triggered some vital questions regarding 'human rights, civil liberties, protection of minorities, self-determination, an orderly world, international law, economic growth, free markets, privatisation, limits on environmental degradation, curtailment of the arms trade, and the prevention of the spread of advanced weapons' (Schlesinger, 1992, p. 18). These have a tremendous impact on foreign policy during the post- Cold War period.

Besides, the transformation in the ideological and military dynamics between United States (US) and the Soviet Union, a political and military landscape emerged, characterised by a 'unipolar system led by US' (Yilmaz, 2008, p. 44). Concurrently,

the global economic integration and the growing demand for technological collaboration resulted in new power dynamics, and within this framework, economic and strategic priorities gained precedence over ideological considerations (Relia et al., 2014, pp. 158-172). In this context of global restructuring - ideologically, politically, economically, and strategically - numerous questions about national security arose, significantly influencing foreign policy dimensions and leading to the formation of fresh alliances and partnerships (Muller, 2004. pp.609-631).

In response to the evolving international environment, every national actor felt compelled to redesign its foreign policy themes, aligning them with post- Cold War security landscape (Ikenberry, 2010, pp. 535-556). In this shift, even the Non-aligned national actors also began prioritising pragmatic concerns over previously held idealistic principles (Talbott, 1995, pp.7-10).This broader trend in post-Cold War foreign policy behaviour is also evident in case of India's approach to foreign policy regarding Israel.

1.2. Focus of the Study

India and West Asia have shared extensive interactions across economic and cultural domains (Wheeler, 1945, pp.85-103). However, with the advent of British colonialism in India and the subsequent political subjugation severed India's traditional ties with West Asia (Brunatti & Malone, 2009). During this period, the Jews were subjected to severe harassment in Europe and they attempted to establish a Zionist state in Palestine based on the Biblical claim of 'Promised Land' (Maoz, 2013, pp. 30-40). In the broader global context of concern over human sufferings and the anti-imperialistic ideology of Indian National Congress (INC), prominent Indian nationalist leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru expressed sympathy for the plight of the Jews under the Nazis in Europe (Blarel, 2015). Nevertheless, they maintained a negative stance towards establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine and seemed to overlook the historical links between Jews and their homeland (Abhayankar, 2012, p.7). Furthermore, Gandhi believed that the establishment of a state based on religious grounds, as pursued by the Zionist, contradicted his vision of non sectarian and inclusive society (Rao, 1972. p.19).

In connection with this, (Kumaraswamy (2010) states that the Arab-Israel issue was perceived by INC as a struggle between the nationalist Arabs and Zionist, supported by the British imperialism. This perception led to Indian hostility towards Zionist aspirations, characterising Israel as 'Western Implant' or 'an imperialist stooge' and 'an artificial creation' (p.1). Consequently, Indian leaders choose to provide ideological support to Arabs in their pursuit of establishing an Arab state in Palestine (Shimoni, 1977, p.51).The early animosity cultivated during the pre-independence period persisted for years, forming the basis of 'ideological constraint' in India-Israel relations (Ningthoujam, 2021, p.227). However, Israel persisted in its efforts to convince India of the Zionist cause of establishing a state in Palestine.

India's participation in the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) raised hopes of Zionist aspirations, and a shift in India's stance (Giant, 2004). Nevertheless, India vehemently opposed the partition plan proposed by the UN and casted a dissenting vote at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in November 1947(Rao, 1972). However, amidst of opposition, the state of Israel established on May 14, 1948. The newly formed nation actively sought international recognition, leading to diplomatic overtures to various countries, including India (Blarel, 2015, pp. 102-103). Despite sharing some historical commonalities, India adopted a policy of estrangement, citing electoral factors and financial constraints as reasons in establishing diplomatic relations with Israel (Rubinoff, 1995, p.490). Despite India's reluctance to forge diplomatic ties with Israel, the latter made attempts to convince India and modify its policy towards Israel.

However, India voted against Israel's UN admission in June 1949, it became a member of the UN with international support (Rubinoff, 1995). In the context of Israel's UN admission, as gesture of international recognition, India decided to grant de facto recognition to the state of Israel on September 1950 (Misra, 1961). Subsequently, in 1953, an Israeli Consulate was established in Bombay (now Mumbai). However, the Indian government placed significant limitations on the diplomatic functions of the Consulate until the opening of the Israeli embassy in

1992 (Inbar, 2017, p. 370). Considering this context, it referred as 'India's diplomatic Siberia' (Srivastava, 1970, p.245).

In spite of this policy of estrangement, it is worth noting that India was keen to include Israel in the Afro-Asian conference in 1955. Nevertheless, this initiative was dropped due to opposition from Pakistan and Arab states (Gerberg, 2008). Despite India's pro-Israeli sentiment in wider Afro-Asian collaboration, India condemned Israel's pre-determined attack against Egypt during the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 (Blarel, 2015-pp.130). However, irrespective of this contrary stance, instances of camouflaged cooperation were recorded, with Israel supplying military equipments upon India's demand during the wars with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965and 1971 (Kumaraswamy, 2010). Even though, the foreign policy stance of Nehru towards Israel recorded any improvement in apparent terms.

After Nehru, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi continued the Nehruvian policy of 'estrangement towards Israel' (Tripathy, 2013). During the non-Congress period under Prime Minister Morarji Desai, some pro-Israeli moves were expected, with the pro-Israeli Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) was also playing a part. However, these initiatives did not leave a profound impact (Gerberg, 2008, p.92). However, later, with the entry of Rajiv Gandhi to the Prime Ministership in 1984, some diplomatic moves, and cooperation were initiated to improve relation with Israel, but could not reach in the establishment of a diplomatic relations between the two countries (Dixit, 1998).

Indo-Israel relations experienced a significant upswing with the conclusion of the Cold War, prompting a shift in India's erstwhile policy towards Israel (Inbar, 2004). The evolving global dynamics necessitated India to redefine its stance towards Israel as part of comprehensive foreign policy reorientation. In this context, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao made the strategic decision to establish Diplomatic relation with Israel on January 29, 1992 (Sharma, 1992, p.593).This marked a pivotal moment in the trajectory of India- Israel relations, signalling a departure from historical patterns and setting the stage for a more robust and cooperative engagement. After the normalisation of relations between the two

countries, Israel has become a significant trading and strategic partner for India (Rajiv, 2016). Cooperation in the military-security arena and other areas has also grown significantly (Blank, 2005).

The political decline of the Congress party and the increasing influence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) paved the way for strengthening friendly relation with Israel (Inbar, 2017).When the BJP assumed power in May 2014, with Narendra Modi becoming the Prime Minister of India, it marked the beginning of a new era in Indo-Israeli relations charactarised by 'fresh dynamism, including symbolic breakthroughs and substantial progress' (Mohan, 2014, pp. 23-26). Focused on altering perceptions and realities of foreign relations imperatives, the Modi period represents a time of 'constructive engagement' (Kumar, 2017). Notably, he became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel, and this visit marked an unprecedented milestone in the relationship, elevating to greater heights (Gupta, 2017; Inbar, 2017).

The paradigm shift in Indian policy towards Israel marks a move away from a highly politicised approach, heavily influenced matter by the regional dynamics and domestic political considerations (Ningthoujam, 2021). This shift signifies a fundamental metamorphosis in India's foreign policy, entailing alterations in narratives, processes and envisioned outcomes, and a conscious and consistent departing from historical norms (Muni, 2016). The contemporary harmonisation of interests and engagements with Israel undoubtedly constitutes a departure from Nehruvian model (Pate, 2020). In the changing context, 'Israel occupies a unique place in the process of India's foreign policy making' (Sunilkumar, 2017, p. 38). This situation requires an explanation regarding the policy shift and its underlying reasons.

1.3. Statement of the Problem

Despite long standing historical ties with West Asia, India, after the establishment of the state of Israel, maintained a policy of embarrassment and estrangement. Although, India officially recognised Israel in1950, it desisted to establish full diplomatic relation with Israel for four decades. However, during this period of estrangement, some discreet diplomatic links were pursued under the guise

of national security, particularly amid conflicts with China and Pakistan. These clandestine engagements, often unfolding during times of war, occurred without any overt acknowledgement. However, the post-Cold War era witnessed a significant shift as India embarked on a transformative journey to redefine its bilateral relations with Israel. The relationship became more open and expansive, marked by collaboration in various domains and the formalisation of agreements through multiple Memorandums of Understandings (MoUs). However, with the entry of BJP led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the bilateral ties further strengthened, representing as a crucial turning point.

The disparities in interpreting this paradigm shift appear to generate perplexity among various stakeholders, leading to erroneous conclusions about the use of foreign policy as a tool for pursuing national interest. This research constitutes an enquiry into the evolution of India's Israel policy, examining its transformation in response to the dynamic global and regional security environment, evolving ideas and shifting leaderships. Moreover, the study seeks to provide a comprehensive explanation for this policy shift during the post-Cold War period, particularly within the context of the escalating security challenges confronting India in its geo- strategic landscape.

1.4. Research Questions

1. Did India and Israel have a history of notable conflicts or hostility in their past relationships?

2. What are the historical, ideological, and political factors shaping India's policy towards Israel?

3. What are the key security challenges that India confronted during the Cold War period and beyond?

4. What are the significant factors contributed to the policy shift towards Israel during the post-Cold War period?

5.   What specific areas of mutual security interest have driven convergence in bilateral relations between India and Israel in the post- Cold War landscape?

1.5. Objectives of Study

1.   To analyse the evolution of India-Israel relations, with a focus on examining the ideological and political perceptions that shaped this bilateral dynamic.

2.   To identify the domestic and international constraints that influenced the partnership between India and Israel.

3.   To elucidate the factors behind the paradigm shift in India-Israel relations during the post-Cold War period.

5.   To uncover the major areas of cooperation between India and Israel, and analyse their significance in India's security context.

1.6.   Hypotheses

1.   The trajectory of India's Israel policy has been predominantly been shaped by a complex interplay of historical, social, political and economic factors.

2.   The relationship between India and Israel has been significantly influenced by ideological and personal factors.

3.   The paradigm shift in India's relation with Israel is the result of international dynamics by the end of the Cold War along with regional geopolitical imperatives.

4.   The security challenges India confronted after the Cold War period had a significant impact on India's relation with Israel.

5.   The engagement with Israel has a significant role in enhancing the security of India.

1.7. Research Methodology

The thesis 'India-Israel Relations in the post- Cold War Era: An Analytical Study' is primarily a qualitative research. This research employs analytical and historical methods to examine the foreign policy stance of India towards Israel during the post- Cold War period. Various leaders and organisations influenced India's Israel policy and its formations and dynamism. Indian National Congress and the national leaders like M.K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru had great say on India's estrangement towards Israel. However, later Indian National Congress itself made the decision to establish diplomatic relation with Israel under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. It serves as a variable for analysis due to its role in shaping the policy trajectory, which initially deviated but eventually led to the decision to establish relations with Israel at the end of the Cold War.

Moreover, the analysis demands a meticulous historical reconstruction of the political and organisational elements, both domestic and international, spanning the Cold War and post-Cold War periods within India's foreign policy settings. Therefore, it requires an examination of ideological and personal stances, conditions, as well as independent and dependent variables that influenced the policy choices towards Israel during the Cold War era. In this context, historical analytical method applied as a reliable tool.

In addition, this study uses the Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis. The study primarily analyse various forms of primary data, such as treaties, reports, agreements, resolutions, and related documents from the Government of India and the State of Israel and various international organisations like United Nations (UN) and other regional international arrangements like Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) and the Arab League. This method serves as a major empirical tool utilised to analyse the arguments collected from archival research and comments made by the statesman and policy makers through their publications and interviews. Besides this approach also useful to derive conclusions by examining the debates which held in various bodies like Constituent Assembly and Union Parliament.

Furthermore, this approach tries to derive conclusions by scrutinising the resolutions of influential political parties shaping foreign policy. Besides, it also examines the debates held in the Indian Constituent Assembly and the Union Parliament. In addition, this approach is also finding as an appropriate tool because the study includes the foreign policies of Pakistan, United States, China, and the countries of Middle East.

In addition, this analysis takes an examination of India's national security challenges during the Cold War and post- Cold War periods. In this context, the statistical analysis is a tool employed to evaluate various factors like relative military strength, possession of resources, and their strategic positioning. By analysing trends through this data, the study aims to reveal the changes in power dynamics and the possible threats against India's security. Besides, this tool was also used to analyse Israel's strength and capabilities, technological advancements and volume of defence engagements.

1.8. Theoretical Framework

The shift from an estrangement policy during the Cold War period to closer engagement in the present foreign policy discussions of India, particularly in its Israel policy, raises the questions of general and specific nature. The behavioural shifts in Indian foreign policy towards Israel, from its formation to present, shows a series of contradictions. Therefore, a suitable theoretical framework is necessary to analyse India foreign policy in different political contexts. Besides, this relationship was influenced by intricate internal and external variables, along with contextual determinants. In this complex scenario, the multifaceted relationship between India and Israel since independence necessitates a more nuanced theoretical framework instead of a single comprehensive theory.

Therefore, to comprehensively analyse the bilateral relationship between India and Israel, it is essential to incorporate a range of International Relations theories in conjunction with historical description and narratives. This approach enables a deeper understanding of the diverse dimensions, and evolutionary stages

of their relationship. Consequently, the analysis will focus the following theoretical frameworks.

1. The Securitisation Theory

2. Theory of Defensive Realism

3. Rational Choice Theory

The chosen foundational analytical and explanatory framework for this research is Securitisation theory. This selection is driven by the inherent connection between foreign policy and bilateral relations, both deeply rooted in considerations of national security. National interest plays a crucial role in political contexts, shaping the formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of the nation. This dynamic framework involves various actors, and their interactions, and significantly influenced by the security challenges they face. Therefore, this study meticulously identifies and analyses these security challenges through the lens of securitisation theory in international relations.

The Copenhagen school, spearheaded by prominent figures like Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, has made substantial contributions to security studies (Stritzel, 2014). Securitisation theory serves as a conceptual framework, shedding light on the intricate process through which certain issues transform into security threats. It emphasises that national security policy is not inherent but rather a product of deliberate design by politicians and decision-makers (Buzan & Weaver, 2009, pp.253-276). In international relations and domestic politics, securitisation is the process of redefining regular political issues as security concerns, enabling state actors to use exceptional measures in the name of security (Buzan et al, 1998).

Securitisation theory focuses on the process through which specific issues or threats are constructed and designated as security problems. This process involves securitising the actors, who present the issue in a way that convinces the audience that immediate and extraordinary measures are necessary to address the perceived threats (Eroukhmanoff, 2018). Therefore, securitisation involves three major acts:

(i)   Identification of threats,

(ii)   Immediate action, and

(iii)   Effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan et al, 1996, p.06).

Charrett (2009) highlights three features of securitasation theory propounded by Copenhagen school as:

(i)   They adopt a sector-based perspective, categorising security threats into five interconnected sectors, including military, but also extending to environmental, economic, social, and political realms.

(ii)   Emphasise regional security studies, examining the interconnected dynamics within regions rather than solely focusing on individual states, which challenges the traditional state-centric approach, and

(iii)   Contributed significantly to a social constructivist view of security through their development of 'securitisation studies', which highlights the role of societal factors in shaping security perceptions (p.9).

The goal of securitisation studies is to gain a precise understanding of securitised issues, including what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and under what conditions (Buzan et al., 1998, p.32). Therefore, securitisation refers to a collective recognition of an existential threat, compelling an immediate and imperative response that may involve the implementation of extraordinary measures to mitigate threats.

The research provides a comprehensive examination of the India-Israel relationship, with a specific focus on the post-Cold War period and intricate security dimensions. The study aims to dissect diplomacy and foreign policy as strategic instruments in the pursuit of national security. The substantial shifts in global dynamics following the Cold War have given rise to a multitude of threats, both internal and external, challenging India's national security (Arunkumar & Sakthivel, 2017, pp.114-121). Consequently, the challenges to national security have

compelled India to reassess its foreign policy. This transformation can be effectively analysed through the lens of securitisation theory.

In addition to conventional security aspects associated with national interests, India's evolving foreign policy centered around the concept of human security (Parthasarathy, 2017, pp. 74-82). Throughout this period, Indian foreign policy has confronted diverse challenges, including sustainable development, poverty alleviation, water management, energy security, and the well-being of marginalised and indigenous populations, along with challenges from neighbouring states (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011, pp.87-104). Consequently, the national security has emerged as a focal point, influenced by factors such as climate change, energy shortage, health, and pandemics (Gupta, 2010, p.4).The analysis of this comprehensive dimension can be effectively undertaken through the application of securitisation theory.

Another pivotal facet of Indo-Israeli relations involves the securitisation of terrorism. Both countries have faced severe terrorist threats; India with incidents like the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and Israel grappling with terrorism from its geo strategic settings (Karmon, 2022). Framing terrorism as a security imperative has led to heightened collaboration in intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism strategies, and defence cooperation, facilitating joint efforts to tackle this common threat (Blarel, 2015).

Therefore, the strategic partnership between India and Israel can be elucidated by using securitisation theory. Both nations leverage this partnership to maintain regional equilibrium. India perceives Israel as an instrumental ally in counteracting Pakistan and China, while Israel regards India as a crucial partner in curbing Iran's regional aspirations (Pant, 2004). This mutual interest in stabilising regional power dynamics has solidified their security-oriented cooperation. Economic interests and diplomatic considerations also wield significant influence over the overall trajectory of the India-Israel relationship (Ningthoujam, 2021).

Another theory employed to elucidate India-Israel relations is the theory of Defensive Realism. This theory posits that states accumulate power to safeguard

themselves from perceived threats (Waltz, 1989, pp. 39- 45). Operating within the broader realist framework, it acknowledges the continuous power struggle among states in the absence of a global governing body, compelling them to amass sufficient power to deter potential aggressors (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). However, defensive realist argues that the costs of conquest often outweigh the benefits, advocating for defensive strategies in various international engagements (Golovicks, 2017, p.365). In this context a rational actor, prefer balance of power and better alliances to guarantee their survival in international system.

The theory of Defensive Realism offers a compelling framework to analyse Indo-Israeli relationships, asserting that states pursue power primarily for defence within an anarchic international system (Waltz, 1979). Within this framework, the security concerns of both countries, such as India's challenges with cross-border terrorism and Israel's regional adversaries, have propelled them to collaborate for enhanced security. Indo-Israel cooperation against common threats shows the idea of 'Balancing' in the theory of Defensive Realism. The collaboration between the two countries, including the transfer of arms and technology, also corresponds with the principles of this theory. This alliance contributes to regional stability and provides a defence against possible threats, as outlined in the theory's concept of 'collective defence.' The theory also highlights that economic interest and diplomacy play a significant role in the relation between the states (Kilic & Sheikh, 2018).

This analysis also utilises the Rational Choice Theory, it focused in the idea that states are unitary entities, and they act upon the influence of domestic factors (Waltz, 1979). This theory emphasises that the states are rational actors and make decisions targeted to maximising their interests. Therefore, at its core, the theory says that states act with strategic calculation, and at the same time evaluating the costs and benefits associated with various actions to achieving their self-interests (Axerlod, 1984). In addition, this theoretical framework has been applied to elucidate various phenomena within international politics, including the dynamic mechanisms of formation of alliances, the problems underlying the outbreak of conflicts, and the dynamics of diplomatic negotiations (Alden, 2017). Furthermore,

14

Rational Choice Theory provides a critical perspective on the utilisation of force in international affairs and the underlining logic that states pursue in their actions to maximise gains while minimising losses (Waltz, 2017).

Rational Choice Theory is a better option to clarify the reasons behind the growing collaboration between India and Israel. India collaborate withy Israel in various domains of security to strengthen the defence. Their economic ties, driven by a rational pursuit of growth, capitalise on complementary strengths in technology and agriculture. Besides, the geopolitical challenges prompt strategic alignment and enhancing regional maneuvering. During the post- Cold War security landscape, particularly in the context of the collapse of Soviet Union, Israel emerged as a rational choice to provide technological support, helping to fill the vacuum left by the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

1.9. Review of Literature

A review of the existing literature is a crucial aspect of this research project, serving several essential purposes. It aids in the development of a comprehensive understanding of behavioral patterns, identifies potential relationships between key concepts, clarifies the definitions of these concepts, identifies data sources, assists in formulating alternative research designs, and explores the connections between the current research and previous works (Nair, 2004, p. 23). Regarding the specific topic on Indo-Israel relations, the literature reveals that there has been limited historical analysis of Indo-Israel relations. Most of the early literature concentrates on Israel's efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Asian countries in general. However, the strategic and bilateral relationship between India and Israel gained significant attention after the post-Cold War period, leading to a substantial body of literature focusing on this topic.

The foreign choices are always revolves around the national interest, which is examined by Joseph Frankel (1970) through his book, *'National Interest'*. He includes aspects like national security, economic well-being, and moral values in the scope of national interest. He articulates the dynamic nature of foreign policy as a strategic instrument seeking optimal advantages within the external environment.

However, Ganapathi (2017) through his *'Contours of India's Foreign Policy-An Overview'* observes the influence of the historical, idealistic and cultural themes of national interest, which are having greater influence on the foreign policy.

As the part of protecting the national interest, the Indian National Congress, the driving force of Indian national movement, started to frame its foreign policy principles during the British period itself. Appadorai (1981) in '*Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy'* stands as a pioneering and influential work in the realm of Indian foreign policy evolution. He analyses the intricate relationship between domestic factors and India's external relations, asserting that these internal considerations significantly shape the trajectory of the country's foreign policy. This work gives an insight on India's colonial history and nationalism and the emergence of Indian foreign policy. Besides, Dalmia and Malone (2012) in, *'Historical Influences on India's Foreign Policy,'* and Dubey (2016) in *'India's Foreign Policy'* also gives a picture of evolution of India's foreign policy in different time periods.

Sen (1949) in *'India's foreign policy'* gives a picture of the post-independence foreign policy formation of India, and economic and human security challenges due to the British imperialist policies. Tharoor (2017) in '*Inglorious Empire: What the British did to India'* also gives the picture of economic hardships of British imperialism upon Indian economy and society.

During the context of Cold War, India opted for a foreign policy choice rooted in Non-alignment. Abraham (2008) in '*From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-65'* sheds new light on India's Non-alignment strategy in the early stages of the Cold War by emphasising the intricate interactions between contingent political factors and ideological commitment. Bandyopadhyaya (1977) in *'The Non-Aligned Movement and International Relations'* effectively captures the historical context and principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, its weakness, later developments and challenges. However, Gopal (1991) through his *'Relevance of Non-alignment'* gives the institutional weaknesses of the organisation and its relevance in the post- Cold War context.

Vasudevan (1983) in '***Prospects for Non –Alignment: India's Role'*** and Sharma (1989) in '***Nehru's World-view: An Alternative to the Superpowers' Model of International Relations'*** also analyse the India's policy of Non- alignment.

In navigating the intricacies of evolving global dynamics, Indian foreign policy framework, as Khanna (2012) in **'*Foreign Policy of India*,**' is analysed as it rooted in ideological pillars such as anti-colonialism, solidarity with Asian nations, and a commitment to global peace and security. Konwer (2018) in, ***'Hallmarks of Current Indian Foreign Policy'*** and Power (1964) in his work, ***'Indian Foreign Policy: The Age of Nehru,*** ' also examines the ideological factors of India's foreign policy.

Singh (2008), in ***'Emerging Frontiers of India's Foreign Policy*,' and Tripathi (2013) in **'*India's Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Scenario*,' provides a picture of the challenges, of India in the post-Cold War regional and global landscape. Both scholars emphasises the role of security imperatives in influencing India's foreign policy choices. The security imperatives of the post-Cold War period is also analysed by Jindal (2002) in '***Changing Dimensions of National Security'***. Singh (2015) in ***'India's Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century: Shifting Paradigm,*** ' highlights the factors for departure from the traditional Non-aligned policy to a more pragmatic oriented approach.

Kidwai (1992) in ***'India's Security in Post-Cold War World'*** highlights the transformations in global security dynamics including new challenges like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental degradation. Deshpande (2023) through '***China's Belt and Road initiative with likely implications for India and the world'*** and Gorawantschy & Bohme (2010) in ***'India: Internal and External Security - Current Challenges to the Government'*** also examines the geo-security landscape of India in its foreign policy choice. Arunkumar & Sakthivel (2017) in ***'Challenges to National Security in India'*** examines the internal, external, and non-traditional challenges. They also highlight the internal security threats like insurgency and separatism.

Dahiya & Behuria (2012) in *'India's Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades,'* give the other factors like the neighborhood, and instability in the Af-Pak region, anti-India sentiments, illegal migration, and climate change that affect India's security, and foreign policy. Pant & Bommakanti (2019) in, *'India's national security challenge,'* also reminds about porous border security and maritime threats.

Khobragade (2015) in his *'India's Engagement with the World'* comprehensively explores India's foreign policy since independence, analysing its interactions with major powers, regional organisations, and the developing world. It elucidates India's leadership in regional organisations like SAARC and BIMSTEC, and contributions to South-South cooperation, and provides an understanding of India's multifaceted global role in the changing context.

Therefore, in the changing post-Cold War security scenario, India was compelled refresh its relation with global powers. As part of this foreign policy redesigning, India revised its relation with Israel. Though India had no cause of contention between India and Israel, the relations between the two displayed full of estrangement. Ahmad (1969) in his '*Indo-Arab Relations'*, stands as a comprehensive exploration of the historical, cultural, and political connections between India and the Arab world. He traces the roots of this relationship to the pre-colonial era, highlighting shared cultural and commercial exchanges. His analysis extends into the colonial and post-colonial periods, where he examines the impact of British rule on Indo-Arab relations.

Misra (2019) in *'Looking West: India's Relations with West Asia'* also stands as a comprehensive analysis of India's dynamic relationship with this strategically crucial region. He provides an understanding of the multifaceted dimensions encompassing political, economic, cultural, and security aspects, and the historical roots of Indo-West Asian relations. However, during the period of India's nationalist struggle, its leaders developed an anti- Zionist stance. Jansen (1971) in his, '*Zionism, Israel, and Asian Nationalism'* observes the intricate relationship between Zionism, Israel, and Asian nationalist movements in the 20th century. He

says that many Asian nationalists perceived Zionism as a form of European colonialism, influencing the development of relations between Israel and Asian countries. Indian national leaders towards Zionism and its effort to establish a state in Palestine also held the same view.

Shimoni (1977) in his, *'Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Jews: A Formative Factor in India's Policy towards Israel'* gives an analysis of the Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy and his stance on Zionism and Israel. Srivastava (1970) in *'India-Israel Relations'* gives a picture of India's initial ideological hesitations and non-recognition policy towards Israel. Prasad (1960) through *'The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and World Affairs, 1885-1947'*, tracing the trajectory from the late 19th century to India's independence. He analyses the domestic and international factors, behind the evolution of Indian foreign policy. Naaz (2005) in '*West Asia and India: Changing Perspectives'* also provides a comprehensive and insightful analysis of the dynamic relationship between India and the West Asian region.

Nicholas Blarel (2015) in his work '*The Evolution of India's Israel Policy: Continuity, Change, and Compromise since 1922'* gives insights into the diplomatic efforts of Israel and provides a detailed analysis of India's policy towards Israel. Kumaraswamy (1995) in *'India's Recognition of Israel, September 1950'* also provides valuable insights into the complex factors behind India's decision to recognise Israel. Gerberg (2008) in '*The Changing Nature of Israeli-Indian Relations (1948-2005)'* traces the historical trajectory of Indo-Israel relations, and strategic convergence. He emphasises domestic and international factors and the influence of India's Muslim minority on India's Israel policy. In *'Dynamics of Diplomacy Delayed: India and Israel'* by Nair (2014) gives a profound exploration of the intricate and evolving relationship between India and Israel.

Rubinoff (1995) in his article, *'Normalisation of India-Israel Relations: Stillborn for Forty Years'* examines that the normalisation of relations remained elusive for decades, due to India's unwavering support for the Palestinian cause. Abhayankar (2012) in his work, *'The Evolution and Future of Indo-Israel*

Relations', highlights shared strategic and economic interests as crucial elements fostering the bond between India and Israel. Kumaraswamy (2004) through ***'Israel-India Relations: Seeking Balance and Realism'*** outlines the evolving cooperation in defence, trade, and technology between the two nations. Ghosal (2016) in ***'Strategic Hyphenation between India and Israel: The Major Areas of Cooperation and Constraints'*** provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolving post-Cold War shift, shared security concerns.

In ***'My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary'***, Dixit (1996) provides an account of India's foreign policy from 1986 to 1991. He emphasises the significance of economic diplomacy in India's foreign relations and highlights the need for regional stability and multilateral cooperation. Baba (2008) in ***'OIC and Pakistan's Foreign Policy: The Indian Dimension'*** gives a picture of the relationship between the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Pakistan's foreign policy, and its implications for India-Pakistan relations. Nicolas Blarel's article, '***Assessing US Influence over India–Israel Relations: A Difficult Equation to Balance?'*** (2017) provides an analysis of the relationship between the United States, India, and Israel. Blarel observes the US influences the India-Israel relations. Menon & Pandey (2015), in their book, ***'An Axis of Democracy? The Uncertain Future of Israeli-Indian Relations,'*** examines the delicate balancing between Israel and the Arab world.

Browne (2017) in ***'A Perspective on India-Israel Defence and Security Ties'***, examines of the India-Israel defence and security relationship, he highlights its robust and expanding nature, emphasising a convergence of interests encompassing security, counter-terrorism, and economic cooperation. Despite this positive trajectory, Browne astutely identifies significant constraints, including India's domestic political considerations, its ties with the Arab world, and the enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The key findings underscore the strength of the bilateral defense and security cooperation, setting a positive tone for future growth.

Inbar and Ningthoujam, in their paper (2012), ***'Indo-Israeli Defence Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century,'*** offer a thorough examination of the

evolving defence cooperation between India and Israel. Samuel and Rajiv (2016) in *'India-Israel: Contours of the Strategic Partnership,'* gives an analysis of expanding strategic partnership in the domains of security, counterterrorism, and economic collaboration. Rubin (2017) in his *'Israel's defence industries-an overview'* comprehensively gives a picture of Israel's defence industries strengths, its innovative prowess, and role in global defense supply chain.

The book titled *'India, Israel, and the Jewish People: Looking Ahead, Looking Back 25 Years after Normalization'* written by S. S. Wald and A. Kandel in 2017, stands as a significant anthropological exploration. Its core subject is the historical narrative of Jewish communities in India, delving deep into their past, culture, and social dynamics within India, followed by their migration to Israel.

Tanvi Pate (2020) in his article, '*Re-(Modi)fying India's Israel Policy',* provides a picture of the transformation in India's relationship with Israel under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Puthanpurayil (2020), in his work '*Shifting Trajectory in India-Israel Relations under Modi,'* also offers a comprehensive analysis of the factors contributing to the notable rapprochement between the India and Israel. Kaura (2018), in *'Modi Is Coming to Jerusalem,'* presents a thorough examination of the historic visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Israel. Kumaraswamy (2023), in the article *'Indo-Israel Relations: Changes under Narendra Modi,'* highlights the significant transformation in diplomatic ties between India and Israel during Prime Minister Modi's tenure.

The collection of literature offers a comprehensive view of the complex and evolving dynamics that have shaped the relationship between India and Israel. It examines the historical foundations, changes in policies, major areas of cooperation, and potential challenges in the security landscape. Furthermore, the literature provides an insight into the intricate interplay of various factors, including ideology; domestic politics, regional complexities, and global geopolitics, all of which have significantly influenced India's approach to Israel. These aspects enhance our understanding of the multifaceted interactions within this international partnership. Even though, this literature contributes invaluable resources and enriching analyses,

it does not pay adequate attention to recent developments and emerging dimensions in Indo-Israel relations.

1.10. Research Gap

The review of literature has examined several prominent works related to strategic Indo - Israel engagements. Though there are abundance of literature on Indo-Israel relations in general, only a limited analysis directly addresses the security aspect of Indo-Israel bilateral relationship. Although the existing literature appropriately highlights shared historical backgrounds, they tend to place more emphasis on ideological and personal factors shaping Indo-Israel foreign policy.

A more in depth exploration of the strategic imperative, including an analysis of the threat landscape in India and how it aligns with Israel's capabilities, could provide a fresh perspective on the foundation of India-Israel relations. A notable research gap in the current literature is the limited exploration of the security dynamics in India as a catalyst for its engagement with Israel. This study aims to address this gap by examining the nature of the strategic aspects of Indo-Israel relations at various levels. Exploring this research avenue may provide valuable insights into the driving forces behind this partnership and contribute to enriching the existing body of knowledge on the topic.

1.11. Chapterisation

The study is structured into eight chapters, including an introduction and recommendations. In Chapter 1, serves as the **introduction**, presents the outline of the problem and also provides a concise overview of Indo-Israeli relations, both in the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras. It raises the significant research questions and proposing five hypotheses that will guide the study. Moreover, this chapter presents a succinct explanation of the theoretical framework employed in the research, with a particular emphasis on the securitisation aspect spanning across multiple dimensions of security. More, it gives a comprehensive review of literature, and the methodology employed in the analysis and the significant limitations of the study.

Chapter 2, titled '**Changing Contours of Indian foreign policy: An Analysis'** offers an insight into the fundamental foreign policy objectives of India. It also analyses the evolving nature of Indian foreign policy during the post- Cold War period and the emerging trends in Indian foreign policy within the transformed geopolitical security landscape, leading to the formation of fresh engagements by setting aside traditional ideological compulsions on foreign policy.

Chapter 3, titled, **'Emerging Security Challenges: India's National Security Beyond Cold-War'** examines the multidimensional security challenges that India encounters in the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape and its domestic imperatives. It also explores various security challenges presented by neighbouring countries and analyses their relative security strength in posing threats to India. Besides, the chapter seeks to point out the internal security challenges stemming from the reorientation of the global power structure after the Cold War, leading to engage with Israel through multiple security arrangements.

Chapter 4, titled '**Indo-Israel Relations: From Estrangement to Engagement'** offers a comprehensive analysis of the historical dynamics between India Israel, from the pre-independence era to normalisation of relations in January 1992. This chapter gives a picture of the different factors that influenced Indo-Israel relations, particularly, ideological, personal and organisational. Besides, it provides an insight into the socio-political and security environment of India, and throwing light on factors played a pivotal role in policy shift.

Chapter 5, titled **'India-Israel Post-Cold War Engagements: Adapting Emerging Realities,'** analyses the factors that influenced India's approach to Israel in the post-Cold War era and contributed to a policy shift. The chapter also examines Israel's technological advancements and excellence in various security areas, including the military, surveillance, space, medical, energy, agriculture, and related areas. Additionally, it also scrutinises the changing domestic political landscape in India, and the decreasing ideological hesitation in India's relations with Israel. The changing attitudes of Arab states toward Israel and the rise of pro-Israeli BJP in India are also explored as factors to the strengthening of bilateral ties.

Chapter 6, titled, '**Security Synergy between India and Israel during the Post-Cold War Period',** offers an exclusive analysis of the bilateral relationship between India and Israel, focusing on a wide spectrum of mutual interests. It also examines the bilateral engagements in various critical domains, including military security, ocean security, space security, food security, environmental security, health and energy security. Besides, it also provides a picture of commercial cooperation and people to people contacts. Within the context of India's evolving political landscape, the chapter examines the increasing alignment and convergence between the two nations in diverse security arenas.

Chapter 7 is the concluding part of the study with an overview of the comprehensive analysis, and in which the observations and findings are also included. This overview discusses how this study contributes to the border theoretical domain of international politics and diplomacy, offering insights and genaeralisations.

Chapter 8 provides policy recommendations and suggests areas for further research regarding the expansive nature of Indo-Israel relations. The focus is on understanding and formalising the systematic processes that govern their bilateral interactions. This includes a specific emphasis on exploring the diverse informal aspects of their multifaceted diplomatic ties. Additionally, the chapter highlights the importance of securitising India in the evolving global context.

1.12. Limitations of study

The study attempted to offer a new perspective on India-Israel relations, moving beyond traditional examinations of bilateral ties between the two nations. It seeks to explore the potential security implications embedded within this relationship, covering a period from 1992 to 2022. However, an attempt was made to analyse the policy constraints and their evolution, tracing back to India's pre-independence period. The primary objective of this is to illuminate the pivotal linkages that underpin Indo-Israel bilateral relationship, providing a comprehensive understanding of the intricate web of interactions.

Throughout the analysis, a concerted effort was made to explore the multifaceted strategic imperatives that have played a pivotal role in shaping the relationship between India and Israel. However, it is essential to acknowledge certain inherent limitations in this research. These limitations stem from the analysis of various agreements and historical documents, which form the primary sources of this investigation. Some of these documents remain classified as confidential or unreleased for research purposes, as the respective governments have chosen not to disclose them. This constraint places specific boundaries on the scope of our study, limiting access to crucial primary sources.

Moreover, the Indo-Israel relations were influenced by various ideological factors and the foreign policy stances of different actors, both national and international. To comprehensively analyse these aspects, it is imperative to consider the broader spectrum of influences. However, this study was confined to the securitisation aspect only. Nonetheless, within these acknowledged limitations, a conscientious attempt is made to provide a thorough analysis that sheds light on the evolving dynamics of India-Israel relations.

CHAPTER 2

CHANGING CONTOURS OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: AN ANALYSIS

2.1. Introduction

Nations, during its interaction with complex international process, employ different strategic standpoints through their foreign policy to attain maximum advantages. These policies are framed, usually, as a response to the dynamic domestic and external feedbacks (Nair, 2004, p. 16). Therefore, the foreign policy strategies that are developed and applied in a specific international context, by an actor, may not be appropriate for other unpredictable situations (Lebo & Moore, 2003, pp.21-22). Consequently, in the dynamic international political, economic and technological landscape, national actors are compelled to continually re-define and rejuvenate their foreign policy (Clark & Reed, 2005, pp. 609-624).

However, in this process of diplomatic updating, certain historical, idealistic, and cultural themes that shaped the foundations of nation intermittently appear in foreign policy framework (Ganapathi, 2017, pp. 42-43). Nevertheless, the foreign policy choices revolve around the pursuit of 'national interests' and are inherently embedded with national security (Nuechterlein, 1976, pp. 246-266). During the post-Cold War period, Indian foreign policy, as is the case of every global actor, has also undergone a significant transformation to adapt evolving dynamics of international environment (Mitra & Schottli, 2007, pp.19-34). This chapter is an analysis of changing foreign policy behaviour of India from independence period to 2022.

2.2. National Interest and Foreign Policy

National interest is the heart of the foreign policy, through which nations engage in international interactions. It consistently reflects national commitment, aspirations, and standards of conduct, extending beyond superficial interactions with international entities (Raja, 2019). Miskel (2002) identifies national interest as a 'tangible power and sphere of influence relative to other states', it also considering

intangible variables like 'human rights, economic well-being and the health' of its citizens (p.97). Besides, it encompasses 'economic, political, military and ideological factors essential for a state's survival and security' (Ebegbulem, 2010, p.138). The national interest is expressed and pursued by the national actors through their foreign policy, which are adaptive to the dynamics of time, place and location (Lebo & Moore, 2003). Consequently, the foreign policy as a means to protect the national interest is 'intricately designed and managed on the basis of well-defined principles that guide the nations in navigating the complex and conflictual international landscape' (Frankel, 1970, pp. 16-17).

National interest and foreign policy are interlinked, as expressed in the views of Rhodes (1933), who says that foreign policy framework, 'involves the formulation and implementation of a group of principles which shape the behavioural pattern of a state while negotiating or contracting with other states to protect or further its vital interests' (p. 513). Rosenau (1968) also views foreign policy as the vital interests decided by 'constitutionally authorised dignitaries of a state to maintain the state of affairs in international system in tune with objectives they have chosen' (p.222). However, Holsti (1967) view foreign policy as a 'political act in which the influence of the external environment and domestic conditions plays a role in the formulation and implementation' (p.21).

This was further elaborated by Waltz (1996) when he posited that, 'the development of foreign policy strategies and postures are influenced by a complex interplay of national values, international goals, moral and ethical considerations, spiritual ideas, historical context, customs, culture, and public sentiments' (pp. 54-57). These factors can originate from both domestic and international settings, which are compiled in the chart below:

Figure 2.1

Foreign Policy Determinants

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                      FOREIGN POLICY                          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
        ⇑                   ⇑                      ⇑
┌───────────────┐   ┌───────────────┐   ┌──────────────────────┐
│ Foundational  │   │ Macro and Micro│  │ External Structural  │
│ Principles/   │   │ Domestic       │  │ and Ideological      │
│ Ideas         │   │ Settings       │  │ Settings             │
└───────────────┘   └───────────────┘   └──────────────────────┘
```

Compiled by the Researcher from different sources.

The foundational settings of foreign policy could be crafted or evolved based on idealistic and historical ethos that has shaped the evolution of a Nation state (Brands & Suri, 2016). The macro and micro setting encompasses the socio-political and economic environment in which these policies are formulated. The external environment denotes the outer context in which these policies are applied and continually adjusted in response to feedback (Bindra, 2019, pp. 26-43). In adapting foreign policy to navigate changing global security dynamics, certain elements of ideological and historical considerations may be apparent (Gimba & Ibrahim, 2018, pp.119-130). These considerations are the result of the feedback of external actors and international organisations and multilateral forums. In this context, Bindra (2019) observes that, 'at the foreign policy level, the influences of the past and the present can clash, co-exist, and merge' (p. 43).

After considering the dynamic environmental aspect of the international system, Morgenthau (1968) emphasises the crucial role of foreign policy in 'forging and breaking alliances' to safeguard the national interest. He underscores that 'realist motives and associated benefits, rather than emotions', drive nations to establish and dissolve partnerships. These alliances function as a means to preserve 'a nation's physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations' (p.86). Therefore, foreign policy assumes a 'crisp, clear, and objective nature, focusing on what is in the best interest of a nation in its interactions with other sovereign states' (Marleku, 2013, p. 415).

Therefore, foreign policy functions as a vision, protects national interest and are designed to ensure the security of the nation. These security considerations, including 'economic, political, military and ideological' aspects, significantly influence and shape the principles of foreign policy (Buzan et al., 1997). This perspective is reflected in the formulation of foreign policies of global actors during the transformative post- Cold War period.

2.3. Foreign Policy: Changing Framework

Foreign policy, being a tool of national interest, adapted in response to the existing security landscape. Its goal is to achieve 'possession goals and milieu goals'[1] through the synergy of external and domestic variables (Moon, 1985, pp. 297-329). Through the comprehensive assessment of these variables, the strategies and methodologies of foreign policies are meticulously crafted. However, there are external and internal influences on the foreign policy (Herman, 1990, pp.03-21). The external influences contributing to foreign policy include the international power structure, alliances, international organisations, military capability and international law (Gimba & Ibrahim, 2018). Simultaneously, a nation's domestic environment significantly guided foreign policy inclinations, encompassing 'cultural and historical milieu, geography, demographic factors, economic capability and resources, technological advancements, strategic positioning, and the nature of political system' (Vandana, 1996, p. 135).

During the Cold War period, the foreign policy orientations underwent a profound transformation, significantly influenced by the personality traits of national leaders (Richter, 1992, pp.271-301). According to Hermann and Hagan (1998) 'decision-making during this period was driven by the concept of leadership, emphasising the role of individuals rather than abstract state entities' (pp, 124-137). This influence encompassed cognitive processes, background, individual characteristics, motives, and beliefs (Smith, 2012, Para, 01). This approach extended to shaping the national security paradigms, where personality factors played a decisive role in determining the predominant national ideologies that, in turn, guided the national behaviour.

The foreign policy paradigm emerged during the Cold War era again underwent a transformative evolution in response to the global and regional security dynamics of Post-Cold War landscape, and it marked a profound shift in both structural and ideological dimensions of global politics (Gaddis, 1992, pp. 5-58). As traditional ideological ethos waned in influence, nations found themselves in struggle with their foreign policy compulsions, setting aside established norms to align with the evolving international circumstances (Kramer, 1999, pp. 539-576). Consequently, nations recognise the imperative need to re-evaluate their foreign policy strategies in response to the power dynamics and the growing interconnectivity within the emerging multipolar world.

The Post-Cold War era presents a more complex landscape, where factors beyond the personalities and traits of leaders play a pivotal role in shaping foreign policy. Notably, the nature and ideology of political parties, the influence of interest groups, the media, and public opinion exert substantial influence over foreign policy pronouncements (Gimba & Ibrahim, 2018). In the changing context, Stengel & Baumann (2017) highlight that 'foreign policy interactions have expanded beyond state actors to include non-state actors, and these non-state entities now possess the capacity to significantly influence and shape national interests' (pp. 492-493). Furthermore, during the post-Cold War era, the impact of economic considerations on foreign policy decisions and the dominant role played by economic parameters in shaping the course of action for international actors serves as a crucial means to achieve overarching national security goals (Friedberg, 1991, pp. 265-276).

In the light of the significant changes during the post-Cold War era, the relationship between national interest and foreign policy objectives is illustrated in the chart below.

Figure 2.2

Changing Foreign Policy Goals

Development and FDI	Transfer of Technology	Supporting to Global Peace	National Image and Capability

DIPLOMACY AND ALLIANCES

NATIONAL SECURITY

NATIONAL INTEREST

FOREIGN POLICY

Compiled by the Researcher.

The chart illustrates a notable shift toward prioritising economic security by fostering increased economic collaboration and facilitating transfer of technology. Besides, it displays that the foreign policy and national interest are interlinked aiming to safeguard national security through the diplomacy and alliances. The evolving foreign policy signifies a growing emphasis on economic and technological importance, contributing to global peace and upholding national image.

Since the 1980s, there has been a major focus on economic and technological aspect in international relations as a decisive factor in determining national power

(Contractor & Sagafi Nejad, 1981, pp.113-135). This shift reflects a departure from the previously ideological and person-oriented approach of foreign policy. The current approach aims at establishing a more objective and universal foreign policy framework, ensuring that all stakeholders to receive equal participation in global interactions through foreign policy initiatives, with a shared vision for building a future centered on global peace and security (Lahneman, 2003, pp. 97-111). This posture is also applicable to Indian foreign policy, which is undergoing a transformative stage in the post-Cold War period to gain greater acceptance on international political landscape (Ganapathi, 2017).

2.4. Postures of Indian Foreign Policy

Jawaharlal Nehru, the chief architect of Indian foreign policy and its inaugural Prime Minister, who also assumed the role of Foreign Minister, articulated a guiding principle that 'the art of conducting foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country'[2]. Therefore, Nehru's approach to foreign policy was rooted in the core tenet of reconciling national interests through diplomatic collaboration with other nations (Dethe, 2018, p. 1237). As a staunch nationalist and proponent of a unified humanity within a co-operative international framework, Nehru envisaged an ideal international system characterised by the concept of 'one world' (Khanna, 2012, p. 28). This vision underscored India's commitment to seeking diplomatic solutions that aligned with its national interest while fostering international cooperation and unity.

In this context, Nehruvian foreign policy approach centered around 'avoiding involvement in global power struggles and condemning war as an outdated, futile, and inconsistent action against humanity' (Nair, 2004). Consequently, India proposed to stay away from power politics, believing that such politics had led to two World Wars and might again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale (Pant, 1989). Therefore, India 'sought no domination over others and claimed no privileged position over other people'[3]. Though India confronted several national security challenges during the post- Independence period, instead of engaging in power games, India advocated for the human security and economic development in an

atmosphere of global peace (Sen, 1949, pp.32-40). Therefore, its primary criteria while framing the foreign policy focused on 'eradicating poverty, ensure peace and security, and promote domestic transformation' (Dio, 2016). This view underscored India's commitment to prioritising not only its own development but also contributing to global stability and socio-economic progress through a principled and Non-aligned foreign policy (Raghavan, 2017, pp. 326-341).

With a strong emphasis on nation-building and ensuring the higher level of national security, India conceived and developed its post-independence foreign policy (Engelmeier, 2009). Nehru was conscious of domestic challenges and international political situations that could influence Indian foreign policy (Nair, 2004, pp. 30-31). Therefore, India formulated its foreign policy posture, while considering its diversified socio-cultural subsystems. In this context, it was also compelled to preserve certain cultural norms during its foreign policy discussions with other states (Hameed, 2009, pp. 62-76). Thus, during the early period of independence, Indian foreign policy priorities were influenced by idealistic and domestic imperatives, with a primary focus on upholding social, economic and strategic security (Dalmia & Malone, 2012, pp.1029-1049).

The Nehruvian rationale posited that achieving national security goals required a positive global political environment (Nair, 2004, p.36). Consequently, India aimed to re-structure the existing world order democratically, and in which India wanted to find a stable position, economically, politically and strategically (Rauch, 2008, p. 6). Therefore, the post-independent foreign policy priorities focused on building and enhancing the nation's capabilities through economic development, strengthening the social fabric to ensure the well-being of the people, and upholding national sovereignty and integrity (Appadorai, 1981, p.15). In the environment of Cold war, India supported the organisational framework of Non-Alignment to realise these objectives (Raghavan, 2017). This added an ideological foundation to Indian foreign policy in its global interaction during the immediate post-independence context.

This foundation underwent recalibration during the post-Cold War global landscape to effectively address to emerging responsibilities and challenges (Singh, 2008, pp. 27-39). Such a transformation is rooted in India's recognition of its 'national imperatives and the aspiration to establish itself as a prominent power in the Asian region' (Kumar, 2010, p.102). Therefore, the transition from its idealistic approach during the Cold War period to post-Cold War era viewed as a more pragmatic '*realpolitik*' stance in foreign policy (Sen, 2016, pp. 9-21). The evolution of Indian foreign policy intricately connected with global and regional dynamics, serving as a cornerstone that shapes and influences diplomatic strategies. A comprehensive analysis of this can be possible only through both global and regional perspectives.

2.4.1. Global Posture: Cautious Approach

Immediately after independence, as a newly established nation, India recognised the need for cautious foreign policy measures in the emerging bipolar world with the aim of safeguarding and fortifying its sovereignty and strategic interests (Sharma, 1989, pp. 324-332).The transformation brought about by the World War II (1939-1945) and the subsequent dismantling of the colonial system gave way for the emergence of numerous independent Afro-Asian countries (Bartlett, 1960, pp.105-111). Furthermore, the inauguration of the Cold War and the consolidation of the Socialist bloc under Soviet Union, in opposition to United States' power alliance, significantly shifted global power dynamics and has tremendously shaped India's foreign policy stance (Deshpande, 2022). In this context, India has adopted a balanced foreign policy approach with the aim of maximising opportunities to ensure domestic and national security.

Besides, Nehru exhibited strong resentment against power politics, colonialism and imperialistic practices (Bhatia, 1990, pp.106-108). He recognised India's potential to emerge as a significant global power, leveraging its abundant resources and human capital, not just in Asia but world wide (Sharma, 1989). Therefore, India adopted a shrewd diplomatic approach to protect the national interest without aligning with any power blocs (Damodaran, 1983, pp. 41-49). In

addition, Nehru believed that India had the 'potential to emerge as the fourth major global power, alongside the United States, USSR and China, while upholding its autonomy and independence' (Nair, 2004, p.37). This approach of Nehru strengthened India's realistic ambitions and its actions toward the consolidation of the alternative policy of Non- alignment.

The central objective of foreign policy during its post-independence period was to redefine India's identity and liberate itself from the lingering effects of colonialism (Lodhi, 2004, pp.118-124). This policy was initiated in the backdrop of India's colonial past, which had inflicted severe damage on its economy, resulting in a notable decline in India's global wealth share, from thirty percent in the eighteenth century to less than three percent on 1947 (Tharoor, 2017). The British policies inflicted a significant negative impact on Indian industries, trade, and agriculture, leading to a substantial decline in India's global share and adversely affected socio-economic security (Chandra, 1991, pp.81-167).

Therefore, taking into account the subsequent challenges of famine and socio-political instability, Nehru made crucial decisions regarding the tenets of Indian foreign policy (Patnaik, 2014, pp.13-35; Haque, 2017). In this context, India assumed a leading role in the movement of Non-alignment, aiming to ensure collective security while representing the aspirations of developing nations and countering bi-polar dynamics (Mahapatra, 2022). Through this alternative approach, India successfully reshaped its relationships with both superpowers and countries in the Afro-Asian regions, and 'uniting decolonised nations together, through fostering cooperation towards shared political, economic, and social objectives' (Rauch, 2008, p. 4).

In addition, India's internal security concerns, including economic underdevelopment and the repercussions of partition, its domestic socio-political realities, historical traditions, and the enduring presence of Pakistan as an ongoing adversary had a significant impact on its foreign policy framework (Sikri, 2017). Furthermore, as a prominent representative of the third world, India recognised the significance of addressing food security and the pressing requirements for basic

necessities of recently decolonised nations (Bhatia, 1984, pp. 46-56). In pursuit of this objective, India aimed to re-align its policy decisions to give precedence to national security and to pursue pragmatic aspirations that aligned with its evolving global position.

2.4.2. Regional Posture: Policy of Co-existence

In its regional approach, during the Cold War, despite grappling with security threats of both strategic and ideological nature, India had the option of joining the Western alliance to counter them. However, India refrained from such move, considering the possible alienation of the USSR and the enmity of China (Nair, 2004, p. 38). India believed that such an alliance would have entailed mutual obligations and could have compromised the fundamental tenets of 'free and independent foreign policy' (Mudium, 1994, p. 22). Due to India's 'substantial size, abundant human resources, and strategic location at the intersection of Western, Northern, Eastern, and South East Asia, it has assumed a distinct position and responsibility towards Asia' (Tanchum, 2016, p. 418). Therefore, in its regional approach, India's foreign policy initiatives are guided by the core principle and a dedicated commitment to Asian solidarity. However, India's regional priorities are driven by its aspirations to gain prominence in the region that is always overshadowed by the neighbouring states.

The geographical proximity and policies of these states have consistently disrupted the regional equilibrium, thereby impacting India's security interest and its aspirations for power (Donnellon, 2023). Moreover, the regional posture of India is significantly influenced by its animosity with Pakistan, which stems due to Pakistan's support for anti-India elements (Sitaraman, 2015, pp.154-179). Besides, the growing economic size of China and India, there has shift in global attention to Asia, leading to the characterisation of twenty first Century as 'Asian Century' (Woetzel & Seong, 2019). It is projected that Asian share of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will expand 52% by 2050[4], and India could potentially emerge as Asia's leading power. This has prompted India to actively engage in regional partnerships to enhance economic security. As part of this initiative, India adopted

the 'Act East Policy'[5], and became a full 'dialogue partner' of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, and collaborating on various areas of common interest (Jha, 2008, pp. 01-34).

In addition, India has established ties with various organisations, including the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)[6], the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),[7] the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) (*Report*, MEA, 2021-22, p.03). These partnerships and bilateral engagements with Asian countries aim to foster strategic cooperation, mutual collaboration, and regional integration[8].

Furthermore, the presence of weak and fragile states in the South-Asian region poses a significant security challenge for India, giving rise to concerns about the potential disintegration, power vacuums and external interference (Pant & Shivamurthy, 2022). Therefore, India decided to actively engage in transnational and regional institutional frameworks to foster economic interests and deepen interdependence with other actors in South Asia (Kohli, 1988, pp.301-311). This extension is also visible during the post-Cold War period through the 'Gujral Doctrine'[9] and 'Manmohan Doctrine'[10], which promoted collaboration, connectivity and stability with neighbours and international community (Baru, 2008).

Since attaining independence, India has continually adjusted its foreign policy perspectives in response to evolving global and regional power dynamics. In the face of developmental and existential challenges, territorial disputes, separatist movements and modernisation issues, India attempts regularly updates with the dynamic global and regional context (Dormandy, 2007). Nevertheless, India's foreign policy is rooted in some fundamental themes that carefully considered both global and regional contexts. These foundational principles have provided the groundwork upon which India has constructed its post-Cold War foreign policy.

2.5. India's Foreign Policy: Basic Themes

The principles underlying India's foreign policy were influenced by nationalist leaders who connected it with the philosophical and cultural history of India. M.K. Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Subhash Chandra Bose played pivotal roles in shaping the philosophical and intellectual aspects of Indian foreign policy, aiming to promote global peace while safeguarding national interests (Shaw, 2018). Indian foreign policy has its origins in the resolutions of the INC on foreign policy and the establishment of the foreign department in 1936 (Power, 1964, pp. 259-261; Keenleyside, 1987, pp. 99-100).These deliberations formed the basis India's foreign policy approach, emphasising the importance of fostering cooperation among Asian countries, opposing colonial rule, and standing in solidarity with other countries in the global South (Bozeman, 1958, pp. 258-59). Some of the major themes of Indian foreign policy in the post- independence period are analysed below.

2.5.1. Independent Foreign Policy: Breaking the Past

India's foreign policy has been marked by the steadfast commitment to independence and non-intervention, as evident in the multiple resolutions of the INC[11]. A significant number of these resolutions, primarily crafted by Jawaharlal Nehru, underscored India's proactive involvement in global politics while eschewing power blocs (Lal, 1967, pp. 879-887). However, Nehru's official pronouncement on foreign policy through All India Radio on September 7, 1946, articulated India's aspirations to cultivate friendly relations with other nations and to co-operate with them. It reiterated India's stance to distance from power politics[12]. Being a newly independent country with a bitter colonial past, India thought that succumbing to the imperatives of the Cold War could jeopardise its freedom of policy in international politics (Bhambri, 1982, pp. 52-53).

In this context, India's foreign policy aimed to retain autonomy and avoid a satellite role, and prioritising the utilisation of available resources for economic development while safeguarding hard-won independence and sovereignty (Ganguly & Pardesi, 2009, p.6). Additionally, the process of deindustrialisation and human sufferings caused by the British colonial rule had left the country impoverished

(Tharoor, 2017). Therefore, by recognising associated national and human security challenges, stemming from colonialism and aftermath partition, India opted for a 'realistic diplomatic approach' to secure its independence and freedom (Sreekandan, 2004, p. 31).

Therefore, Nehru strategically prioritised the nation's security, going beyond military terms and sought closer cooperation with progressive nations worldwide (Bhatia, 1990). Consequently, India adopted the Non-aligned foreign policy as a strategic move to develop an independent approach and ensure its security and sovereignty (Bandyopadhyaya, 1977, pp.137-164). This approach also aligned with India's ambition to become a significant global power (Chopra, 1968). Additionally, the free and independent foreign policy posture offered diplomatic advantages to address India's economic and allied security concerns more effectively (Dalmia & Malone, 2012, p.1041; Appadorai, 1949, p. 40).

2.5.2. Non-alignment: A Strategic Balancing

The Non-alignment Movement (NAM) is a core element of Indian foreign policy, allowing it to manage its relationships with major powers. The policy of aligning with major powers, immediately after independence, might have granted India access to capital, technology, and markets (Harshe, 1990, pp. 399-405). However, India chose the Non-aligned approach to protect its autonomy and decided to pursue its national interests independently (Raghavan, 2017, pp. 326-341). It was a strategy to bring together the newly independent Afro-Asian nations, providing an alternative forum for development and collective bargaining in the Cold War landscape (Vasudevan, 1983, pp. 50-62). Therefore, the Non-alignment aimed to improve conditions and promote the interests of these nations by fostering cooperation and asserting their collective voice in the international arena (Mohan, 2013, p. 28). While explaining the significance of Non-alignment in Indian foreign policy, Nehru remarked that:

> *"This sets a new pattern for Afro-Asian development and generates significant interest from economists and experts from both the worlds. This*

makes India becomes an area of agreement between opposing ideological forces" (Karanjia, 1966, p. 58).

Gamal Abdul Nasser, Jawaharlal Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Sukarno, and Josip Broz Tito played significant roles in this movement (Luthi, 2016). The historic Bandung Conference in 1955 brought together by twenty nine newly independent countries, adopting ten principles as the core objectives of Non-alignment (Dinh, 1976, pp. 39-49). These principles aimed to safeguard the sovereignty of member states, combat colonisation and racial discrimination, promote disarmament and global peace, discourage neo-colonialism, and serve as a platform for mutual interests (Gopal, 1991, pp. 54-73). In his speech at the Bandung Conference, Nehru remarked that:

"Non-alignment is not just a formula but it is a faith. It is grounded in a belief in the essential unity of mankind, recognising that a problem in one part of the world ultimately affects all of us. Therefore, it is wiser to co-operate rather than to indulge in mutual destruction"[13].

The Non-alignment was envisioned as a forum for increased external resource flows, improved export access, financial support for development, and also served as a platform for protesting the arms race, strived to maintain an international environment devoid of conflicts to advance its development goals (Vasudevan, 1983). Based on the principle of non-involvement in military alliances, it provided a flexible framework for collective action among member nations to address concerns related to developing nations (Chopra, 1986, pp.161-177). Furthermore, it served as a strategy for democratising the global order and promoting multilateralism. In this context, it proved effective in addressing India's economic and security concerns during the Cold War era (*New Delhi Times*, March 5, 2018).

Besides, Nehru was concerned about the repercussions of the economic security interest through boosting of defence expenditure while joining any power bloc (Nair, 2004). Therefore, the Non-alignment served as a pragmatic tool for the economic gain from both blocs and advance national interests through international collaboration and to achieve political and economic stability and world peace

(Abraham, 2008, pp.196-197). Additionally, by actively participating in NAM, India sought to underline the significance of Third World solidarity and seize the opportunity to shape and articulate the perspectives of these countries, thereby reinforcing its leading role in the global arena (Gerberg, 2008, p. 304). Besides, it served as a 'means to maintain a delicate power balance while positioning India favourably amidst the competing interest of major world powers' (Frangonikolopoulos, 1995, p. 62).

However, with the end of the Cold War and the diminishing ideological and political rivalry between the US and Russia, coupled with the rise of globalisation and liberal democracy, questions have arisen regarding the relevance of Non-alignment as a fundamental theme of Indian foreign policy (Choudhari & Kumar, 2003, 121-154) . In addition, the implementation of structural adjustment programs, subsequent economic reforms, and the increasing dominance of the US in global politics have compelled India to reassess and adjust its stance on Non-alignment (Singh, 2009). As the global landscape changed, India found it necessary to move away from strict Non-alignment and adapt its foreign policy to align with emerging geo-political dynamics and economic realities (Mohan, 2013, p. 29; Yadav, 1993, 53-70).

2.5.3. Supporting International Peace and Security

The concept of peace in Indian foreign policy was profoundly shaped by Gandhian philosophy of non-violence, a principle that exerted a significant influence on the freedom movement (Ganapathi, 2017). As this ethos transitioned into the framing of foreign policy, it naturally guided India's ideals and global peace initiatives. Embracing the notion of international peace, India harboured dual intentions:

(i)   To ensure national security and existence within a peaceful world order, and

(ii)   To recognise peace as a prerequisite for economic development (Nair, 2004, p. 31).

Realising the belligerent nature of the Cold War era and the advent of the nuclear age, India recognised that engaging in hostile actions would have grave consequences for its interests. Therefore, soon after independence, Nehru expressed the view that morality inspires and directs the foreign policy of India[14]. Consequently, India positioned itself as a proponent of peaceful resolution of international disputes, a role that was enshrined in the Directive Principles of State Policy. Article 51 of the Indian constitution emphasises:

(a)   Promote international peace and security,

(b)   Maintain just and honourable relations between nations;

(c)   Foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another; and

(d)   Encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration (*Indian Constitution, as on 26 November, 2021. p.55*)

India's foreign policy was not merely an optimistic aspiration but an imperative for peace, stability and prosperity (Msaldan, 1948, pp.36-40). Rather, by incorporating it as the part of the constitution, this policy transcended being a discretionary decision of the incumbent government to a constitutional directive. In pursuit of this objective, India was compelled to address the pressing security needs, leading to the adoption of a policy of international cooperation and the rejection of racialism. This stance endorsed an ethical outlook, firmly renouncing the fear of war (Mishra, 2014, pp.21-22).

2.5.4. Pacific Settlement of International Disputes: Building Trust

As a corollary to the fundamental theme of a commitment to promoting international peace and security, India supports the use of diplomatic and legal means to settle conflicts (Mishra, 2014, pp. 20-33). It believes in upholding the principles of international law and justice and to contribute to a more stable and harmonious global order[15]. The Indian cultural attitude of 'live and let live' is deeply

ingrained in the country's foreign policy, emphasising friendliness and cooperation among nations for the sake of global peace and development (Sinha, 2017, p.202).

Accordingly, India recognises the importance of cultivating strong relationships with international partners, prioritising cooperation over historic conflicts to foster a better world (Dixit, 1998). In the context growing boarder security tension, the ethical principle of '*Panchsheel*' comprising five principles, was signed between India and China on 29 April 1955, comprises:

(i)   Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty

(ii)   Non-aggression

(iii)   Non-interference in each other's internal affairs

(iv)   Equality and mutual advantage

(v)   Peaceful co-existence and economic cooperation (Fontera, 1966, p.428).

Besides, amid the persistent distrust between India and Pakistan since partition, the Tashkent Declaration in 1965, signed by Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, aimed to reduce the hostilities and initiate cooperation (Gauhar, 1966, pp.13-25). Furthermore, the Shimla Agreement in 1972 also sought to promote territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereignty for mutual security[16]. Upholding the principle of pacific settlement of disputes, India persistently engaged in peaceful negotiations to settle disputes with Pakistan, which is again visible through the Lahore Agreement and Agra Summit[17].

Additionally, India's efforts to settle disputes with neighbouring countries have been hindered by undemarcated boundaries with China, Myanmar, and Bhutan, leading to frequent tension along the borders (Lahiri, 2013, pp.70-79). However, progress has been made in resolving disputes with Bangladesh and maritime boundary issues with Sri Lanka (Gilani, 2020). India's approach to handling international disputes is deeply rooted in its belief in international law, supporting international peace mechanisms, justice, and fairness (Haqqi, 1956, pp. 43-50).

Furthermore, India emphasises the utmost importance of respecting the sovereignty and dignity of all nations.

2.5.5. Asianism: Move to Regional Solidarity

Assuming the responsibility for regional leadership, Nehru addressed the inaugural session at the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 at New Delhi, emphasising that 'India should play its role in Asian development and stressed the urgency of preserving national independence and neutralism, while avoiding involvement in power games' (Senanayake, 2018, pp.3-4). Subsequently, Indian foreign policy has upheld the ideals of Asian solidarity and collective action. This commitment prioritises engaging and co-operating with Asian countries, especially with neighbouring nations, to strengthen regional integration, enhance economic ties, promote cultural exchanges, and foster peace and stability in the region (Krishna, 2009, pp.345-439).

Later, the Bandung Conference of 1955 marked the initial step towards establishing non-aligned move, which culminated in the first summit of the NAM in Belgrade in 1961- an engagement with Asian countries for collective action and multifocal arrangement (Ziering & Suriyamongkol, 2016). Recognising the post-colonial economic challenges faced by India and other Asian countries, there has been a collective effort to ensure economic security and bridge the gap with Western nations, in which India assumed a leading position (Borah, 2015). This changing position of India was highlighted by Nehru in the UN General Assembly in 1958 as:

> *"There are vast tracts of the world which may not in the past, for a few generations, have taken much part in world affairs. But they are awake; their people are moving and they have no intention whatever of being ignored or of being passed by.... Today I venture to submit that Asia counts in world affairs and tomorrow it will count much more than today"* (Fontera, 1960, p. 7).

Later, during the post-Cold War period, India, through the 'Look East Policy'[18] and the 'extended neighbourhood' strategy, fostered greater economic and

strategic ties with West Asia, Central Asia, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and South East Asia, as part of Asian solidarity. Besides, the growing security threats such as terrorism, trans-national crimes, maritime challenges and combating pandemics, coupled with geo-economic compulsions and closer economic integration, technological transfer and innovation, have further accelerated the implementation of extended neighbourhood policy [19].

2.5.6. Anti-Imperialism and Racialism

Imperialism, as the practice of one country extending its power and influence over other territories, often involves the subjugation and exploitation of the people in those territories, and may lead to the racial discrimination (Wright, 1967, pp. 660-674). Therefore, in its foreign policy, India strongly refused to compromise with colonial and imperialist forces, and making anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism as its fundamental objectives (Fontera, 1960). This policy stance earned India the status of a leader and served as a tool for fostering Afro-Asian solidarity through Non-alignment (Devdutt, 1962, pp.380-397).

Besides, the Indian foreign policy was influenced by the traumatic colonial past. Under British control, India was viewed as an economic venture, serving as a captive market for British goods and a source of raw materials (Thakur, 2013, pp.405-415).The political dominance and economic exploitation by the British inflicted immense misery upon India (Tharoor, 2017). These challenges, coupled with religious conflicts, created a fragile state of peace in the region that eventually led to its partition (Rajan, 1969, p. 93). In this context, Nehru believed that 'the problems faced by the world, particularly encountered by the Afro-Asian countries and the incessant fear of war, were the creation of imperialism' (Dev, 1989, p. 261).

Racialism has been intertwined with imperialism and the colonial powers justified the domination by employing racial hierarchies the on belief of 'civilising mission' or 'white man's burden'[20]. India considered racialism and racial discrimination as source of conflict affecting global peace and security, contrary to the very principle of human rights. In his speech Nehru commented:

"The denial of freedom elsewhere leads to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples and in the recognition, in theory and practice, of equal opportunities for all races. We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism, where so ever and in whatever form it may be practised"[21].

Furthermore, the policy of anti-racialism was considered as a protective measure for Indian nationals abroad. India was at the forefront of supporting the anti-racist movement and consistently raised the issue at the United Nations (UN) (Kochanek, 1980, pp. 48-68). It was the first country to raise the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa in 1946. According to the report of the Ministry of External Affairs (2008), 'India initiated the AFRICA (Action for Resistance to Innovation, Colonialism and Apartheid) fund during the eighth summit of NAM at Harare in 1986, and India served as the Chairman of AFRICA Fund Committee'. Besides**,** India actively participated in the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Additionally, India played a significant role in the peer review mechanism of Universal Periodical Review (UPR) process in Human Rights Council[22].

2.5.7. Support to UNO: Strengthening Global Security

India's foreign policy aims and strategies over the last seven decades reflect its steadfast support for the UN and its moral and legal framework (Mukherjee & Malone, 2013, pp.110-117). Despite not being a sovereign state at the time of the UN's establishment due to colonial rule, India became an original member of the UN and actively participated in the historic UN conference held from 25 April to 26 June 1945 (Horimoto, 2017, p.466, Singh,1964, p. 85). Since then, India has instrumentally utiltsed the UN. It has been elected to the Human Rights Council (HRC), International Narcotics Control Board, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), and

the International Court of Justice (ICJ), while also co-operating with other UN bodies[23].

India's strategic approach with UN intends to achieve security through a broader spectrum of multilateral engagements on a wider and common global platform (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011, pp.311-329). As part of India's principled stance towards global peace and security, it has actively participated in UN peacekeeping missions since 1960, driven by three primary objectives:

(i)   India seeks to enhance the authority of the UN as an organisation, emphasising the significance of collective security and international cooperation in maintaining peace and stability.

(ii)   India aims to bolster its own reputation and influence on the world stage through its involvement in UN peace keeping.

(iii)   India's desire for recognition has been particularly focused on exerting influence within the UN Security Council and pursuing a permanent seat (Albrecht & Podder, 2020, pp.47-60; Faridi, 2008, pp.577-584).

Furthermore, India prioritised decolonisation, development, peace and disarmament, just and equitable global order and the development of multilateralism under UN (Mishra, 2006, p. 348). Therefore, India favours a multipolar world and the strengthening of UN institutions to work for a better world and collaborate on problems affecting international security, such as terrorism and climate change (Alam, 2017, pp. 273-291).

In addition, India seeks to address various issues related to sustainable development, global peace-building, disarmament, terrorism, cybersecurity, food security, as well as the fight against pandemics (*Report*, MEA, 2020). Above all, India believes that "UN as an instrument of common good rather than as a body to advance national interest inconsistent with India's faith in multilateralism. It is increasingly interdependent world, global problems require global solutions and as the only international organisation, the UN has a primary role" (Sreenivasan, 2009, p.480).

2.5.8. Disarmament: Efforts to Common Security

India's foreign policy is fundamentally grounded in unwavering support for upholding world peace, recognising it as a moral imperative and a crucial prerequisite for global development and security (Bhargava, 1978, pp. 131-144). When addressing the Constituent Assembly, Nehru expressed that, 'while India may be compelled to use atomic energy for other purpose, the nation's aspirations remains to approach this technology with peaceful intensions rather than with thoughts of war and animosity' (Abraham, 1998, p.49; Kumari, 2009, p. 228).

India feared that the power rivalry of the Cold War could trigger an unprecedented arms race, leading to nuclear war that would threaten humanity and its existence. This fear drove India's strong advocacy of nuclear disarmament, evident through multiple initiatives within and outside the UN[24]. Nevertheless, the presence of China and Pakistan with nuclear capability compelled India to consider the nuclear option for the security reasons (Malik, 1998, p.195, Kumari, 2009). Despite this, India, reiterating its idealist posture of international peace and security, presented a disarmament plan in UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1988 aiming to establish nuclear weapons free and non-violent world order[25].

However, India's principled stance on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is not contradictory as it rooted in the belief that these agreements are discriminatory (Ghose, 1997. pp. 239-261). Therefore, India refused to abandon the nuclear option until all countries embrace the concept of nuclear disarmament in a phased manner (Bajia, 1997, p. 50). The Draft Nuclear Doctorine (DND), which released by India on August 17, 1999 clearly expressed India's intention to join CTBT with certain modifications. It outlined India's willingness to engage in negotiations aimed at ceasing the production of fissile materials without attaching any preconditions. Moreover, the draft document highlighted India's commitment to pursuing a 'no-first-use'[26] policy vis-à-vis non-nuclear weapon states. Therefore, the ultimate goal is to establish a 'credible minimum nuclear deterrent' (Alam, 2003, p.128).

However, since 1990, India found it increasingly difficult to maintain its idealistic presumptions in its approach to foreign policy. It abandoned the slogan of universal disarmament and instead incorporated nuclear power into its security considerations (Mohan, 2006). This shift in stance was motivated by India's pressing security concerns, which including:

(i)   India's aspirations to be acknowledged as a dominent power within the region,

(ii)   Escalating apprehensions within India regarding the expanding nuclear weapons and missile delivery programmes of China, and

(iii)   The growing nuclear weapon capabilities of Pakistan (Kumari, 2009, p.230).

It was in this context, India conducted the nuclear test in 1998, reshaping its relationships with major powers (Ganguly, 1999, pp.148-177). Initially, these powers condemned and isolated India through economic sanctions and the denial of loans from international financial institutions (Morrow & Carriere, 1999, p.4-5). However, with time, countries like Russia and France softened their stance towards India, and the United States initiated dialogue with India (Mishra, 2023). The United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Japan also moved in a similar direction but failed to form a united front against India's isolation. Despite facing sanctions and diplomatic isolation, India managed to safeguard its national interests significantly (Yuan, 2001, pp. 978-1001).

The Pokhran II test demonstrated India's determination to emerge as a major and undeniable power in the world, positioning it as a serious contender for major power status (Yuvan, 2001). However, India committed to maintain credible minimum deterrant posture as a responsible nuclear power state and pledged to non-use against a non- nuclear states (Manjunath & Anand, 2006). India utilises nuclear energy as a means for development[27], and as resposible nuclear power, contributed to global security (Sullivan, 2014). Following this, India is striving for more prominent role in the global security landscape, and its foreign policy reflects a renewd and distinctively 'new' one.

2.6. Shift to 'New Foreign Policy'

The foreign policy practiced during the Cold War period suffered a severe setback with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the advent of globalisation (Thakur, 1993, pp. 831-850). This transformative era opened up new opportunities and challenges, prompting India to adopt a fresh approach towards traditional foreign policy practices (Singh, 2015, pp. 237-244). The growing interdependence and multilateralism in the global arena ushered in a new phase of foreign policy in India (Mukerji, 2018, pp.335-344). Embracing the changing dynamics of the international landscape, India sought to forge strategic partnerships and enhance cooperation with various countries and international organisations (Mehrothra, 1992, pp.19-23). Therefore, the focus shifted towards leveraging economic growth and technological advancements to bolster its position on the global stage (Singh, 2015). While retaining some elements of its idealistic principles, India's foreign policy now 'emphasises pragmatic realism and adaptability to navigate the complexities of the contemporary world' (Konwer, 2018, pp.231-241).

The Nehruvian foreign policy, which emphasised Non-alignment and third world solidarity, enjoyed broad acceptance globally. However, it did not yield rewarding outcomes (Gopal, 1991, pp 54-73). The Non-alignment ethos left India without genuine allies internationally and resulted in ineffective national security management (Raghavan, 2017). Additionally, India failed to establish regional power capabilities in the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, the foreign policy framing during the post independence period, particularly on economic security, centered on state-based control over the economy and planning (Cohen 1955, pp.546-571). This discouraged foreign investment and rapid growth in industrial and agricultural production, and injured the economic and food security of India (Dalmia & Malone, 2012, pp.1038-39; Kabi, 2002, pp. 1161-1169).

The changing security dynamics in the post-Cold War era, coupled with economic challenges, prompted the need for more pragmatic national policies. Simultaneously, the decline of the USSR, a key supplier of defence equipments to India, necessitated the modernisation of the country's military capabilities (Cohen,

2013, pp. 52-53). In response to this evolving security landscape, India embarked on a new strategy aimed at transforming itself into a robust, prosperous, and modern nation (Menon, 2020).

Furthermore, the foreign policy cleavage of Indian domestic politics also matured significantly and adapted to more effective policy options, and many of the idealstic ethos have either disappeared, or transformed into another form during the post-Cold War period (Ahmed & Mohapatra, 2021). A 'new' foreign policy paradigm, which contemplated 'power politics' has emerged, driven by profound geo-political, geo-economic, and technological changes, has led to new choices and partnerships in the global environment (Tourangbam, 2022, p.1). Setting aside the ideological prism in archives, pragmatic tools are being utilised to address the issues related with internal and external security (Hilali, 2001, pp. 734-764). Consequently, foreign policy goals have been redefined as to facilitating the flow of foreign development assistance, access to foreign markets and transfer of technology (Nachiappan, 2023).

This 'new foreign policy' exhibits the character of interdependence, which transcends national barrier not only in economic but also in strategic and diplomatic terms (Tripathi, 2013, pp.38-51). It bears the following features:

(i)   The growing consensus for a shift towards a more capitalist oriented society by moving away from socialist ethos.

(ii)   Shifting towards 'economic diplomacy' as a key focus on international relations.

(iii)   From 'third worldism' towards a proritisation of self-interest in foreign policy decisions.

(iv)   Rejection of anti-West fervor in foreign policy, signalling a more balanced and pragmatic approach towards global engagements.

(v)   A shift from idealism to pragmatism, reflecting a more realistic and practical outlook in dealing with international challenges (Mohan, 2004).

Such a shift in Indian foreign policy reflects the growing sense of pragmatism, with heightened emphasises on security considerations in both military and non-military dimensions (Dubay, 2016, p. 2). Post-Cold War period also witnessed India's rising prominence as a global power in the 21st century (*Times of India*, 10 December 2022). In order to meet the expectations of this role and assert its autonomy on the international stage, India places a premium on securing and safeguarding its borders to uphold unity and territorial integrity. Besides, India's aspiration to become an 'Indian ocean power' shaped its approach to international relations also demanded the modernisation in strategic mobility (Baruah, 2020).

Therefore, the new foreign policy strives to maintain the uninterrupted economic growth through trade and investments, ensure energy security, and is committed to preserving the environment and promoting technology (Relia et al., 2016, pp.158-172). Furthermore, it seeks to ensure freedom of operation and strengthening defence and security cooperation with like-minded nations, as well as participate in joint efforts to combat terrorism, cyber threats, piracy, drug trafficking, and organised crimes. In addition, India aims to enhance people-to-people contacts through the use of soft power approaches (Ganapathi, 2017, pp. 43-44). By adopting a comprehensive approach through its new foreign policy, India aims to assert itself as a responsible global power and effectively navigate the complexities of the international arena (Menon, 2020). In this context, the changing contours of India's post- Cold War foreign policy is analaysed below.

2.6.1. Embracing Economic Diplomacy

In the post-Cold War global environment, India had to set aside the traditional and idealistic elements of foreign policy instruments and protectionist canons of economic system due to the new challenges it confronted (Jain, 1995, pp. 71-79). In 1991, India experienced a looming economic meltdown characterised by low GDP growth rate, upward surge of budgetary deficit and soaring inflation (Sau, 1992. pp.1741-1745). As a result, India's foreign exchange reserve plummeted to little more than $ 1 billion leading to lose of the confidence of international financial community (Saraogi, 2006, p, 4). It compelled India to adopt bilateralism and

multilateralism to ensure economic security, thereby paving the way for 'economic diplomacy'.

Economic diplomacy encompasses the utilisation of diplomatic expertise alongside economic instruments to promote nation's economic, political and strategic objectives (Wayne, 2006). Therefore, strategically dealing with national actors and international organisations became essential as economic resources were increasingly required to support rapid industrialisation and address allied security concerns[28]. Economic security, a critical determinant of national power, prompted India to foster trade-related alliances with other nations. Economic growth underpins Indian foreign policy, shaping our commitment to recover India's lost space in the global economy[29]. The utilisation of diplomatic channels to assess foreign resources and investments led to the emergence of economic statecraft or economic diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, paving the way for greater economic cooperation[30].

Therefore, during the post-Cold War era, economic diplomacy surpassed political diplomacy and became instrumental in facilitating the flow of capital, technology, products and services (Yueh, 2020, pp. 01-12). India recognising the changing perceptions and shifting paradigms of the global order, and therefore, actively involved in multilateral forums, to facilitate the economic security (Hussain, 2006, pp. 35-36). Besides, the post-Cold War unipolar structure and the growing influence of the US in the global strategic architecture promoted India to realise the need for western economic support to revamp the sinking economy (Timberg, 1998, pp.123-136). As a result, India adopted economic restructuring closely connected to its foreign policy and implemented New Economic Policy (NEP) (Madaan & Madan, 1995, pp.104-113).

In consonance with this transformation, India initiated to manage economic diplomacy as a better tool for policy making, planning, organising and articulating to maximise bilateral and multilateral arrangements, gaining benefits conducive to encountering multiple security challenges (Ranjan, 2022, p.321; Kaushik, 1997, pp. 69-84). Through this, India aims to elevate its status as a major global economic power. India's active engagement with Association of South East Asian Nations

(ASEAN), Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and other international organisations exemplifies its stance in economic diplomacy (Snedden, 2016, pp. 69-82; Deshpande, 2023). This orientation is further evident through its participation in various international platforms, preferential trade agreements, and diplomatic exchanges. The new foreign policy deepened its integration with global economy, contributing the growth in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and significantly to India's GDP, strengthening its position globally[31]. The chart shows the FDI inflow to India during the period (2011-2022).

Figure 2.3

FDI Inflow to India (2011-222)

Source: *Compiled by the researcher from the RBI data.*

The provided data on FDI inflow to India from the fiscal year 2011-12 to 2021-22 reveals a consistent upward trend, indicative of sustained interest from foreign investors. Despite occasional fluctuations, notably a decline in 2012-13 followed by a steady rise until 2015-16, but suffered a little set back during the recent years 2017-18 and 2018-19, but showing a growing trend from 2019-20 to 2021-22.

In the context of economic diplomacy, India, with the pursuit for sustainable economic growth emphasised on multilateral arrangements and economic diplomacy (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011). As a result, India's political relations with other countries have been redefined, with economic diplomacy and emerging strategic and

security considerations taking precedence over traditional ideological factors (Bava, 2017, pp. 02-07). These developments have led to the emergence of new foreign policy themes, reflecting the changing realities of India's global engagement.

Subsequently, the idea of India's national security has shifted from a focus on geo-strategic considerations to geo-economic dimensions (Baru, 2013). This shift involved moving away from primary emphasis on territorial security and military dimensions towards a more comprehensive security approach that includes social, economic, political and environmental aspects (Chacko, 2015, pp. 326-344). In this connection, India's economic reorientation has not been limited to 'extended neighbourhood'; rather, it extended towards major states of Asia-Pacific region (Behera, 2023, pp. 13-17).

As an extension of economic diplomacy, India engages in 'technology diplomacy' to deal with the foreign policy to acquire emerging technologies[32]. As part of this effort, India focuses on emerging technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), block chain, augmented reality (AR), virtual reality (VR), machine learning (ML), deep learning, Natural Language Processing (NLP), and robotics in its 'new foreign policy' (Behera, 2023, pp. 28-29). By setting an ambitious target of five trillion dollar economy[33], India is re-designing its foreign policy directed towards a network of partnerships or multilateralism, along with an India's innovation strategy that has resulted in key successes in the nuclear, defence, and space sectors.

2.6.2. Growing Multilateralism

Multilateralism is regarded as a 'deep organising principle of international life'[34], epitomising the contemporary diplomatic approach to acheiving multifaceted national security objectives (Taylor, 2014, pp. 16-30). It involves the establishment of formal organisational structures or ad hoc arrangements, where actors' expectations converge, driven by the principles of 'consultation, inclusion and solidarity'[35]. Therefore, the regional multilateral engagements have emerged to address the complexities of interdependence and growing transnational challenges (Bloodgood, 2022, pp. 60-61). It has become the fashion of new diplomacy to address the specialised security challenges the actors confront in the post- Cold war period (Hampson, & Heinbecker, 2011, pp.299-310). At the systemic level, the

present multilateral framework operates through the United Nations and its specialised agencies, including the monetary systems (Taylor, 2014).

India, while acknowledging the contemporary realities of the world, emphasises the significance of UN and its efforts as a multilateral forum (Surie, 2019). Even though, India expands its multilateral diplomacy with UN, it highlights two main limitations of UN system, concerning security matters:

(i)   The UN sponsored multilateral mechanism has proven ineffective in preventing wars and even the permanent members of the Security Council themselves violating and undermining the global peace process.

(ii)   Regionally, the growing belligerence and aggression of China in the South China Sea and Indo-Pacific region raises significant security question for India (Pant & Mishra, 2022).

In this context, India has demanded the adoption of cutting-edge foreign policy tools to address the concerns of both global North and South. India's extensive network of bilateral ties has gradually opened up avenues for multilateralism, covering a wide range of security issues to protect national interest (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011). Such a shift in foreign policy strategy displays India's growing approach in realism (Roy, 2018).

This shift, from the geo-economic security perspective, ensures the growing strategic confidence needed to confront the multiple security challenges that India confronts in its present posture. Therefore, it blends bilateral and multilateral diplomatic tactics in the foreign policy delivery, thereby expanding India's global reach more than ever before (Kaushiki, 2022). In this context, the quest for strategic autonomy to promote national interests has necessitated a shift from Non-alignment to multi-alignment (Raghavan, 2017). This transition reflects a strategic approach that enables India to engage with many countries and making alliances for safeguarding its own interests and maintaining independence in decision-making processes (Mohan, n.d). The shift from Non-alignment, which emphasised neutrality and avoiding formal alliances during the Cold War era, to multi-alignment signifies India's evolving foreign policy stance in the contemporary geopolitical landscape (Mishra, 2023, pp.53-54).

Through multilateralism, India attempted to address common security threats such as ethnic conflicts, environmental security, and population explosion, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and pandemics, which demanded a global collective initiative (Jindal, 2002, pp. 93-112). It prompted India to enthusiastically participate in various diplomatic engagements, including QUAD[36] (Australia, India, Japan and US); IBSA[37] (India, Brazil and South Africa); BRICS; and Presidency Pro Tempore CELAC (Community of Latin America and Caribbean States). This showcases India's significant multilateral endeavours aimed at fostering a more security environment (Pant & Mishra, 2022).

Furthermore, India has consistently advocated for and actively participated in Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi- Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)[38]. These efforts broaden economic security initiatives towards addressing common challenges, including food security, sustainable development and proliferation of technology and development chains among members of the community (Chathurvedi, 2018; pp.128-135). Consequently, India requires multifaceted foreign policy strategies for intra-regional and inter-regional engagements. These endeavours offer India a fresh platform to safeguard its national and security interest while also pursuing its aspirations for great power status.

2.6.3. 'Look East Policy': Securing Border

The 'Look East Policy', was initiated as a diplomatic tool to forge closer ties and enhance cooperation with Southeast Asian nations and beyond (Mehrotra, 2012, pp.75-85). This initiative leveraged the changing global dynamics in the aftermath of the Cold-War to serve India's national interests and tap into new opportunities in the region (*Economic and Political Weekly*, 2010, p. 8). It was announced by the Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1944, reiterating the 'strategic importance of the region and the growing engagements of India in the Indo-Pacific region[39]. Furthermore, the Policy recognised economic potential of the north-eastern region as a gateway to South-east Asia and aimed to integrate it with the thriving markets across the borders (Borah, 2020, pp 843-847). At the time of its inception, India's economy was growing at a slower rate compared to the rapidly developing economies of South-east Asian nations, often referred to as the 'economic tigers' of the East

(Snedden, 2016).Through this, India attempted to make significant improvements and achieve economic growth with the 'policy of open skies' and free trade (Mehrothra, 2012, pp.75-85).

Furthermore, the policy also intended to establish trust and confidence of India's relations with neighbuoring countries like Bangladesh, China and Myanmar. It seeks to promote a positive and fresh approach to interactions, ensuring that there are no concerns about activities that could threaten India's security (Nath & Nath, 2004, pp. 636-652). In addition to addressing economic security, the 'Look East Policy' aimed to strengthen India's presence in Southeast Asia, enhance trade and economic cooperation, and strategically counter the growing influence of China in the region (Kesavan, 2020). The 'Look East Policy' includes an economic security strategy for the region, which involves signing of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN to foster cooperation in various areas such as trade and investment, tourism, science and technology, agriculture, health care, disaster management and climate change (Sarkar, 2010, pp.111-126). It enhanced India bilateral relations with the region. India's bilateral trade with ASEAN during the period 2016-2022 is given in table 2.1.

Table 2.1

India's Trade with ASEAN

Year	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21	2021-22
Export (USD Billion)	30.96	34.20	37.47	31.55	31.49	42.32
%Growth	23.19	10.47	9.56	-15.82	-0.19	34.43
Import (USD Billion)	40.62	47.13	59.32	55.37	47.42	68.08
%Growth	1.77	16.04	25.86	-6.66	-14.36	43.57
Total (USD Billion)	71.58	81.34	96.80	86.92	78.90	110.4
Trade Balance (USD Billion)	-9.66	-12.93	-21.85	-23.82	-15.93	-25.76

Source: *Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India*

Figure 2.4

India's Balance of Trade with ASEAN (In Billion US$)

Source: Compiled on the basis of the data of *Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.*

Analysing the data on India's trade with ASEAN from 2016-17 to 2021-22, shows a mixed trend. India's exports to ASEAN showed overall positive growth, with the highest growth rate of 23.19% in 2016-17, followed by fluctuations in subsequent years. However, in 2019-20, there was a significant decline of -15.82%. Import-wise, there was steady growth in most years, reaching a peak of 25.86% in 2018-19, but a notable decline of -14.36% in 2020-21. The total trade between India and ASEAN increased over the years, reaching USD 110.4 billion in 2021-22, indicating a recovery and growth. However, India consistently faced a trade deficit with ASEAN, with the highest deficit of USD 21.85 billion recorded in 2018-19. These figures highlight the need for efforts to enhance export competitiveness and promote balanced trade relations with ASEAN.

In this changing context, India had a multifaceted partnership with ASEAN, which was further emphasised during the 34th Bangkok Summit in June 2019 (Ganapathi, 2019). This partnership focuses on advancing towards 'Digital ASEAN'

and encompasses collaboration with dialogue partners. India actively engages with ASEAN - related systemic arrangements such as East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meting Plus (ADDM+), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Maritime Forum[40]. Therefore, in the emerging south East Asian landscape, the 'Look East Policy' has three fold economic security dimensions:

(i)   It aims to ensure India's economic integration with Asia through comprehensive economic partnership, thereby ensuring that India becomes an integral part of Asia's economic future.

(ii)   Politically, India is actively engaging with ASEAN and seeks greater involvement in the security and stability of the East Asia.

(iii)   The 'Look East Policy' expanded India's realistic ambitions to include Japan, South Korea and Australia in its engagement with the region (Mohan, 2013; Palit, 2016, pp. 81-92).

Taking into account the politico-economic significance of the policy, Singh (2015), contends that India's 'Look East Policy' represents more than just an external economic strategy; it signifies a strategic shift in India's perspective of the world and its role in the evolving global economy (p. 101).

2.6.4. 'Act West Policy': Securing Extended Neighbourhood

The 'Act West' policy, initiated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's remarks at the 'Make in India' conference in 2014, was a shift in India's focus, which prioritised the diplomatic engagements with the countries in Western region[41]. This shift has led to a multi-layered and significant policy approach towards West Asia, particularly the Gulf countries, and holds immense strategic significance for India due to its energy security, maritime connections, and the region being virtually a neighbour of India through a 'web of historical ties, contemporary links, trade, and expatriate communities' (Joshi, 2018).

Subsequently, India's engagement with the region has transitioned from a transactional approach to a genuinely strategic one, which was evident through high-

level visits and strategic collaborations (Rajiv, 2017). Consequently, the energy trade between India and the Gulf has emerged as a critical link, as India heavily relies on the region for a substantial portion of its oil and gas supplies (Rai, 2022). Besides, Gulf nations have made investments in India's strategic petroleum reserves, refineries, and infrastructure. Furthermore, there has been a notable increase in cooperation in security and technology, encompassing intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism measures, and advancements in fields like space and artificial intelligence[42]. The following table provides information on the economic security aspect of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in relation with India.

Table 2.2

India- GCC Economic Cooperation (2017-18 to 2021-22)

(In US$ Million)								
	Year	Saudi Arabia	UAE	Oman	Kuwait	Qatar	Bahrain	Total
Imports	*2017-18*	22,070	21,739	4,264	7,166	8,409	431	64,079
	2018-19	28,479	29,785	2,759	7,431	10,722	540	79,716
	2019-20	26,857	30,257	3,669	9,574	9,686	422	80,465
	2020-21	16,187	26,623	3,088	5,214	7,930	547	59,589
	2021-22	34,100	44,833	6,840	11,001	13,193	753	1,10,720
Exports	*2017-18*	5,411	28,146	2,439	1,366	1,472	557	39,391
	2018-19	5,562	30,127	2,246	1,334	1,611	742	41,622
	2019-20	6,237	28,854	2,262	1,287	1,268	559	40,466
	2020-21	5,857	16,695	2,355	1,287	1,285	528	87,364
	2021-22	8,758	28,044	3,148	1,241	1,837	899	43,927

Source: Compiled from different sources by the researcher.

Looking at the trade between India and the GCC countries from 2017-18 to 2021-22, shows that importing more from the GCC nations, especially from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which saw a big jump in exports to India in the latest fiscal year. On the other hand, India's exports to the GCC countries have been growing steadily over the years, with a significant increase in shipments to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the last fiscal year. However, the trade balance still favors the GCC countries, meaning they export more to India than India exports to them. This suggests that there might be a need for some strategic actions to balance things out.

Looking at specific countries, the economic relationship is strengthening with Saudi Arabia, steadily growing with the UAE, and showing varied patterns with Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. Overall, this data shows that India is closely connected economically with the GCC nations, presenting opportunities for more collaboration, but there's a need to work on improving trade balances.

Besides, from a strategic perspective, India and the GCC share an interest in promoting political stability and security in the region (Pradhan, 2019, pp.93-103). Their mutual political and security priorities translate into collaborative efforts aimed at fostering peace, security, and stability in both the Gulf region and South Asia[43]. Therefore, the 'Act West policy' envisioned a 'high level political interactions for increasing cooperation between India and West Asia for realising transformative domestic economic agenda' (Rajiv, 2017). The 'Act West policy' focused on three main axes: the Arab Gulf countries, Israel, and Iran (Burton, 2019). Through this Policy, India has tried to successfully transform its ties with Gulf and West Asian countries, as evident through the enhanced high-level political interactions, increased defence and security cooperation, and involvement of region's resources in realising India's ambitious transformative domestic economic agenda (Rajiv, 2017).

As part of this policy, since taking office in June 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi significantly increased high-level political interactions between India and West Asia through visits to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar (Mishra, 2019). These visits addressing the long-standing anomaly of limited engagement in this crucial region, which holds high stakes for India, including the diaspora security and well-being, remittances, and energy security considerations. Additionally, the visits aimed at balancing the equation of India China in the region (Mansoor, 2022; Kumaraswami, 2019).

Therefore, India's 'Act West policy' has strategically enhanced its credibility as a partner in the Middle East. It has done so by engaging with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and the UAE while maintaining diplomatic balance and upholding its commitments (Alterman and Mohan, 2022). As part of this policy, the Chabahar

port agreement with Iran and Afghanistan has also bolstered India's influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia, while countering Chinese influence and bypassing Pakistan (Ray, 2018, pp.704-712). Due to India's proactive diplomacy, it secured an invitation to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit despite Pakistan's attempts to sway the organisation against India (Mohan, 2019). Therefore, amid evolving geopolitical dynamics, India continues to pursue multilateralism and strategic outreach to solidify its position as a credible power in the region during the emerging Asian Century World Order[44]. The Act West policy, as security strategy with Gulf countries, enhances 'India's development and national security goals as well as contribute to regional security and stability' (Rajiv, 2017).

2.6.5. The Growing Influence of Diaspora

Diasporas, often seen as 'soft power', have emerged as influential entities in the realms of foreign policy and economic development[45]. These transnational communities extend beyond borders, leveraging their collective strength and connections to shape policies and contribute to international political and economic relations (Shain & Barth, 2003, pp. 449- 479). They posses the ability to influence the foreign policy of their home and the host countries contribute to the development of their global identity (Khara, 2020, p. 13).

The Indian Diaspora, as a significant component of the global Diaspora community, has grown increasingly influential in shaping India's foreign policy and has evolved into a strategic asset for the country (Gupta, 2008, pp. 61-68; Desai, 2006, pp. 94-108). Recognising the importance of its Diaspora, India has undertaken concerted efforts to engage and leverage this resource. The Indian Diaspora is estimated to be around 25 million, spread across 136 countries. They provide a huge financial support through FDI and Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), and supports infrastructural development and technical support (Verma, 2020, p.433).

Diaspora is a major factor contributing to the economic security and development, influencing foreign policy (Abraham, 2014, pp.73-106). The Indian diaspora in major countries is outlined in the following table.

Table 2.3

Diaspora in Major Countries and Financial Inflows

Country	Indian Population in Host Countries	% of Total Population	% Foreign Remittance
Saudi Arabia	4,100000	13.22%	5.1%
UAE	3, 500000	27.1%	18.0%
UK	1,451862	2.3%	6.8%
Kuwait	7,00000	17.5%	2.4%
US	450000	0.13%	23.4%
Canada	1689055	4.51%	0.6%

Source: Non Residents Indians Online, from https://nriol.com/indiandiaspora /statistics-indians-abroad. asp and Ministry of Finance, India.

The Indian Diaspora plays a crucial role in terms of population and financial remittance, making substantial contributions to the India's financial security (*The Economic Times*, 10 May 2023). It has played a pivotal role in positioning India at the center of global affairs. The diaspora is strategically positioned to contribute significantly to positively reshape the world's perception of India (Ashraf, 2005, pp. 33-48). Moreover, the government aims to bolster economic security initiatives and development programmes by actively seeking investment from Indian diaspora. Through initiatives like 'Make in India' campaign, the government actively encourages the diaspora to contribute to country's development by investing in various projects. The foreign remittance of India diaspora during the period 2017-18- to 2021-22 is given in a graph below:

Table 2.4
Foreign Remittance of Indian Diasporas from 2018-2022
(In Million US $)

Year	Inward Remittances
2017-18	69129
2018-19	76396
2019-20	83195
2020-21	80185
2021-22	89127

Source: Reserve Bank of India.

The data shows a general upward trend in inward remittances to India over the given years, with some fluctuations. There was consistent growth from 2017-18 to 2019-20, followed by a slight decline in 2020-21. However, the most recent year, 2021-22, saw a notable increase in remittances. This indicates the continued importance of remittances as a significant source of external funds for India, contributing to the country's financial stability and economic security. In this context, the government, while framing foreign policy, paying due attention to diasporas, as they play a major role in spreading the soft power of India through immense influence they possess in their residential countries (Gupta, 2008, p.65).

2.6.6. Increasing 'Techno-Defence Diplomacy'

During the Post-Cold era, science and technology have emerged as a predominant factor in reshaping the dynamics of international relations. Amidst this, technology, recognised as a pivotal factor in international affairs, underscores the significance of diplomatic efforts (Chiang, 2021). It plays a crucial role in 'safeguarding national interests, projecting national power, and ultimately, ensuring national security, and as such it demands emphasising the need for technological collaboration (Relia et al., 2014, pp.158-172). In this context, Mallik (2016) observes that, 'the competition for techno-economic power has intensified among nations, with a clear realisation of the impact of technology on economic progress, military strength, and the art of statecraft, which shape the balance of power among nations' (p.4).Therefore, technology continues to be one of the most sought-after commodities in international affairs during the post- Cold War period.

The post-Cold War period ushered in a profound transformation in diplomacy, employing an array of technological tools such as 'digital diplomacy' and public diplomacy to 'engage broader audiences and facilitate dialogue with the general public' (Banerjee, 2022). In this context, where technological integration transcended geographical barriers, enabling communication between individuals and nations, resulting in swifter resolutions of international disputes (Adesina, 2017, pp, 01-13). Therefore, it fostered global cooperation and mutual understanding,

displaying the ability to resolve issues on the frontiers of science and technology in the direction of global peace and not war (Salzman, 1989, p. 4).

Technological advancements have made significant strides throughout the 20th century, exerting a profound influence on defence and strategic sectors (Onorato et al., 2014 pp. 449-481). The quest for technological supremacy spurred nations to engage in intense research and development activities, leading a shift in military capabilities. This competition accelerated the development of defence technologies and its transfer to other nations, referred as 'defence diplomacy' (Relia et al., 2014, p. 159). Such a revolution in military capabilities came through the developments in electronics, rocket propulsion, missile guidance, control systems, and new materials. This paradigm shift in defence capabilities was brought about by the integration of technology in diplomacy, affecting not only defence but allied sectors, which could offer national security (Riyan, 2021; Mallik, 2016, p. 69).

In this context of reforming foreign policy, the Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) outlined the common requirement of Indian armed forces. This analysis includes battlefield transparency, command and control architecture, communication systems, smart radars, electronic warfare, nano technology and Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS), Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence, unmanned systems, precision air-ground weapons, air to air weapons, surface to air weapons (SAMs), space based radars, Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons, stealth technology, digital systems, adaptive antenna signatures, propulsion technology, and navigation capabilities[46]. Achieving these capabilities is possible only through the efforts of defence diplomacy, and it has become the part of India's current foreign policy (Kowshish, 2013).

Therefore, India has been actively seeking techno-military and economic cooperation to improve its defence and technological capabilities. These partnerships entail knowledge exchange, tech transfer, and cooperative R&D projects in fields including robotics, aerospace technologies, artificial intelligence, and more. India also pursues collaboration with technologically advanced nations

like US, France, Japan, Israel, UK and Germany in defence manufacture and procurement, and defence training and exchange programmes[47]. India's efforts to improve its defence capabilities through strategic alliances and technology acquisition are further aided by multilateral interactions. This marks as a major shift in new diplomacy.

2.6.7. Shift to an assertive Foreign Policy

Assertive foreign policy involves striking a delicate balance between maintaining national sovereignty and establishing influence within the global community. It is crucial to note that assertiveness does not equate to aggression; instead, it signifies a strategic deployment of soft power (Debory & Sinha, 2023). India's assertive foreign policy represents a proactive diplomatic approach designed to safeguard and advance the country's national interests on the global stage (*Economic Times*, 2021, May 01). This policy is defined by a readiness to engage with major powers, a steadfast commitment to upholding international law, and a dedicated focus on fostering regional cooperation.

On May 26, 2014, Narendra Modi took the helm as India's Prime Minister. Modi's approach involved departing from India's traditional stance of strict Non-alignment, instead fostering robust relationships with both major and intermediate powers around the world (*Times of India,* June 03, 2022). Under his leadership, India's foreign policy underwent a 'transformation, strategically positioning the country as a formidable player on the global stage' (Sahoo, 2014). Staniland (2020) observes that Narendra Modi has embarked on a dual transformation of Indian foreign policy. Firstly, he has implemented concrete foreign policy alterations, including a revitalised focus on India's soft power and the cultivation of stronger relationships across Asia and with the United States. Secondly, Modi has undertaken a significant shift in discourse by employing rhetoric, symbols, and narratives that connect himself, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the government to notions of global respect, influence, and prestige (p.172).

Narendra Modi's foreign policy represents a 'blend of nationalist-driven geopolitics and pragmatist geo-economics' (Sahoo, 2014). This shift from traditional foreign policy is evident in several key aspects:

(i)   Modi views foreign policy as a tool to safeguard national interests, engaging with rival nations based on this premise, regardless of their own policy orientations.

(ii)   His 'Security and Growth for All in the Region' (SAGAR) concept underscores the integration of economic and strategic needs in shaping foreign policy.

(iii)   Modi advocates for an approach of 'effective multilateralism', recognising the increasing influence of multiple nations.

(iv)   He has pragmatically linked foreign policy with domestic economic interests, actively encouraging Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into India.

(v)   Modi has harnessed the Indian diaspora as a diplomatic asset.

(vi)   His decisive actions, such as the surgical strikes and Balakot air strike in response to provocations from Pakistan, not only neutralised Pakistan's nuclear threat but also signalled India's departure from the strategic restraint that had limited its national security posture in the past (Pradan, 2022).

Therefore, in the Changing political context, Indian foreign policy has been focused on cultivating mutually advantageous relationships with significant global players in diverse regions, including Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean region, West Asia, Central Asia, and Africa (Pant, 2016). This approach is motivated by the imperative of meeting India's security requirements. The objective is to nurture strategic alliances that contribute to economic stability, advancement, national development, and security objectives (Hall, 2019). Therefore, India's foreign policy reorientation towards major powers during the Modi era encompasses areas such as defence, economic security, food security, steel production, manufacturing, services, and technology procurement (Chakravarthy, 2018, p. 52).

The post-Cold War security dynamics, both on a global and regional scale, have undergone significant transformations. In response, India has been compelled to play a more prominent role in global politics to safeguard its security and existence. During this period, extensive diplomatic efforts have resulted in international cooperation and financial support for crucial national development initiatives, such as 'Make in India', 'Aatmanirbhar Bharat', 'Skill India', 'Digital India', 'Namami Gange', and Start-up India (Jayswal, 2022). These strengthened relationships with foreign nations have delivered tangible benefits to the population, including foreign investments and technological collaborations. India's strategy for assuming an expanded role in international politics is characterised by a commitment to upholding its idealistic reputation from the past while embracing a more significant role.

2.7. Conclusion

Since gaining independence in 1947, India's foreign policy trajectory has undergone a discernible shift, profoundly influenced by the dynamics of the Cold War. Over a span of more than four decades, India adhered steadfastly to the Non-Aligned Movement, a pivotal guiding principle during the Cold War. However, the post-Cold War period marked a significant transformation in Indian foreign policy, spurred by the evolving security landscape. This recalibration aimed not only to shield and preserve India's integrity, citizens, values, and assets but also to propel the national development and transformation into a modern state, thereby fostering the realisation of each India's full potential. India's foreign policy evolution reflects a dynamic response to changing global scenarios, showcasing a pragmatic and adaptive approach to safeguarding national interests and fostering holistic development. This strategic shift was the result toward the direct response to the escalating security threats from its internal and external settings.

End note

1. 'Possession goals' are choices of foreign policy seeks to achieve to preserve its passion such as territory, membership in international organisation etc. 'Milieu goals' are those goals, which a nation adopts in order to shape favourable condition beyond their national boarders. (Arnold Wolfers, 1962, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, John Hopkins Press. Baltimore, p.67-80).

2. See, Akashvani. (1982, May 23). *Nehru: and Non- Alignment.* Vol. XLVII, No.21.

3. See the address by Jawaharlal Nehru as Vice Chairman of the Viceroy's Executive Council on September 7, 1946, as quoted in K. C. Pant, *"Philosophy of Indian Defence"* in Jasjit Singh and Vatroslav Vekaric (Eds.), *Non-Provocative Defense: the Search for Equal Security*, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1989.

4. See, 'Asia 2050: *Realising the Asian Century: Executive Summary,* Asian Development Bank.

5. 'Act East Policy' aims to strengthen connectivity, fostering economic cooperation, cross-cultural ties and developing strategic relationships with nations in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly focusing on neighbourhood and states of North-Eastern region including Arunachal Pradesh (*Ministry Of External Affairs, Government of India.* Press Release on 23 December 2015).

6. BIMSTEC is a regional organisation that was established on 06 June 1997 with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration. Initially known as BIST-EC (Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation), the organisation is now known as BIMSTEC and comprises seven Member States with the admission of Myanmar on 22 December 1997, and Bhutan and Nepal in February 2004.

7. SCO an inter-governmental organisation established on June 15, 2001, in Shanghai. As of right now, the SCO consists of eight Member States (China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), four Observer States (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia), who are interested in becoming Full Members, and six 'Dialogue Partners' (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey). In 2021, it was decided to begin the process of Iran becoming a full member of the SCO, and Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia were made conversation partners.

8. Based on the reply of the former Minister of External Affairs, Gen. Dr. V.K. Singh (Retd.) in Lok Sabha on 23 December, 2015.

9. The 'Gujral Doctrine' aims at building a conflict-free co-operative South Asia and at the same time to build bridges of development co-operation with the neighbours of South Asia.

10. The doctrine centers on outward-looking and internationally minded economic growth and to ensure India's domestic stability- especially in its north-eastern region.

11. See, Indian National Congress: Resolutions of Foreign Policy, 1947-57, All India Congress Committee, New Delhi, e-book, available in the national library of India,

Kolkata, Retrieved from http://indianculture.gov.in/ebooks/indian-national-congress-resolutions-foreign-policy-1947-57, accessed on 11, February, 2022.

12. See, Publications Division-Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India (Ed.) *Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches.* 3rd edition, Volume I: September 1946 - May 1949. Delhi: Government of India Press, 1967. 388. pp. 29 - 31.

13. See, Prime Minister Nehru: Speech to Bandung Conference Political Committee, 1955.

14. See, Jawaharlal Nehru, Visit to America (New York, 1958), pp. 2 and S. L. Poplai, ed., *Select Documents on Asian Affairs: India 1947-1* (Bombay, 1959).

15. Article 33 of UN Charter says any dispute that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international   peace and security should first be addressed through negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means.

16. Signed between India and Pakistan by then Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhuto and Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi to ensure peace and security in the region.

17. Lahore agreement on 1999 February 21 and Agra Summit on 2001 July 14-16, between India and Pakistan.

18. India's Look East Policy is a resurrection and rejuvenation of India's traditional, cultural, historical and political ties with the countries in the South East Asian region.

19. *See* the keynote address by Mr. Anil Wadhwa, Secretary (East) in India's Ministry of External Affairs, at 6th IISS-MEA Dialogue on India's extended neighbourhood: Prospects and Challenges' at IDSA, New Delhi March 4, 2015.

20. See, the poem 'The White Man's Burden' by Rudyard Kipling. According to Kipling's poem, it is the moral responsibility of Western nations to spread civilisation to the less advanced populations of the South and East.

21. See, Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches September1946*, April, 1961, New Delhi: 1961, p.2

22. See, the Ministry of External Affairs 2020 on *'India and the UN'*. http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_UN_2020.pdf.

23. *India and the United Nations*. Ministry of External Affairs, 15 February, 2023.

24. See, '*India's Disarmament Initiatives'*, Ministry of External Affairs. Retrieved from https://meaindia.nic.in/cdg eneva/? 0424?000, accessed on 12, March 2022.

25. In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi presented to the UN General a comprehensive Action Plan for a nuclear weapon free and non-violent world order.

26. See, 'Nuclear Disarmament India', *Nuclear Threat Initiative*. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/india-nuclear-disarmament/, accessed on 30, March 2022.

27. Nuclear Power in India, World Nuclear Association, Retrieved from https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx, accessed on 30, March 2022.

28. See, Mobilising the State: India's Economic Diplomacy in the 21ˢᵗ Century, Centre for Policy Research, June 2014.

29. Manmohan Singh, 'Speech by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at I*ndia Today Conclave*, New Delhi', meaindia.nic.in, 25 February 2005.

30. See Economic Diplomacy, Ten points plan for making it more effective, October 2005. *The Association of Indian Diplomats.* Retrieved from http://www.associationdiplomats.org/publications/ifaj/vol1/ecodiplomacy.htm, accessed on 20 October 2022.

31. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IN to view World Bank statistics.

32. Lok Sabha, "New and Emerging Strategic Technologies Division," Unstarred Question No. 552, Answered on February 05, 2020.

33. Chief Economic Adviser. V. Anantha Nageswaran on June 14 said that India would become a $5 trillion economy by 2026-27 and $10 trillion by 2033-34. *The Hindu* 14 June 2022.

34. See, John Gerard Ruggie: 'Unraveling the World Order: The United States and the Future of Multilateralism,' mimeograph, University of California, San Diego, 1989 as quoted in Caporaso, J. A. (1992). International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations. *International Organization*, *46*(3), 599–632 (p.601).

35. Used on April 24, 2023, the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace, in 'The Virtues of Multilateralism and Diplomacy'; Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/observances/multilateralism-for-peace-day.

36. The Quad, officially the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, is a group of four countries: the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. Maritime cooperation among them began after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. But today the countries- all democracies and vibrant economies—work on a far broader agenda, which includes tackling security, economic, and health issues.

37. *IBSA* is a Trilateral Dialogue Forum of India, Brazil and South Africa which was created in the year 2003. .

38. Retrieved from https://bimstec.org/about-bimstec/, accessed on 10 September 2023.

39. See, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's speech: "India and the Asia-Pacific-Forging a New Relationship", October 1994, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

40. See, the Report Ministry of External Affairs, India, 9 May 2022.

41. See, 'India's Look West Policy in the Middle East', *The Diplomat,* 28 August 2020.

42. 'India's Act West Policy biggest success story of Modi's government': Envoy, Embassy of India, Ankara, Turkey, accessed from, https://www.indembassyankara.gov.in/eventlistview/Mjg5.

43. See India- GCC Relations, Embassy of Riyadh. Accessed from https://www.eoiriyadh.gov.in/page/india-gcc-relations/, on

44. See, Azam Tariq, 'Asian century the creation of new world order and its impact on existing global economic governance', *Modern Diplomacy*, 19 March 2023.

45. Indian Diaspora is bigger and more influential than any in history, *The Economist*, 12 June 2020.

46. See, Technology Perspective Capability Roadmap, Ministry of Defence, April 2013.

47. See, International Science and Technology Cooperation, Department of Science and Technology, Government of India, available in, https://dst.gov.in/international-st-cooperation.

CHAPTER 3

EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES: INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY BEYOND COLD WAR

3.1. Introduction

Geographically, India positioned with natural barriers - the Himalayan mountain range to the north, the Arabian Sea to the west, the Indian Ocean to the south, and the Bay of Bengal to the east - that traditionally provided a degree of inherent security[1]. However, the relentless march of science and technology, especially in defence, has eroded the notion of natural security (Ramo, 1989). The Cold War and its associated transformations has given rise to a multitude of challenges to India's national security, and it became a complex interplay of transnational factors (Harsh & Bommakanti, 2019, pp.835-857). In response to the emerging threats, India, keeping aside the ideological constraints on foreign policy, and embarked on a path of establishing fresh relations with global partners (Tourangbam, 2022). This nuanced shift in India's foreign policy resonates with the wisdom of Lord Palmerston's words: "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests we have to follow" (Billy, 1993, p. 21). The security challenges that India confronted compelled it to refresh its relations during the post- Cold War era (Arunkumar & Sakthivel, 2017, pp.114-121). This chapter analyses India's security issues in the post-Cold War period, highlighting the intricate interplay of factors affecting its national security.

3.2. National Security: Changing Framework

National security, traditionally conceived as the safeguarding of a nation through military power and preparedness, and aimed at countering any external encounters[2]. National security has been viewed as the "state of being free from external physical threats" (Louw, 1978, p.10). Mario Nobilo (1988) offers a more comprehensive analysis of national security as 'the complex interplay among

political, economic, military, ideological, legal, social and other internal and external factors'. It is through which 'individual states endeavor to ensure adequate provisions for maintaining sovereignty, safeguarding territorial integrity, securing the physical well-being of their population, preserving political independence and fostering balanced and rapid social development on an equal footing' (pp.72-73). Grizold (1994) says that, 'the national Security ensures the existence of state as a political community, and maintains international recognition of a state, and quality of life' (p. 40). However, the idea of national security has expanded, beyond its narrow perspective, by Subrahmanyam (1972), as:

> *"National security does not simply imply preserving territorial integrity. It also entails ensuring the country's rapid industrialisation and the development of a unified, equitable, and technical society. Anything that gets in the way of its progress, whether inside or outside, is a national security threat" (p.7).*

Therefore, in the post-Cold war context, the idea of national security, expanded as an activity to include economic, military, geo-political, ecological, informational security and a range of other components. Consequently, the nation states, while framing the national security policies are considering global dynamics and developments for protecting their identity, existence and interests (Jindal, 2002, pp.93-112). These interests involve:

(i)   Securing national territory, including air space and territorial waters;

(ii)   Protection of lives and property of its population;

(iii)   Maintaining national sovereignty; and

(iv)   The exercise of economic, socio-political, cultural and ecological functions of society (Grizold, 1994, p. 41).

The idea of national security enables a country to navigate the turbulent international and geo-strategic landscape, safeguarding its physical integrity and maintaining economic relationships with other nations on equitable terms (Ullman,

1983, p.149). Furthermore, it has broader dimensions, as it is associated with mitigation of threats and the preservation of national institutions and core values, as well as the realisation of legitimate aspirations of the people (Siwach, 2003. pp. 145-158). In this connection, Walter Lippman (1943), offers a perspective that 'a nation achieves security when it doesn't need to give up its legitimate interest to avoid war and is capable of defending those interests if challenged by resorting to war' (p, 5).

In 2006, former President of India, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, added the economic aspect while commenting that, 'national security is born out of two important components:

(i) Economic growth and prosperity; and

(ii) The capability to defend the nation against all types of threats (Kakar, 2023).

Based on the several conceptual approaches, the essence of national security is summarised in the table below:

Table 3.1

Dimensions of National Security

Approach	Essence
National Interest	Ensures conditions for the stable national development and providing an environment for better Human security
Sovereignty	Maintaining political structure and ensuring political security by rejecting external intervention by self or through alliances
Economic	Secure the stability of national economy with sufficient structural parameters to ensure growth rate and providing economic security to its citizens.
Legal	Protection of national institutions, and constitutional values
Defence	Mitigating external and internal tensions which affect the smooth functioning of political system, and provide safety net to nation.
Ethical	Ensuring the natural liberty, and provide human security in an atmosphere of peace and security.

Source: Compiled by the researcher from different sources

3.3. National security: Changing Post-Cold War Priorities

During the Post- Cold War era, the concept of national security has evolved more expansive and multifaceted, as it emphasises the national development and the well-being of the people with full faculties (Singh, 2014, p.1920). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its report (1994) says that, 'the concept of security has interpreted narrowly as the security of territory from external aggression, while forgetting the legitimate concerns of ordinary people seeking security in their daily lives. Therefore, security now symbolises protection from the threats of diseases, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards'[3].

The national security, in its changing context, encompasses a combination of factors, including political resilience and maturity, human resources, economic structure and capacity, technological expertise, industrial capacity, availability of natural resources and military strength[4]. Therefore, the national security vision shapes the goals of both domestic and foreign policies, with the objective of advancing the nation-building process and maintaining socio-political stability through effective governance, diplomatic strategies and management, as given in a chart below:

Figure 3.1

Link between National Security and Foreign Policy

| NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY |
| FOREIGN POLICY |
| DEFENCE SECURITY PLANNING |
| DEFENCE SECURITY MANAGEMENT |
| IMPLEMETATION OF POLICIES |

Compiled by the researcher

The perception of National Security has undergone a substantial transformation from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. While the former primarily revolved around military capabilities, the latter has broadened its scope to encompass economic security, human security, and political security, among other dimensions (Rahman, 2023). Besides, it also expanded as to encompass not only the nations but also groups and individuals, and various aspects like environmental concerns, involving multiple entities such as international institutions, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), public opinion, and the market forces (Rothschild, 2007). During this period, it has faced challenges due to the emergence of transnational and unconventional threats, as well as growing dominance of super national organisations and sub-national entities (Clark, 1995, pp.507-525).

Another significant aspect of national interest during the post-Cold War era is the growing demand for collective global partnership and action in national security debates (Rahman, 2023). This paradigm shift highlights the prominence of

geo-economics, technology and geo-politics over war, emphasising cooperation, rather than conquest and arms race (Jindal, 2002, p.93). The alteration of foreign and security policy frameworks largely depends upon international system, domestic political flux, cultural parameters and even personality traits of decision-making units (Vandana, 1996; Gimba & Ibrahim, 2018). The evolving notion of national security has impacted both domestic and foreign policy priorities, with human security becoming the focus of every national actor (Hudson &Vore, 1995, pp. 209-238).

3.4. Dimensions of National Security

The discourse in international relations, during the Cold War era, revolved around state power, military security, wars, arms race and alliances (Jindal, 2002, pp. 93-112). But during the post-Cold War era, there was a noticeable shift away from the conventional state-centered notion of security towards a greater emphasis on the safety and welfare of individuals and communities within the state (Babu, 2016). This new approach prioritises the institutionalised and collective policy actions to address these concerns, moving away from the sole reliance on the military power (Kerr, 2007, p.92). Human security has become a central tenet of modern security, placing a significant emphasis on safeguarding individuals from a wide array of threats, including poverty, hunger, disease, environmental degradation, human rights abuses, and organised violence (Buzan et al., 1998).The idea of human security demands policy formulation by every national actor in consonance with Article 2 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948 which reads as:

> *"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty"* (p.6).

With the publication of the Human Development Report of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994[4], the concept displays a new political landscape in international political analysis by broadening the idea of security in following areas:

(i)   Economic Security, including energy security

(ii)   Food Security

(iii)   Health Security

(iv)   Environmental Security

(v)   Personal Security

(vi)   Community Security

(vii)   Political Security (*The Human Security Handbook,* 2016, p.7; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 27).

3.4.1. Economic Security: Realigning Global Prosperity

Economic security is the imperative for nations to ensure the basic material needs of their citizens, including access to essential resources such as food, water, and energy. Buzan (1984) provides a perspective on economic security by extending beyond the traditional realms of military strength to encompass the fundamental well-being of states and their populations (Buzan, 1984, pp.597-624). Additionally, safeguarding economic infrastructure, diversifying trade relationships, and maintaining stable financial systems are highlighted as crucial components in fostering national resilience (Buzan et al., 1998).

In this context, the shift of attention from military security to a robust economic infrastructure is gaining prominence as an essential condition for national security (Hussain, 2006, pp. 35-45). It is a tool to ensure stable and higher growth rates, expand social security measures, and respond timely to economic threats, and thereby ensuring national security (Akimova et al., 2020, pp.1-7). Economic security, tied with political stability and community welfare, is an institutional design aimed at protecting economic interests, and encompasses a range of economic issues, including trade agreements to remain competitive in global

marketplace, investment, finance and access to natural resources (Ossa, 2023). Therefore, it serves as a crucial parameter upon which the national security is determined, as it refers to the wide range of policies adopted by the national actor to promote economic growth and competitiveness in alignment with international economic environment (Goodman et al., 2022, p.1).

Further, Buzan expands the scope of economic security beyond the state level, emphasising its direct impact on the well-being of individuals and communities (Buzan, 1984). It becomes a catalyst for societal health, education, and political stability. By prioritising the economic welfare of citizens, nations contribute not only to individual prosperity but also to the broader goal of national security (Buzan et al., 1998).Therefore, Buzan's influential perspective has thus broadened the discourse on international security, emphasising the pivotal role of economic factors in maintaining global peace and stability.

The era of Cold War was characterised by arms race, including proxy wars, and politico-ideological conflicts, as a means of political influence, became outdated, replaced by the concept of deterrence and economic cooperation (Jindal, 2002, p.97). This shift necessitated the concerted global efforts to establish a favourable international financial environment, and sound economic principles and institutions (Cable, 1995, pp.305-324). Ripsman and Paul (2005) views that the policies of Globalisation and Liberalisation, which adopted after the Cold War period, as significant steps in fostering development, and enhancing economic security, aiming to strengthen national economies and their integration into global economy (pp.199-227). Globalisation was thought to promote economic security, however, the North's dominance of capital and technology raised concerns about national security in the South by allowing foreigners to dominate the economy and by widening internal disparities that exacerbated social unrest, environmental issues, migration, and economic inequality (Jeffery, 2000, p.303).

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the concomitant end of the Cold War opened a new global order with geo-political and geo-economic priorities (Griffith, 1993, p.1). In the changing context, economic security, as adopted by G-7 meeting

in Hiroshima in May 2023, covers the measures to enhance global stability and security by bolstering supply chain resilience, fortifying critical infrastructure, addressing non-market policies and practices, economic coercion, tackling harmful digital practices, fostering international cooperation on standard-setting, and preventing the unauthorised diffusion of critical and emerging technologies (Goodman, 2023).In addition, energy is also a fundamental necessity for economic growth and a driving force behind the rapid industrialisation, particularly in the context of globalisation.

Therefore, the energy security, which has the most direct connection with the economic and military security, became a major component of national security due to its intertwined character with the development (Milina, 2013, p.76). European Commission defines energy security as 'reliable, affordable access to all fuels and energy sources'[5]. This entails utilising sufficient domestic energy resources that are extracted in economically acceptable conditions or kept as strategic reserves.

Therefore, it involves accessing reliable and stable external energy sources, which can be complemented, if needed, by strategic energy plans (Yadav, 2008, p.3). Global energy demands continue to rise, giving oil-producing countries significant influence in international relations that extends beyond strategic and geopolitical considerations. The primary factors impacting energy security include the considerable increase in global energy demand, limitations in the oil market leading to high prices, weaknesses in the energy infrastructure across the supply chain, and the deregulation and liberalisation of domestic energy markets (Proniska, 2007, p.219).

However, with the integration of national economies through the process of globalisation, the issues such as the failure of financial institutions and procedures, liquidity crises, and volatile oil prices are crucial economic variables that have an impact on the national security (Kim, 2006, pp.35-51). In this context, it is relevant to highlight the report of International Labour Organisation (ILO), '*Economic Security for a Better World*' (2004). It says that economic insecurity fosters a 'world full of anxiety and anger'[6]. The global economic crises and stagnation may have the

potential to global political and economic instability and inequality. Persistence of poverty, unemployment, lack of access to credit and other economic opportunities are the root causes of economic insecurity[7].Therefore, broader geopolitical and economic strategies are required on the basis of the available resources to meet the economic security crises with minimum injury to national interest.

3.4.2. Food Security: 'Hunger as a Weapon of War and Conflict'

Food security is a key ingredient of national and economic security and 'the right to food is not only a basic human right but a prerequisite for peace and stability'[8]. Food security as a fundamental aspect of human security, aligning it with critical needs such as health, shelter, and personal safety, has underscores its significant role in national security, asserting that food insecurity can contribute to internal instability and conflict within states, while also emphasising the global implications tied to factors like climate change and resource scarcity (Buzan et al., 1998).

In mid-1970s, during the time of global food crisis, food security evolved into an operational concept in public policy. It prompted rapid global action to reduce poverty and levels of malnutrition. In the 1994 Human Development Report of UNDP, food security was recognised as a key ingredient of human security, sparking discussions at both individual global levels (p.3-4).Further, The World Food Summit in1996 embraced the concept of food security, stating, 'it is attained when all individuals, households, nations, regions and the global community have continuous physical and economic access to enough, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary requirements and preferences, enabling an active healthy life'[9]. World Food Programme (WFP) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2020 for its efforts in combating hunger. The Nobel Committee highlighted the connection between food security and national security, describing 'hunger as a weapon of war and conflict' (Dewaal, 2020). Buzan also pinpoints key contributors to food insecurity, citing poverty, conflict, environmental degradation, and inequitable resource distribution as factors that collectively impede people's access to food (Buzan et al., 1998).

In this context, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 2006, brief that the 'national security approach requires food security to be ensured through international co-operation among national governments, international financial institutions, the FAO, and NGOs' (pp.1-4). The systemic assurance of improving the governance of food security systems and strengthening social protection mechanisms, such as employment and income support, are recognised as key factors in overcoming hunger and food insecurity (Duverux, 2012, pp.01-22). In this context, Antonio Guterres (2018), comments that the food security is 'an essential part of any conflict prevention strategy and a key to ensuring that communities and countries are stable and resilient and can withstand the shocks of conflict and crisis'[10].

Therefore, in the context of growing food insecurity crisis, a comprehensive strategy is needed to combat food insecurity, urging investment in agriculture through initiatives such as supporting small-scale farmers and enhancing irrigation systems, promoting sustainable development by addressing climate change and poverty, and emphasising the importance of international collaboration to share resources, establish food reserves, and respond effectively to emergencies (Buzan et al., 1998).

3.4.3. Health Security: Incremental Global Concern

Health security and national security are intricately intertwined, as a healthy population is crucial for the prosperity and stability of a nation. Illness can hinder productivity, and leading to economic downturns, social unrest, and political instability (Abubakar, 2012, p.133). Furthermore, health threats can have far-reaching implications, disrupting global trade, eroding public trust in governance, and even precipitating conflicts (Matheson, 2021, pp.1-13). World Health Organisation (WHO) views global public health security as:

> *"Proactive and reactive efforts aimed at reducing the risk and consequences of sudden public health crisis that threaten the well-being of people across different geographic areas and international borders"* (World Health Report, 2007, ix).

WHO has listed 13 urgent global security concerns for the coming decades which demands concerted global actions are: (a) Climate crisis (b) health care delivery in areas of conflict and crisis (c) healthcare equity (d) access to treatment (e) infectious treatment prevention (f) epidemic preparedness (g) unsafe products (h) underinvestment in health workers (i) adolescent safety (j) improving public trust of health workers (k) capitalising on technological advancement (l) threat of anti-microbial medicines and other medicines, and (m) health care sanitation[11] (WHO, 15 January, 2020).

According to Barry Buzan, health security, as defined for a state, encompasses safeguarding its population from preventable diseases, maintaining a skilled health workforce, ensuring access to vital medicines, and effectively preparing for and responding to public health emergencies through strategic planning and resource stockpiling (Buzan, et al., 1998). He contends that health security is integral to national security in the contemporary era, citing the globalisation of diseases, the constant emergence of new threats, and the increasing concern over bio-terrorism as pivotal reasons for prioritising robust health measures on a national scale (Koblentz, 2010, pp.96-132).

The geo-political shift during the era of globalisation has established new connections between health security and national security (Lee, 2004). In the post-Cold War era, with increased people-to-people contacts, health security has emerged as a significant concern due to the potential threat of the spread of infectious diseases, including the risk of bio-terrorism (Simmons, 2007). Consequently, a new concept of security has emerged placing 'people at the centre of concern' (UNDP 1994, pp. 27-28). Increasing epidemics and biological risks have the potential to challenge the economic security and to political instability. Strengthening global collaboration between national actors and international stakeholders in setting up the agenda and strategic goals with available resources has bolstered the concept of 'health diplomacy'[12].

The global health security concern has a dramatic impact on international engagement, as it leads to the disruption in the supply chain, border management;

travel monitoring, evacuation and airlift procedures, blame games and disease migration (Kevany et al., 2020, p.6). Health diplomacy, as a national security instrument, fosters relationship building to overcome obstacles in global technological cooperation and creates global awareness of the 'trans-boundary dimensions of health hazards' (Prabhakar et al., 2021). The tragic impact of Covid-19 pandemic exposed the weakness of global security system demanded greater attention to address the global health emergency through international engagements and foreign policy.

3.4.4. Environmental Security: Need for Concerted Action

Environmental security is an essential element of national security and foreign policy, encompassing sustainability and the protection of the natural resource, which has a significant impact on economic security and thereby national security (Levy, 1995, pp.35-62). The environment and economy are intertwined, and humans cannot sustain in the absence of a sustainable environment (Maathai, 2010, p.104). Environmental security entails guarding against environmental degradation to preserve or protect human, material and natural resources at scales ranging from global to local levels (Belluck et al., 2006). Therefore, environmental security as measures to protect environment, ensure resilience to climate change, and promote peace in politically complex and fragile contexts (Petsonk, 1990, pp. 367-370).

Environmental risks due to climate change have been identified as one of the top risks affecting global security (*Global Risk Report*, 2020). Besides, the report of Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014), also issued warning about the far reaching impacts of climate change on hydrological cycles, making vulnerable regions susceptible to droughts, heat stress, sea level rise, cyclones and floods. Additionally, the repercussions of climate change have led to national security concerns, triggering insurgencies, impacting public health, infrastructure and even posing risks to nuclear installations (p.755-791).

The environmental security issues grown from the limited environmental anxieties of ozone depletion, cross boarder contamination issues, and water and air pollution during the Cold-War period, the discussion has evolved into a grave

security concern with anthropogenic and natural dimensions potent enough to harm ecology, people and a threat to global security (Narwaria, 2015, pp.100-111). Environmental issues, now encompasses multi-dimensional threats that jeoparadise not only the security of the individual countries but also transgress national boundaries, leading to disasters, regional tensions, and vulnerabilities in peace, stability and human security (Knos, 1998, p.7).

The expanding population and its increasing pressure on the eco-system, primarily due to the encroachment on wild life habitats for agriculture extension, result in bio-diversity loss. Furthermore, the construction of infrastructure exacerbates the depletion of natural resources, which can lead to ecological imbalance (Singh, et al., 2021, pp.11-14). The imbalance has socio-economic dimensions, ultimately causing migration of population from one state to another, leading to tensions and conflicts between states (Mittal, 2013, pp. 2-3).

Globalosation has encouraged the idea of capital-intensive industries as solution for development, but this has had an increasing impact on the environmental system and has resulted in significant social risks (Vyshnevska et al., 2020). The technological upgradation associated with global development goals is a major concern for global environmental security, primarily due to the use of organic and inorganic chemicals and the management of toxic and hazardous waste, which can cause severe damage to the environment (Siddiqua et al., 2022). Furthermore, desertification poses a significant risk, as it has the potential to trigger famine, affecting human security, political stability and causing international conflicts and tensions (Warren, 1993, pp. 11-14).

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) enforces obligatory measures to protect the environment and averts human caused disruptions to the climate system (Droge, 2020, pp.01-38). During the post-Cold War era, the consequences of environmental deterioration have emerged as a critical security concern. The potential for collaboration and diplomacy in addressing these issues further gained importance of the environment in the global security landscape (Brauch, 2014, p.3).The environmental security undoubtedly has a cascading effect

on national security, which necessitates a reorientation of development priorities and policy changes that embrace environmental responsibility (Ozcan, 2023). Further, by adapting new technological solutions to mitigate trans-boundary risks and global warning is imperative at this time to eliminate incremental threats such as economic slowdown and migration (Droge, 2020).

3.4.5. Community and Political Security: Securing Social Cohesion

UNDP (1994) views community security as an integral part of national security, defining it as 'the protection of people from sectarian and ethnic violence' (p.31). Community security threats, as defined by the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) includes inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions (UNOCHA, 2009, p.7). These threats can also manifest as violence, discrimination, exclusion and other identity related tensions. The impact of community security threat is far reaching; affecting social identities, endangering nation-building efforts, and posing risks to national security. Such threats can lead to severe political discrimination and civil war (Buzan, 1991, p.19).

Buzan argues that security is inherently social and cannot be solely understood in terms of military threats. He introduces the concept of 'security communities' to describe groups of states that have achieved a high degree of mutual trust and cooperation, leading to a shared sense of security (Buzan, 2007). Buzan defines a security community as a group of states whose members 'have accepted the legitimacy of each other's existing borders and the basic rules and institutions of international order; they do not threaten each other militarily; and they have established a dense network of economic, political, and social relations' (Wilson et al., 2016, pp. 94-136).

Community security encompasses both group and personal security, with a primary focus on the freedom from fear, and avoidance of threats to personal and group security include physical torture, ethnic tension, and threats against women and children (UNDP, 2009, pp.13-14). Therefore, the concept of community security can be approached from state-centered and individual-centered perspectives. Its emphasis lies in building an effective state system with greater accountability to

its citizens, ensuring the efficient delivery of services. Furthermore, community security is 'inter-connected with the security of other states because it is a collective good shared by all members of international system' (Sugnami, 1989, p.122).

During the post-Cold war era, community security threats have acquired transnational character, demanding global concerted diplomatic action to address this menace. As a multi-faceted concept, it has close linkages with human and economic security, as well as democratic political process (Axworth, 2001, pp. 19-23). During the post- Cold War era, there has been a decline in state- based conflicts, but there is an increase in non- state conflicts (Englehart, 2016, pp.72-73). The source of many communal security threats in the post-Cold War period lies in their cross-border nature, impacting internal security and contributing to crime. These threats are potent enough to undermine public confidence, necessitating social cohesion and joint action to counter their intensity (Bruun & Halsall, 2016).

The incremental transnational crimes, such as human trafficking, drug trade, terrorism, spread of diseases and fluctuating economical conditions, in the post-globalised era, demanded greater international cohesion to effectively address these issues[13]. Thus, community security and political security are intricately linked. The community security approach, which emphasises individual entitlement to safety and protection, can have implications for political security as it addresses the underlying drivers of insecurity and social cohesion (Jones, 2004). By strengthening relationships among people, social groups, and public authorities, community security efforts can foster greater political stability and reduce the potential for conflicts rooted in inequality, exclusion, and violence (Drysdale et al., 2023, pp.215-231).

Political security is a major dimensional aspect of human security and one of the five sectors of analysis of Copenhagen school of security studies, aimed at ensuring people's lives with full human rights. Barry Buzan (1991) defines political security as:

> *"the stabilisation of state system, including its institutions and the values underlying them, against coup attempts, revolutions, insurrections and other*

forms of internal violence, as well as against external aggression or the use of force by other states"(p.20).

Buzan's idea of political security revolves around the maintenance of internal political order, the protection of sovereignty and institutions, and the management of external threats. On the other hand, the Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994 focus on human-centric aspect of institutional excesses particularly in terms of preventing government repression, systematic violation of human rights, and threats arising from militarisation[14]. Both internal and external dimensions of political security emphasises its role as a 'fundamental concept of national security provides strong foundation for a stable and prosperous society and equips the state to pursue its goals in international arena' (Cox &Stokes, 2018, p.107).

National actors must meticulously contemplate the security challenges outlined above when formulating their foreign policy strategies. Nevertheless, in the post-Cold War era, the escalation of security threats, encompassing a blend of conventional and unconventional challenges, has been intensified by swift advancements in technology and weaponry (Camilleri, 1994, pp.135-145). These challenges present hindrances to attaining supremacy in global power, securing geopolitical advantages, and ensuring economic security. The proliferation of diverse security challenges at both national and international landscape has markedly affected India, shaping foreign policy considerations in the post-Cold War era.

3.5. India's Changing Security Landscape

The post-Cold War period witnessed significant geopolitical shifts, leading to increased focus on meeting economic and political standards (Cohen, 1991, pp.551-580). Simultaneously, the dissolution of the Soviet Union highlighted the complexities of inter ethnic conflicts and spurred discussions on the concept of 'social security' within the context of both regional stability and the nascent formation of a global society (Fita, 2012, p.155). This period also witnessed

numerous security challenges, of economic, political and ideological, that invariably impact the national security of almost all nations of the world (Laos, 2000).

The changing context compelled the national actors to devise such security strategies, expressed through foreign policy, deemed necessary to 'protect domestic core values from external threats' (Leffler, 1990, p. 143). Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh (2021) remarked that:

> *'Today, the security scenario in the whole world is evolving very rapidly. As a result, the challenges to our national security are increasing and becoming more complex' (Times of India, 19 August 2021).*

The security landscape of India has been significantly influenced by wide range of external and internal variables. These challenges encompassing military, political, economic, technological, and environmental aspects collectively shaping the global security landscape that affecting India (Kidwai, 1992, pp.63-67).The global threats posed by terrorism, disarmament, environmental protection, and epidemic control, necessitates global collective action for ensuring international peace and security, which is also relevant for India (Siwach, 2003, pp.151-52). Besides, the strategic position of India as the point of convergence for Western, Northern, Eastern, and South East Asia, comprises seven states with diverse transnational ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups has encouraged trans-border tensions, proxy wars, and highly intense conflicts amongst tribes, ethnic groups and ideologies (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011).

More, as per the Failed States Index of the Fund for Peace, six of India's neighboring countries are among the top twenty-five dysfunctional states worldwide[15], also have a considerable impact on India's security landscape (*Times of India,* August 14, 2005). In addition, the region is also experiencing the rise of China, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, makes the security environment more complex (Pant, 2014, p.1; Ganguly & Shoup, 2016, p.194). These challenges are characterised by 'volatility, uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity primarily arising from the collaborative hybrid threats posed by its neighbuoring countries and escalating politico-economic instability in the region' (Sharma, 2022).

Besides, the insurgencies, religious and communal tensions, socio-economic disparities, unemployment, environmental degradation, and resource scarcity aggravates the security threats (Siwach, 2003).

As an emerging global power in the post-Cold War era, India drew its foreign policy by taking into account regional and global security dynamics (Singh, 2004). Every subsequent alteration in foreign policy was justified to address both military and non-military security challenges (Sibal, 2019, pp.24-37). Such a shift is well remarked upon by C. Raja Mohan as 'transformation through incremental adaptation' (Dio, 2016). The transition of India from a balancing force to a leading power during the Post- Cold War era, reshaped 'India's multi-vector foreign policy by adding the tone of realism' through adaptive diplomacy, market power and more reliable strategic partnerships (Peedikayil et al., 2020).

India has evolved as a regional power and a global player with expanding economic and geopolitical significance. India achieved this by redefining unconventional security responses to switching security threats in the air, coastline, land, and cyberspace (*Times of India,* 10 December 2022). Furthermore, it cultivates a friendly international environment through regional and global co-operation, and broad global stability (Kidwai, 1992, p.66). Sabarwal (2012) says that, in the context of multifaceted challenges; India formulated the components for its national security programme focused on:

(i)   Effective boarder management;

(ii)   Protecting the lives and property of its citizens from any internal and external threats;

(iii)   Save the country from instability and other forms of radicalism and extremism;

(iv)   Promoting cooperation, and

(v)   Understanding with neighbuoring countries and build confidence on mutually agreed basis (pp.151-161).

However, the security challenges that India is facing in its geo-strategic environment are diverse, which are analysed below.

3.6. Geo-strategic Security Challenges

India's external and internal environment has been under flux during the post-Cold War period (Ranasinghe, 2012). The security situation has been aggravated by its unstable neighbours such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan (Kakkar, 2023). Additionally, conflicting territorial claims and contested borders with both China and Pakistan along its land borders make the situation more alarming (Pant & Bommakanti, 2019, p. 2). The Line of Actual Control (LAC), an unmarked border with China, and the Line of Control (LoC), a de facto border with Pakistan, have been a source of contention for years (Parthasarathy, 2017, pp. 74-82).

Countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives, individually, may not directly pose serious security risks to India, but are having fragile politico-economic condition, to affect India's security (Dahiya & Behuria, 2012; Tuli, 2022). Defence Minister Rajnath Singh comments that, 'India is bound by geography, and our destinies are intertwined. The security and prosperity of it is intrinsically linked to the security and prosperity of its neighbours' (*Arunachal Times*, September 2023). India's leverage at both regional and international levels has significantly increased, playing a significant role in shaping security situations (Khobragade, 2015, p.46). The principal security issues are analysed below.

3.6.1. China: Facing the Dragon

The unresolved border conflict between India and China, spanning 3488 kilometers and running along several Indian states, including Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim, and Jammu and Kashmir, poses a significant security risk to India's North Eastern boundaries (Guruswami, 2003, pp. 4101-4103). The India-China boundary dispute is a complex issue rooted in historical, geopolitical, and ideological contexts (Sharma, 1965, pp. 16-47). One of the primary points of contention is China's claim that Arunachal Pradesh is entirely their territory, part of the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region[16]. However, India contests this claim and maintains that Aksai-Chin is a part of the eastern most section of the Union Territory of Ladak (Dutta, 2020).

Against the backdrop of the optimistic slogan '*Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai'*, India and China entered into the landmark Panchsheel Agreement on April 29, 1954 (Dasgupta, 2016, pp. 26-31). Reflecting the enthusiasm surrounding this accord, Nehru proclaimed in the Indian Parliament on May 18, 1954, that 'since we gained independence, we have achieved nothing more significant than this' (Madhav, 2014). Unfortunately, it failed to prevent a brief border conflict in 1962. Again in May 2020, the two powers came to blows over the border issue, resulting in the biggest loss of life since 1967[17]. China's military involvement in the region and its military rise emerged it as the 'potential threat number one'[18] for India's security (Yadav & Rana, 2020, pp. 895-907).

In addition to the territorial dispute, India contends with a persistent security challenge posed by China's extensive military and nuclear activities in Tibet, coupled with substantial infrastructure investments aimed at enhancing connectivity with the region (Sikri, 2011.pp.55-71; Banoth, 2023). This has raised apprehensions in India; as such developments could potentially confer strategic advantages to China in the event of military engagements (Jetly, 2010, p.6). The perceived Chinese insecurity in Tibet and its utilisation of the territorial disagreement as a tool for 'coercive diplomacy' contribute to the ongoing standoffs and tensions along the border (Jash, 2022).

India's sovereignty and territorial integrity are under threat due to China's pursuit of dominance in South East Asia (Kugleman, 2023). The disputed region becomes a flashpoint in China's ongoing 'act of Dragon'[19] over the disputed lands, which exacerbates border expansion and infiltration. The unresolved boundary dispute may offer China a strategic advantage in leveraging its bargaining power and projecting strength on the global stage (Tarapore, 2021). India is well aware of the potential risk posed by unresolved border disputes, which China may utilise as a means of strategic leverage.

There were previous standoffs in 2013, 2014, 2015, and in 2017 India-China relations witnesses its most precarious moments during the 73-day long Doklam stand-off which started on 16 June 2017, were also dangerous but did not result in casualties (Roy, 2020, p. 34).The skirmish took place in Galwan Valley since 2020 took serious clash between India and Chinese forces on December 9, 2022, a result

of China's extensive infrastructure development in the border region, in the Yangtse sector of the Tawang region along the India-China frontier (Ruser & Grewal, 2023; Panda & Baruch, 2019, p.2). The major areas of security challenges between India and China are discussed below.

3.6.1.1. Military strength: Widening Gap

Annual Report to US Congress 2019, says that China is positioned as a prominent player in the global military, economic, and political landscape, with aspirations to become a leading force in international politics. The report further points out that, 'China aims to strengthen its presence within established regional and global institutions, while also strategically pursuing the creation of new multilateral mechanisms and organisations to advance its specific interests'[20]. As part of its expansion in Asian region, China holds a dominant position in both conventional and nuclear military capabilities compared to India (Sitaraman, 2020, pp.283-84). According to figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), since the middle of the 1990s, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has grown significantly, becoming into a powerful military force. China is predicted to have spent $293 billion on its military in 2021, while India spent only $77 billion[21].

India is apprehensive about Chinese rapid modernisation and enhancement of its military infrastructure, coupled with its possession of the world's largest army (*Economic Times*, 2023, March 05). India's concerns have escalated due to China's substantial military strength, marked by a larger contingent of troops and artillery, resulting in an imbalance of power between the two nations (Balasubramaniam & Murugesan, 2020). China has executed several medium and long-term strategies within its defence industry, along with plans and institutional adjustments, aimed at bridging the technological gap in global military advancements (Mc Reynolds, 2016). These efforts focus on fostering native innovation to develop advanced weapons platforms, systems, and technologies; ultimately enabling a transformation into a fully digitised and technologically advanced armed force (Razka & Bitzinger, 2020, p. 94).The Military Direct's rating gave China a score of 82 out of 100[22]. In terms of GDP, and defence spending parameter, the gap between the two is also wide. China's spends 1.7% of GDP, US $252 Billion and India spends 2.4% of GDP

US$67 Billion[23]. See the table for the relative military strength of India and China in 2022.

Table 3.2

Comparison of Indo-China Military Strength in 2022

Variables	India	China
Power Index Rank	4	3
Annual Defence Expenditure Rank	6	2
Total Military Personal	14,55,550	21,85,000
Nuclear Warheads	160	350
Total Aircraft	2,240	3284
Fighter Aircraft	577	1199
Attack Helicopters	36	281
Tank	4614	4950
Armored Vehicles	100882	174300
Self Propelled Artilleries	100	2795
Aircraft Carrier	2	2
Submarines	18	78
Destroyers	11	50

Source:*globalfirepower.comhttps://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php*

The comparison of the military strength between India and China in 2022 reveals that China holds advantages in various aspects. With a higher power index rank, larger annual defence expenditure, more military personnel, nuclear warheads, aircraft, fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, and a larger fleet of armored vehicles, self-propelled artilleries, submarines, and destroyers, Chinese military capabilities surpass India in these areas. However, India maintains strengths in certain domains like tanks and aircraft carriers. The data underscores China's dominant position in overall military prowess, but both countries possess significant capabilities that contribute to the complex regional geopolitical landscape.

China has significantly expanded its military capabilities with the introduction of various advanced equipment and systems. Collaborative efforts with Pakistan have led to the development of fourth-generation fighters (FC-1/JF-17)[24],

alongside the enhancement of its presence in the global defence market through the J-10. The introduction of new combat trainers (FTC-2000, L-15, K-8), a fifth-generation fighter (J-31), and a range of missile systems, including anti-ship, anti-tank, and man-portable variants, as well as Surface-to-Air Missiles (HQ-9), radars (YLC-8B, SLC-2E), transport aircraft (MA60, Y-20), helicopters (Z-9G, Z-10, Z-11, Z-15, Z-19E), and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Pterodactyl WJ-1, CH-4) have augmented China's striking capabilities (Harold, 2018, pp.39-49). China has also introduced new versions of tanks (VT-3, VT-4, VT-5), and light armored vehicles (VN-4), self-propelled and towed artillery (PLZ45, PLZ52), multiple rocket launchers (A-100), trucks (CS/VN3), ships (Type 053, 054A, 056), and submarines (S26T/Type 039A), which significantly enhanced its potential for offensive operations (Raska & Bitzinger, 2020, p.101).

Besides, China possesses a range of Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in its arsenal, including silo-based ones like the CSS-4 Mod 2/DF-5A, which has a reach of around 13,000 kilometers[25]. Another silo-based ICBM, the CSS-4 Mod 3/DF-5B, is equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) and has a comparable range to the DF-5A. Additionally, China possesses the CSS-10 Mod 1/DF, a solid-fueled, road-mobile ICBM with an estimated range exceeding 11,200 kilometers (Cordesman et al., 2016. pp. 377-426). China is in the process of developing a new road-mobile ICBM, the CSS-X-10/DF-41, which is expected to feature MIRV capability and an extended operational range[26].

3.6.1.2. Chinese Economy: Growing Tensions

World Bank Group in China (2020) in its report says that, with an annual GDP growth rate of nine percent and the position of the world's second-largest economy, and China has attained its status through a growth-oriented approach, heavily relying on investment and exports (pp, 01-101). Chinese expanding influence is noticeable in its interactions with developing economies and emerging markets, largely driven by its significant investments[27]. With ongoing sustainability and structural balancing, China is poised to become the world's largest economy by

around 2035 (Prazereset al., 2021). The rapid expansion of Chinese economy has led to the substantial increase in its defence spending and military capabilities, raising concerns of a security threat for neighbuoring countries and Asia-Pacific region (Jochheim & Lobo, 2023).

China during 2018-2021 recorded the GDP, 6.75%, 5.95 %, 2.24% and 8.11% respectively[28], which is higher than India even during the Covid-19 pandemic periods. Besides, India is one of the biggest importers from China in pharmaceutical ingredients, chemicals, and auto components, electrical and mechanical machinery (Reuters, 2023). The bilateral trade increased to US$ 135.98 billion in 2022 and Indian export to China of US$17.48 and the trade deficit marked US$100 billion (*Economic Times*, 13 January 2023). Between 2000 and 2022, India's imports from China growing, the growing trade deficit is a threat to India's economic security. See the table below.

Table 3.3
India- China Trade Deficit from 2017-2022 (in US $ billion)

Period	Imports from China	Exports to China	Trade Deficit
2017-18	76.38	13.33	-63.05
2018-19	70.32	16.75	-53.57
2019-20	65.26	16.61	-48.65
2020-21	65.21	21.19	-44.03
2021-22	94.57	21.26	-73.31

Source: *Ministry of Commerce, India*

The data illustrates India's consistent trade deficit with China from 2017-2018 to 2021-2022. Despite slight fluctuations, the trade deficit remained prevalent throughout the period, reaching its widest gap in 2021-2022 at -73.31 billion. This imbalance signifies India's higher imports compared to its exports to China. The data underscores the ongoing economic security challenge India encounters in managing and harmonising its trade dynamics with China, prompting the need for continued efforts to address this trade disparity.

Besides, China made huge investments in Indian industrial sectors. Chinese investment in India has predominantly flowed into key sectors such as infrastructure, manufacturing, and technology. Significant capital has been injected into India's infrastructure, spanning projects in roads, railways, and ports. The manufacturing sector, with a notable focus on automotive and electronics industries, has also attracted substantial Chinese investments (Bhandari et al., 2020). Moreover, there is a growing trend of Chinese companies channeling funds into India's technology sector, with a particular emphasis on e-commerce and fintech industries. The Chart shows the share of Chinas investment in Indian industry.

Figure 3.2

Chinese Investment in Indian Industrial Sectors (in %)

Source: *Chinese Investment in India, Report No. 3, Map No. 10, February 2020.*

The Chinese Investment India Report (2020) says that China has made huge investment in automobile sector and metallurgical industries, along with power and construction sectors also (pp.01-24). China's substantial manufacturing and robust research and development investments provide it a notable advantage in exports, making it a considerable economic threat to India and potentially surpassing India as Asia's leading economy. However, some alleged practices such as dumping goods,

intellectual property theft, and unfair trade strategies have adversely impacted India's economy[29].

3.6.1.3. Growing Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), a crucial geostrategic zone connecting the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, holds vital importance by facilitating access to diverse regions and acting as a pivotal gateway for the East-West trade corridor (Naha, 2022, pp.47-64). Due to the economic significance of the area, become a focal point of contention and conflict between India and China. Besides, both India and China, rapidly expanding economies, heavily rely on the region for importing their energy resources (Abhinandan, 2019, pp.138-139).The escalating prominence of China in global supply chain, coupled with its interest in the abundant resource reserves of the Indian Ocean and the strategic sea lines of communication has gained IOR a prominent position in Indian foreign policy (Sweijs et al., 2010 pp.15-40). The strategic significance of IOR is given in the chart below:

Figure 3.3
Strategic Significance of Indian Ocean Region

Compiled from, 'A 2030 India's Vision for Economic Diplomacy, P. 47'.

The chart reveals the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean Region, encompassing vital aspects such as maritime security, the protection of the blue economy, and holding geopolitical importance by fostering multilateral constitutionalism. This displays the multifaceted role the IOR in shaping regional and global dynamics.

Amidst the remarkable surge in Chinese military might, former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh highlighted the challenges emerging in the region. He commented that 'India resides in a complex neighbourhood marked by a spectrum of conventional, strategic, and non-traditional challenges. India has aimed to take on the responsibility for fostering stability in the Indian Ocean Region and is well positioned to assume the role of a net security provider not only within its immediate surroundings but also beyond' (Chauhan, 2016). Both India and China, driven by security and connectivity objectives, have embarked on various infrastructural initiatives, resource mobilisation, and modernisation efforts in IOR (Khan, 2022, pp.13-33).

The establishment of Chinese hubs in the IOR has indeed heightened concerns and generated perceptions of a potential security threat to India. Chinese maritime strategy often referred to as the 'String of Pearls'[30] revolves around creating a network of ports and naval facilities across the Indian Ocean. India views this strategy as a means for China to expand its influence and assert power in the region. Besides, as part of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) [31], the development of the deepwater port of Gwadar in Pakistan. Which situated at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, is strategically positioned near the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global energy supplies (Khan, 2012, p.79). China has also secured access to facilities in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations such as Djibouti, Oman (Salalah Port), and Yemen (Aden Port) (Erickson & Collins, 2015). These facilities are seen as providing logistical support for Chinese naval operations and bolstering China's capacity to maintain a lasting presence in the region. Additionally, the case of Hambantota port in southern Sri Lanka serves as an illustration of China's growing influence (Nitin, 2021). As Sri Lanka faced challenges in repaying the Chinese debt, China acquired a 99-year lease on the Hambantota port, granting it control and a strategic foothold near vital shipping lanes (Vasudeva, 2018). Furthermore, China extended financial support to the Maldives for the construction of the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge, facilitating the connection between Male and the islands of Hulhumale and Hulhule (Thakur, 2023). This endeavor also led to China obtaining a 50-year lease on several islands in the Maldives (Ethiranjan, 2020).

Responding to the growing power imbalances, military expansion, and evolving perceptions within the maritime domain, China has fortified its offshore security capabilities in relation to India (*Times of India*, 2023 October 30). Chine has achieved this through military and semi-military alliances, the establishment of ports, the deployment of non-combatants, and the provision of weaponry to specific allies. The Maritime Silk Road (MSR), a core component of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has spurred driven China's increased focus on the IOR. Moreover, the escalation in maritime drug trafficking via the Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor across the Indian Ocean has become a notable security concern for India (Hlongwa, 2020, pp. 21-37).

3.6.1.4. One Belt One Road

The One Belt One Road (OBOR) refers 21st century Maritime Silk Route (MSR), a strategy aimed at boosting trade and accessing new markets of Asia, Africa and Europe (Ray, 2016, pp. 828-834). The proposal entails creating a comprehensive land corridor linking South Asia, South East Asia, Central Asia, and Europe (Cai, 2017). This initiative focuses on enhancing transportation infrastructure and communication networks, including railways, roads, and fiber optics highways. The OBOR consists of three overland routes:

(i)   Connecting China with South East Asia, and the Indian Ocean;

(ii)   Connecting China with Central Asia, Russia and Europe; and

(iii)   Linking China with Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia (Sarker et al., 2018).

The OBOR and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project raise serious security concern for India. These initiatives pass through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), thereby violating India's territorial integrity and challenging sovereignty and claims over disputed border territories, especially vis-a vis China and Pakistan (Nataraj & Sekhani, 2015, pp.67-71; Deshpande, 2023). More than an infrastructure project, OBOR grants China greater geopolitical dominance and economic and diplomatic leverage upon India's neighbuoring states which undermine Indian strategic interests. India views the OBOR project with suspicion, that it might violate international norms, and standards (Girisankar, 2020).

India has several reasons to be frustrated with China, including the growing skirmish on the boarder, trade imbalance, problems with the Brahmaputra River, diplomatic activity in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Nepal, and Bangladesh is supported by 'cheque-book diplomacy'[32]. Beyond the border skirmish, China followed the duel strategy of 'friendship and hostility' and an existential threat to India through its dramatically modernised and expanding forces (Khobragade, 2015, p.47). The enhancing Pakistan's nuclear and defence capabilities, close defence cooperation with China has been the one element contributing the most to India's regional security worries.

3.6.2. Pakistan: an Untamed Neighbour

Since partition, Pakistan has posed the most apparent security threats to India, with Kashmir became the most contentious issue between the two nations (Ahmar, 1984, pp.100-119). This dispute sparked two major wars in 1947 and 1965 and a limited conflict in 1999. The 1971 war was centered on the creation of Bangladesh. Pakistan's set back in multiple wars have fueled long-term rivalry and led to the proxy wars (Khobragade, 2015, p.46). Pakistan employs proxy war against India, as evidenced by the incidents such as Parliament attack in 2001, the Mumbai attack in 2008, the Uri attack in 2016 and the Pulwama attack in 2019.These action can be seen as a continuation of Pakistan's policy to 'bleed India with thousand cuts' (Ashok,2020).

Former Foreign Secretary, Muchkund Dubey commented that 'Pakistan has been encouraging and assisting terrorists to cross over the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir and this purpose, it maintains a whole infrastructure of terrorist organisations and their training camps on its territory to destabilise India'[33]. The underlying cause of Indo-Pak rivalry stems from the geopolitical dynamics, rather than solely religious, ideological, or territorial factors, primarily driven by three key elements:

(i)   The involvement of the United States and China has influenced Pakistan's military capabilities in relation to India.

(ii)   The proxy war in 1980s Afghanistan facilitated the acquisition of arms and trained Mujahedeen fighters, enabling insurgency in Kashmir.

(iii)   Pakistan's enduring 'all-weather friendship' with China provides a counter-balance against India in South Asia, allowing it to rally extra-regional support and sustain the Kashmir issue through backing for Kashmiri terrorist groups rooted in distinct social and ideological contexts (Sattar, 2015; Nayar & Paul, 2003, p. 84).

Therefore, the grave challenges from Pakistan is in the form of direct attack on people, national infrastructure, and the defence system, sponsored by external forces, remain major security concern for India (Narayanan, 2010, pp.165-190). Commenting this issue, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh says that, 'national security challenges are increasing and become complex because of the changing geo-political situation globally'[34]. In military terms, Pakistan is considered as a secondary threat to India (See table 3 (4), but cross-border terrorism in Kashmir and the Pakistan sponsored infiltration is serious security threat against India.

Table 3.4

India- Pakistan Military Position

Variables	India	Pakistan
Global Military Position	4	7
Defence Budget Rank	4	29
Active Military personal	1,450,000	6,54000
Aircraft (Fighter)	173	60
Helicopters	729	400
Combat Tank	4614	3742
Submarines	16	6
Navel Destroyers	11	0
Aircraft Carriers	1	0
Nuclear War Heads	150	160

Source*: Compiled by the researcher from different sources.*

The data indicates a notable military advantage for India over Pakistan. India holds a higher global military position and maintains superior defence budget rank compared to Pakistan. India boasts larger active personnel and possesses more fighter aircraft, helicopters, and combat tanks than Pakistan. Additionally, India has a greater number of submarines, naval destroyers, and aircraft carriers in comparison

to Pakistan's absence of destroyers and carriers. However, Pakistan slightly edges in nuclear warheads. These figures depict India's military superiority in several aspects, though comprehensive security considerations encompass more than numerical strength alone. However, geopolitics, alliances, technology, and strategic doctrines play a pivotal role in shaping the regional dynamics.

Along with this, the unstable political setup, and the possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan raises concerns. In an emergency, Pakistan might feel compelled to use nuclear weapons to counter superior conventional Indian forces (*Al Jazeera*, 2023, January 25). India's growing apprehension revolves around Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, particularly its military command and control over these weapons, and its seemingly sympathetic stance towards extremism (Mustafa, 2009, pp.84-94). Apart from the increasing presence of terrorist groups in 'Af- Pak' region and their growing influence on Pakistan, India also suspicious that the possible lose of systemic control over nuclear arsenal may be detrimental for India's security interest (Perlez et al., 2010).

3.6.3. Other Unstable Neighbourhoods

India's security landscape is complex and multifaceted, featuring nuclear-armed adversaries like China and Pakistan, alongside security uncertainties arising from the unstable political situations in neighboring nations such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka[35]. With extensive land borders as well as a maritime border shared with Sri Lanka, India's security is intricately interwoven into a web of geopolitical intricacies. These complexities, influenced by socio-cultural identities and historical legacies, contribute to contentious issues with its neighboring countries (Gorawantschy & Bohme, 2010). Besides, the evolving crisis in Afghanistan, coupled with the rise of the Taliban, adds another layer of complexity to these challenges.

3.6.3.1. Bangladesh

The sharing of a 4096 kilometer boundary with Bangladesh poses more vicious and insidious threat to India. The illegal migration from Bangladesh

impacting border security challenges, population pressure, socio economic and cultural-identity concerns affecting inland security (Singh, 2014). Further, Bangladesh is grappling with terrorism from groups like Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), leading to concerns for India's security as these groups could potentially use Bangladesh as a base for attacks[36].

Insurgent outfits like United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) have bases in Bangladesh's bordering areas, raising fears of cross-border attacks and using the country as a sanctuary for regrouping (Routary, 2020). Bangladesh's actions have added to the instability in India's northeast by permitting the ULFA and other militant organisations to use its territory for the purpose of conducting terrorist operations within India (Bhaumik, 2007). The porous India-Bangladesh border, coupled with the challenge of illegal immigration, further intensifies India's security worries, while acknowledging the need for joint efforts to address these challenges and enhance bilateral ties (Sarkar, 2010, pp. 683-686).

3.6.3.2. Myanmar

The northeastern states of India face a considerable security challenge due to the porous 1,600-kilometer border shared with Myanmar. This region hosts various insurgent groups that maintain connections with Indian counterparts, making cross-border movement of militants and weapons relatively straightforward (Yousuf, 2022). The challenging landscape, encompassing dense forests, rugged terrain, and riverine zones, further facilitates this activity. Therefore, the India-Myanmar border is susceptible to threats such as cross-border movement of insurgents, gun running, and drug trafficking (Fannigan, 2019).

Indian insurgent factions exploit the porous border to find refuge, plan operations, and receive training, often with implicit backing from Myanmar and assistance from arms trafficking and drug smuggling networks (Dutta, 2000). The area's vulnerability, given its proximity to the 'Golden Triangle' for drug trafficking, is exacerbated by factors such as the 1967 boundary agreement and the

Free Movement Regime, adding complexity to border dynamics (Finnigan, 2019; Mishra, 2009, pp. 81-96). The political instability and refugee crisis stemming from the military takeover in Myanmar have heightened security concerns for India in the region.

3.6.3.3. Nepal

Nepal, a landlocked country sharing the strategic geographical position between India and China and share a 1,850 km long open border, and sharing boundary with five Indian states- Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, facilitating unrestricted movement of People and goods (MEA, July, 2014). To the north, Nepal is sharing border with China's Tibetan region, with twenty eight passes of which three are opened throughout the year. The presence of Nepal is not raising any direct threat perception. Murthy (1999) views that the concern related with:

(i)   Any external power, could access to the India's mainland by exploiting the open boarder between India and Nepal.

(ii)   The growing vulnerability arising from the political and economic instability of Nepal (Para, 04).

In response to the shared security concerns, India entered the Treaty and Friendship in 1950, which also supplemented with the Treaty of Trade and Commerce. This foundational agreement forms the basis for bilateral relations, safeguarding economic and security interest for both nations. However, both nations share concerns regarding transnational terrorism and cross-border criminal activities (Subedi, 1994, pp.273-284). Besides, Nepal is also facing Left wing Maoist extremism, which could have link with various anomic groups in the states of Bihar and Andra Pradesh, thereby posing internal security threats to India (Murthy, 1999; Ashraf, 2002, pp. 62-80). Furthermore, the presence of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the ongoing Maoist insurgency in Nepal creates potential security challenges to India (Katoch, 2020).

Besides, the porous Indo-Nepal border creates a persistent risk as it potentially facilitates collaboration between international terrorist groups and Nepalese armed factions (*Annual Report,* MEA, 2004-05). This threat is a shared concern for India, which fears the border's exploitation by anti-Indian elements, posing a significant danger to national security. The rise of armed groups has fueled an increase in illegal small arms trade, leading to a surge in armed violence, especially in Nepal's Terai and Eastern hills. (Khakurel, 2015, p.16). Furthermore, Nepal serves as a hub for transnational crimes, includes activities such as smuggling, trafficking, and terrorism. Consequently, this situation poses a threat to India's security, as it facilitating the spread of illegal weapons, drugs, and the infiltration of criminals (Adhikari, 2021).

3.6.3.4. Bhutan

Bhutan, nestled in the Himalayas, shares its borders with India to the south and west and China to the north and east. Given its status as a crucial strategic partner, Bhutan's security holds paramount importance for India (Saroha, 2021, pp.126-137). Bhutan and India share an enduring and historically intimate relationship founded on mutual respect, collaboration, and understanding (Srakar, 2012, pp.347-352). However, recent developments in the region have given rise to concerns regarding potential security threats originating from Bhutan, with implications for India's national security.

China's deepening engagement with Bhutan has raised apprehensions in India, fearing the potential leverage that China could exercise over India or its access to critical regional assets[37].China's deepening economic and diplomatic connections with Bhutan, evident through investments in infrastructure like roads and hydropower projects have raised apprehensions in India (*Rauters*, 2022 January 12). India believes that these investments could potentially provide China with increased access to Bhutan's resources, influencing its political and security decisions and challenging India's regional influence. Moreover, the persistent border dispute between Bhutan and China is a cause for concern, with the potential for escalation that could draw India into the conflict. Bhutan's internal security

struggles, including terrorism and insurgency, also present risks, potentially rendering Bhutan vulnerable to external influences (Sarkar 2012).

Bhutan's security landscape is intricately linked with India's northeastern region, and any instability in Bhutan has the potential to spill over into India, compounding existing challenges posed by insurgency and militancy in the northeast (Mazumdar, 2005, pp.566-580). In the extensive forested area along the India-Bhutan border, approximately 50 training camps are operated by insurgent groups such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isaac-Muivah) or NSCN(I-M) (Chaudhari, 2003). Following this India demanded action against these militants have base in Bhutan. However, the open borders shared by India, Nepal, and Bhutan, while fostering close ties and border trade, have also raised worries about national security due to their porous nature and the potential for facilitating illegal activities (*The Economic Times*, 2017, February 28).

3.6.3.5. Maldives

The Maldives located in the Indian Ocean and sharing an ocean boundary with India, poses a security concern due to its limited military capabilities, rendering it susceptible to external threats. Its strategic position along crucial sea routes for India adds to the significance of this concern (Ahmed, 2023). The history of political instability and the rise of authoritarianism, along with the presence of religious extremism and escalating internal turmoil, have implications for global peace (Naseem, 2025, pp.99-119).

India is apprehensive about the heightened Chinese economic and political involvement in the Maldives, fearing possible exploitation for strategic advantages and access to vital regional resources (Mitra, 2022). Additionally, the increasing number of terrorist activities, amplified by its unstable political history, which provides opportunities for extremist factions and external interference, is also a concern for India (*The Economic Times*, 12 July, 2018). Besides, the susceptibility of the Maldives to climate change-induced predicaments, including rising sea levels

and potential social upheavals, further adds to India's anxieties. The increasing incidence of transnational crimes, such as drug trafficking, and the rise of extremism within Maldives, contribute to tensions in Indian security (Roy, 2022).

3.6.3.6. Sri Lanka

The strategic location and geographical proximity of Sri Lanka to India is currently not perceived as a direct security threat to India, as both nations share a longstanding history of close relations and common interests (MEA, August, 2015). However, specific security concerns arise from the politico-economic situation in Sri Lanka. The country is grappling with a severe economic crisis and political instability, which could potentially escalate into social unrest, creating opportunities for terrorist activities to emerge (Edirisuriya, 2017, pp.211-228).

The history of extremist groups like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that had connections and support from Tamil groups in India, have posed significant security challenges for India (Mohanasudaram, 2008, pp.1161-68). The conflict involving the LTTE had repercussions in India, leading to issues such as refugee influx and arms smuggling (Manoharan, 2010, pp.338-350). Furthermore, the growing presence of China in Sri Lanka raises significant concerns for India's security. China's increasing economic investments, infrastructure projects, and military co-operation with Sri Lanka raise apprehensions about encroachment on India's sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean region (Mallempati, 2022, pp.61-63; Gupta & Balakrishnan, 2010, pp.203-211).

Besides, India faces a daunting array of security challenges, stemming from both nuclear and non-nuclear neighbouring countries, which are exacerbated by their involvement in instigating internal security problems across various regions within India. The Global Risk Report of 2022 has positioned India with a vulnerability index of 42.31,[38] highlighting its susceptibility to risks spanning human security, economic vulnerabilities, societal disruptions, and environmental hazards. This vulnerability is further heightened by externally-supported non-conventional security threats, resulting in incidents of violence, insurgency, and terrorism within the country.

3.7. Non-Conventional Security Threat

Since the end of the Cold War and the inauguration of globalistion, the concept of security has undergone a dimensional change by including non-military aspects referred to be 'non-conventional security' threats (Davis, 2003). Non-traditional security challenges defined as 'to the survival and well-being of people and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources'[39] and non-state actors. The issues related with international terrorism, ecological issues, energy security, contagious diseases, drug trafficking and trans-national crimes constitute the core of non-conventional security threats (Ripsman & Paul, 2005, pp.199-227). In the context of growing security challenges, Indian Minister of External Affairs, S. Jaishankar comments:

> *"Indian society is extremely sensitive to challenges of security, perhaps more than many of its contemporaries. Like the rest of the world, it faces conventional and non-conventional threats of a broad range"*[40].

In the broader context of national security discussions, accurately identifying and contextualising internal security challenges is of paramount importance. The prevailing perception of internal security issues in India has largely revolved around four key threats: the Maoist conflict, ethnic tensions in the North-eastern states, domestic terrorism, and separatist unrest in Jammu and Kashmir (Simon, 2022, pp.107-120). The security risks posed by terrorism and insurgencies often trace their origins to external influences and support, leading to the perception that these challenges are not purely internal but are rather subjects of extensive discussion within the context of India's internal security concerns (Ranasinghe, 2012). Former Union Home Minister, P. Chidambaram remarked on this situation by stating that, 'India in the twenty first century turned to be the confluence of every kind of violence' (Manoharan, 2010, p.368). The significant non- conventional security threats that India faces, impacting its internal security, are discussed below.

3.7.1. Cross - border Terrorism

The Post-Cold War security landscape of world is becoming more complex and serious due to the increasing occurrence of terrorist activities, defined as, "the use of serious violence against persons or property, or threat to use such violence to intimidate or coerce a government, the public or any section of the public, in order to promote political, social or ideological objectives"[41]. Terrorism, recognised as a transnational menace, is defined by the UN Security Council Resolution (2004) as 'criminal acts, including those targeting civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or the taking of hostages, with the purpose of inducing a state of terror in the general public or within a group of individuals aiming to intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to either act or refrain from taking certain actions'[42].

The post-globalised period witnessed the proliferation of terrorism beyond specific geographical boundaries, assuming transnational character, referred to as 'cross border terrorism'. This strategy is adopted by the adversaries when the possibility of winning is limited through the conventional war. States and state-sponsored non-state actors predominantly utilise this strategy to create an atmosphere of fear and undermine government, and sow unrest within a nation (Pillar, 2001).These cross-border terrorist   entities receive political, economic, and logistical support from external forces to be employed against nations with unresolved border issues and communal or religious vulnerabilities[43] . They employ both military and non-military strategies, targeting public and private spaces, thereby posing threats to infrastructure, democratic and economic institutions, as well as communication systems through various means such as high seas, cyberspace, and psychological spheres (Kydd & Walter, 2006, pp. 49-80).

Terrorism poses a serious threat to Indian security through various means, including the infiltration and exfiltration of armed militants, emergence of non-state actors, the nexus between arms smugglers and narcotics, Left wing extremism, illegal migration and separatist movements (Sakthivel & Sakthivel, 2010.pp.153-162). Cross-border religious terrorism is a significant issue faced in regions of

Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir (*Annual Report*, MEA, 2021-22). Similarly, insurgent terrorism is prevalent in north-eastern states bordering Bangladesh and Myanmar as well as Andhra Pradesh, Telengana, Odisha and Madhya Pradesh (Manoharan, 2013, p.368). Numerous groups are engaged in the transnational networks, and listed 180 terrorist groups have been listed in India during the last twenty years. During the period 2000 to 2022, total estimated incidents killing reached 23756[44]. As per the of List of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967, some active terrorist and insurgent groups include Lashkar-e-Toiba(LeT), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Jaish-e- Mohammed (JeM), Harkat-e-Mujahiddeen and Al Badr. Additionally, Left wing extremist groups like the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) Peoples War, along with all its formations and front organisations are also a matter of security concern due to their external connections (Balakrishnan, 2018, pp. 11-17).

India has consistently accused Pakistan of fostering a conducive atmosphere for terrorism and posing a significant cross-border terrorist threat. This accusation revolves around the alleged support that Pakistan provides to various terrorist groups operating in the Kashmir region (Mohanty & Mohanty, 2017, pp.137-144; Noor, 2007, pp. 65-84). According to India's claims, these groups are not only allowed to operate freely within Pakistan's borders but also receive assistance and resources from elements within the Pakistani establishment (Dwivedi, 2008, pp.31-53). Furthermore, due to its strategic geopolitical location between Pakistan and China, both adversaries of India, Afghanistan holds significant strategic importance. The turmoil in Afghanistan and the rise of the Taliban have led to tensions and question of security in India (Wani, 2022).

3.7.2. Maritime security

In the post globalised era of geo-economics, maritime power also determines the capability of a nation's economic and strategic security. With the growing economic security needs due to the exhausting land resources, the oceans garnered significant attention. This attention is focused on not only their living resources but with offshore mining, deep sea mining and Ocean engineering and also with the

growing volume of blue economy (Zhang & Chen, 2022, pp. 69-83). The ocean's multifaceted contributions to society span vital resources, climate regulation, cultural significance, and economic value, embodying a critical cornerstone for global sustenance and well-being (*International Maritime Organisation*, 08 June 2023). Therefore, it is vital parameter for national security.

India's geographical position and the presence of Indian Ocean ensure an opportunity for India to emerge as key player in the region (Mukherjee, 2017, pp. 21-26). The presence of Indian Ocean raises fundamental questions regarding the maritime security of India, as its geo-strategic location has paved the way for geo-economic opportunities (Mohan, 2022). The Indian Ocean Region stands as the third-largest economic region globally, encompassing various strategic areas. To the west, it covers critical passages such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, and the region around the Horn of Africa. On the eastern side, it includes significant waterways like the Malacca Strait, the Sunda Strait, and the Lombok Strait (Micheal & Sticklor, 2012. p.09). Additionally, it incorporates the Indian coastline, featuring important navigational routes such as the Six Degree Channel and the Nine Degree Channel (Parnjpe, 2007, Naidu, 2013, pp. 236-259). The growing maritime security interest of India in the Indian Ocean region was not limited to the utilisation of water resources but embedded with geo-political and strategic interest.

In the post 26/11 period[45], Indian maritime security lapses were seriously discussed and suggestions were formed to ensure better surveillance along the countries 7516 KM coastlines (Karve, 2018). Besides the presence of Diego Garcia, the USA's multipurpose logistic base and several important natural gas and oil platform complexes of the Western coast and huge investment for converting sea waves into energy boosted India's security concern over the region (Agarwal, 2012). The Chinese maritime ambitions in the region also pose serious ocean security challenge for India (Surie, 2016, pp. 238-252).

3.7.3. Food security challenges

The Post- Cold war period also witnessed the climatic change, which created the securing food security to the 1.39 billion population of India is a monumental task. India's performance in all four aspects of food security- availability, affordability, quality and safety, sustainability and adoption- is marked below average (Waniet al., 2019, pp.171-172).The deterioration of global food environment poses a significant threat food security, which is reflected in India's rank of 71ˢᵗ position in Global Food Security (GFS) Index 2021 out of 113 countries, with a score of 50.2 points in the category of food availability[46]. The challenge India faces in ensuring food security includes low investment in agricultural technologies, low adoption of key technologies in farming and lack of information and poor physical structure.

Based on the data published by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), the Gross Value Added (GVA) of agriculture and its related sectors demonstrated a percentage of 20.1% in the fiscal year 2020-21. This figure witnessed a decline to 19% in the subsequent fiscal year of 2021-22, and further dropped to 18.3% in the fiscal year 2022-23 (Singh, 2023). This badly affecting the food security of India, as shown in the Global Nutrition Report (2022), with no progress in anemia, and 14% of Indian population are undernourished[47]. India's food security is affected by the less adoption of newer technology in agriculture, low soil quality, failure of irrigation and soil management, lack of agri-credit and crop insurance, the absence of proper marketing management system, climate change and natural disasters (Nayyar, 2023).

3.7.4. Energy Security Challenges

Energy security became an important concern of national security, particularly regarding oil and natural gas, which are always prioritised in foreign policy. International Energy Agency (IEA), defines 'energy security as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price' (IEA, 2023 August 03). Energy security is closely linked to economic security and is a major concern for states, as it is a vital element for development. Therefore, foreign policy

measures are always linked to ensure energy security, which involves protection of energy supply chains from foreign attacks; maintaining better relations with oil producing and exporting nations, and ensuring the availability of oil resources at an appropriate price level[48].

India, being a fastest growing economy in the world, realises the importance of a comprehensive and enduring energy security policy without disturbing the economic security of the country aspiring to be a global economic power. Energy security is a crucial factor for the economic growth, with oil playing a predominant role (Pant, 2006, pp.58-72). The Integrated Energy Policy Report of the Export Committee in India defines the energy security as:

> *"When we can supply lifeline energy to all our citizens as well as meet their effective demand for safe and convenient energy to satisfy various needs at affordable costs at all times with a prescribed confidence level considering shock and disruptions that can be reasonably expected"*[49].

India's vision on energy security aims at hundred percent exploration and coverage of Indian sedimentary basins by 2025, exploration of deep water energy resources, overseas investment in exploration of oil and gas resources, self-sufficiency in petroleum refining and storage of oil in various locations[50]. Demographic transition, speedy urbanisation and economic reforms and subsequent industrialisation and the ambition for higher growth rate have boosted the demand for more energy sources. Energy Statistics (2020) of Government of India reveals that there is wide gap of energy production and consumption[51]. To bridge this gap, India depends on energy imports to ensure energy security. India has to engage with many nations, especially those in the Arab region. However, the volatility of global energy market and geopolitical tensions impact the availability and the affordability of oil imports.

3.7.5. Space Security Challenges

The pursuit of space activities is crucial for enhancing national security, foreign policy, and global economic interests, as well as expanding scientific

knowledge. It is defined as the 'actions taken to ensure the sustainability, stability, and free access to, and use of, outer space in support of a nation's vital interests' (Rose, 2011). Sheehan (2014) views, Space technology as a strategic resource for civilian, commercial and military use, offers benefits while also having potential to influence the international balance power, and was used to primarily refer the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, with a focus on military aspects (pp.07-21).

By realising the space based remote sensing, communication and navigation systems, for commercial, military and civilian purposes, India inaugurated its space programme during 1960s (Nair, 2023). Despite with limited technology and resources, India aimed to harness space technology for economic development and social prosperity (Mistry, 2001, pp.1023-1043). But later due to the grave national security challenges posed by the neighbuoring states, space research and technology became a matter of serious concern for India, given their military and security importance in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Mistry ,1998, pp.151-174).

Beyond border surveillance, Indian space assets have a commercial and economic dimension, with the capability to launch commercial satellites as a source of revenue[52]. India's space assets, developed initially for economic purposes, have evolved to offer both economic and military applications (Pant, 2023). Despite the significant initial investment, these assets have not generated immediate tangible benefits. However, they have saved foreign exchange by providing locally supplied space services, and provide a destination for low cost launching facility to other nations (Kasturirangan & Shaijumon, 2021, pp. 305-316). Politically, these assets have boosted India's international prestige and strengthened its ties with other nations. Moreover, India's ability to build and launch strategically important satellites has expanded its power projection and force multiplication capabilities in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific regions (Goswami, 2020, pp. 43-49). Although India's space capabilities may be somewhat limited compared to major space-faring agencies, they contribute to its modest economic, political, and military utility,

enhancing its nuclear deterrent and strategic capabilities. These advancements align with India's emergence as a major player in the global landscape in the coming decade (Mistry, 2001, pp. 1042-43).

However, Indian space faces security challenges within its current geopolitical settings. While there exists a qualitative gap between Pakistan's and India's space programs, Pakistan's space agency, the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), is developing strategies to counter India by enhancing its observation and surveillance capabilities to detect Indian space assets (Ahmad & Arif, 2017, p.822; Bano, 2020). China's satellite constellation, launched with military and strategic objectives, aims for constant surveillance across the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and Himalayan region, underscoring the importance of boosting space security through the enhancement of Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), and electronic warfare[53].

3.7.6. Cyber security Challenges

The spread of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) during post-Cold War globalised period has redefined the systemic operations, governmental and non- governmental, in all major spheres of life (Agunsole, 2005. pp. 01-15). Human life has undergone a revolution with the advent of e-mail, satellite communication, the internet and artificial intelligence (Muheleisen, 2018). As a vital technology that complements military, economic and human security areas, the national infrastructure, including strategic sectors supported by ICT, encounters wider cyber security concerns such as cyber-crime, infrastructural protection, cyber terrorism, cyber warfare, cyber espionage, cyber sabotage, which pose potential threat for the economic and political stability of a nation (Parikh &Patel, 2017, pp.01-07). The rapid digitalisation of public life and the 'Digital India' programme became a major step towards human security (Singh, 2022).

Minister of State for Electronics and Information Technology, Rajeev Chandrasekhar, said that, India witnessed 13.91 lakh cyber security incidents in 2022[54]. This shows that India is vulnerable to cyber security attacks. Therefore, India's Cybersecurity policy (2013) outlines a strategic objective of establishing a robust and secure digital environment for its citizens, businesses, and government.

Its mission is to safeguard information and digital infrastructure, enhance the ability to preempt and manage cyber threats, mitigate weaknesses, and limit the impact of cyber incidents[55]. This approach involves a blend of organisational frameworks, skilled personnel, operational methodologies, technological advancements, and collaborative efforts.

3.8. Redefining Priorities during the Post- Cold War Era

India faces mounting security threats from both internal and external sources, which have intensified in the post-Cold War era. Enhancing self-reliance and deploying countervailing forces tailored to address specific challenges are critical measures for effectively reducing vulnerabilities. Achieving security can be pursued through two main approaches:

(i)   Involves taking appropriate actions to eliminate both internal and external threats, which may include addressing internal vulnerabilities and countering external risks, and

(ii)   Focuses on developing practical alternatives to address potential challenges (Siwach, 2003, pp.145-158).

In this context, strategic planning necessitates clear and straight forward explanations of policy objectives, as well as well-considered choices regarding resources, instruments, and steps to effectively implement those policies (Mazumdar, 2011). In the light of limited resources, India had to employ appropriate foreign policy tools to address the potential threats, both visible and concealed. Therefore, during the post-Cold-War period, India had to redefine its national security agenda. It needed a more sophisticated national strategy and foreign policy to manage its strategically important neighbourhood and exert significant influence over regional geo-political developments (Singh, 2015).

During this timeframe, India confronted a noticeable lack of support and backing from the USSR in its global pursuits, particularly at the United Nations, where it had to contend with adversaries challenging its interests (Tripathi, 2003, p.44). In response, the Indian leadership opted to establish robust diplomatic ties with new allies, notably the United States and Israel (Sunilkumar, 2017, p. 38).

Among these, Israel, owing to shared similarities with India, emerged as a natural and strategic choice for addressing the numerous security challenges facing India.

The deepening strategic partnership between India and Israel carries significant weight, driven by India's practical goal of positioning itself as a major military power in Asia. In pursuit of this ambition, India actively sought to acquire advanced military technology and weaponry, underscoring the pivotal role of its collaboration with Israel in realising this strategic objective. The shift of Indian stance towards Israel has sparked broader discussion, signifying paradigm shift in Indian foreign policy.

3.9. Conclusion

In the post-Cold War era, India confronted a complex set of challenges, including external threats from longstanding rivals such as Pakistan and China, coupled with instability in neighbouring regions. Domestically, insurgencies and a severe economic crisis tested the nation's resilience. In response, the government, led by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, initiated a transformative foreign policy shift characterised by a pragmatic and globally engaged approach, emphasising economic development and international integration. This strategic pivot manifested in India's active participation in global forums like ASEAN and active involvement in multilateral forums the UN system, coupled with the embrace of economic liberalisation. This recalibration not only played a pivotal role in reshaping India's global position but also led to the establishment of stronger diplomatic ties with global powers, exemplified by a strategic realignment with Israel, marking a significant paradigm shift in Indian foreign policy.

Endnote:

1.   See, in K.M.Panikkar, *The Himalayas and Indian Defence* (1947) and Mahla (2022) *'Impact of Geographical Factors on National Security and Strategic Environment of India'*.

2**.**   See**,** Robert Longley, National Security Definition and Examples, Retrieved from: https://www.thoughtco.com/national-security-definition-and-examples-5197450

3.   Human Development Report 1994, Published for UNDP, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994.

4.   The 1994 Report introduces a new concept of human security, which equates security with people rather than territories and examines both the national and the global concerns of human security. Retrieved from, https://www.undp.org/publications/human-development-report-1994.

5.   See, '*Energy Security'*, International Energy Agency.

6**.**   See, ILO, Press release on 01 September 2004,'Economic security strengthens tolerance and happiness as well as growth and development'.

7.   Mentioned in Human Security Handbook 2018.The UN Trust Fund for Human Security, p.9.

8.   Kofi Annan in his address on the occasion of World Food Day at WFO Head quarters at Rome on 14 October 2005. Retrieved from https://www.fao.org/home/en

9**.**   See, Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action. World Food Summit, 13-17 November 1996, Rome.

10**.**   See Antonio Guterrres (2018), statement on UN international Day of Peace, Retrieved from, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1020092.

11.   See for further explanations. Retrieved from https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2020/01/15/who-health-challenges

12.   See, 'Global Health Security is Integral to Foreign Policy'. Retrieved from https://www.emro.who.int/health-topics/health-diplomacy/foreign-policy.html.

13.   Mentioned in UN meeting coverage and Press release of Secretary General on 18, February 2022.

14.   See more explanation in 'New Dimensions of Human Security', Human Development Report, 1994.

15.   See, https://fragilestatesindex.org/

16.   Beijing's envoy in New Delhi Sun Yuxi has claimed that Arunachal Pradesh is a Chinese territory. "In our position, the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. And Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all of that. That is our position (Arunachal Pradesh is our Territory: Chinese Envoy",

November 14, 2006 Retrieved from https://www.rediff.com/news/2006/nov/14china.htm, accessed on May 09, 2023.

17. Twenty Indian soldiers killed in fighting; BBC. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53061476

18. See, Manoj Joshi, "China is the potential threat No. 1, says George Fernandes," India Today, May 18, 1998.

19. The policy of China to exert influence and powers around the globe in every aspect of social, economic and geopolitical dynamics (Dragon Policy, Bernadan D Bussmaan, 27 September, 2021).

20. See, China Military Power Report, 2019, Us Department of Defence, Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

21. See, Milex.sipri.org/Sipri on 28 March 2023.

22. See, https://www.military.direct/blogs/news/which-world-military-would-win-in-a-war

23. Taken from, India- China Military expenditure statistics. Retrieved from https://armedforces.eu/compare/country_India_vs_China accessed on 9 May 2023.

24. See, 'China, Pakistan to upgrade their jointly produced fighter jet: Report'. *The Economic Times*, 12 March 2019.

25. 'China is Building a Second Nuclear Silo field', Retrieved from https://fas.org/publication/china-is-building-a-second-nuclear-missile-silo-field/

26. Collected from 'China-Military Power; modernising a force to Fight and Win', https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf accessed on 9 May 2023.

27. See, 'China overview', Development News, Research Data, accessed from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview

28. India, China GDP 1960-2023, data collected from https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/IND/india/gdp-gross-domestic-product

29. 'Impact of Chinese Goods in Indian Industry', PRS Legislative Research, Retrieved from https://prsindia.org/policy/report-summaries/impact-of-chinese-goods-on-indian-industry.

30. Pearl of String refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial chalk points from China to port of Sudan in Horn of Africa. From Marantidou, Virginia. 'Revisiting China's 'String of Pearls' Strategy: Places 'with Chinese Characteristics and their Security Implications'; taken from Issues & Insights. 14 (7), June 2014.

31. CPEC established in 20 April 2015, envisions to improve the lives of people of Pakistan and China by building an economic corridor promoting bilateral connectivity, construction, explore potential bilateral investment, economic and

trade, logistics and people to people contact for regional connectivity. Retrieved from https://cpec.gov.pk/

32. Used by Daniel S. Hamilton in The Diplomatist, Annual Edition 2016, accessed from http://www.diplomatist.com/dipoannual2016/index.html

33. See, 'India faces threats from almost all its neighbours'. *The Hindu*, 03 September, 2012.

34. See, 'India's national security challenges becoming complex: Rajnath Singh'. *Times of India*, 19 August 2019.

35. From the analysis of 'Threat perception for India and its neighbourhood', Prateek Modi, *Times of India*, 7 June 2021.

36. See 'The Funding Methods of Bangladeshi Terrorist Groups', *Combating Terrorism Centre,* Retrieved from https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-funding-methods-of-bangladeshi-terrorist-groups/

37. See, the 'China-Bhutan boundary talks and India's security concerns', *Times of India*, 31 March 2023.

38. See, Global Risk Report 2022.

39. See, Prof. Mely Cabellero Anthony; As quoted in "Internal Security: Issues, Challenges, Threats and Linkages , by Dr. Sasikala Pushpa, Dr. Sr. V.A. Mary Published by Prabhat Parakashan, 2021.

40. Delivering the 34th Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Memorial Lecture at Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy on 9 August 2022. Retrieved from https://www.outlookindia.com/national/india-faces-conventional-non-conventional-threats-eam-jaishankar-news-215260

41. See, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism (1996).

42. See, UNSC Resolution No. 1566 of 8 October 2004. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/security-council-resolution-1566-2004-on-threats-to-international-peace-and-security-caused-by-terrorist-acts/

43. See Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No.1773 answered on 01.12.2016 by the Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs (Shri M. J. Akbar)

44. Data collected from STAP, Retrieved from https://satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/india.

45. Terror attack in Mumbai on 26 November, 2008.

46. 11th Global Food Security Index. Retrieved from https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/

47. See Global Nutrition Report 2022.

48. See, 'The Impact of Energy on National Security and Foreign Policy', Just Energy. Retrieved from https://justenergy.com/blog/impact-energy-national-security-foreign-policy/

49. Planning Commission, Integrated Energy Policy: Expert Committee Report, New Delhi, August 2006, Government of India.

50. See, http://petroleum.nic.in/sites/default/files/vision.pdf, India's Hydro Carbon Vision.

51. See, https://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/ ES_2020_240420m.pdf

52. See, Sandhya Agarwal, ISRO Earnings And Spending: Here's How ISRO Earns From Its Commercial Services. Retrieved from https://www.india.com/business/isro-earnings-and-spending-heres-how-isro-earns-from-its-commercial-services-2223421/

53. Sidharth M.P, 'How India and China compare in space capabilities, shares analysis'; Retrieved from https://www.wionews.com/science/how-india-and-china-compare-in-space-capabilities-veteran-aerospace-expert-shares-analysis-489127

54. Answer to unstarred Question Number 1043, Rajya Sabha on 10-February 2023.

55. Retrieved from, https://www.meity.gov.in/content/national-cyber-security-policy-2013-0

CHAPTER 4

INDO-ISRAEL RELATIONS: FROM ESTARNGEMENT TO ENGAGEMENT

4.1. Introduction

India and West Asia, despite their geographical separation, share a rich historical tapestry dating back to 2500 BCE through cultural exchanges and commercial connections (Ratnagar, 2004). However, this relationship faced interruptions during the British colonial period (Blarel, 2015, pp. 42-43). After gaining independence, when the matter of recognising Israel as an independent state arose, India initially opposed it. However, India formally recognised Israel in 1950, but full diplomatic relations were not established until 1992 (Kumaraswami, 1995). The long four decades of diplomatic estrangement, without any direct conflict of interest, like boundary dispute, stands as a unique example of Indian diplomatic history (Abhayankar, 2012). Despite the lack of diplomatic relation, India and Israel engaged in unofficial interactions, particularly in agriculture and people-to-people contacts (Srivastava, 1970, pp. 238-264). The eventual establishment of formal diplomatic ties in 1992 marked a pivotal shift in India's foreign policy trajectory, signifying a meticulous recalibration in Indian foreign policy approach. This reflected the growing recognition of shared strategic interests and the pursuit of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two nations (Suri & Sethi, 2022). Subsequently, the bilateral relationship has steadily evolved, marked by advancements in defence collaboration, and technological exchanges, research and development (R&D), and commerce, emphasising the maturing partnership between India and Israel (Waldand & Kandel, 2017). This chapter provides an analysis of the development of India-Israel relation through different periods.

4.2. Historical Overview

Historically, West Asia and the Indian sub-continent had interlinked primarily through political and commercial endeavours (Ahmad, 1969, p.70). The

ancient settlements of Indians in the Arab world and Arabs on the western coast of India indicate extensive cultural, commercial and political linkages with West Asia, significantly contributing India's rich and diverse cultural heritage (Wheeler, 1945, pp.85-103). Indian subcontinent served as a central hub for trade between Arabs and South Asia, fostering commercial contacts that included the presence of Jewish merchants (Blarel, 2015, p.39).

However, later, with the decline of Mughal Empire and the rise of British imperialism, driven by their own commercial and strategic interest, a profound negative impact inflicted upon the rich ties that had existed between the two regions for centuries (Prasad, 1965). The British utilised various foreign policy tools to maximise their political and economic interests, resulting in a detrimental effect on India's earlier commercial relations with West Asia (Brunatti & Malone, 2009, pp.44-45). Later, when Indian nationalist movement gained momentum, it led to the establishment of new contacts with Egypt and Palestine, marking the beginning of new phases in India's engagement in West Asian policies (Tripathy, 2013, pp.159-172). It offered its vocal support for the Palestine, and opposed to Zionist efforts in the formation of an independent Jewish state, despite recognising the historical refuge provided to the Jewish community[1].

India gained independence on 15 August 1947, while Israel followed suit nine months later on 14 May 1948. Both nations grappled with the traumatic legacy of partition with unsettled borders (Kumar, 2014, pp.1-12). Despite multiplicity of security burdens they faced, both countries have managed to maintain their democratic regimes in a non-democratic environment (Pant, 2004, pp.60-73). In this context, there was a greater possibility of diplomatic ties. However, India's West Asian policy, after independence, appears as a 'roller coaster ride', characterised by initial ideological hesitation and culminating in contemporary strategic embracement (Puthanpurayil, 2020, pp. 471-483).

During the independence period, the Indian National Congress (INC) served as ultimate decision-making unit, with influential leaders such as M.K. Gandhi (1869-1948) and Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) shaping India's perspective on West

Asia and specifically on Israel (Kumaraswamy, 2010, pp. 25-43). Until the establishment of diplomatic relations in January 1992, the journey was marked by uncertainties and controversies (Srivastava, 1970). The normalisation process between India and Israel was influenced by numerous external and internal variables including historical, personal and organisational. This period, viewed from historical and political perspectives, can be divided into three stages:

1.   Pre-independence Period - (1920 -1947)

2.   The post-independence Nehruvian Period - (1947 -1964)

3.   The Post- Nehruvian period to Normalisation - (1964-1992).

The relevance of analysing the pre-independent period lies in providing insight into the origins of India's foreign policy towards Israel and the Middle East. The events and developments during this time had a direct impact on the subsequent interactions between the two states after India gained independence. The second phase of analysis encompasses the domestic and international imperatives, as well as the security landscape of post-Independent India. The post-Nehruvian period was characterised by consistent efforts on the part of Israel to establish diplomatic relations with India. However, India followed its pro-Arab policy and deferred its decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Nevertheless, in the changing political circumstances of the post-Cold War period, India decided to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, constituting the third phase of analysis.

4.2.1. Pre- Independence period (1920-1947)

Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, is the oldest and most organised nationalist movement in India, representing Indian masses, including the Muslim community in their struggle against British colonialism (Hanes, 1992, p.72). During the period of British colonial subjugation, India did not have an independent foreign policy; British officials decided India's stance on foreign affairs (Mahajan, 2018). However, All India Congress Committee (AICC), the apex body of the INC, officially declared its independence from British foreign policy in November 1921 (Appadorai, 1949, pp.37-46). Thereafter it started developing an autonomous

position and began to consider other independence movements across the world (Keenleyside, 1987, pp. 97-120; Prasad, 2013, pp.12 32).

Indian National Congress slowly gained diplomatic experience during colonial period and laid the foundations of India's Israel policy and as an organisational and ideological model (Gerberg, 2008, p.43). Therefore, India did not wait until independence on 15 August 1947 and the creation of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948 to shape its position on the Jewish state (Blarel, 2015, p.41). In developing a policy towards Zionism, the INC faced daunting political challenge during the nationalist movement, involving navigating connection between Arab-Jewish conflict and the sentiments of Muslim community in India, all while maintaining the momentum of the progressive surge against British colonialism (Kumaraswami, 2010, p.116).

Indian National Congress founded and operated as an anti-colonial ideological movement of India (Kaushik, 1986). Naturally, it supported the independence movements of Palestine, Egypt and Syria in their struggle against British imperialism (Tripathy, 2013). In this context, INC expressed suspicions regarding the Zionist motives in Palestine and believed that the 'issue primarily involved a conflict between the Arab nationalist and the Jews supported by British imperialism' (Srivastava, 1970, p.239). Therefore, the INC did not prioritise Zionist efforts in its diplomatic attempts; instead, it viewed that Zionism as a movement representing British and American interest and financial support (Hassan, 1993, p. 751).

In the escalating contentious atmosphere, the British Government appointed Peel Commission[2] to settle the claims of Zionist in Palestine land in 1936 (Bartal, 2017, pp. 51-70). In this context, at the Haripura session of February 1938, the INC resisted the partition of Palestine by the Peel Commission. Instead of endorsing a separate, independent Jewish state, the INC advocated for a Jewish settlement within the framework of a pluralistic order, rejecting the idea of partition (Ahmad, 1973, pp. 300-307; Gerberg, 2008, pp.45-46). By opposing the partition of Palestine, the INC strategically conveyed a clear message to Muslim League regarding its attempts

at promoting the 'Two Nations Theory', as a political option in India (Blarel, 2015, p.71). Recognising the growing attention focused on Palestine by the Muslim League, the INC has made earlier, a significant statement by designating 27 September 1936 as 'Palestine Day' (Singh, 2004, pp. 1025-1030).

However, the INC demonstrated sympathy towards the Arab cause in Palestine but was not outrightly anti-Jewish; rather, it held an anti-Zionist position (Gordon, 1975, pp. 221-234). This is evident from Jawaharlal Nehru's, meeting with the Jewish leaders in the late 1930s to discuss the persecution they faced in Germany (Blarel, 2015, p.53). In this context, he not only proposed a resolution in AICC, urging the British to facilitate Jewish immigration into India, but he also arranged for settlement of some Jewish refugees from Germany (Hasan, 2008, p.79). While maintaining a sympathetic attitude towards the plight of Jews in Europe, the consistent efforts made by the Zionist leaders to convince the INC about the Jewish cause had limited success (Blarel, 2015, pp. 65-66).

After considering the prevailing socio - political realities, the Indian National Congress decided to maintain a certain distance on West Asia, particularly when dealing with Zionism (Singh, 2004). This decision was influenced by the ongoing mobilisation of the Indian masses in the freedom struggle, wherein the Muslim community also holding a significant position and expressed sentimental to Palestine issue (Sharma, 2022). Additionally, by realising that the dissatisfaction of Muslim minority could potentially lead to separatist movement, which was already gaining strength under Mohammad Ali Jinnah, would undermine the nationalist movement (Moore, 1983, pp. 529-561). In this context, INC adopted a stance that upheld the ideology of a unified and secular Indian state based on the territorial integrity (Blarel 2015, pp. 67-69). By maintaining pro-Palestinian stand, the INC aimed to mitigate the ongoing rivalry between itself and Muslim League to curb the seeds of Muslim separatism (Blarel, 2015, p.72).

Throughout the nationalist movement, M.K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru held the principle of the separation of religion from nationalism. They laid the foundations for a secular India based on this principle (Muralidharan, 2006, pp. 3-

36). Consequently, their interpretations of Zionism as a religious ideology behind the formation of state have significantly influenced India's post-independence policy towards Israel. In this context, Kumaraswamy (2010) expressed that 'India's policy on West Asia, and particularly towards Israel, was symmetrical to Gandhi-Nehruvian views (p.35).

4.2.1.1. Gandhi on Zionism: Ideological Taboo

In 1920, Gandhi initiated the Non-Cooperation Movement, which established him as the leader of the freedom movement (Chaube, 1985, pp. 430-437). Although Gandhi had never held a position to influence foreign policy matters, but his elevation to the position of a unique moral authority[3] and the leader of Indian masses prompted the Jewish agency to make a special effort to engage him in dialogue to change his attitude towards the Jewish National Movement (Blarel, 2015, p.44). During his twenty-one years of stay in South Africa (1893–1914), Gandhi had the opportunity to learn more about the Jewish religion and the Jewish people's demand for a national home. His oldest friends Herman Kallenbach and Henry Polack[4] played a role in his understanding (Gerberg, 2008, p.206). In this context, he maintained sympathy towards Jews in the light of their sufferings. However, Gandhi steadfastly rejected the demand for a national home for Jews in Palestine. In his publication, *'Harijan'*, he expressed that:

> *"The Palestine of the biblical concept is not a geographical tract. It is in their hearts. But if they must look to the Palestine of geography as their homeland, it is wrong to enter it under the shadow of British guns. They can settle in Palestine only by the good will of the Arabs" (26 November 1938, p. 140).*

Due to Gandhi's principled stance, Jewish intellectuals made repeated attempts to convince him of the special relationship between the Jewish people as a nation and their cause, but these efforts proved unsuccessful (Blarel, 2015, p. 48). As a leader of the Nationalist movement, Gandhi was actually aware of the communal tensions in India and approached the issue through the lens of domestic security concerns (Chandra, 2004, pp. 03-29). His overriding concern was to

maintain harmony and amity between the Hindu and Muslim communities (Shimoni, 1977, p. 60).

In this context, Gandhi's political efforts as the leader of the nationalist movement, and as a '*Karma yogi*'[5], were aimed to involve Indian Muslims in the freedom struggle, which was evident in his aligning with Palestine, and Khilafat question, to which Indian Muslims had sympathies (Panter Brick, 2009, pp. 127-133). Consequently, Gandhi co-operated with Ali brothers in organising the All India Caliphate Committee in August 1920 in Mumbai, which adopted non-cooperation with British government (Krishna, 1968). All this marked as the societal security concerns of Gandhi and the INC in expressing their solidarity with Khilafat movement, despite its explicit religious nature (Blarel, 2015, p.57).

This support expressed through a special session held in Calcutta; the INC officially adopted the strategy of non-cooperation to achieve the goal of self-government, garnering the support of Indian Muslims (Gordon, 1973, pp. 443-473). Although the Khilafat movement had concluded in 1923, it significantly influenced the policy of the INC on Arab-Jewish dispute (Appadorai, 1981). Embracing the Gandhian path, INC incorporated more elements of a secular nationalist flavour into its West Asian policy (Ginat, 2004, pp.189-218). This shifted the Muslim leaders to move away from its Pan- Islamic focus toward a more nationalist platform (Blarel, 2015, p.60).

Gandhi's views toward Jewish people were very complex. On 26 November 1938, Gandhi published an article in the '*Harijan*', in which he referred the Jews as 'the untouchables of Christianity' (Sklar, 2016). Despite this, he consistently rejected Jewish claims for a national homeland and their aspiration for national self-fulfillment (Blarel, 2015, p.45). In March 1939, Gandhi met Kallenbach once again, who urged him to declare publicly his stance on the Arab-Jewish question in Palestine and the persecution of the Jews in Germany (Panter Brick, 2009). However, Gandhi was reluctant to do so. Rao (1972) observes Gandhi's reservation towards Jewish nationalism, was the result of:

(i)   The methods employed by the Zionist to achieve their aspirations, clashed with his principles of non-violence, and '*ahimsa*'.

(ii) The establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was in conflict with Gandhian secular conception of nationalism.

(iii) It also counters to the sentiments of Indian Muslims, potentially exacerbating pan-Islamic anxieties and inciting unrest.

(iv) The Zionist advocated a state based on religion, which contradicted to Gandhian concept of Pluralistic Nationalism.

(v)   He opposed Zionist attempts to secure British support for their territorial ambitions in Palestine, as the INC was concurrently engaged in struggle against British colonial rule in India (p.19).

The eruption of World War II (1939-1945) and the holocaust did not sway Gandhi's perspective on the Jewish-Arab dispute (Tripathi, 2008). In 1942, even as he strongly condemned the persecution of Jews in Europe, Gandhi held steadfast to his belief that, 'granting Palestine to the Jews, whether partially or entirely as their national homeland, would amount to crime against humanity and Muslims' (Shimoni 1977, p.51).

Gandhi's position on the intricacies of Palestine question was shaped by a blend of ideological and pragmatic factors, going beyond a mere effort to reconcile the differences between the INC and the Muslim League. His interpretation of Zionism left a lasting imprint on India's Israel policy. The cool and unfriendly attitude and the aberration of diplomatic relations until 1992 can also be traced back to the Gandhian ideological construct. Upon the attitude of Gandhi on Israel, Kumaraswamy (2010) remarked that, "When it comes to Jews, Israel and the wider Middle East, even Mahatma Gandhi is not infallible" (p.1).

4.2.1.2. Jawaharlal Nehru: Coy but Reluctant

Nehru's impact on India's foreign policy, particularly regarding Israel, originated during the freedom struggle as he served as the spokesperson for INC

drafted and piloted every resolution on foreign affairs (Haidar, 2010, pp.35-37). In this context of West Asian policy, though maintained pro-Palestine stance, he was sympathetic to the plight of Jews in Europe (Hasan, 2007, pp.1125-1140). This was evident in the statement of AICC in 1938, that:

> *"While sympathising with the plight of the Jews in Europe and elsewhere the Committee deplores that in Palestine the Jews have relied on British armed forces to advent their claims and thus aligned themselves on the side of British imperialism. The Committee trusts that Arabs and Jews will endeavour to find a basis for direct cooperation with a view to establishing a free democratic state in Palestine with adequate protection of Jewish Rights".(Zaidi & Zaidi, 1977, p.478).*

Besides, in 1933 in a letter to his daughter, Indira, he acknowledged that:

> *'They (Jews) had no home or nation, and everywhere they went they were treated as unwelcome and undesirable strangers' (Nehru, 1987, p.762).*

In 1936, Nehru's election as the President of the INC captured the attention of the Jewish Agency, prompting them to establish direct contact with him. Despite the sympathy that Nehru showed and continued to maintain towards the Jews, it did not influenced his stance on the Palestinian problem. As a result, he remained resolutely opposed to the establishment of a Jewish national home (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 48).

Nehru perceived the Palestine issue as an Arab nationalist movement against British imperialism, and regarded the Jewish matter as a minority concern stemming from the British imperialist activities and their lenient immigration policies (Blarel, 2015, p. 52). In this context, during the Presidential Address at Faizapur Congress, Nehru remarked that; 'the struggle of Arabs against British imperialism in Palestine is a part of great world conflict, akin to India's struggle for freedom against imperialist forces'[6]. He viewed it as the problem created by the British Imperialism (Singh, 2000, p.114).

Nehru supported the view that Palestine was primarily an Arab country and recognised that the Jews were an integral part of Palestine, and the Jewish religious rights should respect in independent Palestine (Nair, 2004, p.68). Nehru conveyed compassion with the plight of the Jews in Europe and else where, but criticised the Jews who relied on British imperialism to advance their claims in Palestine (Mukherjee, 2021). In this context, Nehru expressed his trust that both the Arabs and Jews would make efforts to establish a foundation for direct co-operation, aiming to create a free and democratic state in Palestine that would ensure the adequate protection of Jewish rights (Srivastava, 1970, pp.238-264).

Nehru's approach to the Arab-Israel problem was not based on race or religion. Instead, he expressed hope that the Arabs and Jews could co-exist and cooperate with each other, working towards their mutual benefit (Pande, 1973, p. 27). Nehru highlighted the growing socio-economic disparities between immigrant Jews and Arab residents in Palestine as the primary reason of non-absorption of new Jewish immigrants (Blarel, 2015, p.52).

However, the Balfour Declaration[7]of 1917 embodied the Zionist principle of a national home for Jews on the territory of Palestine (Verete, 1976, pp.48-76). Nehru has commented that, 'Palestine was not a wilderness or an empty uninhabited land; it was already some body else's home', signifies India's principled opposition against the formation of the state of Israel (Kuttab, 2015, p.28). In this context, he expressed the opinion that the Balfour Declaration, as a 'generous gesture of the British government, was made at the expense of the people who were already living in Palestine' (Singh, 2001, pp.113-148). In response to the Balfour Declaration, Nehru censured the British position for providing contradictory commitments to both Jews and Arabs to solicit their support during the First World War (1914-1918) (Mathew, 2021).

In 1936, Immanuel Olsvanger, an official of the South African Zionist Federation and an acquaintance of Hermann Kallenbach, Gandhi's close friend from South Africa, visited Nehru in an attempt to convince the cause of Israel. However, Olsvanger failed to alter Nehru's stance (Shimoni, 1977, p.30). Subsequently,

Chiam Weizmann, a Zionist leader, made an effort to persuade Nehru about the legitimacy of the Zionist cause during a meeting in London in July 1938. Nonetheless, Nehru's stance remained unchanged (Gerberg, 2008, p.71). On 20 March 1939, Nehru met Joseph Nedivi, who was sent by the Political Department of the Jewish Agency to meet him and Gandhi. The meeting was cordial; however, Nehru maintained his pro-Arab standpoint (Blarel, 2015, p.53). Later, in March 1947, a Jewish delegation from Palestine visited India to attend the inaugural Inter-Asian Conference in New Delhi on the eve of Indian independence. Despite meeting Nehru, his stance remained consistently pro-Palestinian (Shimoni, 1977, p.50).

Nehru's approach to the Palestine question was also a political one, as he perceived both India's and Palestine's struggles for freedom as battle against British imperialism (Tripathy, 2013). Aligned with the policy of anti-imperialism, Nehru viewed the core issue in Palestine not through the lens of religion but as a struggle against imperialism (Hasan, 2008). He believed that a strong base of Arab-Jewish co-operation could pave the way for eliminating imperialism and securing a stable future for Palestine (Nehru, 1987, p.767). Driven by the robust anti-imperialist convictions, Nehru regarded Zionism as a concept concocted by British imperialists, akin to how the notion of Muslim nationalism in India was manipulated to further their 'divide and rule' strategy (Gerberg, 2008, p.68). In this context, he opposes the endeavours of Jews, supported by Britain, to establish a territorial presence in Palestine (Ahmad, 1973, pp.300-307).

Gordon (1975) notes that, Nehru maintained the perspective that 'the Middle East belongs to Arabs, and no other nationalism in that area should be considered as illegitimate'. However, he acknowledged that 'the Jewish should have the right to access their holy places but have no right to establish a state there' (p.226). In this context, Nehru saw the formation of an autonomous territory in Palestine, as an act of intrusion sponsored by British imperialism (Singh, 2000).

While Nehru supporting Arabian nationalism, he was not hostile towards Jewish religious interest (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p.186). He was conscious of Jewish

opposition in Europe and their struggle. This was evident from his letter to his daughter Indira in May 1933:

> *"They had no home or nation, and everywhere they went they were treated as unwelcome and undesirable strangers…and yet these amazing people did not only survive all this but mange to keep their racial and cultural characteristics and prospered and produced a host of great men…These people without home or country…have never ceased to dream of old Jerusalem, which appears to their imaginations greater and more magnificent than it ever was, in fact"* (Nehru, 1987,p.762).

It was due to his sympathetic stance towards the Jewish people that Jawaharlal Lal Nehru extended welcoming hand to Jewish refugees to India, believing that 'they could contribute to India's progress' (Sareen, 1999). India became a haven for Jewish refugees fleeing persecution in Europe, with an estimated 2,500 Jews finding refuge during the holocaust. These refugees were embraced by Indian people, and allowing them to rebuild their lives and communities in India (IANS, 2019). However, due to his commitment to secularism and the preservation of domestic social fabric, Nehru could not lend support the Zionist project.

Before independence, during the visit of the Jewish delegation from Palestine to the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, in March- April 1947, Nehru upheld his pro-Palestinian stance, while also did not displaying any hostility towards Jewish religious interest in Palestine (Singh, 2001, pp.113-148). Instead, Nehru expressed the sympathy of the Indian people to the suffering of the Jewish people in Europe and expressed that, 'Palestine was mainly an Arab country and that no decision in Palestine should arrive at without the consent of the Arabs'[8]. He also extended supported for an Arab-Jewish dialogue to accommodate all interest through a federal arrangement (Blarel, 2015, pp.89-90). Nehru's decision regarding Israel, led Richard.J.Kozicki (1958) to express the opinion that, 'the cautious approach of Indian leaders stemmed from the belief that India's Pro-Zionist stance might lead to new state of Pakistan to gain the sympathies from its Arab co-religionist' (p.163).

Therefore, during the pre-independence period, Indian leaders were committed to preserving communal harmony and security, emphasising Hindu-Muslim unity. In this context, India's West Asian policy reflected the socio-political imperatives and the question of societal security, intertwined with intellectual, ideological and moral legacies. Hence, the impact of ideological constraints, shaped by personal convictions, remained a significant force shaping India's West Asian policy, especially in relation to Israel.

4.2.2. The Post-Independence Nehruvian Period (1947 -1964)

As a newly born state emerging from the long-lasting sufferings of colonialism, India designed its foreign policy themes mostly guided by domestic imperatives rather than transnational imperatives (Chandra, 1991, pp.81-167). The INC, which served as the vanguard of the freedom struggle, formed the provisional government after independence. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated that Indian foreign policy, in keeping with the traditional background and temper of the country, had to be 'realistic while avoiding being wholly ineffective or adventurist' (Brecher, 1959, p. 127).

4.2.2.1. Partition Plan: Real Test

On April 28, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) convened to handle the question of Palestine. As a result, an adhoc investigating board known as the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)[9] was established (Ben-Dror, 2007, pp.997-1008). India was one of the members of the committee, which given broad powers to investigate the question of Palestine and prepared two reports. The majority report recommended for the partition of Palestine, while the minority report proposed that for an independent federal state of Palestine (Ginat, 2004, pp.200-202). Following that, the United Nations partition plan for Palestine was adopted by UNGA as per resolution 181(II) to terminate the British mandate in Palestine on 29 November 1947[10]. India did not subscribe to the majority plan of UNSCOP recommending partition of Palestine. India was one of thirteen delegations that voted against the partition plan (Blarel, 2015, p.96). After the resolution was adopted, India, Pakistan and Arab delegates made declarations indicating that they

did not feel obliged by the decision and retained the right to make their own choices on the matter (Rao, 1972, p.27).

Due to the developments in West Asia, Jawaharlal Nehru expressed his viewpoint in the Constituent Assembly regarding issue. He stated that India's suggestion of a federal state for Palestine was 'not only a just and impartial resolution but also the most genuine solution to the problem'[11]. Indian opposed the proposal to create a Jewish state through the partition of Palestine along the religious lines. This approach was seen as being crafted by Western powers to further their imperial ambitions (Rinat, 2004). Furthermore, India's opposition for partition of Palestine was influenced by the painful experience of the religious based partition of India (Abhayankar, 2012, p.7). In addition, India's historical ties with the Arab world played a significant role in fostering sympathy towards Palestine cause. Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Indian delegate, speaking in the adhoc Committee on Palestine question stated that peace in Palestine is a vital interest for India but opposed it as designed by imperial powers (Ahmad, 1973, pp.300-307).

Before the termination of the British mandate over Palestine, Zionist forces occupied cities and other areas within the territories designated for the Palestinian state. By May 14, 1948, roughly two-thirds of the Palestinian land had been occupied by the Zionist forces (Dana & Jarbawi , 2017,pp.197-220). On the eve of May 15, 1948, as Britain completed its withdrawal, David Ben Gurion, the leader of the Zionist movement, officially declared the establishment of the state of Israel (Shalaim, 1987, pp.50-76; Biger, 2008, pp.68-93). Subsequently, on May 15, 1948, Egypt, Jordon, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq entered the borders of Palestine in response to Israeli invasion. However, the Arab armies were at a disadvantage in terms of less equipment, and achieved limited military successes (Bigrat, 1973).

Following this, Israel sought for UN intervention, accusing the Arabs of initiating the conflict. The Security Council threatened the Arab States and warned of action, including sanctions (Hughes, 2019, pp.539-562). The war, which ended in the favour of Israel, brought more Arab territories allotted to Palestinians by the UN, under the occupation of Israel (Shalaim, 1995, pp.827-304). Finally, the Jewish state

became a reality, which forced India to adjust its perceptions and traditional stance on Jewish state of Israel.

4.2.2.2. Move towards Recognition

The immediate goal of every state after gaining statehood was to secure full international recognition as a sovereign state. This recognition held significance as it provided legal safeguards, access to financial assistance and loans and ensured support for national security (Kelsen, 1941, pp.605-617). Immediately after the formation of the state of Israel, it attempted to get international recognition. In its efforts, the Soviet Union was the first country grant *de Jure* recognition to Israel, followed by Nicaragua, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland. Subsequently, on May 31, 1949, the United States also extended its recognition to Israel[12]. Even though, India opposed the partition plan at the UN, Israel continued to engage in diplomatic communication with India in the aim of achieving *de jure* recognition (Blarel, 2015, p.102). On May 17, 1948, Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett officially requested formal recognition from India. However, India did not acknowledge this request or take any subsequent actions in response (Srivastava, 1970, pp.243-44).

On 23 May 1948, Chaim Weizmann, the newly appointed President of Israel, formally requested India's recognition of the state of Israel. However, India's initial response was not favourable (Kumaraswamy, 1995). In a letter to Chief Ministers in May 1948, Nehru reiterated India's position on the issue, which was influenced by the evolving developments in West Asia (Blarel, 2015, pp. 99-100). India refrained from reversing its longstanding policy towards Israel, on two grounds:

(i) Largely because of the unstable and tense situation in West Asia resulted from the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel.

(ii) India took into account its substantial Muslim population, many of whom had already endured the traumatic experience of the partition of India (Gerberg, 2008, pp.230-31).

However, Nehru officially acknowledged the receipt of the Israel's request for the recognition for the first time during a session in the Constituent Assembly in August 1948[13]. This acknowledgement came in response to a question raised by H.V. Kamath, a representative of the Central Province. Nehru clarified that India would defer its decision regarding recognition of newly created states, until an independent assessment of the situation has been conducted, taking into consideration the international stance on the matter (Blarel, 2015, p.106).

In addition, Nehru, influenced by Maulana Azad, his colleague and senior member of the Congress party, took into account the pressure of Muslim population in India and their aspirations (Srivastava, 1970). Nehru was conscious about the establishment of a secular and democratic polity in India, which aimed to provide an equal voice to the substantial Muslim population that remained after partition (Abadi, 1991, p.164). This led the INC to reject the possibility of establishing full relations with Israel (Rubinoff, 1995, pp.489-491; Abhayankar, 2012, p.9). Srivastava (1970) highlights following reasons for India's hesitancy to establish diplomatic relations with Israel:

(i)   India's apprehension that such moves could adversely affect its relations with Arab nations, and

(ii)   Concerns that Pakistan might attempt to portray India as an ally of Israel within the Arab world, a perception that India would be concerned could potentially undermine its interests in the Arab region (p.244-245).

It was in this context, In May 1948, Israel submitted its application for membership to the UN, which was approved by the Security Council (Engdal et al, 2013, pp.465-485). Subsequently, the General Assembly adopted Resolution No.273 and granted Israel as 59th member of United Nations with a vote of 37 in favour of admitting Israel to 12 against and with nine abstentions [14]. India voted against Israel's application to become a member of the UN. India's Chief Delegate to the UN, M.C. Setalvad, explained India's negative vote by arguing that this stand was completely consistent with India's past political views on that matter. He further

emphasised that the Indian government could not recognise Israel due to its attainment of objectives through armed force (Rao, 1972, p.68).

Due to the evolving international circumstances and the absence of any direct conflict of interest between India and Israel, Nehru was compelled to reconsider for a policy stance, and the recognition of Israel could not be postponed indefinitely (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p.112). In the light of Israel's UN membership, Nehru hinted about the re-evaluation of Indian policy on Israel and its gradual moving towards recognition during his visit to Washington in September 1949 (Blarel, 2015, p. 105). However, in February1950, the Ministry of External Affairs expressed certain practical difficulties confronted by the Government of India. They stated that recognising of Israel could lead to displease among the Arab nations, be viewed as an unfriendly gesture, and possibly worsen India's relations with Pakistan[15].

However, under increasing international pressure, Nehru acknowledged that 'Israel is now a member of the UN, and therefore its recognition could not be postponed indefinitely' (Blarel, 2015, p.106). Simultaneously, regional developments in West Asia opened up new opportunity for India to reconsider its policy on Israel. Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, which had been engaged in open military conflict with Israel, signed armistice agreements in 1949[16]. Although the intensity of the conflict had diminished, Arab states persisted in their refusal to recognise Israel. Realising the situation, India also pursued the policy of sympathy towards Palestine people, as a continuum of its pre-independence stance, and engaged in the relief work to address the problems faced by the refugees during the first Arab-Israeli conflict (Blarel, 2015, p.107). Between 1948-1950, six Asian nations-Burma, China, Iran, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey- recognised Israel, made India's position increasingly isolated (Abadi, 2004).

On the domestic front, the Jan Sangh, Swatantra Party and Praja Socialist advocated for a pragmatic foreign policy and endorsed the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel (Madhok, 1967, pp.3-7). Their argument centered on the fact that Israel, being the sole democratic country in the West Asian region,

justified a re-evaluation of India's decision and the establishment of full diplomatic relation with Israel (Gerberg, 2008, p.142). Besides, the recognition of Israel by Turkey and Iran, two Muslim majority states, weakened India's traditional argument concerning the domestic Muslim factor (Kaye et al., 2011, pp. 09-18). Above all, Israel employed various lobbying efforts, including leveraging its links with the United States, to exert pressure on India to change its policy. In its campaign for recognition, Israel utilised personal contacts with prominent diplomatic personnel such as B.N. Rao, Shiva Rao, Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, and Krishna Menon (Kumaraswamy, 1995, p. 125).

After a hiatus of twenty-eight months since receiving Israel's request, India granted recognition to it on 17, September 1950, with an explanation that both India and Israel had collaborated within the UN for two years, and were now working alongside with other members of the UN for global peace and betterment of socio-economic conditions[17]. However, the recognition of Israel did not lead to immediate establishment of diplomatic relation between the two countries. Nehru ruled out the diplomatic exchange due to financial and other reasons, as the government was not in a position to shoulder additional commitments abroad (Nair, 2004, p. 101).

Nehru opted only for a partial recognition policy, intending to foster better relations with both Arab and Western states. Recognising the resentment of Arab states, India made it clear that granting *de jure* recognition does not imply endorsement of Israeli position on boundaries and the status of Jerusalem (Blarel, 2015. p. 109). Through this India expressed its principled support and solidarity with the plight of Arab refugees. Consequently, there was minimum criticism from the Muslim community and Arab nations, which signalled a potential opportunity for India to normalise its relation with Israel (Blarel, 2005, pp. 111-112, Srivastava, 1970, p.243).

Nehru's diplomatic decision regarding Israel was shaped by pragmatic considerations, driven by the delicate balance act to avoid anatagonising Arab nations and to respect the sentiments of domestic Muslim Population (Kumaraswamy, 2010). Besides, it was also rooted in India's principled stance

during the Indian Liberation Movement and the economic constraints during the early years of independence. In addition, the trade relations with Arab states, both in terms of volume and importance, outweighed those with Israel (Jain, 1978, pp.285-295; Chatterjee, 1987, pp. 2053-2055).

4.2.2.3. Post-Recognition Phase: The Escalating Anxieties

Even after India formally recognised Israel, numerous obstacles hindered the completion of the foreign policy shift toward Israel. Significantly, was the opposition of the old orthodoxy, which 'continued to advocate for a pro-Arab policy' (Blarel, 2015, p.117). Additionally, Maulana Azad, the Minister of Education in Nehru's government, represented the sentiments of Indian Muslim community, who warned against the probable loss of the support of Arab states in Kashmir issue, which could be exploited by Pakistan to propagate anti- India sentiments in West Asia (Brecher, 1963, p.130; Brecher, 1961, p.114). Given Nehru's a close friendship with Azad and his influential position in Indian Muslim community, Nehru chose to pursue a unanimous decision in the cabinet on the matter of Israel (Blarel, 2015, p.117).

Amidst this, there were hectic efforts on the part of Israel to make diplomatic relations with India. In January 1951, Nehru provided assurance to the Israeli Ambassador in London that diplomatic ties would be established after the completion of specific procedures (Gerberg, 2008, p. 79). Subsequently, India granted permission for a consular office in Bombay (now Mumbai), marking the inaugural Israeli diplomatic presence in independent India became the first Israeli diplomatic office to open in independent India (Kumaraswamy, 1995). This office was often referred to as 'India's diplomatic Siberia' (Srivastava, 1970, p. 245).

In September 1951, F.W. Pollack was officially appointed as Honorary Consular Agent of Israel to India (Kumaraswami, 2010). In March1952, Walter Eytan, Director General of Israel Foreign Ministry visited India. He was sent by Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion to discuss further steps in India-Israel relations and to strengthen bilateral relations (Blarel, 2015). However, as Nehru was preparing for the first general election and considering political factors, he was not

ready to take any decisive action. Instead, he cited financial constraints in establishing a diplomatic mission (Rubinoff, 1995, p.490; Gerberg, 2008, p.220).

Despite the initial setback, Eytan engaged with prominent diplomatic figures during his visit, including G.S. Bajpai, the Secretary General of Ministry of External Affairs; K.P.S.Menon, the Foreign Secretary of India; and Mrs.Vijayalakshmi Pandit, India's Ambassador in Washington to persuade Nehru on the importance of strengthening diplomatic ties between the two states (Blarel, 2005,p.113).

Besides, the ongoing political and territorial disagreements with Pakistan were also reflected in India's policy towards Israel. Pakistan sought to gain Pan-Islamic solidarity on the Kashmir issue, but with little success (Srivastava, 1970). In its search for international support, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact[18], an Anglo-American military initiative in 1955 that included Britain, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. This pact aimed to contain communism in West Asia (Jasse, 1991, pp.140-156; Sanijan, 1997, pp.226-266). Nehru, however, was concerned about the Anglo-American assistance provided to Pakistan through the Bagdad Pact, as it could potentially lead to military solution to Kashmir issue and trigger an arms race in the region (Jalal, 1989, pp. 409-433).

To counter this possibility, Nehru reinforced India's ties with the Arab states and refrained from normalising relation with Israel (Blarel, 2005, p.118). Therefore, Nehru strongly criticised the Baghdad Pact, as he believed it would undermine Arab unity. India supported the rise of a secular Arab nationalism in West Asia, with a focus on Egypt (Rao, 1972, p.45). India saw this as a crucial measure to counter Pakistan's attempt to isolate India through the Baghdad Pact[19]. Consequently, India signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Egypt in April 1955. This was both significant and pragmatic, aimed at safeguarding and defending India's national security (shah, 2021, pp. 60-77).

4.2.2.4. Afro - Asian Conference 1955: Compromising Tones

The Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in 1947 served as a catalyst for promoting unity and collaboration among Asian nations (Mc Callum,

1947, pp.13-17). It brought together the representatives from diverse Asian countries to address shared challenges, including the pursuit of freedom, racial equality, and economic development[20]. Recognising the significance of fostering economic and cultural cooperation, the newly independent Asian states initiated the Afro-Asian Conference in 1955. This conference aimed to unite nations from Africa and Asia, encompassing a rich tapestry of cultures, histories, and aspirations[21]. It represented a significant milestone as it sought to facilitate dialogue, understanding, and collaboration among these diverse nations, with the goal of addressing pressing global issues and promoting peace and development (Appadorai, 1955, pp. 209-10).

Israel sought integration to the Afro-Asian movement. However, during the preliminary meeting in Colombo in April-May 1954, Muhammad Ali, Pakistan's Prime Minister, presented a draft resolution criticising the establishment of Israel, its aggressive policies towards Arab states, and the plight of Palestinian refugees (Jansen, 1971, p.250). India supporting the institutionlisation of a larger Afro-Asian movement opposed the resolution with the backing of Burmese Prime Minister U Nu (Blarel, 2005, p.121). As a result, the final statement differed from the Pakistani proposal. It expressed concerns for the sufferings of Arab refugees and called for their rehabilitation, but it did not include any direct condemnation of Israel (Brecher, 1961, p.117). Nehru's decision not to include a direct condemnation of Israel was a welcome gesture, indicating that he did not hold any hostile position towards Israel.

During the second preparatory meeting in Indonesia, held in December 1954 for the Bandung Conference, challenges aroused in reaching a consensus on inviting the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Israel (Blarel, 2015, p.121). Despite Nehru's initial support for their participation based on their independence and geographic location within Asia, the prospect of Arab countries boycotting the conference prompted him to reluctantly refrain from inviting Israel (Gerberg, 2008, p.82). Consequently, in January 1955, David Hacohen, Israeli Ambassador to Burma, held a meeting with Nehru where he conveyed his concerns about Israel's exclusion from Bandung Conference (Brecher, 1959,p.79). Nehru's tacit granting of veto power to Arab countries over India's Israel policy added difficulties in the

furthering of relations (Blarel, 2015, p.122). In this context, the Bandung conference marked a turning point in India-Israel relations, introducing added complexities for Indian policy makers striving to establish full diplomatic relations.

The Bandung Conference, held without Israel's participation, resulted in the issuance of a Joint Statement endorsing several principles (Appadorai, 1955, pp.207-235). These included the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, a commitment to refrain from acts or threats of aggression and the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country, and the promotion of peaceful means for resolving international disputes (Jayaprakash, 2005; Tiomssi, 2015). Nehru expressed his sympathy to Arab refugees from Palestine and called on Arab nations to initiate negotiations with Israel for resolving Palestine issue, a stance that was not acceptable to the Arab delegates (Appadorai, 1955; Blarel, 2015, pp. 122-23). The conference established a precedent of permenent exclusion of Israel from the institutional framework of Afro-Asian community, posing a set back to Israel. This exclusion was grounded on two factors; 'the Arab countries were determined to block Israel's participation, and Pakistan sought to outmnaeuver India' (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p.192).The Bandung Conference, coupled with India's involvement in it, presented additional hurdles in the pursuit of establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel.

4.2.2.5. The Suez Crises: The Real Test

By the 1950s, the relation between India and Egypt had grown stronger, and Nehru developed a closer personal bond with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (Bhatia, 1977). Nayudu (2016) observes that 'Nasser often asked Nehru for advice on world security, especially regarding issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He was worried about the safety of the Gaza strip and how Israel was getting more aggressive under Ben Gurion'. This made India switch its support away from the Western position on Israel, focusing instead on promoting the idea of secular nationalism in West Asia (Para, 02). In this context, Mekkawi (2006) highlights two factors for India's closer relation with Egypt:

(i)   The shared opposition to imperialism, and

(ii)   The condemnation of Israel's alliance with imperial powers (p.79).

Amidst this, on July 26, 1956, Nasser made the decision to nationalise the Suez Canal as an immediate response to the withdrawal of loans by the contributing powers for the construction of Aswan Dam (Shupe et al., 1980, pp. 477-479). The Suez Canal, a strategic link, continued to be under British control even after the independence of Egypt. The decision to nationalise the canal was seen as gesture against European imperialist powers (Dietl, 2008, pp.259-278).

Nehru officially expressed agreement with nationalisation move in a statement delivered in the Lok Sabha on 8 April 1956[22], as it aligned with the principles of sovereign Egyptian laws[23]. However, he also expressed regret over the suddenness of the decision and its swift implementation. Despite these concerns, he stood in support of Nasser and called for the resolution of the dispute (Blarel, 2015, p.125). On October 13, 1956, UN Security Council adopted a resolution sponsored by UK, France and Egypt, which addressed matters concerning Egyptian sovereignty and the principle of open transit through the canal[24]. However, just two days later, British and the French troops seized control of the Suez Canal. Then, on October 29, 1956, Israel initiated a military attack on Egypt. Nehru vehemently condemned this pre-determined assault on Egypt as a blatant act of aggression, accusing Israel of aligning with the formal colonial powers and flagrantly violating the principles of UN Charter[25].

On October 30, 1956, Nehru met with Moshe Sharett, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, and expressed his criticism of the military action (Caplan, 2002, pp.82-83). Nehru firmly believed that Israel had no right to invade Suez by aligning with imperial forces, and he considered it a 'scandalous case of aggression by a stronger military power against a weaker country' (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p.197). Later, Israel withdrew its troops in March 1957, and Nehru welcomed the departure of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory. The Suez crisis represented a significant shift from Nehru's previous stance, as it close the possibility of diplomatic exchanges. However, Israel's involvement in the invasion of Egypt

during the 1956 Suez crisis reinforced India's view that Israel, as an even more prominent outpost of Western interests (Oren 1989, pp. 347-373).

Blarel (2015) highlights that India's stance during the Suez crisis was underpinned by its pursuit of national interest, influenced by several factors:

(i)   India aimed to counter Pakistan's attempts to label India as an anti-Islamic nation and Pakistan's endeavour to garner Arab support on the Kashmir issue, and

(ii)   The collaborative military incursion by Israel, France and Britain further solidified the perception that Israel served as an outpost of Western interest in West Asia, and

(iii)   India sought to protect its economic interest[26] due to the strategic significance of air space and sea routes in the West Asian region, which were vital for India's economic security and regional stability (pp.130-31).

4.2.2.6. Moves for Engagement

In July 1960, Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion extended an invitation to Nehru, urging him to visit Israel. However, Nehru declined the invitation, citing concerns about the potential resentment from Arab leaders over the prospect of forging ties with Israel (Rafael, 1981, pp.87-89). In the context of repeated efforts on the part of Israel to establish diplomatic ties, in a press conference in London on 12 March 1961, Nehru stated that, 'India recognised Israel in 1950, but did not establish a mission in Israel. It might not have been logically consistent, but it was a pragmatic decision' (Gerberg, 2008, p. 85).

At the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Alignment Movement in September 1961, Israel was excluded from the conference due to the criticism of Egyptian President Nasser regarding Israel's imperialistic behaviour in West Asia (Luthi, 2016, pp. 98-147). During the concluding session, Nehru aligned himself with Nasser's perspective, acknowledging Israel as a potential menace to the Arab nations in the Middle East (Gerberg, 2008, p. 86). He also lent his support to

Egypt's plea for the self-determination of the Arab populace in Palestine (Luthi, 2016).

Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, there were interactions between India and Israel. In October 1958, Levi Eshkol, Israeli Minister of Finance, held discussions with his counterpart Morarji Desai during his visit to New Delhi to be the part of conventions of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Gerberg, 2008, p. 237). Later in 1960, an official delegation from India visited the Afro-Asian Institute for Labour Studies and co-operation in Israel[27]. While developments were progressing in a discreet manner, Nehru consented to send a government delegation to study agrarian and cooperative methods. Informal dialogues in connection with agricultural cooperation occurred, along with visits of scientists, including Homi.J.Babha, the head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p.134). However, India was hesitant to justify the establishment of an Indian mission in Israel.

4.2.2.7. Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962: Helping Hands

Following the1959 Tibetan uprising[28], a serious significant skirmish unfolded between India and China, ultimately culminating in a war during October to November 1962 along the disputed Himalayan border (Van der May, 1994, pp.183-199). Prime Minister Nehru communicated India's position and sought the support of various world leaders, including Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion and Arab states (Blarel, 2015, p.155). Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey and Yemen, officially or unofficially expressed support, while Egypt remained neutral and aimed to play a mediating role in resolving the dispute (Dutta, 2017).

In response to Nehru's letter, Ben Gurion expressed hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, upon India's request, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, Golda Meir, approved the sale of heavy mortars and mortar ammunition to India (Bhattacherjee, 2017). This collaboration was never explicitly acknowledged by India and stopped the exchange upon the objection of Egypt (Heikal, 1973, pp. 297-98). However, Nehru did not change his position on Israel despite the apparent military support. Isreal utilised Indo-China conflict as a 'back channel diplomacy',

offering military and intelligence cooperation afffter the war (Blarel, 2015, p.157). As part of this, the Chief of Military intelligence of Israeli army visited to New Delhi and the meeting with Indian top military officials was reported by media but denied by the government (Gerberg, 2008, pp.107-108). Nevertheless, the precedent established by Nehru in acquiring military assistance from Israel without a diplomatic exchange existed (Bhattacherjee, 2017). However, the security assistance not publicly acknowledged, it did mark as the initial strategic interaction between the two states (*Times of India*, 2011, December 18).

Nehru's cautious stance towards forging full-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel stemmed from a pragmatic recognition that the potential drawbacks of such a decision outweighed the perceived advantages. This approach aligned with India's policy of Non-alignment and its commitment to supporting the Palestinian cause, showcasing solidarity with the Arab nations. However, with the death of Nehru in May 1964, the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel was depended upon the subsequent political atmosphere of India.

4.2.3. Post-Nehruvian Period: Move to Normalisation (1964-1992).

The Post -Nehruvian period began with the entry of Lal Bahadur Shastri as the Prime Minister of India (9 June 1964 to 11 January 1966) for a short span, followed by Indira Gandhi, she served for two terms (24 January 1966 to 24 March 1977 and 14 January 1980 to 31 October 1984). Amidst of this, Morarji Desai (24 March 1977 to 28 July 1979) and Charan Singh (28 July 1979 to 14 January 1980) held the position of Indian Premiership. After the period of Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi (31 October 1984 to 2 December 1989), Viswanath Pratap Singh (2 December 1989 to 10 November 1990), and Chandra Shekhar (10 November 1990 to 21June 1991) held the position of Indian Prime Ministership[29]. It was on 21 June 1991 that P.V. Narasimha Rao, who took the charge Indian Prime Ministership broke the ideological paradigm of non-relationship towards Israel in January 1992, constitutes the post Nehruvian period.

4.2.3.1. Lal Bahadur Shastri Period: Policy of 'No change'

After the passing of Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri (1904-1966) became the Prime Minister of India. Influenced by the enduring impact of Nehru's policy, Shastri continued it (Edwards, 1965, pp.48-58). However, he introduced a notable change by appointing a fulltime Foreign Minister[30] during his tenure, leading to a more realistic approach in Indian foreign policy (Thapar, 1964, pp.1081-82). During his period, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) gained greater control over India's West Asian policy and adopted 'a conservative stance towards Israel and did not envisage any change' (Blarel, 2015, p.154).

Shastri assumed an assertive posture during the Non-alignment Summit held in Cairo in October 1964, which he personally attended. He did not oppose the conference's denunciation of Israel's imperialist policies in West Asia and instead endorsed full restoration of rights of Palestine people, including the right to self-determination[31]. Furthermore, India extended full support to the Arab people of Palestine in their fight against colonialism and racial discrimination (Rao,1970, pp.393-400). This diplomatic behaviour demonstrated by Shastri signified a departure from Nehru's comparatively moderate stance in earlier Afro-Asian gatherings.

Shastri's government initiated a significant shift in India's approach towards Palestine nationalism by hosting an official reception to welcome a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in November 1954 (Gerberg 2008, p. 241). This action was seen as a departure from India's previous cautious stance and marked a more explicit pro-Arab approach during Shastri's tenure as Prime Minister. However, co-operation in the agricultural sector between India and Israel continued (Blarel, 2005, p.155). Shastri's inclination towards the Arabs can viewed as a logical extension of Nehru's policy. Following Shastri's death in January 1966, Indira Gandhi appointed as the Prime Minister, and her appointment was welcomed by Israel. Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abba Eban, expressed optimism that the new government would rekindle its policy towards Israel[32].

4.2.3.2. Indira Gandhi Period: Era of Estrangement

After the demise of Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966, the political developments in India led to the emergence of Indira Gandhi (1917-1984), to power. In contrast to Shastri, Indira Gandhi assumed a more active role in foreign affairs, fostering expectations for improved relations with Israel (Rauch, 2008, pp.5-9). Upon assuming office in January 1966, Israel held hopes for a potentially closer relationship with India. However, Indira Gandhi opted for a hostile foreign policy towards Israel and firmly aligned herself as a supporter of the Arab world (Tripathy, 2013, p.163). During Mrs. Gandhi's tenure, the deterioration in India-Israel policy was characterised by multiple factors including armed conflicts, domestic disturbances, shifting of political alliances, and controversies, all of which contributed to the downward trajectory (Surjith, 2015).

At the outset of her tenure, Indira Gandhi articulated that India's support for the Arab people rooted in traditional friendship. During her visit to Cairo, she commented that 'states should not be created or carved out based on religion', emphasising that India has continued adherence to a pro-Arab policy (Jansen, 1971, p.302). Despite consistent efforts by Israel to foster closer relations, the Indian government remained reluctant to review its policy towards Israel. In March 1980, India granted diplomatic recognition to Palestine and upgraded its office to a full-fledged embassy (Tripathy, 2013, p. 167). Subsequently, in November 1988, India acknowledged the state of Palestine, as declared by the Palestine National Council in Algiers (Hafees, 2009, p.66). However, several incidents during Gandhi's tenure further dampened Israeli hopes for improved relations.

In March 1966, the Israeli President, Zalman Shazer, sought a twenty-four hour stopover in Delhi en route to Nepal. However, the Government of India declined to grant permission for the delegation to land in New Delhi, directing them instead to land in Calcutta (Nair, 2004, p.108). Upon Zalman's arrival, he encountered disregard from both central and state government. Instead, pro-Arab demonstrators gathered in front of the hotel where Zalman was staying (Gerberg, 2008, p.108). Consequently, the Israel Knesset passed a resolution expressing regret

over the treatment of the Israeli President (Nair, 2004). The issue seemed to indicate the Government of India's unwillingness to maintain cordial relations with the state of Israel.

During the six-day war that erupted on 5, June 1967, between Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, Israel swiftly emerged as a victorious party. Within few days, they had won the land war and taken control of the Gaza strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria (Karsh, 2017; Samuel, 2017). India, during this conflict, provided support to Egypt and the Arab states (Miller, 2003, pp.57-58; Shah, 2021, p.64). During the war, several Indian soldiers serving under the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) killed. Indira Gandhi described that the Israeli raids leading to the death of Indian personal in the UNEF as 'deliberate and without provocation'[33]. Mrs. Gandhi appealed to the UN to ensure the safety of Indian troops. Subsequently, a formal protest was lodged with Israel through Indian Embassy and in Moscow. Israel had the advantage in the war through the acquisition of territory, and India condemned Israel's intention to change the status quo[34].

The repercussions of the Six-Day War of 1967 had a profound influence on India's anti-Israeli stance, leading to a more pronounced condemnation, notably expressed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by considering several significant factors:

(i)   The emergence of the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation (OIC) in 1969 further solidified India's pro-Arab policy, aligning with the ethos of Arab solidarity.

(ii)   India's substantial economic interests in the Arab world coupled with an increasing reliance on Middle East energy resources.

(iii)   India recognised the economic potential of Arab markets and the importance of Middle Eastern trade routes for the West.

(iv)   The presence of Indian migrant workers in the Gulf countries played a crucial role in shaping India's alignment with Arab nations (Gerberg, 2008, pp.438-39, Basu, 2019).

However, later on, there aroused an expectation that India's stance might undergo an alteration due to the prevention of Indian participation in the Rabat Conference. This anticipation was based on a significant incident that occurred in August 21, 1969, when Dennis Michael Rohan, an extremist Australian, made an attempt to set fire to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, which hold the status of being the third holiest site in Islam. Rohan accused the Israeli forces of seemingly endorsing his actions (Hussain, 2017). India condemned the incident, deeming it a 'spiritual injury', and advocated for peace through the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, along with UN resolutions. In response to the developing situation, Muslim countries organised an Islamic Conference in Rabat, Morocco, on September 23, 1969 (Akhtar, 1969, pp.336-340). Despite India boasting a sizable Muslim population, it was prevented from attending the conference due to Pakistani pressure, although India had the support of Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, and Libya (Singh, 2006, pp.105-106). The Pakistani President agreed to participate in the final session only after ensuring the absence of the Indian delegation[35]. The entire conference proceeded without any representation from India.

The Rabat Conference served as another instance highlighting the shortcomings of India's West Asian policy, which attracted strong criticism from the opposition[36]. In response to Rabat humiliation, India recalled its ambassadors from Morocco and Saudi Arabia, along with Charges d' affaires from Jordan (Blarel, 2015, p.182). The indignity faced at the Rabat Conference prompted India to perceive the pro-Pakistani stance of the Arab states as unjust, especially considering India's consistent support for the Arab cause during various crises. In this context, advocates of the India-Israel relations pressed for the reconsideration of India's stance on Israel[37]. However, despite these calls for shift, India remained committed to its unconditional support for the Arab nations. A minor alteration in India's stance

came about when Mrs. Gandhi, expressed her opinion that 'Israel had every right to exist in peace and understanding with its neighbours' (Blarel, 2015, pp.182-83).

Later, the Indo-Pak war concerning the East Pakistan issue in 1971 presented another test of the attitudes of Arab states towards India and Pakistan (Saliba, 1972, pp.129-137). Throughout the conflict, most of the Arab states remained largely indifferent to India's position (Simha, 2017). During the war, apart from political support to Pakistan and monetary aid received from Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan also obtained weapons from Jordan and Iran (Faruki, 1972, pp.10-20; Rubinoff, pp.1995, p.499). The Indian government was disappointed due to the absence of support from the Muslim world, and it had expected at least a stance of neutrality during the Indo-Pak conflict.

Unexpectedly, when the war broke out, the Israel openly defended India's position. Israel Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, in a speech in Knesset on 23 June1971, expressed Israel's 'deep shock at the terrible acts perpetrated by Pakistani army' [38]. Indira Gandhi specifically requested artillery weapons, such as 160 mm mortars and ammunition, manufactured by Israel. Golda Meir secretly arranged for the airlifting of artillery equipment to India. India received political, medical, and even military assistance from Israel (Blarel, 2015, p.186). India formally expressed its disappointment at the Arab attitude and their inadequate understanding of the issue (Gerberg, 2008, p.111). After the formation of Bangladesh through the defeat of Pakistan, Israel recognised the new Bangladesh government on February 4, 1972. As per the documents of Rajya Sabha debates, India only acknowledged the medical assistance for refugees and cautiously avoided acknowledging the military aid provided by Israel[39].

The lightning military success in Bangladesh contributed significantly to the political image of Indira Gandhi, helped her in achieving a landslide victory in the General election held in March 1971(Weiner, 1971, pp.1153-1166). Most opposition parties that criticised India's West Asian policy suffered political setbacks. Furthermore, political parties with a pro-Israeli attitude, such as the Swatantra Party and Jana Sangh, also faced political setbacks[40]. The electoral mandate and military

success solidified Indira Gandhi's control over foreign policy. However, in the domestic political context, she hesitated to explore the possibilities of forging closer ties with Israel (Nair, 2004, p.110).

Later, a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israel on October 6, 1973, during the Jewish Yom Kippur holiday[41] (Nowland, 2001, pp.37-48; Givens, 2002, pp. 27-30). In response, Israel initiated a counter-offensive in Syria and Egypt, and a ceasefire was imposed on 25 October 1973 by UN Security Council[42]. Despite the fact that Egypt and Syria initiated the joint attack on Israel, India adhered to its traditional policy by supporting them. India's rationale for maintaining such a stance was grounded in the belief that 'the primary source of tension in West Asian region was stemmed from Israeli aggression and its refusal to withdraw from the occupied territories' (Kumaraswamy, 1990, p.163).

The Rabat Conference marked a policy failure and highlighted India's inability to garner support from Arab countries during the 1971 war, leading to severe criticism of its West Asian policy (Ward, 1992, p.90). Despite this setback, India's increasing energy requirements not only influenced its policy approach in the region but also compelled the country to develop strategies to countering Pakistan's efforts to gain support from the West Asian nations (Noor, 2004, pp.91-104; Azhar, 2020, pp.1-40). Although, India received nominal support from Cairo during various crises led to a re-evaluation of its over-reliance on Egyptian support as the cornerstone of its West Asian policy (Blarel, 2015, p.187).

During the post-1973 period, the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) represented a significant development in West Asia (Hamid, 1975, pp. 90-109). Recognising the growing political importance of the PLO as the sole spokesperson for the Palestinian people, the government of India declared Al-Fatah within the PLO as a secular organisation fighting for the liberation of the Palestinian people. The PLO had participated as a guest in the consultative meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in July 1969. In June 1975, India officially recognised the PLO and granted diplomatic privileges and immunities to the representatives of Palestine (Mehrish, 1975, p.137). India immediately permitted the

opening of a diplomatic mission in New Delhi[43]. During the first tenure of Mrs. Gandhi, India's policy towards Israel was cautious, with a focus on aligning with Arab states and supported Palestine cause. India aimed to strike a balance between its energy needs and its broader alignment with Arab nations, rather than leaning towards forging closer ties with Israel (Ashwarya, 2022, pp. 84-101).

4.2.3.3. Morarji Desai period

In the 1977 Lok Sabha election, the incumbent Indian National Congress lost power for the first time since India's independence. This election followed two years of emergency (25 June 1975 to 21 March 1977) imposed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (Rai and Kumar, 2017). After the emergency, the Janata Alliance, a coalition of opposing parties advocating for the 'restoration of democracy'[44], emerged victorious in the March 1977 Lok Sabha election (Mathur, 2019, Para.1). The electoral victory of the Janata Party, which included the presence of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) and its pro-Israeli attitude, presented the possibility for a shift in India's Israel policy (Madhok, 1967, pp.3-7). Morarji Desai (1896-1995) became the Prime Minister of India, and Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1924-2018), the leader of BJS, assumed the position of Minister of External Affairs. This marked the first coalition government in the post-independence era, and leading such a new government proved challenging for Morarji Desai, limiting his ability to implement changes in foreign policy (Aziz, 1977, pp. 37-39).

The political transition and the absence of ideological constraints created anticipation in modifying India's West Asian policy. However, the formation of a coalition government and the indications of preserving foreign policy continuity tampered this expectation. Despite the Janata Party's international openness and the pro-Israel stance of the Jana Sangh Party within the Janata coalition government, the traditional Nehruvian framework continued to shape India's foreign policy (Blarel, 2015, p.200). As anticipated, no significant changes regarding India's stance towards Israel were observed during this period (Gerberg, 2008, p. 92). However, later, the Camp David summit, which sought to bring hope of peace in West Asia, was also expected to influence India's stance towards Israel.

The Camp David Summit established a framework for historic peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, concluded on 26 March 1979, with a pivotal role played by the United States and the presence of President Jimmy Carter (Brams &Togman, 1996, pp.103-105). This significant development leads to the exchange of Ambassadors between Egypt and Israel, subject to Arab criticism and accused as a betrayal of Arab cause on the part of Egypt (Quandt, 1986, pp.357-359). The isolation of Egypt in the Arab world, coupled with India's decision to side with the Arabs and justify it as their principled position, furthered diplomatic tension. In this context, Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee stated during a press conference that 'India opposing the Camp David Accord due to its failure to address the key issues of Palestine'. Which includes 'the restoration of Palestinian rights, the recognition of the PLO as the representative body, and the status of Jerusalem', thereby reaffirming its steadfast support for the Palestinian cause and the PLO's interests (Tripathy, 2013, p. 166).

However, after the Camp David Accord, India's attitude towards Israel underwent a positive shift. In 1979, Desai's principal private secretary, V. Shankar, visited Israel to explore potential cooperation (Gerberg, 2008, p. 92). While no concrete understanding was reached due to the eventual collapse of the Janata government, a small quantity of arms and ammunition was eventually procured from Israel through a third country, Cyprus, during the tenure of the successor government (Swamy, 1982).

India's foreign policy towards Israel during Prime Minister Desai's tenure displayed signs of openness and realism, inspired by the conviction that better ties required wider political consensus (Noorani, 1978, pp.216-228). However, there was ultimately little to no shift in India's relations with Israel due to Desai's brief term, attention to local problems, and lack of interest in international matters. As a result, the traditional Nehruvian pro-Arab foreign policy attitude in the Ministry of External Affairs was strengthened (Dasgupta, 1992, p. 769).

4.2.3.4. Return of Mrs. Gandhi

After the fall of the Janata Government, Indira Gandhi returned to power in the 1980 Lok Sabha election (Gould, 1980, pp. 595-616). Her control over India's foreign affairs became total (Rauch, 2008, p.7). However, she persisted in maintaining pro-Palestine policy and displayed reluctance in enhancing relations with Israel. Indira Gandhi reiterated that a comprehensive peace process in the Middle East could only be possible with the full participation of the PLO as an equal partner in any settlement[45]. Following the Report of Amnesty international, which accused Israel of committing war crimes resulting in the death of numerous Palestinians and the demolition of their homes, India became the pioneer in granting full diplomatic status to the PLO (Abraham et al., 1988, pp.12-13). This move included the upgrading their office in New Delhi to the status of a full-fledged embassy (Mehrish, 1975; Faleiro, 2018, p.171).

Mrs. Gandhi's anti-Israel policy was once again evident when, on 7 June 1981, she publicly denounced the Israel Air Force attack on the nearly completed nuclear reactor Osirak, located near Baghdad in Iraq[46]. Later, during the Israeli attack on Lebanon on 6 June 1982, it was described as a 'deliberate genocide of the Palestinian and Lebanese people'[47]. Upon India's criticism on the attack, India was subjected to an open criticism of the government's approach towards Israel through the press by the Israeli Consul in Bombay, Yossef Hassin [48]. In the interview, he stated that, the government's concern about the Muslim lobby in New Delhi and India's economic interests in the Middle East, particularly regarding oil, were cited as reasons for India's unfavorable stance towards Israel (Naaz, 1999, p. 243). In July 1982, the Israeli Consul in Bombay was declared a '*persona non grata*' and subsequently expelled from India (Gerberg, 2008, p. 112).

This action resulted in the elimination of the only diplomatic channel between India and Israel that had existed since 1953[49]. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Deputy Leader of the opposition party Janata at that time, Subramaniam Swamy, not only opposed the expulsion and characterised it as a harsh diplomatic move, but they also pleaded with the Government of India to establish

diplomatic relations with Israel (Blarel, 2015, p.221). However, their pleas were rejected by the Minister of External Affairs, Narasimha Rao, and India's anti-Israeli and pro-Arab policy persisted throughout 1980s.

During this period of indifference towards Israel, the Indian political leadership maintained a soft approach that was not explicitly reflected in their official programmes and policies (Nair, 2004, p.111). This is evident after the establishment of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Indira Gandhi reportedly allowed Director K.N. Rao to establish a line of communication with the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad (Raman, 2008, p.127). However, amidst these covert channels of co-operation, Indira Gandhi is widely considered the most anti-Israeli and pro-Arab Indian Prime Minister. During her tenure, bilateral relations between India and Israel reached their lowest point (Gerberg, 2008, p.91).

4.2.3.5. Rajiv Era: Building Foundation

After the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her security personnel on 31October 1984, Rajiv Gandhi assumed the role of Prime Minister of India. His tenure as Prime Minister had a significant impact on Indian foreign policy (Tripathi, 1988, pp.112-114). With his open-mindeness and education from Cambridge University, Rajiv Gandhi ushered in a fresh approach for India towards Israel, departing from the pro-Arab foreign policy of India (Gerberg, 2008, p. 94). Despite facing domestic political constraints, his government took several steps favouring Israel (Rubinoff, 1995). Rajiv Gandhi initiated a series of changes in Indian foreign policy, focusing on the politico-economic dimensions, while paying less attention to ideological and political orientations of his predecessors (Dixit, 1998, p.172).

Rajiv Gandhi's government took significant steps towards normalising relation between India and Israel. In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi met with his Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres during the 40th Annual Session of UN General Assembly, marking a historic first meeting between Prime Ministers of the two countries (Nayar, 2016). In June 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met prominent Jewish lobbyist in New York, as requested by US Congressman Stephen Solarz (Tripathi, 1988). This meeting resulted in the appointment of new Israeli Consul in Bombay in

a long unfilled vacancy since the expulsion of Yossef Hassin in 1982 (Gerberg, 2008, p.113). Amidst the shifting moods, Israeli government conducted a diplomatic campaign to persuade Indian government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.

Israeli efforts were apparent in the statements made by India's Minister of External Affairs, K.K.Tiwari, who acknowledged Israel's right to live in peace and security within internationally recognised borders, alongside Palestine and neighbuoring Arab states[50]. Later, Israeli Foreign Ministry official, Joseph Hadass visited India upon an invitation from Indian authorities. In order to avoid internal controversy, the visit was described as a tourist visit by the Indian official spokesperson and not officially connected to Israel. During the visit, he also held a meeting with the Minister of External Affairs, P.V. Narasimha Rao (Blarel, 2015, pp. 227-28).

Amidst of these indications, the relationship between India and Israel extended beyond mere open official meetings and consultations. Following the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the Indian external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), reportedly invited an Israeli security specialist to advice on the Prime Minister's Security System (Gerberg, 2008, p. 161; Dutta, 2018). Following this, RAW has upheld its link with Israel, and it has played a significant role in attempting to establish a presence for Israeli defence industry within India.

However, Israel's alleged involvement in Sri Lankan ethnic conflict led to India's resentment towards Israel (Dixit, 1998, p.327). The Israeli support in intelligence co-operation with Sri Lanka was against the security interest of India (Kuruwita, 2023). Later as part of Indo- Sri Lankan Accord, in July 1987, India ensured that Sri Lanka would not directly contact with Israel (Blarel, 2015, p. 230). Amidst of this resentment, India granted permission for Israeli tennis players to participate in the New Delhi Davis Cup Tournament in July 1987[51]. Even though, there was no policy change or political will to establish full diplomatic ties with Israel.

In these circumstances, several members of the Rajiv government, including Narasimha Rao and P.K. Singh, who held foreign affairs responsibilities, pushed for improved relations with Israel. Furthermore, J.N. Dixit, the foreign secretary, acknowledged the benefits of strategic and intelligence cooperation and supported the normalisation of relations with Israel (Blarel, 2015, p.231). Despite Rajiv's personal inclination towards new ideas, he was hesitant to make definitive decisions. Nonetheless, the Rajiv government encouraged the emergence of a fresh perspective.

Rajiv Gandhi, driven by his vision of a technologically advanced modern India, did not find the ideological and internal compulsions of past governments appealing (Kapur, 2008, pp. 469-480). He diverged from the traditional West Asian policy of the Congress Party and adopted a more pragmatic approach. However, Rajiv Gandhi did not fully endorse a complete reversal of India's Israel policy, but he initiated several efforts to set the foundation for change (Kumaraswamy, 2002, p.6).

Rajiv Gandhi openly engaged with Israeli officials and pro-Israeli leaders, displaying less political inhibition in accepting change during his five-year tenure from 1984 to 1989 (Mohan, 2003, pp. 32-33). He consistently sought avenues to extricate India from its diplomatic stagnation. However, the corruption charges and internal divisions within the Congress party ultimately resulted in the Rajiv government being voted out of office in the 1989 elections, leading to the formation of a coalition government, the National Front, led by V.P.Singh (Nalapat, 2000, pp.427-431).

4.2.3.6. Coalition Government: Period of Policy Stagnation

Under the leadership of V.P. Singh, the National Front formed a coalition government that stayed in power from December 1989 to November 1990. Despite several members of the 'Janata Dal' having connections with Israel through their previous association with Jayaprakash Narayan's Praja Socialist Party (PSP)[52], the new government did not seek to continue the diplomatic ties with Israel that were established during the Rajiv government's tenure (Anderson, 1990, pp.527-540).

However, they were preoccupied with managing the delicate political circumstances of a coalition government (Fickett, 1993, pp.1151-1162). The new minister of External Affairs, I.K. Gujral, though a former Congressman, followed the pro-Arab policy. During this period, one of the significant events that had a major set back on Indian economic security was the Gulf war.

During the Gulf war in August 1990, Indian oil security was threatened, as forty percent of India's crude imports originated from Iraq or were obtained through a trilateral arrangement with USSR[53]. To address this situation, India had to import crude from Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran; resulting in doubling Indian import bill. Furthermore, the foreign remittance from Iraq and Kuwait through Indian nationals also disrupted (Malik, 1991, pp. 847-48). To ensure the safety of Indians, Gujral met with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on 20 August 1990 in Bagdad. India safely evacuated 170,000 Indian nationals[54]. This move, to address the oil security and economic crisis that India faced during the Gulf war, gave a contradictory signal to India-Israel relations (Baral & Mahanty, 1992, pp.368-384).

However, due the split in Janata Dal party, V.P. Singh's government lost confidence vote, and Chandra Shekhar from Janata Dal (S) came to power in November 1990 with the support of INC (Fickett, 1993, pp. 1156-57). During his brief tenure from November 1990 to March 1991, some diplomatic gestures were made towards Israel. In July 1991, Chandra Shekhar had a meeting with Giora Becher, Israeli Consul, but the meeting offered any diplomatic trajectory (Gerberg, 2008, p.99). Subramaniam Swami, the minister of state in Commerce and Law, attempted to normalise the relations between India and Israel by persuading Shekhar, but he was reluctant to modify the policy. At the World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting in Brussels in December 1990, Swami held a meeting with Israeli minister of Trade and Commerce, Moshe Nissim. However, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) deemed it as an unofficial meeting and not approved by the government (Blarel, 2015, p.234). Shekhar was preoccupied with the problem of political survival and did not make any change in the West Asian policy.

The conclusion of the Gulf War marked an escalation in the United States' engagement both on global and regional levels, solidifying their expanding influence in the region (Petras, 1991, pp.482-484). During the Gulf War, a discernable shift in India's foreign policy became evident when, in January 1991, the country allowed US military aircrafts to utilise Indian refueling facilities (Gaan & Das, 2002, pp. 177-204). This decision, made in the face of severe political criticisms, marked a significant departure from India's previous stance (Crosette, 1991; Malik, 1991, p.853). This policy was indicative of India's eagerness to modify its foreign policy towards the United States, a close associate of Israel. These developments created a congenial atmosphere for the reassessment of India's approach towards Israel by the Narasimha Rao government.

4.3. Towards Normalisation

In May 1991, during the Lok Sabha election campaign, former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was tragically assassinated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (*BBC News*, 21 May, 1991). This act was perceived as retaliation for his earlier decision to send troops to SriLanka in 1987 and to prevent his potential return to power (Mitra, 1991). P.V. Narasimha Rao, with a distinguished record as the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and his previous role as the External Affairs Minister in the governments of both Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, assumed the position of Prime Minister of India on 21 June 1991. Despite being labeled as 'accidental Prime Minister' by the political critics[55]; Rao with his extensive foreign policy experience, was not constrained by the limitations of a minority government or the ideological burden of the INC regarding West Asian policy (Blarel, 2015, p.236). However, he described as 'lackluster' by L.K. Advani, the prominent BJP leader, and 'Old wine in new bottle' by S. Jaipal Reddy, the spokesperson of Janata Dal[56], Rao surprisingly opted for a reformist foreign policy approach towards Israel (Singh & Thakkar, 2022).

The end of the cold War and the subsequent international, regional, and domestic developments, especially after the Gulf War, created an opportunity for India to revise its policies towards West Asia (Sarkar, 1991). The Gulf War exposed

divisions among Arab states, isolating the PLO due to its pro-Iraqi stance (Telhami, 1993, pp.437-452). While the Arab League condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and backed United Nations resolutions against Iraq, while Iraq received support from Libya and the PLO, resulting in their alienation and the erosion of their traditional support base (Wedgwood, 1998, pp. 724-728). Additionally, the decline in oil prices that followed the Gulf war further diminished India's reliance on the Arab nations[57]. Recognising this scenario, India realised the opportunity to initiate revision of its West Asian policy. Furthermore, beyond mere normalisation, India aimed to assume a significant 'diplomatic role in the new peace process' (Blarel, 2015, p. 238).

During the Gulf War, Iraqi forces launched Scud missiles at Israel[58]. Despite the resulting damage, the Israeli Defence force chose not to retaliate, realising that Iraq aimed to introduce an Arab-Israeli aspect to the conflict (Yolcu, 2016, pp. 165-186; Welch, 1992, pp. 328-369). Israel's stance during the war was garnered respect and appreciated by both India and Arab states. Furthermore, following the war, there was a growing realisation emerged regarding the shifting dynamics and the rising influence of the United States in the region (Kourvetaris, 1991, pp. 68-73).

Countries like Oman, Qatar, Jordan, Syria, and even the PLO expressed a willingness to reconsider their previous stances towards Israel and ready to engage in talks (Segal, 1991, pp.353-354). These developments eventually led to the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference. This favourable regional atmosphere provided India an opportunity to re-evaluate its policy towards Israel, taking into account the evolving dynamics and emerging possibilities for engagement.

India's Cold War foreign policy towards Israel linked with its Non-Alignment principles and pro-Arab orientation. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent rollback of Cold War, India was compelled to address its regional security situation and redefine its strategic security (Tripathi, 2013, pp. 38-51). Besides, the changed geopolitical landscape and the absence of previous strategic support by Soviet Union pushed India to reassess its foreign policy position (Kumaraswamy, 2010). In this context, India was required to modify

its policies to align with shifting global dynamics and establish novel relationships in order to safeguard its security interests (Nandy, 2020, pp.24-26). This imperative called for a thorough review of its approach towards Israel and a potential re-definition of its strategic priorities.

Consequently, in November 1991, Madhav Singh Solanki, the Minister of External Affairs, highlighted the possibilities for bilateral relations with Israel, although without specifying a specific date for the exchange of diplomatic missions (Ashraf, 1993, p.102). During a debate in the Rajya Sabha, various leaders, including Pramod Mahajan and Ram Jethmalani from the BJP, Subramanian Swamy from the Janata Party, and Yashwant Sinha from the Samajwadi Janata Party, expressed their support for establishing diplomatic relations with Israel (Blarel, 2015, p.242). This cross-party political consensus provided the Indian National Congress the assurance to depart from its historical stance and contemplate a policy shift towards Israel.

Moreover, following the initiation of the Madrid Peace Process, several nations with long-standing hostilities towards Israel began establishing diplomatic relations with the country without jeopardising their ties with Arab states (Atherton, 1992, pp. 123-24). Russia re-established diplomatic relations with Israel in October 1991. Despite Israel being the first West Asian country to recognise the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1950, it upheld an anti-Israeli stance (Sobin, 1991, pp. 111-125). Nonetheless, China eventually opted to establish diplomatic relations with Israel on 24 January 1992 (Han, 1993, pp. 62-63). The increasing trend of the countries normalising relations with Israel, combined with the emerging political consensus within India, set the stage for potential shifts in India's approach towards Israel.

In anticipation of a policy shift, India invited Yasser Arafat was invited to New Delhi to secure the support of the PLO on 18 December 1991(Singh, 2001, pp.113-148). As the PLO had already initiated negotiations with Israel and was considering diplomatic relation due to its isolation resulting from its stance during the Gulf war, Arafat found himself found unable to openly contest India's policy

change towards Israel (Blarel, 2015, p.244). During his stay in New Delhi, Arafat made a significant statement that, "the exchange of Ambassadors and recognition of Israel are acts of sovereignty, in which I cannot interfere and I respect any choice of Indian government" (Hasan, 2007, p.1133). The concurrence of PLO aimed to break one of the ideological barriers that had impeded India from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel since the times of its independence.

On 22 January 1992, J. N. Dixit, the Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, invited the Israeli Consul, Giora Becher, from Bombay to New Delhi (Singh, 2001). During their meeting, Dixit conveyed India's intention to enhance its relations with Israel in the near future. In response, the Israeli Consul expressed Israel's interest in establishing full-fledged diplomatic relations with India (Yegar, 2010). On January 29, 1992, India officially declared its decision to elevate the level of its relations with Israel to the level of embassies (Ashraf, 1993, pp. 99-106). As a historic decision by India, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao commented that the establishment of relation between the India and Israel would open up new avenues of co-operation in trade, investment, technology, and promote peace and stability in the region (Kumaraswami, 1998).

4.4. Conclusion

India's diplomatic relationship with Israel underwent a complex trajectory marked by a four-decade-long policy of estrangement, largely guided by national security concerns during the pre-independence and post-independence periods. Despite consistent overtures from Israel, India refrained from establishing formal ties, although there were instances of covert co-operation during times of conflict with China and Pakistan. Notably, during the post-Cold War era, India's security landscape shifted, leading to a re-evaluation of its foreign policy stance. Consequently, India relinquished its policy of estrangement, opting for a more open engagement with Israel, indicating a significant shift in its geopolitical strategy and recognition of the potential security benefits of fostering diplomatic relations with Israel.

Endnote:

1. See in, 'India Hailed for giving refuge to Jews fleeing Nazi genocide', *Business standard,* 29 January 2019.

2. Peel Commission, in full Royal Commission of Inquiry to Palestine, group headed by Lord Robert Peel, appointed in 1936, by the British government to investigate the causes of unrest among Palestinian Arabs and Jews.

3. M.K. Gandhi shaped the philosophy of *'satyagraha',* which advocated the non-violence as a means of action and believed in the world by melting the heart of adversary and converting it to good through non- violent means.

4. Hermann Kallenbach (1871–1945) was a South African architect and an intimate companion of Gandhi. Alongside another Jewish associate, H.S.L. Polak, Kallenbach stood with Gandhi throughout the Satyagraha struggle, which continued in South Africa until 1914.

5. '*Karma Yoga'* is the practice of performing actions without attachment to outcomes guided by the belief that one's duties are ordained for them. It involves acting selflessly, without claiming credit for one's actions or desiring any rewards.

6. Jawaharlal Nehru, Presidential Address at Faizapur Congress. December 27-28, 1936.

7. The British government's support for 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people' was stated in the Balfour Declaration, which was published on November 2, 1917.

8. Report of the Proceedings and documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March- April 1947.

9. UNSCOP with eleven members to investigate all matters relevant to the Palestine problem and to submit a report, including proposals for a solution, to the UN General Assembly.

10. See, the partition of Palestine, 29 November 1947: an analysis: UNGA. Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine Question, Sub committee- 2, published by Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1967.

11. Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Part I, vol. 2, No. 5, 4 December 1947, p. 1261.

12. See, Israel Inter national Relations: International Recognition of Israel, *Jewish Virtual Library.* Retrieved from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/international-recognition-of-israel

13. See, *Constituent Assembly Debates*, 20 August 1948, Vol.6, Session 1, pp.380-81.

14. See, Year Book of United Nations 1948-49 (Excerpts), Department of Public Information United Nations, New York, 1949.

15. Note of External Affairs Ministry, India, National Archives of India, New Delhi F.23 (2) ANT/50 as *quoted* in Sreekandan, R. 2004. *Dynamics of Diplomacy Delayed: India and Israel*.

16. See, Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon, *UN digital Library System*. Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/413258.

17. See, the communiqué published in *The Hindu*, on 18, September1950.

18. Baghdad Pact or Central Treaty Organisation**,** formerly mutual security organisation dating from 1955 to 1979 and composed of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom.

19. Also mentioned by Alie Abel, in 'NEHRU SEES PACTS IN ASIA AS FUTILE; Two Pro-Western Treaties Have 'No Reality Left,' He Asserts in Parliament; *The New York Times*, 9 December 1958 (Archives).

20. The Asian Relations Conference (1947), hosted by Jawaharlal Nehru, aimed to unite Asian independence movement leaders to focus attention on social, economic and cultural problems of the different countries and to foster mutual contact and understanding.

21. See, Bogor *communiqué,* issued in connection with Bogor Conference in Indonesia on December 28-29, 1954, as quoted in Appadorai.A..1955, The Bandung Conference,*India Quarterly* , July-September 1955, Vol. 11, No. 3 (July-September 1955), p.209.

22. See, Lok Sabha (Debates), Vol.7, Pt 2, 8August 1956, 2536-44, Retrieved from https://eparlib.nic.in/handle/123456789/7, on 15- August 2023.

23. See, Organisation of SCA, Article 1. Retrieved from, https:\\www. suezcanal.gov.eg

24. See, the Resolution No.118 of UNGA. Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112088.

25. See, Report of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India, 2:10, 10 October 1956.

26. Seventy percent of India's exports and seventy six percent of its imports passed through the Suez canal, See, Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.1, No.8, March 1957, 800-803, as referred in Blarel,2005, p. 131.

27. See *Middle East Records*, 1960; Vol1, p.304.as *cited* in Blarel, 2005, p.208.

28   . Began on 10 March 1959, in Lhasa.

29. Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia (2020, February 20). List of Prime Ministers of India. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/topic/list-of-prime-ministers-of-India-1832692

30. Sardar Swaran Singh was posted as External Affairs Minister on 18 July 1964.

31. See, India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Documents of the Gatherings of Non-aligned Countries, 1961-1979*, New Delhi, 1981, p.21.

32. See, *The Israel Digest* 9, 1966, 2-3.

33. See, *Lok Sabha Debates.*Vol.4, No.11 June 1967.p.3292-5, and the News in *Times of India* 6, June 1967, also covered the condemnation, as explained in Blarel (2015) p.166.

34. *See*, 1967 War: Six Days That Changed Middle East, BBC, 5 June 2017. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461

35. See, CHRONOLOGY September-November 1969. (1969). *Pakistan Horizon*, *22*(4), 352–386.

36. The Swatantra party expressed shock and demanded for the revision of India's West Asian policy, Lok Sabha Debates, 4:33, November 17, 1969, P.430.

37. Balraj Madhok, leader of BJS, also demanded for reevaluation of India's Israel policy. See *Lok Sabha Debates*, 4:33, 17 November 1969, p.430.

38. See, MEA. India, Bangladesh Documents, vol. 2 (Delhi, 1971), p. 154. As *cited* in Rubinoff (1995) p. 499.

39. . See, Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol. 75, 31 March 1971, p. 123-24, as *cited* in Blarel (2015) p. 186.

40. See, 5th Lok Sabha Election Results. Retrieved from, https://www.elections.in/parliamentary-constituencies/1971-election-results.html

41. Yom Kippur is a holiest day in Judaism, on which people refrain from eating, drinking, and having sexual relations. Both wearing leather shoes and self-oiling are prohibited among Orthodox Jews. Jews who practice Orthodoxy may dress in *kittel,* long white robes. *Yom Kippur. Encyclopedia Britannica.*

42. See, UNSC Resolution 340, 1972. UN Digital Library System. Retrieved from, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/93468

43. See, Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, 1979-80.

44. See, 'India Returns to Democracy', 22 March 1977. *New York Times*. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1977/03/22/archives/india-returns-to-democracy.html

45. See, Foreign Affairs Record, No-5, May 1982, pp. 152-154

46. In the Israeli attack, Iraq's Osirak nuclear research reactor at Tuwaitha, partially destroyed by using U.S. supplied F-15 and F-16 aircraft. Ten Iraqi soldiers and one French engineer killed during the airstrike.

47. See, Israeli Invasion of Lebanon. (1982). *Economic and Political Weekly*, *17*(26), 1059–1060.

48. '*Sunday Observer,* Published an interview of The Israeli Consul, Yossef Hassin, on 27 June 1982.

49. See, Expulsion Of Israeli Consul from India, United Press International, 8 July 1982.

50. In the speech of K.K.Tiwari , in the special session of UNGA in January 1989.

51.   See, Kumaraswami.P.R (n.d). India- Israel Davis Cup Tie 1987- New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs.

52.   Jayaprakash Narayan visited Israel in September 1958 and met with Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion. *Times of India,* 18 October 2018. In the article 'Jaishankar unveils plaque at 'Bhoodan Grove' in Israel'.

53.   See, 'The First Oil War: Implications of the Gulf Crisis in the Oil Market'. *Oxford Institute for Energy Studies*, 1990.

54.   See, the Annual Report of Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India, 1990-91, Gulf Crisis, p.30.

55.   Sanjaya Baru 'How P.V. Narasimha Rao, India's first 'accidental' prime minister, earned his place in history'. *The New Indian Express,* 28 June 2021.

56.   Agha Zafar, 'Narasimha Rao's election as Prime Minister heralds return of the old Congress guard'. *India Today*. 15 July 1991.

57   . See, Crude oil Prices-70 Year Historical Chart. Retrieved from https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart

58.   See, 'History Flash back: How Iraq Used Russian- Made Scud Missiles during the Gulf War'. 20 June 2022.

CHAPTER 5

INDIA-ISRAEL POST- COLD WAR ENGAGEMENTS: ADAPTING EMERGING REALITIES

5.1. Introduction

India and Israel sharing many commonalities and 'clear parallels'[1] of colonial past and the history of contentious partition, as well as the presence of unhappy neighbours and maintaining democratic political systems (Inbar, 2017). However, Israel was not a diplomatic fascination, during the early years of independence for India due to the perception that Israel was carved out from the Arabian soil through western imperial interest (Srivastava, 1970). Nevertheless, the aftermath of the Cold War, India underwent a comprehensive re-evaluation of its foreign policy priorities in response to the changing global security landscape (Ghosal, 2016). With the waning influence of the Soviet Union and the ascendant power of the United States, India recognised the necessity of strategic recalibration to address its security needs (Browne, 2017). Simultaneously, the 1990s saw a dramatic shift in the global economic system and a rapid advancement of technology; compelling India to reassess its foreign policy stance (Brainbent, 1996). Consequently, India's foreign policy objectives pivoted towards enhancing national security and fostering economic development, prompting the nation to forge new alliances (Mohan, 2003). Due to this transformative shift, India's engagement with Israel emerged as a noteworthy departure from its longstanding policy of non-engagement. This chapter investigates the reasoning behind India's decision to re-evaluate and deepen its relationship with Israel.

5.2. Factors for Policy Shift towards Israel

The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel by India is widely regarded as a pivotal 'paradigm shift' in its foreign policy, reflecting a strategic response to evolving global security dynamics (Blarel, 2015, p.260). Because, it refashioned, India's unfavourable stance towards Israel due to several factors:

(i)   India traditionally supported the Palestinian cause, which significantly influenced India's anti-Israeli attitude.

(ii)   India's sensitivity to the concerns of its sizable Muslim minority, coupled with apprehension about the potential criticism from Pakistan regarding any improvement in relations with Israel, played a significant role in shaping its stance towards Israel.

(iii)   India's security strategy to safeguard its position in Kashmir, and its anticipated support of Arab states contributed to its anti-Israeli stance.

(iv)   India had an increasing economic dependence on Arab states for oil security and foreign remittance (Rubinoff, 1995, p.487).

However, following the collapse of the bipolarism and the emergence of multipolar world, India found it necessary to address international security concerns, monetary perspectives, traditional development patterns, and escalating environmental security issues (Singh, 2015, pp. 238-40). Besides, the post-Cold War global circumstances facilitated the establishment of US hegemony and undermined India's cherished Non-alignment ideology (Mazumdar, 2011, pp.166-67). The geopolitical and strategic shift has created ambiguity regarding the global order, 'forced India to reorient its foreign policy to accommodate the changing international milieu', and to confront the emerging security challenges and safeguard national security through reliable means (Pant, 2004, p.61).

According to Mohan (2003), the post-Cold War challenges and the globalisation had a direct influence on Indian decision for a policy shift towards Israel. The key highlights of these changes are:

(i)   Transformation from state controlled economic model towards a more market-oriented approach.

(ii)   India adopted liberalisation, focusing on trade and foreign investment, to promote economic growth and security, reshaped its economic narrative and seeking more independent global position.

(iii)   Shift from the leadership of Non-alignment to assume greater role in international system prioritising national interest and national security.

(iv)   Transition from default anti-Western stance to more receptive and open approach towards the West for better co-operation.

(v)   Shift from idealistic approach to more pragmatic and practical foreign policy (Introduction, pp. xi-xxii).

The termination of longstanding policy of estrangement towards Israel marked as a significant turning point in Indo-Israel relationship during the post-Cold War period. The decision to establish diplomatic relation with Israel was not only a diplomatic change but also seemed as a security strategy of India (Kumaraswamy, 2018, pp.1-16). It attained 'new heights of co-operation' and potential to gain advancement in various domains during the post-normalisation period. These synergetic ties provided India and Israel to explore various avenues of mutual collaboration[2]. Numerous factors contributed to this paradigm shift, which analysed below.

5.2.1. Israel: an Unleashing Technological Marvel

Israel and India had significant differences on many parameters, see table below.

Table 5.1

India and Israel Comparison: on Selected Parameters

Parameters	India	Israel
Total Area	3,287,263 Sq. Km	20,770 Sq. Km
Population	1,391,308,838	8,768,080
GDP (Per Capita in US $)	2100	34185
GDP (Major sectors)		
Agriculture	19.90%	2.40%
Industry	14.60%	26.50%
Service	51.81%	69.50%
Military Expenditure (of GDP 2022)	2.42%	4.51%

Source: Compiled from Different sources by the researcher

The table shows that India, the seventh largest country in the world by area, covers 3,287,263 square kilometers and has a massive population of approximately 1.40 billion. In contrast, Israel is a much smaller nation with an area of about 20,770 square kilometers and a population of only 8.7 million. Despite India's size and population, Israel has a significantly higher per-capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $34,185 compared to India's $ 2,100. This disparity in GDP can attributed to Israel's focus on cutting-edge start-ups and high-tech businesses. In contrast, in India agricultural sector plays a crucial role, contributing 19.9% to its GDP, whereas Israel's agricultural sector only contributes 2.4% of its GDP. The industrial and service sectors are more vital to Israel's economy, accounting for 26.5% and 69.5% of its GDP, respectively. In contrast, India's service sector dominates its GDP, comprising 51.81%. Regarding military expenditure, Israel allocates a significant 4.51% of its GDP to defence, while India spends 2.42% on defence.

Israel's economic profile, during the time of its formation was not an attractive one (Bernstein & Swirski, 1982, pp.64-85; Gross, 1999, pp.67-83). Therefore, in the early years of India's independence, diplomatic ties with Israel was not prioritised due to the economic and technological backwardness of Israel to offer substantial support for India's developmental goals in comparison with the Arab states (Michaely, 1975, pp. 01-26). However, over time, Israel's remarkable strides in technological and strategic advancement, despite a challenging environment, prompted a significant shift in India's policy towards Israel (Jorisch, 2021). India began recognising the notable achievements of Israel, during the post- Cold War era, which includes the following key domains.

5.2.1.1. Defence Technology

India's initial policy of estrangement during the early years of Israel's formation, which was persisted primarily due to the politico-ideological differences, lessened due to Israel's notable achievements in various sectors, particularly defence (Afterman & Janardhan, 2023). It made Israel an attractive partner to address multiple security challenges India had to confront during the post-Cold War period (Ghosal, 2016). Beginning with the early presence of Jewish paramilitary groups

within the British mandate, Israel has grown into a major exporter of military equipments, missile defence systems, adaptive armor, and cyber weapons driven by the persistent research in the face of growing threats in its geostrategic environment[3] (Brooks, 2017, Para.2).

Israel's saga in military technological advancement began when it faced a significant setback. French President Charles De Gaulle imposed an arms embargo on Israel just before the 1967 Six-Day War, cutting off their access to advanced weapons[4]. This unexpected event forced Israel to reassess its approach and adopt a policy of 'munitions independence', aiming for self-sufficiency in major weapon systems. This marked a new era for Israel's defence industries and the starting of indigenous military industries (Rubin, 2017, p. 231). The formation of local military enterprises in Israel was driven by concerns over the reliability of defence suppliers and the financial burden of purchasing military equipment.

In 1972, Israel introduced domestically designed cruise missiles, followed by Kfir C-2, an all weather multirole combat aircraft. The cost effective 'Merkava' (Chariot), an off-road battle tank, and the Barak missile defence system, introduced in 1981, had a significant impact in global defence market (Farah, 2000; Rubin 2017, p.231). Later, Israel's defence industry has gained recognition for producing a majority of its military equipment domestically, utilising cutting-edge electronics and aircraft technologies. Israel's technological advancement and expertisation in defence production, particularly in small arms, mortars, aircrafts and surveillance systems, have generate significant demand in the global defence market (Labarge, 1988, pp.341-358). The vast commercial applications of the military technology of Israel made it to advance in geopolitical and geo-economics transformations (Singh, 2021).

In the post-Cold War period, Israel has emerged as a prominent actor in defence research and development. It not only addresses its own national security requirements but also extending its expertise to meet the defence needs of the global community[5]. Table 5.2 shows Israel' arms export during the period 2012 to 2022.

Table 5.2

Israel's Arms Export During 2012-2022

Year	Amount (In US $)
2012	7496
2013	6635
2014	5665
2015	5761
2016	6552
2017	9374
2018	7596
2019	7299
2020	8552
2021	11433
2022	12546

Source*: The Times of Israel, 14 June 2023*

Israel's arms exports witnessed a consistent upward trajectory from 2012 to 2022, as depicted in the data. Notably, there was a notable surge in exports from 2016 onwards, with a particularly sharp increase in 2021 and 2022. Despite a slight dip in 2014, the overall trend highlights a significant expansion in Israel's arms trade, suggesting a robust and thriving defence industry during this period.

The Military Research and Development unit in the Directorate of Defence Research and Development (DDR&D) plays a central role in spearheading global technological research that results in the invention of powerful weapon systems (Labarge, 1998. p.343). Its key objectives involve conducting research, advancing projects, promoting future system technologies, ensuring successful project management, and achieving full operational capabilities through full-scale development[6]. Israel solidified its defence superiority by prioritising innovation, fortifying its defence infrastructure, and ensuring the deployment of cutting-edge military technology.

In the early 1970s, India's defence establishment impressed by Israeli technologies, leading to India's interest in diversifying its weapon suppliers during

the post-Cold War period. However, Russia remained the largest supplier[7], the US, UK, and France also played significant roles, but later, Israel showcased the most promising capabilities (Essa, 2022). See the arms import data of India from 2018-2022 in the following diagram.

Figure 5.1

INDIA'S ARMS IMPORT FROM 2018-2022 (In %)

RUSSIA FRANCE UNITED STATES ISRAEL UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY

7,7   21,4
11,1
45,1
28,6

Source: *Compiled from different sourcesby the researcher.*

India's arms import data from 2018-2022 reveals a strategic approach characterised by a significant reliance on Russian arms, constituting 45.1% of total imports. The second-largest contributor is France, with a substantial share of 28.6%, and the US follows at 11.1%, showcasing an increasing defense partnership, Israel provides 7.7%, emphasising technological expertise. The contributions from the UK and Germany, at 2% and 1.4% respectively, reflect a more limited role. This diversified procurement strategy signifies India's aim to balance its strategic relationships, reduce dependency on any single supplier, and access a broad spectrum of advanced technologies.

In response to growing security challenges, India decided to forge diplomatic ties with Israel, which prompted India to start importing weapons. As a result, as the accompanying graphic shows, there was a noticeable increase in Israel's weaponry

imports to India throughout the post-Cold War era. This date is illustrated in a figure below.

Figure 5.2

India's Arms Import From Israel and its growth during the period (1997-2021)

Source: Compiled from the data of SIPRI.

The data shows that there is a consistent upward trend in the percentage of arms transfers from Israel to India over the years. Starting at 15% in 1997-2000, it gradually increased to 27% in 2000-2005, further rose to 33% in both 2005-2010 and 2010-2015, and finally reached the highest percentage of 42% in 2015-2021. This indicates a growing reliance on Israeli arms and defence equipment by India over the years.

Although India had a wide range of military industries and emphasised self-reliance as a military power, the pursuit of this goal was disrupted by global political dynamics. Jaishankar (2019) states that during the Post-Cold war period, India focused on the indigenisation of the defence industry as an essential and valuable national security goal, especially for a sizable nation like India, which has a growing economy, diverse security challenges, and increasing international responsibilities (p.10). In this juncture, Israel's robust defence industry offers significant economic incentives, which enable it to export domestically developed weapon systems, generate foreign currency (Ninjthoujam, 2020, para.3). India, facing economic

security challenges during the post-Cold War period, found this attractiveness beneficial as it sought to address its own economic crisis. Consequently, this could lead to the subsidisation of the nation's annual defence budget.

Furthermore, India's search for security systems suitable for the use in diverse environments such as the high altitudes of the Himalayas and the high temperatures of the Rajasthan desert led to the adoption of Israeli equipments (Chand, 2016). Besides, Israel's expertise in the production of small arms, anti-tank rockets, guided advanced missiles, aircraft, watercraft, spaceflight, weapon stations, active protection systems, radars, optronics, tanks, fighting vehicles, artillery, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and air defence systems offered India a wide variety of security equipment (Essa, 2022).This diversified strategic equipment was developed and provided by Israeli defence firms.

Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) [8], a government-owned aerospace and aviation manufacturing firm, designs, develops, produces and maintain aerial and astronautics systems. Besides, Israeli Military Industries Ltd. (IMI), also referred as TAAS[9], specialises in the development and manufacturing of offensive and defensive security system for land, air and navel forces. It provides upgrades, training and services for firepower and mobility of its systems. Its five divisions of munitions systems, Rocket systems, Land systems, advanced systems, caliber ammunition systems and its subsidiary - The IMI Academy for Security and Anti-Terror Doctrine and Training, which posses highly professional personnel (Egozi, 2013). Further. The Rafael Advanced Defence System (RAFAEL)[10] develops and produces weapons and defence technologies like air defence systems, air-to-air missiles, electronic warfare systems, precision-guided missiles, active protection systems and remote controlled weapon stations.

Moreover, the research oriented industrial military complex of Israel was considered by India as a better option for addressing the defence and security requirements (Rajagopal, 2018). Furthermore, India was also impressed with Israel's successful warfare concepts and strategies. Israel's primarily indigenous technology and simplicity of technological transfer without end-user issues, India preferred to

establish defence co-operation with Israel (Katoch, 2022). India gained substantial benefits from Israel's experience in optronics, electronics, and missile technology when the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) developed programmes for Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) and missiles (Patil, 2022). This knowledge was put to the test in the Gulf War when an Israeli mark was found on the US-operated Pioneer-I unmanned reconnaissance aircraft (Sachdev, 2019).

Further, due to its long history of warfare in challenging geostrategic settings, Israel has developed expertise in border surveillance, sensor technology, and electronic detection (Pant, 2004). This expertise, along with technical support, India thought beneficial in preventing incursions in the sensitive border areas of Kashmir and the North-East (Gupta, 2020). The Indian defence forces have not only been impressed by Israeli weapons but also by the warfare strategies adopted by the Israel Defence Force, particularly in adverse climatic conditions. During the Kargil war between India and Pakistan in May 1999, known as 'Operation Vijay', Israel demonstrated its willingness to supply laser-guided bombs and surveillance drones[11]. This quick response by Israel enhanced its credibility as a reliable arms supplier and a major defence technology partner, providing equipment to the Indian army, navy, and air force (Pant & Sahu, 2019). This period saw a reduction in constraints between India and Israel, leading to a higher level of political, economic, and military convergence.

India and Israel have engaged in co-operation in restricted military and intelligence operations due to Israel's strategic and national security capabilities, even during the pre- normalisation period (Blarel, 2015). This co-operation was crucial for India as it helps to maintain the qualitative and quantitative edge that Israel possesses in terms of defence capabilities during Indo-Pak wars (Noor, 2004, pp. 91-104).

Collaborating with Israel is pivotal for India, offering a strategic advantage that extends beyond defence. Initiated in 1992 by Narasimha Rao due to the rising threat of extremism, this alliance positioned India as a regional influencer. Beyond defence, Israel's excellence in diverse domains, including technology and

innovation, enhances India's capabilities and economic prospects. This partnership not only addresses immediate security concerns but also fortifies India's position in South Asia, potentially reshaping the geopolitical balance in the region.

5.2.1.2. Space security Excellence

During the post-Cold War period, India has experienced some significant military surveillance failures in its history. During the Kargil Conflict with Pakistan in 1999, Indian intelligence agencies failed to detect the infiltration of Pakistani troops into Indian Territory, resulting in heavy casualties and a prolonged conflict[12]. Besides, the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai in 2008[13] also revealed gaps in coastal and maritime surveillance, allowing terrorists to enter the city through the sea route. The Pathankot attack in 2016 had also exposed the vulnerabilities in airbase security and perimeter surveillance, leading to loss of lives and equipment (Singh, 2016). The Pulwama attack in 2019 indicated a failure in intelligence coordination despite warnings, underscoring the need for improved preventive measures[14]. In 2020, Chinese incursions in Ladakh exposed shortcomings in border surveillance and intelligence-gathering, necessitating enhanced border surveillance infrastructure and intelligence sharing (Sagar, 2021). These incidents highlight the need for continuous improvement and modernisation of India's surveillance capabilities.

Israel's surveillance technology has been an attractive asset for India's security environment due to persistent threats from both its immediate and extended neighborhood[15]. Israel has developed advanced earth observation systems, which includes Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), light weight satellites, high-resolution electro-optics, and Low Erath Orbit (LEO) launching capabilities. By 1988, Israel has successfully launched satellites and gained expertise in launching hyperspectral and Nano satellites[16]. In 2008, Israel introduced affordable and lightweight Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellites, called TECSAR, which provide high resolution SAR imageries in all weather conditions[17].

5.2.1.3. Cyber security

Israel was the pioneer in cyber technology as legitimate field of civilian industry and extended its application in everyday life. Israel, recognising the potential vulnerability of being one of the most compueterised nation, facing significant security challenges, and surrounded by hostile neighbours, has prioritised the development of advanced cyber defence mechanisms and engaged in cyber warfare capabilities (Israel, 2021).Therefore, Israeli companies have recognised the vast potential in the realm cyber warfare, actively pursuing opportunities in both offensive and defensive cyber solutions (Egozy, 2019).

Israel's global recognition for its strong cyber warfare capabilities can be attributed to talent development programmes that act as an assembly line for highly skilled and diverse cyber warriors (Jaghory, 2022). These programmes, such as Magshimim, Atudai, Mofet, Mamriot, Odyssey, and Gsharin[18] play a vital role in identifying and nurturing exceptional cyber talents from an early stage (Gill, 2023). Israel persists in making substantial investments in high-tech innovation and research and development. The Israeli National Cyber Directorate (INCD) is actively dedicated to promoting the future cohort of professionals who will spearhead the realm of cyber-systems, guide the Israeli cyber-industry, and utilise it both domestically and globally (Jain, 2022). Exploring these programmes can provide valuable lessons in the Indian context to enhance talent development in the field of cyber security.

5.2.1.4. Agriculture and Water Technologies

Israel has achieved the remarkable success in agricultural and water technologies, despite its arid climate and limited resources. Key factors contributing to its excellence include the invention of drip irrigation, which optimises water usage and increases crop yields[19]. Besides, Israel has also made significant investments in water recycling and desalination, allowing it to reclaim waste water and convert sea water into fresh water for various purposes (Bhatt, 2021, p.5). Further, the precision agriculture techniques, such as sensor-based monitoring and data analytics, further enhanced productivity while minimising resource

consumption. Israel's focus on agricultural research and development, supported by a vibrant start-up ecosystem, has fostered innovative solutions and sustainable farming practices[20]. The country actively shares its expertise globally and collaborates with other nations to promote agricultural sectors worldwide.

5.2.1.5. Medical and Healthcare Technologies

Israel has emerged as a global leader in medical and healthcare technologies due to its thriving medical technology sector and innovative solutions[21]. The country excels in the development of cutting-edge medical devices, digital health, and telemedicine technologies (Sudow, 2017). Israeli companies have introduced revolutionary solutions in imaging systems, diagnostic tools, wearable health technologies, and more. Additionally, Israel's biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector focuses on areas such as personalised medicine, genomics, and regenerative medicine (Fishman, 2016). Israel has advanced healthcare IT systems and data analytics solutions enable efficient management of medical records and facilitate evidence-based decision-making. Israel's strong research and innovation ecosystem, coupled with global collaborations, further contribute to its success in medical and healthcare technologies (*Times of Israel*, 12 March 2023).

5.2.1.6. Renewable Energy

Israel has invested in renewable energy technologies, particularly in solar power. It has developed solar energy systems, advanced solar thermal technologies, and innovative solutions for energy storage and grid integration. Israeli Climate envoy, Gideon Behar, said that, "Israel's biggest contribution to the climate crises has been to solve it with innovative climate technologies"[22]. As part of clean energy mission, Israel has introduced multiple projects to produce substantial solar energy capacity (Aswarya, 2021, pp. 323-24). The country's geographic location allows for ample sunlight, making solar power a viable option. The largest solar thermal power station in the world, Ashalim, is located in Israel. It has a capacity of 300 megawatts and includes a concentrated solar power tower, parabolic troughs, and photovoltaic fields[23].

5.2.1.7. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML)

Israel has become a leading global hub for artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) innovation. Its academic institutions, such as Hebrew University and Tel Aviv University, have made significant contributions to AI and ML research. The country boasts a vibrant startup ecosystem, particularly in Tel Aviv, known as the 'Startup Nation', where numerous AI and ML companies have emerged[24]. Israel's expertise in AI and ML has applied in various sectors, including defence and security, where advanced technologies enhance surveillance and intelligence systems (*Economic Times*, 17 July 2023). The government actively supports this thriving ecosystem through funding, grants, and initiatives to attract talent and promote collaborations. Israeli AI and ML companies also engage in international collaborations, further enhancing their global impact and recognition.

5.2.1.8. Biotechnology and Life Sciences

Israel has established itself as a leading force in biotechnology and life sciences. Renowned academic institutions such as the Weizmann Institute of Science and Hebrew University of Jerusalem have contributed to cutting-edge research in genomics, drug discovery, and regenerative medicine (Beyar et al., 2012, pp. 2563-2569). The country's dynamic biotech startup ecosystem has produced innovative companies like Mazor Robotics and Brainstorm Cell Therapeutics, making significant strides in healthcare and medical technology (*Reuters*, 2014, March 24). Israel's expertise extends to agritech, where advanced agricultural technologies address challenges in arid environments (*The Economic Times*, 2017, November 22). Supported by a favourable government environment and international collaborations, Israel's biotech and life sciences sector continues to drive advancements in health care, agriculture, and related fields[25].

5.2.1.9. Semiconductors

Semiconductors are essential in modern electronics, powering microprocessors and memory chips crucial for computers and data centers across various industries (Arora, 2022). They play a pivotal role in communication devices,

energy applications like solar cells, and automotive electronics, including safety systems and electric vehicles (Mc Callum, 2023). Additionally, semiconductors are integral to healthcare equipment, from medical imaging to diagnostic devices and implants[26]. Israeli high-tech companies thrive through annual exports of advanced services, and driven by an ecosystem supporting over 800 innovative firms and the launch of over 250 new ones annually (Israeli High-Tech, Situation Report, 2022) . The Israeli semiconductor industry, marked by 150+ design centers and creative companies, leads in shaping cutting-edge global products, with notable examples like 3D Signals, Diagsense, Tower semiconductor, KITOV.ai, Newsight, Redler-T.[27] Israel's reputation for pioneering disruptive technological innovations in fields like AI, computer vision, cybersecurity, smart sensors, block chain, and automation processes is reshaping the methods of manufacturing, design, and marketing of products (Boseler & Bostick, 2023).

Therefore, India's foreign policy shifts towards Israel not influenced by any independent or single factor. Instead, the transformation in Indo-Israel relations, progressing from limited engagement to full diplomatic ties, was the outcome of several interrelated variables. These variables include changes in the mood of Arab states as reflected in the Madrid peace process, the growing support of the United States towards India, and the shift in India's internal political atmosphere (Ghosal, 2016). Collectively, these factors created an environment conducive to a diplomatic shift towards Israel (Nair, 2004, pp.119-123). The strategic and security interests arising from the post-Cold War global, regional, and sub-regional geopolitical scenarios, with multiple variables influenced the shift in India's relationship with Israel. The factors contributing to this policy shift, which are analysed below.

5.2.2. End of the Cold War and India's Security Quandary

The Cold War was characterised by political, economic and ideological propaganda struggles between the US-USSR blocs rather than direct military confrontation (Blakemore, 2022). However, various wars were fought in different regions, marking significant events within this era and raising the specter of a potential nuclear catastrophe (Niebuhr, 1959, pp. 212-214). Both blocs provided

diplomatic and financial support to their respective allies in these conflicts. The Cold War ultimately came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, marking a significant shift in the global geopolitical landscape (Filitov & Williams, 2011, pp.298-307). The collapse of the Soviet Union gave way for the emergence of fifteen independent republics, and it left political setback to Eastern Europe through 'de-politicisation' and 'de-ideologisation', transforming the international order and global balance of power (Goshal, 2016, p. 3; Browne, 2017, p. 326). The ideological rigidity of the Cold War period loosened, and the chance of growing military alliances gave way for the economic and multilateral arrangements. However, the disintegration of Soviet Union has created uncertainty and unreliability in arms supply to India, as it was a major supplier of defence equipment[28] during Cold War period. See the table below:

Table 5.3

**Arms Trade and Share Per Country to India
in 'TIV' Per Five Years From 1970-1994 (In US$)**

Country	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94
France	120	144	233	1479	314
%Share	1.7%	1.9%	1.9%	7.8%	4.2%
Israel	0	0	0	0	0
%Share	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Russia/USSR	5185	5478	8381	14296	4773
Share	72.2%	70.4%	70.9%	75.1%	64.1%
UK	1670	1216	2121	1718	762
%Share	23.3%	16.2%	18.0%	9.0%	10.2%
United States	0	0	0	45	36
%Share	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%

Source: Compiled based on SIPRI arms trade Data base.

The data reveals that, from 1970 to 1994, the arms trade data for India reveals that USSR played a dominant role as the primary arms supplier. The trade volume from USSR remained consistently high throughout the period, peaking in 1985-89. France also had an increasing arms trade with India, while the United Kingdom had notable presence with fluctuating volumes. However, there was no

recorded arms trade between Israel and India. The United States had minimal involvement in India's arms trade, except for a small activity in the later years. Overall, Russia/USSR, France, and the UK were the main contributors to India's arms trade during the Cold War, while Israel and the United States had negligible contributions.

The dissolution of USSR had profound implications for India's strategic position as it resulted in the loss of India's strategic alliance with the Soviet Union (Thakur, 1993, pp.831-850). This alliance had served as a crucial security buffer against potential security threats from China, Pakistan, and the United States (Nandakarni, 1995, pp. 22-24).The Soviet Union played a pivotal role in India's military development, contributing significantly to its fourth position in military ranking[29]. It was a major arms supplier for India since 1960s until its demise in 1991[30]. During this period, India heavily relied on the Soviet Union for arms imports and economic support. The Soviet Union not only supplied a wide range of military equipments to India but also supported to its public sector development and countering the geopolitical alignment of US, Pakistan and China[31].

The purchase of arms import started with the acquisition of the Ilyushin II-14, twin engine commercial and military cargo aircraft, followed by MIG-21 fighter crafts. India purchased AK-47 rifles, AKM assault rifles, Dragunov SVD rifles, OSV-96 anti material rifles, PK machine guns and NSV machine guns from Soviet Union (Singh, 1984, pp.707-720). The armoured vehichles T-72 Ajeya and Ajeya MK2 are imported from Soviet Union. BNP-2 Sarath, the infantry fighting vehicle and the engineering support vehichles of bridge laying Tank T-72, Pontoonova Mostova Subravia (PMS) are imported from Soviet Union (Singh, 2022). Soviet BM 21, rocket launching artillery system; M-46, Sharang, 130mm/ 155mm field gun; T 55MBT150mm gun increased India's defence capability. Air defence systems of Kub (SA-6 Gainful, S 125(SA -3 Goa), 9K 33 osa (SA-8 Greko), 9K 35 Sterla-10(SA-13 Gopher) imported and commissioned with Indian defence system. Besides, self propelled anti aircraft weapon, ZSU-23-4M (Shikha) and ZU-23-2, anti aircraft gun purchased from Soviet Union (Nadakarni, 1995, pp. 24-28;

Bommakanthi & Patil, 2022). These acquisitions from the Soviet Union significantly bolstered India's defence capabilities, contributing to its overall military strength.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union had a significant impact on Indian security. The disruption of defence supplies and the difficulty in collecting spare parts and upgrading of Soviet imported military equipments were major challenges faced by India (Thakur, 1993). Moreover, India encountered difficulties in identifying and establishing relationships with approximately 3,500 suppliers scattered across the newly independent republics. These suppliers played a crucial role in manufacturing military equipment for India (Kohli, 1993, pp. 85-100). In these circumstances, India faced obstacles in maintaining a consistent supply of necessary defence equipment, which had adverse effects on its security. Besides, the collapse of the Soviet regime posed risks to Indian armed forces, which were heavily dependent on Soviet hardware.

Consequently, India embarked new military partners, resulting in a shift towards the West. Thakur (1993) says that, the United States, Germany, Italy, Japan, Israel, and even Taiwan emerged as prominent players in India's security considerations (pp. 831-850). The shift reflected India's pursuit of reliable alliances and partnerships in response to the evolving global scenario. Besides, the Gulf war highlighted the superiority of American weapon systems, leading to the concerns about India's military security and the possibility of Pakistan to gain access to US weapons (Snyder, 1994, pp.68-89). Since 1991, India has made efforts to acquire advanced military technology from Western countries. However, their ability to procure such technology has been restricted (Gerberg, 2008, p.291). Furthermore, the escalation of insurgency sponsored by Pakistan in Kashmir prompted India to seek reliable partners in research and development, particularly in strategic areas, and consequently Israel emerged as a viable choice (Karmon, 2022).

5.2.3. Globalisation: Furthering Economic Security

The inauguration of globalistion offered a way to progress for developing nations, where governments are compelled to embrace privatisation and diminish the involvement of state[32]. It deepened economic integration, economic openness, and

increased interdependence among countries in the global economy (Jindal, 2002, p. 98). Brainbent (1996) states that the 'Globalisation integrates economies through the cross-border flow of capital, technology, and labour migration, there by strengthening economic relationships' (pp.163-76).

The economic security crisis marked the beginning of the economic restructuring in India, as it was realised that no global actor could play a dominant role in international arena without addressing the economic security issues. The roots of economic crisis traced back 1980s when India's fiscal deficit and current account deficit had started and widened by spending more than its earning (Khanna, 1992, pp.47-62). This crisis reached its critical stage in 1991, when the government was forced to airlift its gold reserves to London and Tokyo to secure a loan from International Monetary Fund (IMF)[33]. The balance of payment crisis and the oil price hike due to Gulf War forced India to revise its economic and foreign policy (Thakur, 1992,pp. 165-182).

Therefore, India, decided to subscribe to the policy of globalisation to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), to ensure economic security. This move, Bhagwati (2004) highlights that Indian economy integrated with global economy through globalisation has been affected in four ways:

(i)   Changes in transport and communication.

(ii)   Movements of capital and services accelerated due to the development of Information technology.

(iii)   Growing economic competition and subsequent economic insecurity, and

(iv)   The fear regarding the limits on government's freedom to provide for the welfare of the citizens (pp.11-12).

During the early stages of globalisation, India faced challenges in competing with developed nations due to limited access to modern technology (Panagariya, 2004). The implementation of globalisation as an economic policy had an impact on Indian economic system, as foreign capital dominated and led to internal disparities (Shanmukhappa, 2016, pp. 926-934). As a result, there was an increased burden on foreign policy, requiring a cautious approach to safeguard economic security

interests while maintaining national security and sovereignty (Santos, 2018, pp. 217-244).

The post-Cold War transformations resulted in a substantial impact on economic system, opening up market-oriented reforms through easing trade and investment policy and devaluation of currency (Mazumdar, 2011, p.172). India's post-Cold War foreign policy exhibits traits of economic diplomacy rather the political as a security strategy, aimed at ensuring greater economic growth to align with the new international order (Tripathi, 2013). As a part of the global economy, India intensified its collaboration with multilateral institutional arrangements and redefined its relation with major world actors (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011).The changing economic and political equations of the world after the Cold-War required India to restructure its strategic and security priorities for next century (Mukerji, 2018, pp. 335-344). Besides, the adoption of New Economic Policy (NEP) by India as the part of Globalisation and liberalisation positioned it well to meet the economic and technical demands of rapidly growing Indian economy (Madaan & Madan, 1995, pp.104-113). Such a global and regional reorientation was more visible in Indian relation with US and in West Asia towards the state of Israel.

5.2.4. Escalating Dominance of United States

During the Cold War, India adopted the Non-aligned attitude and refrained from joining forces with either the power blocs sponsored by the United States or Soviet Union. This stance, strained the relations between India and the United States, as India exhibited mild pro-Soviet tendencies (Gerberg, 2008, p.135). However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States' triumph in the Gulf War in January 1991- though under UN banner, the majority force to 'Operation Dessert Storm' contributed by the US, has cemented United States' political and military dominance in world affairs (Hsiung, 1991, pp.31-41). Furthermore, the change in the global order from bipolarity to multipolarity also benefited the United States as remaining superpower. This change had a significant effect on global actors to conduct their foreign policies in relation to their strategic and economic engagements (Pertas, 1991, pp. 482-484).

The post-Cold War era witnessed the reaffirmation of United States dominance in various spheres, including strategic, economic, political, and energy

sectors (Wallerstein, 1993, pp. 1-6). The post-Cold War shift in global scenario, coupled with the growing dominance of US, prompted India to lean towards it, primarily driven by Indian security concerns (Gaan, 1992, pp. 1-22). Shahi (2020) outlines these concerns as follows:

(i)   The economic security aspect of the post-Cold War period and India's subsequent advancement in national power were closely linked with the political and strategic rise of the United States.

(ii)   India viewed the US military presence in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, as well as its influence over Pakistan, as factors that could alleviate growing security tensions emerging from China and Pakistan.

(iii) India's aspirations to establish itself as an Indian Ocean power necessitated aligning its national interests with US strategic interests.

(iv)   The restructuring of India's economy was only possible with external financial and technological assistance, in which the United States played a major role (pp. 39-40).

The economic and structural reforms implemented in India laid the groundwork for the new engagement with the US. After facing a financial crisis in 1991, India relied on the economic and technological support of Western nations to revive its economy (Gosh, 2006. pp.413-429). The strategic transformations and dynamic global politics created a favorable environment for improved ties between India and the US. Feigenbaum (2010) viewed this shift towards better relations was primarily driven by economic interests and the policies of liberalisation and globalisation (pp. 76-91). As part of this shift, India joined the UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism, in December 1991, aligning itself with the US. India realised that maintaining a no-relations policy towards Israel would undermine its economic security interests (Blarel, 2015, p.248).

Besides, the strategic shift in South Asia, where Pakistan was no longer a key United States partner, led to an improvement in India's relations with the US (Goshal, 2016, p.4). Further, the West Asian countries and the United States experienced changes in their relations throughout the post-Cold War era (Pant &

Mishra, 2022). In order to retain Israel's military edge over its competitors in the region, the United States offered diplomatic and military backing to Israel (Samuel, 1999, pp.364-378). As part of this strategy, the United States has been trying unsuccessfully since the 1950s to persuade India to change its position on Israel (Nair, 2004, p. 122).

India's strategic decision to allow US combat aircraft for refueling during the Gulf War in 1991 brought India closer to the US. Under US influence, India began reassessing its policy towards Israel (Malik, 1991). Furthermore, the relaxation of US sanctions imposed on India following the Pokhran Nuclear Test in 1998 facilitated Indo-Israeli strategic co-operation (Rajagopal, 2018). This co-operation further strengthened in the international environment shaped by the events of 9/11, under the banner of collaborative security. The US played an indirect but significant role in fostering Indo-Israeli security ties, as India highly depended on US economic and political support in the international arena (Browne, 2017, pp. 328-332).

5.2.5. Madrid Peace Process: Diluting Stand

The policy shift on Israel by India, politically, was also a result of Israeli-Palestine peace process in Madrid in October 1991 (Browne, 2017, p. 326). Immediately after the Gulf War, the Madrid peace conference held from 30 October to 1 November 1991 between Israel and its neighbuoring states of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Palestine to settle bilateral issues hosted by Spain. The conference co-chaired by USA and the Soviet Union, marking a historical moment in the efforts to settle the Arab-Israel conflict and achieve enduring peace[34]. It was hoped that James. A. Baker, US Secretary of State would see it as the "beginning of the first viable negotiating process between Arabs and Israelis since the Camp David talks in 1978" [35].

The conference was followed by the two parallel tracks - bilateral and multilateral. The bilateral track between Israel and its neighbuoring states of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, and multilateral track aimed at resolving shared common issues like economic development, arms control, refugee problems, environment, and sharing of water resources[36]. While Madrid Peace Conference did not result in a final peace agreement, it laid the groundwork for subsequent negotiations, including the Oslo Accords in 1993 between Israel and the

Palestinians, and the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994 (Barak, 2005, pp. 719-736). The Madrid Peace Conference is considered a significant milestone in the Middle East peace process, as it brought adversaries together for direct negotiations and set the stage for future diplomatic efforts to resolve the long-standing conflict in the region (Pfeiffer, 1991, p.21). The Madrid peace process resulted in a dilution of India's previous reluctance towards Israel.

5.2.6. De-hyphenating Israel and Palestine

India's historical commitment to the 'Palestinian cause' has greatly influenced its Israel policy. This sentiment shared by Indian nationalists who saw the Palestinian issue as an integral part of their broader anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle starting from the 1930s[37]. In the aftermath of the partition of the Indian subcontinent, India utilised its support for Palestine as a means to counter Pakistan's influence and advance its interests in the Middle East (Singh, 2022, pp. 250-265). Consequently, the Palestinian cause became a primary security tactic in India's political and diplomatic efforts, particularly in the Middle East region (Tripathy, 2013). The Arab-Israel conflict and the Palestine issue have played a crucial role in shaping India's relation with Israel since 1948. This compelled India to engage in consultation with various stakeholders.

Before laying the ground for a shift in India's policy towards Israel, India's long-standing commitment to Palestine was evident. In January 1992, Yasser Arafat, the leader of Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), was invited to New Delhi for detailed discussions with Prime Minister Rao (Hasan, 2007). This visit provided an opportunity for Indian leadership to assess Palestine reaction and gather political and domestic consensus for normalising relation with Israel. The discussion centered on the evolving peace process following the Madrid Conference, which involved Israel and Palestine supported by US, USSR and Arab countries. Arafat could not oppose India's decision to normalise relations with Israel, and expressed the opinion that India's actions, such as, the exchange of diplomats, were acts of sovereignty in which Palestine should not interfere (Blarel, 2015, p. 244). This reassured India that establishing diplomatic relation with Israel would not elicit a negative reaction from Arab countries. Furthermore, the Palestinian support for Iraqi President Saddam

Hussein during the Kuwait crisis weakened their position and had an impact on Indian perspective (Gerberg, 2008, p. 318).

During the discussions between India and Palestine, on India's policy shift towards Israel, India reiterated its traditional support for Palestine. This commitment was evident from the subsequent co-operation with Palestine (Hasen, 2008, pp.86-87). Similarly, former Foreign Minister, S. M. Krishna described it as a significant aspect of India's well-established foreign policy in August 2010 during a session in the Lok Sabha (Goshal, 2013, p. 83). Furthermore, to navigate the delicate domestic political landscape, especially concerning the Indian Muslim community, the Government of India consistently reiterated that establishing diplomatic relations with Israel would not compromise its commitment to supporting the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people (Rubinoff, 1995). Kumaraswamy (2008) says that, 'India is separating its ties with Israel from its support for the Palestinian cause, emphasising that its commitment to Palestinian interests remains steadfast and undiminished. This strategic de-hyphenation enables India to pursue these two interests independently' (p.8).

5.2.7. The Strategic Move of China

Israel officially recognised the People's Republic of China (PRC) on January 9, 1950, shortly after the PRC was established (Han, 1993, pp. 62-77). However, it was on January 24, 1992, after forty years, that China reciprocated with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel[38]. However, during the most of the period of Sino-Israeli relations, was characterised by non-interaction and was characterised by an uneven dynamic rather than mutual engagement (Han, 1993). However, the establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel by China represented a significant shift, resulting in new regional alignments and political equations (Sobin, 1991, pp. 111-119). This was evident from the visit of Israeli Deputy Prime Minister David Levy on January 24, 1992. Israel achieved one of its long-cherished objectives by development of bilateral ties with a permanent member of the UN Security Council (Kumaraswamy, 1992, p.77). Since then, the closer military, economic and technological engagements between Israel and China have expanded, with Israel offering military assistance and expertise to China (Shichor, 1998, 68-91).

Such a move could lead to new alignments and politico-security equations in the region, which would be detrimental to the security interest of India. Even though, China Economic and Security Review Commission ranks Israel, only second to Russia, as a provider of weapon system to China for sophisticated innovative military technology[39]. However, Chinese move was not advantageous for Indian interest in the region, and India did not want to lag behind China in diplomatic moves in the region, which created an atmosphere for moving towards Israel (Kuo, 2017). India could no longer afford to lag behind its regional rivals and was preparing to establish diplomatic ties with Israel (Nair, 2004, pp. 120-21).

5.2.8. Escalating Terrorism: The Growing Concerns

Terrorism is considered as a major menace to India's internal and external security during the post-Cold War scenario. It encompasses any act intended to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity and security or sovereignty of India (Puroshotham et al., 2009, pp.553-554). This includes 'the act indented to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or any foreign country'[40]. The 'using of bombs or explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or any other substances (biological, radio active, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature; causes the death or injuries or loss or damage of property or disruption of supplies or services essential for human life or damage to the monetary stability of India by way of production smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other material; damage or destruction of any property to be used for the defence of India or any states'[41].

Therefore any 'act which causes to the death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death or detain, kidnaps or abducts any person and threaten to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the government of India or any state'[42] would be considered as an act of terrorism. The Annual Report of Ministry of External Affairs, India (2021-22) analyses that terrorism poses a multifaceted threat to India's internal security, with cross-border support, challenging the countries unity, integrity and sovereignty (p.49-50).

The presence of numerous terrorist cells[43] across the country raises security challenges from the Islamic groups[44] in Kashmir, secessionist groups in Assam,

threat of Naxalites in east-central and south central India. The ethno nationalist terrorism[45], religious terrorism, Left-wing terrorism[46] and narco- terrorism[47] poses serious internal and external security challenges. The major incidents of terrorist attacks from 2000- 2022 given in a table below:

Table 5.4
Terrorist incidents in India from 2000 -2022

Year	Incidents of Killing	Civilians	Security Forces	Terrorists/ Insurgents/ Extremists	Not Specified	Total
2000	1910	1260	573	2260	28	4121
2001	2802	1508	883	3005	108	5504
2002	2329	1255	721	2454	181	4611
2003	2321	1280	524	2328	216	4348
2004	1679	849	531	1465	134	2979
2005	1750	1105	439	1584	111	3239
2006	1376	966	400	1283	146	2795
2007	1290	932	439	1219	113	2703
2008	1122	915	366	1232	92	2605
2009	1158	685	435	1112	31	2263
2010	884	757	359	747	21	1884
2011	555	393	199	465	2	1059
2012	539	274	132	429	2	837
2013	442	308	177	386	2	873
2014	523	400	167	441	4	1012
2015	437	176	152	398	3	729
2016	492	204	178	525	0	907
2017	443	202	172	437	1	812
2018	478	217	183	540	0	940
2019	332	159	132	330	0	621
2020	299	100	106	385	0	591
2021	314	116	104	365	0	585
2022	281	99	47	268	1	415
Total	**23756**	**14160**	**7419**	**23658**	**1196**	**46433**

Source: *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/india-jammukashmir

The data analysis of the terrorist incidents in India from 2000 to 2022 reveals dynamic trends. The data reflects a notable peak in 2001, followed by a gradual decrease in the total number of incidents, with fluctuations over the years. The

Civilians are consistently getting causalities in these incidents, while incidents involving security forces show a decreasing trend. The years 2009, 2010, and 2011 stand out with higher incident numbers. Recent years (2020-2022) show a slight increase in total incidents, with a notable shift in the types of incidents involving more attacks by terrorists, insurgents, and extremists.

Besides, the data demonstrates the persistent security challenge India faces from terrorist organisations in the new millennium. The number highlights the need to address the root causes and strengthen security measures, enhance intelligence, counter terrorism strategies and secure borders (Katoch, 2013, pp.1-14). Israel has gained recognition for its advanced counter-terrorism capabilities, which have been shaped by its experiences with security threats and acts of terrorism (Karmon, 2022). This has led to the development of intricate strategies and cutting-edge technologies that encompass intelligence gathering, proactive surveillance, border security, community involvement, and the utilisation of advanced systems[48]. Israel's expertise in areas such as airport security and anti-terrorism training is highly regarded for combating terrorism in India.

5.2.9. Changing Mood of Arabs towards Israel

During the Cold War era, India's approach towards Israel was largely shaped by the conflict between Israel and Arab states. India aligned itself with Palestinian cause and refraining from establishing formal diplomatic relations with Israel (Kumaraswamy, 2010; Rubinoff, 2015). Nevertheless, as the time progressed, there have been indications of peace and normalisation between Israel and Arab states. The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and the peace agreement with Jordan in 1994 reflected the growing interest of Arab courtiers for the peaceful co-existence (Riedel, 2019). Besides, Saudi Arabia also realised that regional co-operation is the best strategy to ensure the security in the region (Kimche, 1996, pp.135-148; Kostiner, 2009, pp.417- 429). Guzanski (2021) analysed various factors that have contributed to the changing dynamism between Israel and Arab states, including the shifting perception of Israel from an enemy to a potential partner. They are:

(i)   The common perception of Iran as a common enemy has led to a potential partnership between Israel and the Arab states in countering Iran's nuclear, cyber, proxy, and missile programmes.

(ii)   The complicated perception of Turkey, with its historical and ideological disagreements with some Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states, has further fueled suspicion and created an opening for Israel to present itself as a partner in countering regional challenges.

(iii)   The lack of trust in the US commitment to Gulf security, especially with shifts in US foreign policy and the perception of an unreliable partner, has led GCC states to seek alternative alliances.

(iv)   The Divisions among Palestinians and the perceived limitations of Palestinian leadership have shifted the strategic priorities of some Arab states away from the Arab-Israeli conflict, opening up possibilities for closer ties with Israel.

(v)   Israel being seen as a potential reliable partner due to its military capabilities and technological advancements (p. 1-5).

The signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 between Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain marked a historic milestone in Arab-Israeli relations (Cafiero, 2023). These agreements signaled a significant shift as they established formal diplomatic ties and opened up avenues for cooperation in various areas. As part of the accords, the exchange of ambassadors, economic collaboration, and people-to-people exchanges were initiated between the signatory countries (Vakil & Quilliam, 2023). The success of the Abraham Accords also influenced other Arab states, leading to similar normalisation agreements with Sudan and Morocco, further expanding the circle of Arab nations engaging with Israel. These developments have had a transformative impact on the regional dynamics and have opened up possibilities for increased co-operation and dialogue between Israel and Arab states (Smith, 2022, para.1).

The changing power dynamics in the Arab states and the increasing co-operation with Israel has alleviated India's historical ideological hesitations towards engaging with Israel. As the context evolves, India has experienced a shift from covert ties to more open and overt relations with Israel. This shift is a result of the changing landscape of engagement between Israel and the Arab states, which has created an opportunity for India to reassess its stance and recognise the potential benefits of forging closer ties with Israel. Consequently, India has moved towards a more open and visible partnership, cementing its relationship with Israel and shedding its previous reluctance (Singh, 2022).

5.2.10. Changes in the Domestic Political Factors

Although the Indian National Congress dominated India's political landscape for a significant period, the country has been characterised by a multi-party system since independence (Swain, 2008, pp.59-70). During the periods of unstable coalitions in which regional political parties had a significant influence on foreign policy, India heavily prioritised domestic politics (Blarel, 2019, pp. 282-595). This focus on internal political equations has been significantly influenced India's foreign relations, particularly with Israel before 1991. The Indian National Congress, as the ruling party responsible for shaping foreign policy, refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel during the Cold War due to historical, geopolitical, and solidarity considerations towards the Palestinian cause, despite Nehru's typically open-minded approach on other matters (Gerberg, 2008, p.145). The opposition to Israel was rooted in concerns about alignment with Western imperialism, and the influence of the Muslim community's support for Palestine, along with national security concerns.

At the same time, several other political parties in India, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Janata Party, the Swatantra Party, the Praja Socialist Party, as well as the previous political formations like the Jana Sangh were perceived as proponents of establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel (Srivastava, 1970, pp. 238-264). However, these parties lacked the political clout necessary to implement such a policy (Gerberg, 2008, p. 141). The Jana Sangh had

questioned India's diplomatic abstention towards Israel while maintaining relations with hostile neighbouring countries of China and Pakistan (Naaz, 1999, p. 242). Jan Sangh became the part of Janata coalition in 1977 and A.B. Vajpayee as Minister of External Affairs, continued the traditional pro-Arab policy except a meeting with Israel negotiated military arms deal through Cyprus (Swamy, 1982, p.22).

During the Cold War, the left-leaning parties in India, such as the Communist Party of India (CPI), Communist Party of India (Marxist), Janata Dal, and the Muslim League, most are aligned themselves with the Soviet model and showed support for the Arab nationalist cause (Sharma, 1992, p. 593; Rubinoff, 1995, p. 496). They held reservations towards Israel, considering it as part of an alleged anti-Muslim, anti-Arab, and pro-US conspiracy. This perspective on Israel still influences the opinions of Indian intellectual and cultural elites, who continue to maintain an anti-Israel political stance (Kumaraswamy, 2011).

The INC and left parties traditionally held a stance that was less favourable towards establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. However, the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party in India, which perceived to be more pro-Israeli, has had an impact on the policy positions of the Indian National Congress and left parties regarding Israel (Kumaraswamy, 2018. p.3). However, with the BJP's increasing influence and electoral successes, there may have been some adjustments or recalibrations in the positions of these parties. With the formation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980, which included active members from the former Jana Sangh known for their pro-Israel stance, India's approach toward Israel began to change. The BJP, not bound by the same ideological commitments to the Arab world and Palestine as the INC, strongly supported ties with Israel.

The rise of BJP, known for its pro-Israeli stance, may have excreted pressure on the INC and left parties to reconsider their positions or at least modify their rhetoric regarding Israel. Consequently, theses parties might have had to recalibrate their stance on Israel to remain relevant or appeal to a wider voter base. The growing presence of Pro-Israeli BJP, along with regional considerations, international

developments, and changing domestic political dynamics, has likely prompted the INC and left parties in India to reassess their Israel policy.

After forty-two years of formally recognising Israel, India established diplomatic mission with Israel on 29 January 1992. This move marked a significant departure from the traditional orthodoxy and the ideological stance maintained by the political parties in India. India's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel was driven by recognition of changing dynamics in domestic and international security environment. Despite historical constraints stemming from pro-Arab policy, India's decision not injured with growing rapprochement between Israel and the Arabs and the approval of Palestine in establishing diplomatic exchange with Israel. The shifting security concerns of India during the post- Cold War landscape and the urgent need to address these concerns played a pivotal role in overcoming political opposition and facilitating constructive engagement with Israel.

5.3. Conclusion

The post-Cold War era witnessed a profound transformation in the security landscape, marked by significant shifts in the realms of economics, technology, and politics. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ascendance of the United States, coupled with India's growing economic security demands, set the stage for a comprehensive overhaul of Cold War-era foreign policy. This transition notably reflected in India's evolving relationship with Israel. The shifting attitudes of Arab states towards Israel and the broadening scope of mutual engagements alleviated India's longstanding ideological constraints on establishing diplomatic ties with Israel. Furthermore, internal political recalibrations within India also played a pivotal role in redefining the trajectory of India's engagement with Israel.

Endnote:

1.   See, 'India's 75th anniversary: How it is similar, different to Israel?- Analysis'. Herb Keinon. *Jerusalem Post*. 2022, August 16.

2.   See, 'Dynamic Dimensions of the India- Israel Synergy'. 2023, June 12. *Invest India.* Retrieved from https://www.investindia.gov.in/team-india-blogs/dynamic-dimensions-india-israel-synergy.

3.   Luke Tress, 'Israel ranks world's 10th largest weapon exporter in past five years. *Times of Israel*, 2022, April 02.

4.   See, How Charles De Gaulle fathered Israel's tech revolution 50 years ago. *The Jerusalem Post*. 2017 June 2.

5.   2022 figures marked a 50% increase over the previous three years and a doubling in volume over the previous decade. Drones accounted for 25% of the 2022 exports and missiles, rockets or air defence systems for 19%. See *The Economic Times*, 13 June 2023.

6.   For details see, Military Research and Development, Ministry of Defence, Israel

7.   As per SIPRI data base the arms import from Russia is 2000-2005 (73.3%), 2005-2010 (73.8%), 2010-2015 (70.8%), 2015-2020 (51%).

8.   For further explanations visit https://www.iai.co.il/

9.   See, https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Israel_Military_Industries.

10.   For further explanations visit https://www.rafael.co.il/

11.   See, 'How Israel helped India win the air During Kargil'. NDTV. 2019, June 24. Retrieved from https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/how-israel-helped-india-win-the-air-war-during-kargil-2058511

12.   See, Task Force Report, 'A Case for Intelligence Reforms in India' published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi .P.25-27.

13.   On November 26, *2008* - Approximately 58 people are killed during a 90-minute attack by the terrorist.

14.   Pulwama attack: Gross security failure, says Congress, gets surgical strike's Hooda to head panel, Express News Service, 2019 February 22.

15.   Alex, Kane, 'How Israel Became a Hub for Surveillance Technology' 17 October 2017, Retrieved from https://theintercept.com/2016/10/17/how-israel-became-a-hub-for-surveillance-technology/

16.   See 'IAI satellites leading in Space Development'. IAI- Spece/ Technology. *Magster.*

17.   Accessed from Tec SAR (SAR Technology Demonstration Satellite) *from* eoportal.org.

18. *Magshimim, Atudai, Mofet, Mamriot, Odyssey,* and*Gsharin* are all names of different programmes or tracks within the Israeli education system, specifically focused on high school education.

19. See, 'How Israeli Agriculture Technology is changing the World for the Wetter'. *Touch point Israel.* 2021, April 13.

20. 'Indo-Israel Agriculture Project', *MASHAV*, Israel's Agency for International Development Corporation.

21. Israel ranks sixth in the 2022 world Index of Healthcare Innovation. See, https://freopp.org/israel-6-in-the-2022-world-index-of-healthcare-innovation-285aae221de

22. See 'The world wants Israel's Energy and Environmental Innovations'.*Forbes.2022 December 1.*

23. For further Explanation see, https://www.power-technology.com/projects/ashalim-plot-b-solar-thermal-power-plant-negev-desert/

24. See, the list of Top Machine Learning Companies in Israel, at https://www.crunchbase.com/hub/israel-machine-learning-companies

25. See, IATI Israel's Life Science Annual Report 2022.

26. See, https://corporatetraining.usf.edu/blog/what-is-semiconductor-technology-and-why-is-it-important

27. See, 'Semiconductors & High-Tech ecosystem in Israel is considered as one of the world's most innovative digital environments – Insight'. *Israel Economic Mission to Hong Kong*, 2022 March 4.

28. See for more at, Chari, P. R. (1979). Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review. *Asian Survey*, *19*(3), 230–244. https://doi.org/10.2307/2643691

29. Global Fire Power, accessed from; https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=india

30. Ramesh Thakur & Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam '; New York, Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1992, Chapter 4.

31. 'Russia and India a New Chapter', Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer, 22 September 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/20/russia-and-india-new-chapter-pub-87958.

32. 'Globalisation: A Brief Overview', International Monetary Fund, May 2008 https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2008/053008.htm

33. 'The Forex Crisis of 1991 and the pledging of Indian Gold'. Sudeep Khanna, CNBSTV 18, available at https://www.cnbctv18.com/economy/backstory-the-forex-crisis-of-1991-and-the-pledging-of-indian-gold-1257415

34. 'Madrid Conference 1991'. Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/madrid-conference.

35.   See, THE MIDDLE EAST TALKS: A Step Ahead in Madrid; At Last, all the Players in the Middle East Have Sat Down and Talked to Each Other, Thomas.L.Friedman, *The New York Times*, 1991 November 4.

36.   Madrid   Framework,   *Jewish   Virtual   Library*.   Retrieved   from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-madrid-framework

37.   'Why India Must Stand With Palestine?' written by Manoj Kumar Jha, Indian Express, 29 November 2022. Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/ article/opinion/columns/standing-with-palestine-8294922/.

38.   See 'China sets Official Ties with Israel', The Washington Post, 25 January 1992.

39.   See,   Israel-China   Relations.   Retrieved   from *https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-china-relations*.

40.   See (Section 15(1) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967.

41.   See (Section 15(1) (a) (i) - (iv) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967.

42.   See (Section 15(1) (b) and of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967.

43.   M.K. Narayanan, former National Security Advisor pointed out the presence of 800 cells, *Times of India,* 12 August 2008.

44.   See, Major Islamist Terrorist Attacks in India by Pakistan-Based Groups in the Post- 9/11 Period. Retrieved from *https://www.satp.org/islamist-extremism/data/Major-Islamist-Terrorist-Attacks-in-India-by-Pakistan-Based-Groups-in-the-Post-9-11-Period.*

45.   See, Hussain.W (2007). Ethno-Nationalism and the Politics of Terror in India's Northeast, South Asia, *Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol.XXX.no.1, 30 April 2007, https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400701264043

46.   'Left wing Extremism Division', Ministry of External Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.mha.gov.in/en/divisionofmha/left-wing-extremism-division.

47.   'Narco-Terrorism and India's Security' By Kshitij Prabha, IDSA, Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA January 2001 (Vol. XXIV No. 10).

48.   See,   'Counter-terrorism   Overview: Israel'.   Retrieved   from https://counterterrorismethics.tudelft.nl/the-israeli-counter-terrorism-landscape/

CHAPTER 6

SECURITY SYNERGY BETWEEN INDIA AND ISRAEL DURING THE POST- COLD WAR PERIOD

6.1. Introduction

The Indian government's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel on January 29, 1992, has hailed as a significant milestone in India's foreign policy approach towards West Asia (Kumaraswamy, 2010). While maintaining its foundational ties with Arab states, India recognised the evolving global context and regional security dynamics, leading to the strategic partnership with Israel (Ghosal, 2016). Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, India and Israel have identified mutual areas of cooperation and capitalised on the ever-changing global and regional environment to fortify their national security (Sharma & Bing, 2015, pp, 620-632). During the post-Cold War period, both the countries have forged several bilateral agreements in various fields of shared interest (Gerberg, 2008). This chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the collaborative efforts between India and Israel across multiple domains.

6.2. Closer moves

The fast-changing international realities have broken the ice and inaugurated a new era of partnership between India and Israel (Ray, 2006). Both countries moved very carefully but rapidly to develop multifaceted engagements. Therefore, the relationship between India and Israel has steadily improved over the last three decades, with a focus on India's post-Cold War security concerns and the achievement of its national security goals (Shaw & Tabraz, 2020, pp. 872-878). Since establishing full diplomatic ties between India and Israel, during a period of global power restructuring and transition, there has been a rising convergence to meet shared strategic and security interests (Sharma & Bing, 2015). On commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of their bilateral relations, Ambassador Sanjeev Singla, representing India in Israel, said, "India and Israel are two ancient

people, proud of their cultural heritage, and two vibrant democracies, eager to grasp the future"[1]. He reiterated the belief that these commonalities empower India and Israel to collectively forge a brighter future, not only for them but also for the global community.

India's partnership with Israel flourished when it began to delink Israeli-Palestine conflict from its relation with the two countries (Suri & Sethi, 2022). Since then, the relationship between India and Israel has evolved significantly in various areas, including defence, missile defence systems, indigenous weapon systems, defence innovation, counter-terrorism, and intelligence sharing (Inbar & Ningthoujum, 2012, pp. 1-27). Besides, this multifaceted partnership also encompasses diverse fields such as health, agriculture, trade, science and technology, culture, tourism, and space, energy and water management, with a strong focus on research and development to address India's multiple security needs in the post- Cold War period (Chaudhury, 2022).

During the Prime Ministership of Narendra Modi, the engagements between the two countries reached a peak across various domains including government-to-government (G2G), business-to-business (B2B), industry-to-Industry (I2I) and people-to-people interactions (Ciprut, 2017, p.1). The historic visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Israel in July, 2017[2], was the first by an Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel, took place on the occasion of marking twenty-fifth anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations. This visit and the subsequent closer engagement marked symbolically referred, as 'the sky is the limit for the incredible India'[3].

From the pre-normalisation limited weapon acquisition during the crisis of 1962, 1965, and 1971, India's cooperation with Israel has witnessed significant growth in the fields of defence and security (Blarel, 2015). This collaboration involves the supply of state-of-the-art military equipment to ensure border security and surveillance (Inbar &Ningthoujam, 2012). Consequently, India has emerged as one of the largest clients of Israel in the arms trade[4]. However, beyond arms trade, India aims to expand its ties with Israel to address multiple security challenges in the

post-Cold War period (Singh, 2012, pp. 22-44). Department of Science and Technology, Government of India in its vision (2022) says that both nations are driven by a mutual commitment to innovation and technological progress, have collaborated on key initiatives such as the India-Israel Industrial Research and Development and Technological Innovation Fund (I4F) and the India-Israel Initiative for Industrial Research and Development (I4RD)[5]. These programmes aim to facilitate cooperative research and development (R&D) endeavors in critical sectors like agriculture, water, energy, healthcare, and information and communication technology (ICT).

In this connection, throughout the post-Cold War period, India and Israel have conducted a series of visits, and signed various Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) reflects shared security interests. The table below provides an overview of these MoUs, highlighting the areas of multiple security interest between the two countries, from normalisation of relations in 1992 until 2021.

Table 6.1
List of Agreements/MoUs/
Arrangements between India and Israel
(1992-2021)

Name of Bilateral Agreements /MoUs/ Arrangements	Month and Year of Signature
Establishment of Full Diplomatic Relations	January, 1992
Agreement for Cooperation in Science and Technology	May,1993
Agreement in the field of Tourism	May,1993
Agreement for cooperation in Agriculture	December,1993
Agreement for Trade and Economic Cooperation	April,1994
Agreement on Cooperation in Telecommunications and Posts	November, 1994
Agreement on Technical Cooperation	December,1996
Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital	January,1996

Bilateral Agreement regarding Mutual Assistance and Cooperation in Customs matters	January, 1996
Agreement on Cooperation in Peaceful uses of Outer Space	October, 2002
Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Health and Medicine	September, 2003
Agreement on Cooperation in combating illicit trafficking and abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances	September, 2003
Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Protection of the Environment	September, 2003
Agreement on Exemption of Visa requirement for holders of diplomatic, official and service passports	September, 2003
Mo U on India-Israeli Research and Development Fund Initiative	May, 2005
Arrangement on Gainful Occupation for Family Members of a Diplomatic Mission or Consular Post	August, 2005
Inter-Governmental Work Plan on Agriculture Cooperation	May, 2006
Extradition Treaty	January, 2012
Agreement for Transfer of Sentenced Prisoners	January, 2012
Joint Declaration in the field of Water Technologies	February, 2012
Letter of Intent on Cooperation in Textile and Clothing	September, 2012
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters	February, 2014
Agreement on Cooperation in Homeland and Public Security	February, 2014
Agreement on Protection of Classified Material	February, 2014
Third phase of India Israel Agricultural cooperation	September, 2015
Amending Protocol to the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement	October, 2015
Cultural Exchange Programme (2015-18)	October, 2015
MOU on Water Resources Management and Development Cooperation	November, 2016
Declaration of Intent in Cooperation in the field of agriculture	November, 2016
MOU between ISRO and Israel Space Agency regarding Cooperation in Geo-Leo Optical Link	July, 2017
Plan of Cooperation between ISRO and the ISA regarding Cooperation in Atomic Clocks	July, 2017

3-Year Work Program in Agriculture 2018-2020 between MASHAV and M/o Agriculture & Farmers Welfare	July, 2017
MOU on India-Israel Industrial R&D and Technological Innovation Fund (I4F)	July, 2017
MOU on National Campaign for Water Conservation in India	July, 2017
MoU on State Water Utility Reform in India	July, 2017
MOU on Cooperation in Electric Propulsion for Small Satellite	July, 2017
MOU on Cyber Security Cooperation	January, 2018
Agreement on Film Co-Production	January, 2018
MOU on Cooperation in Oil and Gas Sector	January, 2018
Protocol on Amendments to the Air Transport Agreement	January, 2018
MoU on Operational Collaboration on Cyber Security	July, 2020
Cultural Exchange Programme for the period 2020-23	August, 2020
Plan of Cooperation in the field of Water Utility in the Bundelkhand region of Uttar Pradesh, India.	August, 2020
MoU on Tech Innovation	September, 2020
Agreement for cooperation in the fields of Health and Medicines	December, 2020
Bilateral Innovation Agreement	November, 2021

Source: *compiled from the data of https://www.indembassyisrael.gov.in/. and Ministry of External Affairs, India.*

An analysis of the MoUs and arrangements signed between the two countries during the post- normalisation period indicate a broad range of cooperation that covers various areas such as science and technology, tourism, agriculture, trade and economic, telecommunications, health and medicine, environment, space, water resources, cyber security, and oil and gas sector. These arrangements reflect the extensive collaboration and depth of bilateral relationship between India and Israel. Since establishing diplomatic relations in January 1992, India and Israel have

consistently engaging in various domains, demonstrating their commitment to strengthening bilateral ties. Notably, agriculture and water-related cooperation have received significant attention, with multiple agreements signed in these areas. These include inter-governmental work plans, research and development funds, water resource and management, and cooperation in agriculture. The emphasis on these underscores their importance and the shared expertise and the challenges faced by both countries in agriculture and water management.

During the post-normalisation period, there has been growing focus on technology and innovation-related cooperation, leading to agreements on industrial research and development, technological innovation, and cyber security (Inbar & Ningthoujum, 2012). This highlights the recognition of the potential for collaboration in cutting-edge technologies and innovation-driven sectors between India and Israel, and their efforts to leverage each other's strengths. Cultural exchange programmes have also played a significant role in bilateral relationship, with multiple agreements signed over the years (Pol, 2019, p.66). These programmes aim to promote mutual understanding, people-to-people ties, and cultural cooperation between India and Israel. The agreements signed in 2020 and 2021indicate the continued momentum in India-Israel bilateral relations. These recent agreements specify focus on areas such as health and medicine, technological innovation, highlighting the evolving nature of the cooperation between the two countries. The major areas of cooperation are analysed as under.

6.3. Defence and Security Engagements

India's defence and security ties with West Asia have a rich history dating back over a century (Browne, 2017, p.325). A remarkable chapter in this history unfolded on September 23, 1918, when Indian cavalry soldiers, including the Jodhpur, Mysore, and Hyderabad Lancers, undertook a courageous cavalry charge to capture the port city of Haifa in present-day Israel. This historic feat is commemorated as 'Haifa Day' on September 23 each year, and it contributed significantly to the growth of modern-day Israel (Browne, 2017).

India remained one of the largest arms importers during 2018-2022, with significant contributions from Russia, France, United States and Israel[6]. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, Israel has emerged as a major supplier of defence equipments to India. Israel's strong focus on research and development (R&D) has granted it a technological and competitive advantage[7]. This technological edge gave Israel a major share for its military products and equipments, such as sensors, missiles and aircrafts. The extensive cooperation in the defence and security domain has enabled India to address the diverse security challenges in its geostrategic landscape (Madan, 2016). Furthermore, India's pursuit of self-reliance in defence production, aimed at ensuring economic security, has been partially achieved through the development of military industrial-ecosystem encompassing research and development[8]. The defence security imports from Israel to India in various areas are discussed below.

6.3.1. Import of Aircrafts

India, traditionally dependent on Russia and the United States for its military equipment, has been actively seeking to broaden its sources of procurement (Chari, 1979, pp.230-244). Later, Israel, recognised as a leading defence exporter, offers aircraft known for their exceptional technological advancements with unique capabilities, which cannot be matched by other suppliers (Pant & Sahu, 2019). A notable example is Israel's extensive expertise in deploying combat aircraft in situations involving asymmetric warfare (Farah, 2000). The defence security imports from Israel to India in various areas of defence security are given in table given below.

Table 6.2

Import of Aircrafts from Israel to India (1992-2022)

ber order	Name	Weapon	Year of Order	Period of Delivery	Description
36	Searcher	UAV	1996	1998-2000	Searcher- 1 version
7	Astra-SPX	SIGINT Aircraft	1997	1997-98	For ELINT (Electronic Intelligence)
32	Searcher	UAV	1999	1999	Searcher-2 version
12	Heron	UAV	2000	2001-2002	Medium Range Long Endurance UAV
6	Air Refuel System	Refueling	2001	2002004	For 6-II 78 Tanker Aircraft.
30	Searcher	UAV	2001	2002-2003	Searcher-2 version
8	Searcher	UAV	2002	2003	Searcher-2 version
18	Heron	UAV	2003	2005-2006	Medium Range Long Endurance UAV
4	Heron	Maritime Patrol UAV	2003	2005	
16	Heron	UAV	2006	2006-2007	
16	Heron	UAV	2009	2012-2013	
2	Heron	Maritime Patrol UAV	2010	2010	
2	Searcher	UAV	2010	2011	Searcher-2 version
10	Heron-TP	Armed UAV	2018	2021	Multi-role, advanced, long range Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)
4	Heron-TP	Armed UAV	2021	2021	
10	Heron -2	UAV	2022	2022	Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV

Source: *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database.*

The comprehensive data presented in Table 6 (2) covering aircraft imports from Israel to India over the period of 1992-2022 displays a robust and enduring partnership in defence and security procurement. During the period of analysis, a wide array of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) encompasses the Searcher, Heron,

Heron-TP, and Astra-SPX models have been acquired by India, serving diverse purposes ranging from military operations to maritime patrol, intelligence gathering, and surveillance. The Searcher and Heron UAVs bolster border monitoring, early threat detection, and situational awareness. Astra-SPX SIGINT Aircraft enhance electronic intelligence capabilities, while Heron Maritime Patrol UAVs safeguard coastal and maritime territories. Heron and Heron-2 UAVs extend mission endurance, critical for continuous surveillance and threat response. The Air Refuel System extends operational reach, Heron-TP Armed UAVs offer precision strikes, and diversification ensures readiness for various security challenges.

The orders, spanning three decades, indicate the depth of cooperation, with varying delivery times contingent on the specific aircraft and its version. These acquisitions significantly fortify India's defence security across multiple domains. Beyond technology, this partnership nurtures self-reliance in defence production, amplifying India's overall security stance through advanced capabilities. This enduring defence collaboration underscores the profound and multifaceted ties between India and Israel in the realm of defence aviation procurement, ultimately serving India's national security interests for the long term.

6.3.2. Import of Air Defence Systems

India confronted with a broad spectrum of aerial dangers, spanning from small, slow-moving drones to highly maneuverable fighter jets and missiles. These threats can emerge in both unconventional and conventional warfare scenarios, as well as during periods of peace[9]. India has been increasingly concerned about the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for launching attacks, particularly in the Jammu and Kashmir region. Terrorist organisations have been deploying UAVs to target both military and civilian installations, raising serious security issues (Manhas, 2023). Drone incursions along the India-Pakistan border and the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir have surged, with the Border Security Force (BSF) reporting over 268 sightings in 2022, a significant increase from previous years (Kweera, 2023). These incidents underscore the pressing need for more effective detection and countermeasures against such unmanned threats. To meet the

unexpected attack from its adversaries, India imported air defence system from Israel, which shows in the table given below.

Table 6.3

Import of Air Defence System from Israel (1992-2022)

Number ordered	Name	Weapon	Year of Order	Period of Delivery	Description of Equipment
18	Spyder MR	SAM System	2008	2016-18	Medium Range Mobile Air Defence system developed by Rafael Advanced Defence Systems with assistance IAI
23	Barak-MX	SAM System	2009	2021-22	To counter any type of airborne threat including aircraft, helicopters, anti-ship missiles, and UAVs as well as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and combat jets.

Source: *SIPRI Arms Transfers Database*

The data provided in table 6 (3) demonstrates the import of air defence equipment from Israel to India between 1992 and 2022. The shipments consisted of Spyder MR and Barak-MX surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, which were purchased to enhance India's air defence capabilities against various airborne threats, including helicopters, aircraft, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and combat planes. The quantity purchased for each air defence system is 18 units of Spyder MR and 23 units of Barak-MX. The Barak-MX is designed to counter a wide range of aerial threats; while Spyder MR is described as a medium-range mobile air defence system developed by Rafael Advanced Defence Systems in collaboration with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).

6.3.3. Import of Artilleries

Lt. General V.K. Kapoor (2017) highlights the challenges associated with 'critical shortages' and the obsolescence of India's existing military equipment.

These deficiencies encompass a wide range of essential assets, including 155 mm artillery howitzers, light utility helicopters, attack helicopters, air defence systems, various types of ammunition, anti-tank and air defence missile systems, as well as fundamental infantry weaponry like close-quarter battle carbines, assault rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, and anti-material rifles. Notably, the army's current artillery howitzers, specifically the 155 mm, 39-caliber FH 77B (Bofors)[10], have been in service for more than three decades (Para, 1 and 2).To meet the shortage, India imported artilleries from Israel to increase its striking capabilities, is given in a table 6.4.

Table 6.4

Import of Artillery from Israel to India (1992-2022)

Ordered	Name	Weapon	Year of Order	Period of Delivery	Description
180	M-46S 155mm	Towed Gun	2000	2001-2006	The M-46S is the Soviet 130 mm upgraded to 155mm 45 towed gun. The upgrade is provided to the Indian Army by Soltam Systems.
7	M-58 160 mm	Mortar	2000	2000	160 mm Mortar M-160 is a smooth bore breech loading heavy mortar, which fired a 160 mm bomb.

Source: *Compiled from different sources.*

The table displays India's imports of artillery from Israel between 1992 and 2022, revealing two different types of artillery imported from Israel during this period. In 2000, India placed an order for 180 M-46S 155 mm Towed Guns, which were subsequently delivered between 2001and 2006. These weapons, supplied by the Israeli defence company Soltam Systems are a modification of the Soviet 130 mm cannon, featuring a 155mm caliber and 45 caliber length. Furthermore, in 2000, India also procured 7 M-58 160 mm mortars, which were delivered in the same year.

The M-58 is a large mortar equipped with a smooth bore breech loading mechanism capable of firing 160 mm bombs.

6.3.4. Missile Defence System

Strategic stability relies on various factors, including the state of conventional armed forces, nuclear offensive and defensive capabilities, competition in both conventional and nuclear domains, and how differences in conventional military strength affect deterrence (Anjum, 2016, p. 97). The significant threat posed by the neighbouring countries that, might resort to nuclear options in a dispute, creates security challenge for India. To counter this India has developed its own missile defence system. During the 1990s, India initiated the development of the 'Prithvi Air Defence' (PAD) system, designed for intercepting high-altitude threats, as a response to the security concerns posed by Pakistan (Jalil, 2015, pp. 29-46). The system underwent successful testing in 2006, marking India as the fourth nation, following Russia, Israel, and the United States, to create an anti-ballistic missile system[11]. Israel played a significant role in this technological endeavour, as India imported the missile defence system from Israel, which provided in a table given below.

Table 6.5
Import of Missile System from Israel to India (1992-2022)

Number Ordered	Name	Weapon	Year of Order	Period of Delivery	Description
725	Barak-LRAD	SAM	2017	2016-2022	Including production under license in India as Barak-2 MR or MRSAM; for Barak-MX (MRSAM) SAM systems and naval Barak-MX (LRSAM).
40	Harpy	Loitering Munition	1997	1999-2000	The Harpy is optimised for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) function and is built to attack radar systems. It carries a warhead with a powerful explosive.
200	Barak-1	SAM	2000	2003-2004	Surface- to- Air Missile

30	Popeye	ASM	2001	2004-2006	Air- to-Surface Missile
250	Griffin	Guided Bomb	2002	2002-2006	Laser Guided Bomb
20	Derby	BVRAAM	2005	2008-2011	Air-to-Air Missile
100	Python-4	BVRAAM	2005	2007	
675	Derby	BVRAAM	2008	2016-2018	
675	Python-5	BVRAAM	2008	2016-2019	
100	SPICE	Guided Bomb	2008	2009	SPICE stands for Smart, Precise Impact, Cost Effective
250	Griffin	Guided Bomb	2009	2012-2013	Laser Guided Bomb
50	Harop	Loitering Munition	2009	2013-2014	The Harop has a range of 1,000 km and is launched from ground or sea-based canisters. The aircraft's electro-optical sensor allows Harop operator to choose between stationary and moving targets.
30	Popeye	ASM	2010	2013-2014	Air- to-Surface Missile
500	NG-LGB	Guided Bomb	2012	2014-2015	A laser-guided bomb can hit its target with greater accuracy
131	Barak-1	SAM	2017	2021	Surface-to-Air Missile
100	SPICE	Guided Bomb	2019	2019	SPICE stands for Smart, Precise Impact, Cost Effective
260	Spike-MR/LR	Anti-Tank Missile	2019	2019-2020	A tandem-charge high-explosive anti-tank warhead of fire-and-forget anti-tank guided missile
100	SPICE	Guided Bomb	2020	2022	Laser Guided Bomb
300	Sky Striker	Loitering Munition	2021	2021	Sky Striker is a fully autonomous loitering munitions (LM) that can locate, acquire and strike operator designated targets with a 5 or 10 Kg warhead installed inside the fuselage, enabling high-precision performance.

Source: Compiled from *SIPRI Arms Transfers Database*

The data shows that during the period of analysis from 1992 to 2022, India has purchased a wide range of missile system from Israel, including air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-tank, guided bombs and loitering munitions. The Barak missile system from Israel has received the most orders, totaling 856 missiles over the years. The SPICE guided bomb, which stands for 'Smart, Precise impact and Cost Effective' has been ordered in three times, in 2008, 2019 and 2020. The Harop loitering munition, which has a range of up to 1,000 kilometers, has been ordered twice, in 2009 and 2019. Besides, India placed an order for Spike-MR/LR anti-tank missile, which was delivered within a year. The most recent missile system to be ordered is the Sky Striker loitering munition (Pant & Sahu, 2019).

6.3.5. Sensors

The military preparedness requires sensors to detect possible attack from enemy. Sensors play a crucial role in defence and military system, providing essential capabilities for surveillance gathering, and combat operations. "Sensors represent the main sources of real-time data, which by the process of data fusion are integrated and interpreted to allow accurate inferences about the environment" (Benaskeur.et.al, 2007, p.iii). They are integral component of wide range of platforms, from drones and spacecraft to missiles, vehichles, and marine systems, enabling effective monitoring and control in challenging environment[12]. In an increasingly challenging security environment, India has procured a diverse range of sensors from Israel as listed in table the table given below.

Table 6.6

Import of Sensors from Israel to India (1992 – 2022)

Name	Weapon	Ordered	Year of Order	Period of Delivery	Description of Item
EL/M-2084	Search Radar	23	2009	2011-2015	Indian designation 'Arudhra'.
EL/M-205	Combat Aircraft Radar	54	2020	2020	For modernisation of 54 Jaguar combat aircrafts.

EL/M-2140	Ground Surveillance Radar	170	1998	2000-2001	A ground-based, long-range X-band radar with military and paramilitary uses.
EL/M-2032	Combat Aircraft Radar	12	1999	1999-2005	Multimode Airborne Fire Control Radar with look-down shoot-down capabilities created for multi-mission fighters, including Air-to-Air, Air-to-Ground, and Air-to-Sea.
EL/M-2238 STAR	Air Search Radar	3	1999	2010-2012	For 3 Shivalik (Project-17) frigates produced in India
EL/M-2022	MP Aircraft Radar	25	2000	2001-2011	A cutting-edge Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)-equipped X-Band Multi-mode airborne maritime surveillance radar.
EL/M-2221 STGR	Fire Control Radar	9	2000	2002-2005	For modernisation of 1 Viraat aircraft carrier, 2 Project-61 (Kashin or Rajput) destroyers and 1 Godavari (Project-16) frigate and for 3 Brahmaputra frigates produced in India; for use with Barak-1 SAM system.
EL/M-2080 Green Pine air	Air Search Radar	2	2001	2002	For use with Indian anti-ballistic missile system.
EL/M-2083 APR		2	2002	2007-2008	A cutting-edge Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)-equipped X-Band Multi-mode airborne maritime surveillance radar.
EL/M-2238 STAR		2	2002	2006-2007	For modernisation of 2 Kashin-2 (Rajput) destroyers.

EL/M-2221 STGR	Fire Control Radar	6	2003	2005-2006	For modernisation of 3 Delhi (Project-15) destroyers; for use with Barak SAM
EL/M-2022	MP Aircraft Radar	8	2004	2004-2008	For modernisation of 8 Tu-142 ASW aircrafts.
EL/M-2075 Phalcon	AEW Radar	3	2004	2009-2011	A solid-state L-band conformal array radar system called the EL/M-2075 is intended for use on aircraft like the Boeing 707 and others.
EL/M-2221 STGR	Fire Control Radar	2	2004	2004-2005	For modernisation of 2 Godavari (Project-16) frigates; for use with Barak-1 SAM system.
Litening	Aircraft EO System	8	2004	2004-2005	Litening is an electro-optical infrared sensor system for targeting and surveillance that enables aircrews to detect, acquire, identify and track targets.
EL/M-2032	Combat Aircraft Radar	9	2005	2008-2011	For modernisation of 9 Sea Harrier combat aircrafts.
EL/M-20600	AGS radar	10	2005	2007-2008	An operational Reconnaissance and Targeting Pod (RTP) integrating high-performance Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
EL/M-2248 MF-STAR	Multi-Function Radar	3	2006	2014-2016	For 3 Kolkata (Project-15A) destroyers produced in India.
EL/M-2032	Combat Aircraft Radar	40	2007	2016-2022	For 40 Tejas-1 (LCA) combat aircraft produced in India.
EL/M-2070	AGS radar	1	2007	2009	For RISAT-2 reconnaissance satellite produced in India.
EL/M-2221 STGR	Fire Control Radar	6	2007	2010-2012	For 3 'Shivalik' (Project-17) frigates produced in India; for use with Barak-1 SAM system.

Litening	Aircraft EO System	5	2007	2010-2012	Litening-4I version; for Tejas (LCA) combat aircrafts.
EL/M-2083 APR	Air Search Radar	2	2009	2012	For use on aerostat for coastal surveillance; bought in reaction to 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai.
EL/M-2221 STGR	Fire Control Radar	6	2009	2014-2016	For 3 Kolkata (Project-15A) destroyers produced in India.
EL/M-2221 STGR	Fire Control Radar	4	2010	2014-2020	Operating in the X- and Ka-Band fire control radar.
MARS2	AGS/SIGINT System	2	2011	2015	For 2 Global-5000 AGS aircraft from Canada.
EL/M-2248 MF-STAR	Multi-Function Radar	7	2012	2012	For 7 Project-17A (Nilgiri) frigates produced in India.
EL/M-2248 MF-STAR	Multi-Function Radar	4	2013	2021-2022	For 4 Visakhapatnam (Project-15B) destroyers produced in India.
EL/M-2221 STGR	Fire Control Radar	8	2014	2021-2022	For 4 Visakhapatnam (Project-15B) destroyers produced in India.
EL/M-2248 MF-STAR	Multi-Function Radar	1	2015	2022	For 1 Vikrant (IAC or Project-71) aircraft carrier produced in India.
EL/M-20600	AGS radar	10	2016	2018-2019	High-performance Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imaging integrated into an operational Reconnaissance and Targeting Pod (RTP).
EL/M-2052	Combat Aircraft Radar	19	2021	2021	For 'Tejas' IA combat Aircraft.

Source: *Compiled from Different sources.*

The data in table 6.6 shows that India imported a wide range of radar systems, including search radar, combat aircraft radar, ground surveillance radar, air search radar, fire control radar, and multi-function radar, are among the sensors that India imported from Israel between 1992 and 2022. AGS/SIGINT (Airborne Ground

Surveillance/Signals Intelligence) and EO (Electro-Optical) equipment for aircraft are additional items on the import list. Many of the Israeli sensors that are imported are used to update and modernise Indian military hardware. This includes, among other things, combat aircraft, frigates, destroyers, and aircraft carriers. These military assets are being modernised and upgraded in order to increase their capabilities and stay up with emerging technologies. In response to particular security challenges India faced, some sensors were imported from Israel. For instance, the EL/M-2083 APR radar purchase was made in reaction to the 2008 Mumbai terrorist assault, while the aerostat-based radar purchase was made for coastal monitoring. According to the data, some of the sensors shipped from Israel, intended for use in locally built military hardware made in India, such as frigates, destroyers, and combat aircraft. The data as a whole indicates that India has acquired a sizable number of sensors from Israel for a variety of military purposes, such as upgrading, upgrades, maritime surveillance, and the detection of security threats.

The analysis of defence import data from Israel to India during the post- Cold War period shows that India has imported a variety of defence equipment from Israel over the years. This equipments includes:

(i)   *Border Security Equipments:* Equipment for border security, including sensors, fencing systems, and monitoring gear has been imported by India from Israel. These border security tools aid India in maintaining border security, monitoring its borders, and stopping unauthorised cross-border activity.

(ii)   *Communication Systems:* Communication systems, including sophisticated tactical communication systems and satellite communication technology. These communication platforms give India access to safe and dependable communication tools that enable efficient command and control of its armed forces.

(iii)   *Electronic Warfare Systems*: Israel has sold India Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) and Electronic Support Measure (ESM) devices for use in Electronic Warfare (EW). India can detect, jam, and neutralise adversary

electronic threats with the use of these EW equipment, strengthening its defence against electronic warfare assaults.

(iv)   *Missiles:* Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) are only a couple of the missiles that India has imported from Israel. These missiles improve India's defensive posture and operational preparedness by giving it improved firepower and defensive capabilities.

(v)   *Radars***:** India bought radars from Israel for use in air defence, surveillance, and early warning systems, among other things. India's situational awareness and defensive capabilities are improved by the sophisticated detection, tracking, and targeting capabilities offered by these radars.

(vi)   *Training and Simulation Systems:* Israel has sold India training and simulation systems, including trainers for various weapon systems. These systems contribute to the education and professional growth of Indian defence personnel, improving their operational preparedness and efficiency.

(vii)   *Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs):* These drones include the Heron, Searcher, and Harop models. These UAVs are utilised to provide India with better situational awareness and operational capabilities through surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering.

The sensors and surveillance platforms strengthened defence operational capabilities on the   borders. Heron drones, thermal imaging devices, night vision equipments[13]used by Indian Army to prevent infiltration on the LoC proved useful (Patil, 2022).

6.4. Navel Security Cooperation

Situated in the middle of the Indian Ocean, India faces formidable challenges in safeguarding its national interest while simultaneously promoting international free trade. India confronts a significant risk of future conflicts over the exploitation of marine resources, especially as land-based natural resources continue to deplete (Doctor, 1990, pp.360-379). The vast ocean region holds strategic and economic

importance for India. India's economy heavily relies on energy imports, and maritime transportation plays a vital role in this supply chain. Additionally, India's robust maritime economy, supported by a network of ports and the 'Sagarmala project'[14], is essential for international trade, fishing, and economic development. (Suri, 2016, p. 241).

Aparna Roy (2021) provides a comprehensive overview of various sectors and industries contributing to the Blue economy[15], highlighting the diverse range of economic activities associated with sustainable use of marine resources. These sectors including the fishing industry, Marine biotechnology, deep-sea mining, marine renewable energy, ship building industry, port and marine logistics, marine tourism industry, marine commerce, marine engineering and education and research[16]. By considering all this factors, India has imported navel weapons and ships from Israel, as shown in table given below.

Table 6.7

Import of Naval Weapons and Ships from Israel (1992 – 2022)

Name	Weapon	Order ed	Year of Order	Period of Delivery	Description
Barak-MX	Naval SAM System	4	2019	2021-2022	For 4 Visakhapatnam (Project-15B) destroyers produced in India
Barak-1 VLS	Naval SAM System	7	2000	2002-2005	For modernisation of 1 Viraat aircraft carrier, 2 Kashin (Project-61 or Rajput) destroyers and 1 Godavari (Project-16) frigate and for 3 Brahmaputra (Project-16A) frigates produced in India
Barak-1 VLS	Naval SAM System	23	2003	2005-2006	For modernisation of 3 Delhi (Project-15) destroyers
Barak-1 VLS	Naval SAM System	2	2004	2004-2005	For modernisation of 2 Godavari (Project-16)

Barak-1 VLS	Naval SAM System	3	2007	2010-2012	For 3 Shivalik (Project-17) frigates produced in India
Barak-MX	Naval SAM System	5	2009	2014-2016	For 3 Kolkata (Project-15A) destroyers and 1 Vikrant (IAC) aircraft carrier produced in India and for modernisation of 1 Vikramaditya (Gorshkov) aircraft carrier
Super Dvora 6	Patrol Craft	2	1997	1998-1999	Super Dvora Mk-2 version

Source**:** *Compiled from different sources by the researcher*

The table 6 (7) displays the details the shipment of naval ships and armaments into India from Israel between 1992 and 2022. Over the years, India has purchased different naval ships and armaments from Israel. Different category of Barak Naval SAM system between 2000 and 2007 has been the most frequently imported weapon. These were ordered for the upgrade of many destroyers and frigates in the Indian Navy. Two orders for the Barak-MX naval SAM system were placed: four in 2019 for four Indian-built Visakhapatnam (Project-15B) destroyers and five in 2009 for three Indian-built Kolkata (Project-15A) destroyers, one Indian-built Vikrant (IAC) aircraft carrier, and the modernisation of one Indian-built Vikramaditya (Gorshkov) aircraft carrier. With the exception of the Barak family of naval SAM systems, India also imported two Super Dvora 6 patrol craft in 1997.

The naval cooperation highlights India's efforts to modernise its naval fleet with advanced weapons and ships, which is crucial to ensure the country's maritime security (Gopal, 2017, p.343; Inbar & Ningthoujam, 2012, p.1). DRDO signed a deal with IAI to develop jointly the Long Range Surface to Surface to Air Missiles (LRASM) for Indian Navy, which was successfully test fired from Indian Navel Ship[17]. To address the security challenges in the maritime realm, India turned to Israel for the development of missile systems, and radar surveillance systems. These technologies are crucial for effective surveillance of Indian coastline and safeguarding its extensive economic zone, sea lines of communications and island

territories from possible potential threats from Pakistan and China (Baru, 2017, pp. 1-44). Besides, another prosing endeavourer between India and Israel is the creation of a 'Blue Economy Fund', as an emerging idea for ocean governance that focus on economic potential of oceans through environmentally sustainable manner. It try to address the concerns of carbon neutrality, energy security and green energy, using Artificial Intelligence (AI) solutions with India's Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) which proposed in 2015 (Afterman & Janardhan, 2023).

The collaboration between India and Israel during the post-Cold War period displays the growing security threats, which India faces in its geo-political settings. In response, India has securitised its boarders through the acquisition defence capabilities and enhanced surveillance. Although, India imports defence equipments from various countries, there has been a sharp increase in its defence import expenditure from Israel, between 2000 and 2022, as shown in a table below.

Figure 6.1

India's Arms Import from Israel from 2000 to 2022

Source: Compiled from *SIPRI Arms Transfers Database*

The data demonstrates the fluctuating nature of India's arms import from Israel between 2000 and 2022. During this period, there were notable increase in

imports, particularly between 2000 and 2005, and again 2017 and 2018. These years witnessed significant growth in defence imports from Israel, indicating reliance on Isareli defence equipments to bolster Indian defence capabilities. However, there were also periods of decline in imports, particularly, between 2006 and 2008, and after 2018. Overall, the data reflects the varying levels of India's reliance on Israeli arms imports over the years. Indian naval acquisitions from Israel reflects the broad scope of its ambitions which including countering Pakistan and China in the Indian Ocean. These acquisitions serve to project power and extend India's influence throughout the region (Blank, 2005, p.209).

Besides the defence cooperation, there are several other areas of common interest between India and Israel. Theses includes, joint military exercises, technology transfer and upgradation, collaboration in the space and nuclear sectors, agriculture, cyber security, water management, counterterrorism, tourism, trade and commerce.

6.5. Joint Military Exercises and Visits: Building Images

Military exercises and visits serves as instrumental means to demonstrate national defence capabilities, test the performance of the armed forces and equipment, and avoid engaging in actual warfare. They played a crucial role in evaluating the preparedness of the forces and analysing platforms and tactics, enhancing interoperability, building confidence, showcasing military capabilities, and serving as a reminder to the adversaries (Gosh, 2015; Muralidharan, 2022). India's participation in numerous joint military exercises with friendly nations yields constructive engagement in operational terms and enhances the skills of our armed forces across a wide spectrum of warfare domains. These exercises facilitate the exchange of current tactical and technological practices, techniques, and knowledge among participating armed forces.

During the post-Cold War Period, India and Israel has engaged in many military visits. Besides, there were notable military exercises between India and Israel. One such exercise is 'Blue Flag', a large scale air combat exercise held annually in Israel[18]. India has been participating in this exercise since 2017, and in

2021, Indian Air force sent Dassult Mirage 2000 fighter to participate in this exercise[19]. The exercise has helped to improve the interoperability of the Indian Air force and the other participating air forces[20]. In November 2022, Israel and India conducted their largest joint security drill in New Delhi to ensure the preparedness and test the efficacy of contingency plans for potential terrorist attack in the near future. HE Naor Gilon, the Israeli Ambassador in India, remarked that "such joint exercises further deepen the cooperation between the two nations in security and defence, while also building upon shared values to contribute to global stability"[21].

Port visit serves as a tactic to strengthen the relations between the countries, and this practice began in 2004 when 'INS Mysore', a guided missile destroyer visited Israeli port, followed by 'INS Godavari' and 'INS Ganga', both guided missile frigates, and 'INS Shakti', a fleet tanker (Scott, 2009, p.135). Subsequent visits featured 'INS Mumbai', a guided missile destroyer, in June 2006, and 'INS Brahmaputra', a guided missile frigate[22]. In August 2012, 'INS Mumbai' revisited Haifa, alongside 'INS Trishul', a stealth missile frigate, and 'INS Gomti', a guided missile frigate. The momentum continued with 'INS Aditya', a tanker, and 'INS Trikhand', a frigate, arriving in August 2015. In May 2017, 'INS Mumbai' and 'INS Trishul' returned to Haifa, and the visits extended to September 2018 with 'INS Aditya' and 'INS Tarangini', a sail training ship. These visits have strengthened the bonds of friendship and cooperation between India and Israel in the maritime domain (Rajiv, 2023, p.148). Besides, over the years, Indian Naval Ships have made numerous port visits to Haifa, Israel, showcasing the deepening maritime cooperation between the two nations (NDTV, 2017, May 12).

In addition to joint exercises and port visits, there were visits on the part of defence chiefs to enhance the defence cooperation[23]. From 2014 to 2022, notable visits of service chiefs from India and Israel took place, bolstering bilateral defence ties. General Bikram Singh visited Israel in 2014, followed by visits from Indian Air Force and Navy Chiefs, including Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha in 2016, Admiral Sunil Lanba in 2017, and Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa in 2018. In 2021, General M.M. Naravane and Air Chief Marshal R.S. Bhadauria visited

Israel[24]. Reciprocating the engagements, Israeli Service Chiefs, such as Admiral Ram Rutberg and Major General Amir Eshel in 2015, Major General Herzi Halevi and Major General Kobi Barak in 2017, and Major General Amikam Norkin in 2019 (March and August), also visited India (Rajiv, 2023, p.149). These high-level interactions fostered cooperation and expertise exchange, significantly enhancing mutual understanding and collaboration between the armed forces of both nations.

6.6. Technology Transfer and Upgradation

Transfer of Technology refers to the conveyance of "innovations, ideas, expertise, and methodologies from one nation to another, often facilitated through various means such as support, financial investment, licensing, trade agreements, or training programmes" (Srinath, 2020, p.6). It fulfills specific requirements more economically, rapidly, and conveniently than creating the desired product or solution entirely from the ground up. India's security landscape and its ambition to become a global power demand the enhancement of its military strength.

To achieve this, during the post-Cold War period, undertaken military modernisation and upgradation through rejuvenating its armed forces and replacing obsolete equipment[25]. To maintain its strategic superiority in South Asia, India has allocated substantial funds, investing billions to revamp its entire military infrastructure (Rajagopalan, 2023). This dedication is evident in its procurement of a diverse range of weaponry from nations including Russia, the United States, Israel, and France (Khattak, 2019, pp. 20-21).

The sale of arms and the transfer of technology between India and Israel have served to strengthen security and economic alliances in the Post- Cold War period. These efforts are aimed to address not only domestic and national security interest but also laying the foundation for shared interest and assessment of threats (Inbar & Ningthoujum, 2012). The transfer of technology, spanning not only in military and related areas, but also in various other sectors, was intended to bridge the gap between India's ambitious national security goals and boosting economic security interest (Blank, 2005, p. 207). The defence acquisitions from Israel over the past three decades, including technology transfers in defence sector, have been

aimed at overcoming the challenges faced by India in meeting the technological requirements, which were previously fulfilled through imports from the disintegrated Soviet Union (Ghosal, 2016).

During the post-Cold War period, with the demise of Soviet Union, India has been searching for a reliable technological partner to upgrade its MIG fleet, Sakhoi helicopters and Russian made T-72 tanks, which lost tech-support and upgradation. Israel offered technical support for the modernisation (Noor, 2004, p. 96). Later, in 2002, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) collaborated to produce 'Dhruv', helicopters capable to use for civil and military operations. In 2006, India turned to Israel for assistance in developing crucial surveillance systems. India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) encountered technical challenges with its Programme 'Divya Drishti'[26].

To address these issues, the DRDO's Hyderabad-based Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL), along with Israeli company Elbit Systems, the Electronic Corporation of India, and Tata Power Company Limited, collaborated successfully to resolve the problems (Inbar & Ningthoujam, 2012, p.10). In 2006, Israel Aerospace Industries and India's Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) signed a deal to jointly develop and produce the long-range Barak missile system. Following this, they further reached an agreement to manufacture anti-aircraft missiles jointly for the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force (IAF) [27].

In 2007, the Cabinet Committee of India approved for joint production of Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missiles (MRSAM), and later in 2009, India signed an agreement with IAI for the joint development of the Spyder surface-to-air missiles. This collaboration further advanced to joint research and development programmes aimed at developing anti-ballistic missile systems, satellite surveillance systems, night vision devices, advanced precision-guided munitions and network-centric operations (Inbar & Ningthoujam 2012, p.10).

In 2010, Tata group, an Indian company, acquired major stakes of HBL Elta Avionics Systems Ltd., a Hyderabad based company partially owned by Israeli Elta

group, a subsidiary of IAI. This company produces electronic warfare systems, radars, homeland security systems and aerial vehichles[28]. The major technology transfers and joint ventures between India and Israel during the post- Cold War period are presented in the table 6 (9).

Table 6.9

India Israel Joint Ventures and Technology Transfers

Indian Company/Firm	Israeli Partner	Project description
Alpha Design	Elbit Security Systems	Sky Striker Unmanned Aerial Vehichles, Mi 17 helicopter upgrades
Adani Defence and Aerospace; Alpha Design	Elbit Systems	Digital Head up displays
Bharat Forge	Elbit	Artillery systems
Dynamic Technologies Private limited and Elcom	IAI	Unmanned Aerial Vehichles
HBL Power Systems	Elta Systems	Radar technology
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited	IAI	Boeing passenger conversion to cargo carrier aircraft
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited	Elbit Systems	Vertical take off landing (VTOL) UAVs
Kalyani Group, L&T	Rafael Advanced Systems	Medium Range Surface to air missile
Kalyani Strategic Systems Limited	IAI	Radars and air defence systems
Mahindra Telephonics	Scachaf Engineering	Strategic electronic systems
Mahindra Aerostrtuctures	Elbit	Aerostrtuctures
PLR systems	Israel Weapon Systems	Small arms and ammunition
Tata Group	Elbit, IAI	Home land security systems, Radar applications,
Wipro	IAI	Composite aero structures

Source: *Indian Embassy in Israel, website, Ministry of External Affairs*

The table shows that, the joint ventures and technology transfers between Indian and Israeli companies in the defence and aerospace sectors signify a strategic collaboration aimed at bolstering India's military capabilities. These partnerships

span a diverse range of projects, including the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), upgrades to helicopter systems, advancements in avionics technology, and improvements in radar and air defence systems. These initiatives are instrumental in enhancing India's self-reliance and proficiency in critical defence domains. The collaborations address a spectrum of military needs, from converting passenger aircraft for cargo transport to manufacturing aero-structures and small arms. This multifaceted approach fosters a symbiotic relationship, promoting knowledge exchange and mutual growth in the defence and aerospace industries of both nations. Overall, these joint ventures contribute significantly to the technological evolution of India's defence capabilities, ensuring a robust and comprehensive defence infrastructure.

These strategic partnerships reflect the mutual commitment of India and Israel to strengthen their defence sectors and reinforce their longstanding relationship in the realm of defence cooperation. Later, the defence sector focused on joint research and development in line with India's 'Make in India' initiative (Rajiv, 2023, p.6). The growing defence engagement with Israel has been justified by the government of India as, 'the procurement and acquisition of defence items to meet the requirements of the armed forces are sourced from both domestic and foreign suppliers, including Israel. However, providing details in this regard is not feasible, as it could compromise national security'[29].

6.7. Anti-terrorism Cooperation

After diplomatic normalisation in 1992, then Indian Defence Minister Sharad Pawar disclosed clandestine cooperation with Israel on counter-terrorism, involving discreet exchanges of information on terrorist groups' finances, recruitment, and training (Inbar, 2017). Therefore, after the Post-normalisation period, the contacts and consultation between India and Israel paved the way for sharing the experience of Israel to curb terrorism. Earlier, India's external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had contacts with Mossad, Israeli external intelligence agency to benefit from Israel's knowledge from West Asia, and North Africa to learn from its counter terrorism techniques (Bajoria, 2008). The cooperation has

grown stronger due to the shared concern of growing fundamentalism and terrorism capable to destabilise the country and undermining national security (Karmon, 2022, p.2).

Later, during the visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Perez in May 1993, he supported fully the territorial integrity of India and condemned the issue of terrorism. Commenting on terrorism, Yitzhak Rabin, and then Israeli Prime Minister said that Israel had been a victim of this for years and the same has been a concern of India. In the wake of Bombay blast added speculation that cooperation in combating terrorism was a possible area of common interest (Naaz, 2000, p. 974).

In 2003, National Security Advisor, Brijesh Mishra spoke at the American Jewish Committee (AJC), emphasised the possibility of collaboration among India, Israel and US in combating terrorism. Mishra said that 'such an alliance would posses both political determination and ethical legitimacy to make decisive choices when faced with severe instances of terrorist provocations' (Browne, 2017, p.331). In 2009, Lt. General Gabi Ashkenazi, Chief of Staff of Israel Defence Forces, visited India, affirming Israel's firm commitment and support to India in combating terrorism and enhancing defence ties in this connection[30].

The anti terrorism cooperation between India and Israel encompasses various aspects, including the establishment of a Joint Working Group (JWG) on counter terrorism. In 2009, Israel offered Homeland Security Assistance (HLS), and Maharashtra government sent a delegation to gain hands on experience[31]. In 2014, both countries signed two significant agreements, namely Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters and cooperation in Homeland Security, as well as Protection of Classified Material[32]. These agreements led to the formation of a Joint Steering Committee, supported by thematic Joint Working Groups, to facilitate collaboration in the field of homeland security. Since 2015, Indian Police Service (IPS) officer trainees are annually visiting the Israel National Police Academy for one week foreign exposure training. This training occurs at the end of their training at National Police Academy in Hyderabad[33].

The steering committee meetings between India and Israel on Home Land Security were held in 2014, 2018 and 2020, and the most recent meeting were held on 15-16 February 2023 in New Delhi. The meeting was co-chaired by Indian Home Secretary Ajay Kumar Bhalla and Israel National Security Advisor, Eyal Hulata (*The Economic Times,* 2023, April 24). The meeting discussed the range of issues related with terrorism, including:

   i. The threat by cross-border terrorism,

  ii. The need for cooperation in intelligence sharing and law enforcement,

 iii. The importance of counter radicalisation and violent extremism,

 iv. The need to strengthen international cooperation against terrorism[34].

In August 2017, India revealed its plans to deploy an advanced border fencing system, developed by Israel along its border with Pakistan. This system integrates a 'quick response team' mechanism that is triggered when the control room, equipped with CCTV surveillance, identifies any infiltration attempts. The initiative, called the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS), is part of broader strategy to effectively secure the borders between India and Pakistan, as well as India and Bangladesh, in the coming years[35].

6.8. Intelligence Cooperation

Intelligence sharing is pivotal in adapting to evolving security threats as it enables countries to collectively anticipate and respond to covert threats, enhancing national security. The growing security challenges, both internal and external, have made intelligence cooperation and sharing became a paramount factor for maintaining global peace and security (Pathak, 2023). There was a prolonged cooperation between Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of India and Israeli secret agency, Mossad. Such cooperation existed during the period of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi (Gerberg, 2008, p. 292).

In September1968, when K.N. Rao founded RAW, then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi advised him to establish links with Israeli intelligence agency,

Mossad, to counter the growing military cooperation China and Pakistan. As a result, fostering ties with Israel was a strategic move to strengthen India's intelligence capabilities and the national security[36]. The establishment of diplomatic relations provided a formal framework and opened up new avenues for enhanced intelligence collaboration (Naaz, 2000, p. 971).

In October 1995, the Director General of National Security Guards (NSG) visited Israel, with the aim of establishing a co-operative channel, focusing on areas such as training and procurement of weaponry (Rajiv, 2023, p.61). This laid the foundation of anti-terrorism cooperation between the two nations. In May 2000, L.K. Advani, then home minister of India, visited Israel and held official meeting with Mossad for furthering cooperation in the field of security and counter terrorism (Benn, 2000). The growing security threats during the post-Cold War period, created condition to collaborate with Israel in intelligence cooperation, which helped India to gather intelligence on terrorism, nuclear proliferation and Middle East peace processes.

In 2008, Mossad reportedly helped Indian authorities in tracking down and arresting the perpetrators of the Mumbai terrorist attack (*Times of Israel*, 2023, July 31). Furthermore, both the countries have also collaborated on joint operations against terrorist groups such as Jaish- e- Mohammed and Lashkar-e- Taiba (Karmon, 2022, pp.3-4;Tellis, 2012, p.2). Mossad has also provided training for Indian security forces on the topics of intelligence gathering, counter terrorism and hostage rescue. Training sessions were conducted in 2010, and in 2012 and 2014. Besides, the signing of the vital agreements on security cooperation and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters were also undertaken (Kumar, 2014). Former Mossad Chief Uzi Arad, comments that, "there has been intelligence cooperation between Israel and India over the years and these endeavours have been mutually beneficial"[37].

During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's the visit to Israel in 2017, the concept 'I for I' intelligence sharing was introduced between India and Israel to strengthen the deterrence capabilities based on the three core elements:

i.   Common national security challenges

ii.   Home land security challenges

iii. Shared values (Mishra, 2018).

The growing security and intelligence cooperation provides India to gain valuable opportunity to benefit Israeli expertisation and technology to counter the various national security challenges. According to Kumar (2014):

> *"There is a lot to earn and more to learn for India from a very small country, who has managed to survive in the highly hostile atmosphere. Cooperation in the field of security will no doubt help India in combating terrorism and saving the life of the civilians"* *(para, 4).*

6.9. Space Technology Cooperation

In the competitive space environment, space technology plays a vital role in detecting, tracking, identifying, and analysing space objects, including debris, and enhancing understanding of space conditions (Kapoor, 2023). Its primary aim is to ensure safety, security, and sustainability in space operations, serving both military and civilian purposes. This technology encompasses space surveillance and tracking to identify and predict the orbits of objects, as well as space intelligence collection and analysis about unknown satellites, including their operational status, capabilities, and objectives (Guruprasad, 2018, pp.455-481). Furthermore, space technology facilitates the efficient management and control of space assets to meet military requirements and employed for surveillance and communication purposes (Kapoor, 2023).

India's space programme commenced in the 1960s with a primary focus on social and economic development[38]. Over the past decades, it has expanded to include the ambitious space exploration endeavours and has placed increased emphasis on national security due to growing security concerns about Chinese counter space capabilities. This has led to the potential development of new partnerships in space security.

India's decision to invest in military space capabilities, including the 2019 anti-satellite test (ASAT) known as 'Mission Shkati'[39] was prompted by broader global trends in space security and specific developments in the Indo-Pacific region. Notably, China's ASAT test in 2007 played a significant role in shaping India's approach. Despite the challenges posed by these developments to India's longstanding commitment to peaceful space utilisation, the ASAT test demonstrated India's growing focus on space security and the imperative to protect its space assets (Rajagopalan, 2022). The increasing security threats compelled India to seek for new partners in space collaboration. As a result, cooperation with QUAD, France and Israel has emerged as a key outcome of this policy.

During the post-Cold War period, India and Israel showcased their technological prowess through significant collaboration in space technology. After the visit of Shimon Peres, the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister, in January 2002, a space cooperation agreement was signed in June 2002 between Col. Aby Har-Even, the Head of the Israeli Space Research Organisation and Dr. K. Kasturirangan, Chairman of ISRO (Browne, 2017, p.331). In 2003, Israel Space Agency (ISA) and ISRO collaborated in using satellites to improve land and resource management. In 2005, Israel chose India's Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) to launch its first Synthetic Aperture Radar Imaging Satellite, TecSAR, due to the concerns of its own space launch vehicle, the 'Shavit', and the cost-effectiveness of the PSLV option (Opall & Jayaraman, 2005).

In 2009, India successfully launched RISAT-2, a synthetic aperture radar imaging satellite. The satellite was a collaborative effort between IAI and ISRO, launched to enhance India's earth observation capabilities, enabling improved disaster management, increased surveillance, and strengthened defence capabilities (Lal, 2009; Paikowski & Israel, 2011, pp.394-405). The decision to expedite the acquisition and launch of RISAT-2 came in the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, with the aim of bolstering India's future surveillance capabilities.

For over a decade, India and Israel have been engaged in collaborative efforts within the space sector. ISRO received significant technological assistance

from Israel in creating small, high resolution radar imaging satellites (Singh, 2022). Following the visit of Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi in July 2017, both India and Israel signed seven MoUs, including agreements on cooperation in the GEO-LEO optical link electric propulsion for small satellites[40]. The collaboration in the field of satellite technology has significantly enhanced India's defence capabilities, providing the country with a valuable 'eye in the sky' to safeguards its boarders (*The Economic Times*, 2016, December 11).

On July 29, 2021, Dr. K. Sivan, the Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and Secretary of the Department of Space, virtually met with Mr. Avi Blasberger, the Director General of the Israel Space Agency (ISA). The two leaders discussed how the ongoing projects, such as their collaboration on the GEO-LEO optical link and the electric propulsion system, were going. They also talked about possible future collaborations, such as the launch of Israeli satellites using an Indian launcher and an appropriate event in 2022 to commemorate the 30 years of diplomatic relations between India and Israel as well as the 75th anniversary of Indian independence (ISRO, 26 April 2023).

6.10. Energy Security Cooperation

Energy security has emerged as a prominent aspect India's foreign policy, shaping its strategic decisions due to its heavy reliance on imports for hydrocarbon needs. India considers energy as a crucial national security parameter when engaging in the global energy market to meet its requirements (Pant, 2006, p.58). The growing economy, following the adoption of New Economic Policy, and the escalating Foreign Direct Investment have led to a surging demand for energy to meet the industrial and commercial requirements. The rise of India's economy, driven by information and knowledge based services, has created growing demand for energy has necessitated secure energy supplies and making energy security as a crucial factor in foreign policy (Ramkumar, et.al, 2021, pp.1-2).

Energy security has become a vital component of foreign and security policies due to intensifying competition among consumer countries for energy supplies, impacting global economic and political relations[41]. This has created

condition for India to widen its search for more partners to fulfill its energy security needs, not only in hydrocarbon energy sources but also in non-conventional energy technologies. Israel was also one of such partners during the post- Cold War period.

India and Israel are embarking on a fresh path of cooperation to strengthen their strong bilateral ties through energy collaboration. As Israel is a significant natural gas exporter in the Middle East, India endeavours to diversify its energy sources. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2018 to reinforce their engagements in oil and gas sector (Abidi, 2018). This was a significant development in India-Israel relations when Indian firms received licenses from Israel's energy ministry for oil and gas exploration and drilling in its waters. This presented an opportunity for India, already possessing expertise in drilling and exploration, outlining cooperation in the oil and gas sector including joint economic projects (*Reuters,* September 4, 2017).

The existing partnerships have mainly centered on fossil fuels, both countries are increasingly recognising the importance of transitioning to renewable energy sources (Ningthoujam, 2021, pp.227-241). The developing Indo-Israel energy cooperation displays a convergence of interest in promoting renewable energy uses. Both nations are emphasising increasing investment in promoting renewable energy domestically and through international partnerships, as demonstrated by initiatives like joint manufacturing and Israel's willingness to join the India led International Solar Alliance (ISA), supporting the objectives of diversifying India's energy sources (Chaudhary, 2022; Abhayankar 2012, p.22). In 2021, Press Trust of India (PTI) reported, "a partnership has been initiated by the International Federation of Indo-Israel Chamber of Commerce (IFIICC) through which an Israeli based company is producing an innovative robotic solar technology in India for a landmark project in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)" [42].

The changing geopolitical landscape in the West Asian region, especially with the redefined relations between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain, creates possibilities for increased energy cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally. The normalisation of relations between Israel and the Gulf countries presents a

favourable moment for India to explore collaborations in the energy sector, utilising investments from the Gulf States, Israeli technology, and India's manufacturing expertise. This shift aligns with India's 'Look West or Link West Policy'[43], offering ample opportunities to enhance Indo-Israeli cooperation and expand India's engagement in the region, with energy partnerships playing a crucial role. This contemplates India's present emphasis on 'pluralitarianism' or 'minilateralism', which has emerged as a prominent aspect of current Indian foreign policy (Ningthoujam, 2021, p.239).

6.11. Cyber Security

The widespread integration of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in India, during the post-Cold War period has had a profound impact on various sectors, promoting economic growth, efficiency, and international trade through e-commerce and fintech solutions. The proliferation of mobile phones and high-speed internet has revolutionised communication, enabling virtual communities and transparent interactions between the government and citizens (Singh, 2022). However, as India embraces ICT, ensuring robust cyber security measures remains critical to safeguarding the nation's digital landscape and protecting against potential cyber threats. Presently, cyber threats to security represent a highly significant challenge, affecting both economy and national security on a profound level[44].

The ecosystem of cyber warfare encompasses various forms of cyber attacks with distinct objectives and targets, mainly including cyber terrorism, cyber fraud, cyber spying, cyber bullying and cyber assault (Vedza, 2013, pp.130-133). In 2017, India ranked third among the countries with higher number of detected cyber threats and second in terms of targeted attacks[45]. In 2022, India ranked tenth position in the Global Security Index[46] due to improved cybersecurity measures and collaboration. Israel was one of the leading collaborators with India in its cyber security endeavours.

The 2017 visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Israel marked the identification of cybersecurity as a significant area of cooperation between the two nations. The subsequent visit of Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu to

India in the following year led to the signing of a cybersecurity cooperation agreement (MEA, 5 July 2017). In 2018, India and Israel signed an agreement to co-operate on cyber security, and they have held number of joint meetings and workshops. Even before formalising the government level partnership, Indo-Israeli cyber cooperation had been deepening through private sector collaboration and investments, with Indian IT firms like Infosys and Wipro investing in Israeli tech and cybersecurity start-ups[47].

Israeli organisations have shown keen interest in India's growing cybersecurity market, with expectations for substantial growth in the coming years. This burgeoning bilateral partnership has further strengthened by Israeli foreign direct investment in India, particularly in high-tech and agricultural domains (Jindal & Soliman, 2022). In 2020, India and Israel signed MoU on cyber security cooperation covering the areas of information sharing, capacity building, research and development, joint exercise and training[48].

6.12. Agriculture and Water Management

India is a dominant force in global agriculture, with extensive area of cultivation in rice, wheat and cotton and in the production of pulses and milk[49]. Due to the climatic change, and other reasons like small land holdings, inadequate irrigation system, inefficient use of inputs, and poor market and infrastructure agricultural share in national economy has been declined[50]. Despite its declining share in Indian economy, agriculture became a crucial aspect of India's social fabric, and supporting nearly three quarters of Indian families to earn their livelihood[51]. Besides, agriculture ensuring food security and meeting the demands of the growing population requires the emergence of a more productive, competitive, diverse and sustainable agricultural sector at a faster pace. The priority areas were decided to enhance agricultural production and ensuring food security were:

(i)   Promoting new technologies and reforming agricultural research and extension;

(ii)   Improving water resources and irrigation management;

(iii)   Facilitating agricultural diversification to higher value commodities;

(iv)   Developing markets and agricultural credit;

(v)   Sustaining the environment and future agricultural productivity[52].

In its quest for stronger partnerships in agriculture, India has found Israel to be a suitable ally, due to its excellence in overcoming environmental challenges by using cutting- edge technology and innovative practices. Israel's expertise in various areas, including green house equipment, seed and livestock propagation, water management, and desalination techniques has fascinated India, especially sine it faces similar challenges in its agriculture sector[53]. Since establishing diplomatic relations, India and Israel have developed strong and distinctive cooperation in the agricultural sector. Israel has undertaken several joint venture projects in India, focusing on various areas such as irrigation and water management, greenhouses, fertilizers, chemicals, pesticides, insecticides, tissue culture, horticulture, animal husbandry, and dairy development[54]. Additionally, Israel's expertise in agriculture, along with its knowledge of power and food industries, has been integrated into these collaborative projects (Srivastava, 2017).

The Indo-Israel Agricultural Project (IIAP), established through an agreement for agricultural cooperation in 2006, is a collaborative effort between India and Israel. Its primary goals are focused on three key aspects:

(i)   Increasing crop diversity;

(ii)   Increasing productivity;

(iii)   Increasing resources use efficiency[55].

As part of collaboration in agriculture, Israel established Agricultural centers of excellence in various parts of India to serve as an ideal platform for the swift transfer of technology to farmers in India. These centers demonstrate advanced agricultural practices such as protected cultivation, drip irrigation, fertigation, canopy management, nursery production, and integrated pest management technologies. By showcasing these techniques, the centers facilitate their adoption by both small and large-scale farmers, empowering them to enhance their yields and increase their income. The Centers of Excellence aim to ensure that a diverse range

of agricultural practices is accessible to all farmers, enabling them to benefit from the latest technologies and practices in the field[56].

The partnership continued to flourish, and various joint ventures were established, covering areas like seed production, agricultural machinery, and dairy development. Israel's experience in turning marginal water resources into successful agricultural ventures caught India's attention, and both countries worked on innovative solutions for water management and desert stabilisation (Jha, 2017). Demonstrations and training programmes were conducted to promote advanced agricultural techniques and technologies in India, enabling farmers to adopt practices like protected cultivation, drip irrigation, and soilless culture. With India's interest in learning from Israeli expertise and Israel's readiness to share its knowledge, the cooperation expanded, and several bilateral agreements were signed to further strengthen agricultural ties. Throughout the years, this dynamic collaboration has fostered agricultural growth, increased yields, and paved the way for sustainable development in the agricultural sector of both nations. The major agricultural and water management agreements and MoUs signed between India and Israel is given in a table below.

Table 6.10

India-Israel Agricultural and Water Management Agreements and MoUs

Bilateral agreements/MoUs	Month and Year
Agreement for cooperation in Agriculture	Dec 1993
Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Protection of the Environment	Sep 2003
Inter-Governmental Work Plan on Agriculture Cooperation	May 2006
Joint Declaration in the field of Water Technologies	Feb 2012
MOU on Water Resources Management and Development Cooperation	Nov 2016
Declaration of Intent in Cooperation in the field of agriculture	Nov 2016
3-Year Work Program in Agriculture 2018-2020 between MASHAV and M/o Agriculture & Farmers Welfare	Jul 2017
MoU on State Water Utility Reform in India	Jul 2017
Plan of Cooperation in the field of Water Utility in the Bundelkhand region of Uttar Pradesh, India.	Aug 2020

Source: Compiled from the *Web site of Embassy of India, Tel Aviv, Israel*

The table shows that during the post- Cold War period, India and Israel have forged a robust partnership in agriculture and water management through various agreements and MoUs. Initiating with the Agreement for cooperation in Agriculture, they embarked on joint ventures and sustainable projects in the agricultural sector. Their collaboration further extended to water technologies, conservation, and water resource management, strengthening their ties in the domain. Declarations and work programs showcased their commitment to specific projects, fostering knowledge exchange for sustainable development and mutual growth. The cooperation between the two countries holds immense potential for addressing challenges in agriculture and water management effectively.

6.13. Bilateral Trade: Closer Economic Security Ties

Before the normalisation of relations between India and Israel, there was little direct trade between the two countries. India's traditional trade policy prioritised Arab states, making Israel an irrelevant and negligible trade partner. However, the dramatic transformation of global politics after the Cold War period and the advent of globalisation led to technological and economic collaboration becoming a necessary factor. This shift in traditional approaches to nations facilitated a significant change in indo-Israel trade relations (Nair, 2004, p.146). From 1992 to 2023, India is Israel's second trading partner in Asia and the ninth largest globally[57]. In May 1993, during the visit of then Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, a MoU has signed to promote bilateral trade and economic cooperation.

Later, in 1994, both countries granted each other mutual Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status through an agreement. In January 1996, on the visit of P. Chidambaram, then Union Minister of Commerce, an agreement signed for the avoidance of double taxation and on bilateral investment protection (Ray, 2006, p.1310). These agreements smoothed the legal framework for commercial and economic cooperation between the two states. Since 1992, bilateral trade and economic relations between India and Israel have experienced rapid progress. For this the major agreements and MoUs are given in a table below:

Table 6.11

Trade and Allied Agreements between India and Israel

Year	Agreement/ MoU
1994	Agreement for Trade and Economic Cooperation
1996	Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments and on technical Cooperation, Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Bilateral Agreement regarding Mutual Assistance and Cooperation in Customs matters.
2012	Letter of Intent on Cooperation in Textile and Clothing
2015	Amending Protocol to the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement
2017	MOU on India-Israel Industrial R&D and Technological Innovation Fund (I4F)
2021	Bilateral Innovation Agreement

Source: Compiled from different sources by the researcher

Initially valued at US$ 200 million in 1992, with diamonds being the primary component, merchandise trade has diversified significantly over the years. This growth has led to a substantial surge, reaching US$ 10.1billion (excluding defence) during the fiscal year 2022-23[57]. The export import date between India and Israel during the period 2020-21 to 2022-2023 is given in a table below.

Table 6.12

India-Israel Import- Export Data from 2018-2023

(Value in Lakhs)

Sl. No	Year	2020-2021	2021-2022	2022-2023
1	**EXPORT**	1,997,978.03	3,577,045.79	6,827,704.49
2	%Growth	-16.08	79.03	90.88
3	India's Total Export	215,904,322.13	314,702,149.28	362,063,094.86
4	%Growth	-2.74	45.76	15.05
5	%Share	0.93	1.14	1.89
6	**IMPORT**	1,448,158.25	2,297,453.12	1,862,314.30
7	%Growth	28.19	58.65	-18.94
8	India's Total Import	291,595,770.04	457,277,458.91	573,395,859.64

9	%Growth	-13.24	56.82	25.39
10	%Share	0.5	0.5	0.32
11	**TOTAL TRADE**	3,446,136.28	5,874,498.90	8,690,018.79
12	%Growth	-1.83	70.47	47.93
13	India's Total Trade	507,500,092.17	771,979,608.19	935,458,954.50
14	%Growth	-9.06	52.11	21.18
15	%Share	0.68	0.76	0.93
16	**TRADE BALANCE**	549,819.78	1,279,592.67	4,965,390.19
17	India's Trade Balance	-75,691,447.91	-142,575,309.63	-211,332,764.79

Source: Compiled from Different Sources.

The data on India-Israel import-export figures from 2020 to 2023 reveals significant fluctuations in bilateral trade and economic relations during this period. India's exports to Israel initially experienced a decline in 2019-2020, but made a remarkable recovery, with substantial increases of 90.88% in 2021-2022 and 79.03% in 2022-2023, reaching a total value of 6,827,704.49 lakhs. This resulted in a significant rise in India's export share to Israel, reaching 1.89% in 2022-2023. The overall bilateral trade between the two countries demonstrated remarkable growth, with a 70.47% increase in 2021-2022 and 47.93% increase in 2022-2023, reaching a total value of 8,690,018.79 lakhs.

Despite challenges, India maintained a trade surplus of 4,965,390.19 lakhs in 2022-2023, indicating the strengthening economic ties between India and Israel. India's major commodities exported to Israel include gems, precious metals, organic chemicals, electronic equipment, medical and technical equipment, plastics, vehicles, machinery, other textiles and clothing. Israeli exports to India mainly consist of gems, precious metals, and coins, electronic equipment, medical and technical equipment, iron or steel products, fertilizers, machinery, organic chemicals, other chemical goods, inorganic chemicals, and plastics[58].

6.14 Narendra Modi Period: Greater Shift

Since India normalised its relations with Israel in 1992, both countries steadily strengthened their bilateral ties. However, when the Bharatiya Janata Party secured a decisive victory in the Indian elections of May 2014 and Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister, the emphasise on the 'momentum of change, growing confidence, heightened determination, and a clearer path ahead' in India's Israel policy became apparent (Chathurvedy, 2017, p.3). Notably, the Modi government has actively worked not only to alter perspectives but also to tangibly reshape the dynamics of its international relations, as evidenced in its evolving approach towards Israel. Overcoming historical reservations, the government has displayed a renewed decisiveness, redefining and reinforcing connections with key global players, thus marking a significant shift in India's trajectory under Modi's leadership. Modi had 'fundamentally reinvigorated India's foreign policy, finally shedding many of the shibboleths that had previously hobbled the country's foreign policy choices' (Ganguly, 2017, p.131).

Under Modi's leadership, the BJP once again communicated to the global community India's increasing involvement with Israel. Narendra Modi became the first Prime Minister of India to undertake a standalone visit to Israel from 4 to 6 July 2017. This visit further solidified their relationship. His trip to Israel aimed to injecting fresh energy and substance into the burgeoning relationship (Pate, 2020, p.07).

The Modi government is actively working to enhance India's ties with Israel, with the Prime Minister's visit aiming to inject new energy and direction into the growing relationship. There is a clear commitment to fostering political, security, economic, and cultural cooperation (Chathurvedy, 2017, p.03). Various ministerial visits, including those by presidential and parliamentary delegations, have laid the groundwork for this deepening engagement.

Chathurvedy (2017) views this change as Modi's focus on developmental initiatives, coupled with Israel's hands-on involvement in India, is opening doors for concrete economic benefits and fortifying the groundwork for a strong and enduring partnership. He further adds that the Indo-Israel relations have extending across various vital domains (p.04). Notably, cooperation in the agricultural sector has

gained paramount importance. Additionally, the strengthening ties between India and Israel are significantly fortified through their extensive collaboration in the realms of security and defence (Ningthoujam, 2021).

Furthermore, substantial strides have been taken by the government to enhance its involvement with the Indian diaspora, focusing on both the quality and quantity of engagement (Wald& Kandel, 2017). Besides, the emphasis on fostering people-to-people connections, particularly the deepening of cultural bonds and the facilitation of tourism remains a critical cornerstone of the bilateral relationship between the two nations (Pate, 2020). He has displayed enthusiasm in establishing top-level political engagement with Israel, emphasising not only security but also economic and cultural cooperation. Various reciprocal ministerial visits, including those by presidential and parliamentary delegations, have already occurred (Ningthoujam, 2021).

6.15 Conclusion

The deepening ties between India and Israel are rooted in Israel's role as a reliable ally in defence and strategic affairs. India's pursuit of technological advancements for addressing challenges from neighbouring states has found a steadfast partner in Israel, which not only serves as a trustworthy arms supplier but also plays a crucial role in Indian efforts to counter-terrorism. Despite robust defence collaborations with Israel, India has adeptly maintained longstanding ties with Palestine and Arab states, without injuring its relation with Israel, displaying a diplomatic balancing act and a commitment to regional stability. Beyond security engagements, the relationship has evolved into a multifaceted partnership. Israel's contributions span various fields such as agriculture, water management, medical research, space exploration, and cyber security, providing invaluable support to India in addressing post-Cold War security challenges. This comprehensive cooperation underscores the diplomatic acumen of both nations, navigating a complex geopolitical landscape while actively contributing to each other's security and development.

End note:

1. 'India, Israel launch commemorative logo to mark 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties'. *The Economic Times*. 2022 January, 24.

2. See, 'India –Israel Relations', MEA Report, India. August 2022.

3. Referred in 'Sky is the limit for India-Israel Ties'. *Daily Pioneer*, 2016, November 21.

4. See, the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. Retrieved from https://tradingeconomics.com/india/imports/israel/arms-ammunition-parts-accessories.

5. 'Dynamic Dimensions of the India-Israel Synergy'. Strategic Investment Research Unit. *Invest India Outlook, 2023 June 12*.

6. See, SIPRI arms database.

7. DDR&D, Directorate of Defence Research and Development, Ministry of Defence, Israel.

8. See, 'Non-Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty-First Century'. (New Delhi: Centre For Policy Research, 2012) p. 62-63

9. Mentioned in, 'India's Air Defence in the New Age: Preparing for Drones, Jets & Stealth Tech amid Evolving Threats'. *Indian Aerospace and Defence Bulletin*. 2023, July 15.

10. On March 24, 1986, the Government of India and Swedish arms company Bofors signed a $285 million contract for the supply of 410 155 mm Howitzer field guns.

11. See, 'India', *Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance*. November 2022. Retrieved from https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/intl_cooperation/india/

12. See, the 'Role of Secure Internet of Things Applications in Indian Defence'. DEFSTART. October, 14, 2022.

13. Army to procure night vision equipment from Israel', *India Times*, 21March 2007.

14. The 'Sagarmala program', led by the Ministry of Shipping, aims to drive port-led development in India by leveraging its extensive coastline, navigable waterways, and strategic location on international maritime trade routes, with a primary goal of reducing logistics costs for both international and domestic trade while minimising infrastructure investments. *Press Information Bureau,* 2020 March 12.

15. See, 'Blue Economy Policy', 27 July, 2022, Press Information Bureau.

16. Aparna Roy, Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean: Governance perspectives for sustainable development in the region, *ORF*, 17 February, 2021. Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/research/blue-economy-in-the-indian-ocean-governance-perspectives-for-sustainable-development-in-the-region-47449/

17. 'India tests Surface-to-Air-Missiles Jointly Developed with Israel'. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-tests-surface-to-air-missile-jointly-developed-with-israel/articleshow/90477285.cms.

18. See, 'Joint Military Exercises'. *Press Information Bureau, India,* Retrieved from https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1539020

19. As Indian Jets Roar over Blue Flag, Remembering Israel's Love for Mirage Fighters, *The Week* , 10 October, 2021. Retrieved on 23 July 2023.

20. See, 'India to take part in multi-nation air combat exercise in Israel this month', Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-to-take-part-in-multi-nation-air-combat-exercise-in-israel-this-month/articleshow/86828909.cms

21. 'India and Israel Conducted Joint Security Drill in New Delhi to prepare against terror attacks', 18 November 2022. Retrieved from https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/israel-india-conduct-joint-security-drill-in-delhi-to-prepare-against-terror-attacks20221118215508 accessed on 23 July 2023

22. See, 'Operation Sukoon- Indian Navy'. Retrieved from, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Galleries/News/Sukoon/

23. Annual Reports of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Retrieved from https://www.thestatesman.com/india/air-chief-marshal-bs-dhanoa-to-visit-israel-for-four-days-1502638927.html

24. 'Army chief to help boost defence ties with Israel during 5-day trip'. *Times of India,* 2021 November 16. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/army-chief-to-help-boost-defence-ties-with-israel-during-5-day-trip/articleshow/87705715.cms

25. See, 'Modernisation of Armed Forces'. *Press Information Bureau*, 2022 July 29. Retrieved from https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1846129

26. It is an advanced communication and intelligence gathering system. Retrieved from https://www.drdo.gov.in/programme-divya-drishti

27. Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM) Barak 8. Retrieved from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/lr-sam.htm

28. See, 'Tata makes first Purchase', *Times of India,* November 24, 2010.

29. The reply of then Defence Minister of India, A.K. Antony in Lok Sabha in 27 November, 2007.

30. Chief of Staff Concludes Visit to India, 10 December 2009. Retrieved from http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/News/today/09/12/1001.htm

31. Ritu Sarin, 'From Israel, Lessons of fighting Terror', *Indian Express,* July 21, 2009. Retrieved from http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/from-israel-lessons-on-fighting-terror/492051/

32. 'India-Israel Relations', Ministry of External affairs. India. Retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Israel_relations.pdf

33.   See, India- Israel Relations'. Retrieved from
       https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Israel_relations.pdf.

34.   'India-Israel Joint Steering Committee Meeting on Counter Terrorism'. *The
       Economic   Times*,   2023   April,   24.   Retrieved   from,
       https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/india-israel-to-hold-joint-steering-
       committee-jsc-meet-on-homeland-and-public-security-in-may/articleshow/99738

35.   'Israel fence systems, quick response team at Pakistan borders: BSF DG, *The
       Economic   Times*,   July   13,   2018.   Retrieved   from   https://
       economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/israel-fence-systems-quick-response-
       team-at-pakistan-borders-bsf-

36.   'Raw and Mossad the Secret Link', 8 September, 2003. Refiff.com. Retrieved from
       https://www.rediff.com/news/2003/sep/08spec.htm.

37.   See, 'Israel-India Spying Liaison Mutually Beneficial: Ex Mossad Top Man'. By
       Nishtha   Gautham.   *The   Quint.*   2019,   November   03.   Retrieved   from
       https://www.thequint.com/opinion/israeli-spy-chief-india-israel-intelligence-
       agency-cooperation.

38.   India's Space Security Policy: A Proposal,   Ajey Lele, 2016,   April 16. ISDA,
       Retrieved   from   https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196855/pb_indias-space-security-
       policy_alele.pdf

39.   India Test Anti- satellite Missile System, Codenamed 'Mission Shakti', *The
       Economic Times* 28 March 2019.

40.   India-Israel joint statement during the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, MEA
       India,   Retrieved   from   https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
       documents.htm?dtl/28593/IndiaIsrael_Joint_Statement_during_the_visit_of_Pri

41.   'Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics', Final Report, January 2004,
       prepared by Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP), Hague,
       Netherlands.   Retrieved   from
       https://www.clingendaelenergy.com/inc/upload/files/Study_on_energy_supply_secu
       rity_and geopolitics.pdf.

42.   Israeli firms produces solar technology in India for project in UAE. *ET Energy
       world   .com*,   2021   May   07.   Retrieved   from
       https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/renewable/israeli-firm-
       produces-solar-technology-in-india-for-

43.   See, 'India's 'Look West Policy' in the Middle East under Modi'. Retrieved from
       https://www.mei.edu/publications/indias-look-west-policy-middle-east-under-modi

44.   'India Witnessed 13.9 lakh cybersecurity Incidents in 2022: Government', Chethan
       Thathoo. *Inc 42*. Retrieved from https://inc42.com/buzz/india-witnessed-13-9-lakh-
       cybersecurity-incidents-in-2022-govt/

45.   'India ranks 3rd among nations facing most cyber threats: Symantec'. *The
       Economic Times: Tech,* 04 April 2018.

46.   See, Cyber Security Global Index. Retrieved from https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/global-cybersecurity-index.aspx

47.   'Wipro parks $1.5 million for minority stake in Israeli cyber security start ups', *Times of India,* 19 August 2016.

48.   'India –Israel Relations –Beginning of a new Era'. Press Release of Press Information Bureau, 4 May 2023. Retrieved from https://pib.gov.in/Press Release Page. aspx?PRID=1921850.

49.   'India at a Glance', Food and Agricultural Organisation(FAO), Retrieved from https://www.fao.org/india/fao-in-india/india-at-a-glance/en/

50.   See, 'Contribution of Agricultural sector in GDP', Retrieved from https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1909213

51.   See, 'FAO in India'. Food and Agricultural Oraganisation of the United Nations. Retrieved from https://www.fao.org/india/fao-in-india/india-at-a-glance/en/

52.   'India: Issues and Priorities for Agriculture', *The World Bank*, 17 May 2012, Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/05/17/india-agriculture-issues-priorities

53.   'Israel's Science and Technology: Agro-Technology', *Jewish Virtual Library*. Retrieved from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israeli-agro-technology.

54.   See, Israel, India deepen partnership in agriculture & water management. *Agriculture post.com*. June 17, 2022. Retrieved from https://agriculturepost.com/policy/israel-india-deepen-partnership-in-agriculture-water-management/

55.   'Indo-Israel Agricultural Project'. *Embassy of Israel in India*. Retrieved from https://embassies.gov.il/delhi/Relations/Pages/default_old.aspx

56.   'Agricultural Cooperation: India, Israel inaugurate 30th centre of Excellence', 23 January 2023, *Agriculture post.com*. Retrieved from https://agriculturepost.com/allied-sectors/horticulture/agricultural-cooperation-india-israel-inaugurate-30th-centre-of-excellence/

57.   See, 'Exploring India-Israel Trade and Economic Relations', *India Brand Equity Foundation,* Retrieved from https://www.ibef.org/indian-exports/india-israel-trade.

57.   See, 'Bilateral Economic Relations', website of Embassy of India, Israel.

58.   'India's Export to Israel', Trading Economics, Retrieved from https://tradingeconomics.com/india/exports/israel

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS

Foreign policy serves as a crucial diplomatic tool for the states to advance their national interest. In the modern operational context, the foreign policy behaviour of the states often deviates from their earlier approaches in ways that others may not expect. This shift may reflect the complex interplay between domestic and international dynamics in which foreign policy operates. The states navigate the intricate global security landscape to secure their national status and power. These national actors while framing the foreign policy, emphasising the national security interest, and try to protect its sovereignty and promote its global position.

India, in shaping its foreign policy, during the post-independence period, meticulously considered the multifaceted national security challenges arising from its domestic and international milieu. Consequently, India adopted an autonomous and unfettered foreign policy stance towards global powers, to gain their support to bolster economic conditions of India. Rooted in an anti-colonial and anti-racial foreign policy framework, India actively championed global endeavours for independence, extending a warm embrace to any nations seeking diplomatic ties. Intriguingly, amidst this inclusive approach, India maintained a notable exception by abstaining from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, without any direct conflict of interest. This distinctive non- engagement endured for four decades, stand as a distinct model in India's diplomatic history.

Recognising the strategic importance of West Asia as a vital link and commercial hub, India has maintained a rich history of cultural and commercial interactions with the region throughout the ages. Unfortunately, this longstanding connection faced disruption with the arrival of British colonialism. As Indian national movement gained momentum, India actively threw its support behind the national movements in these regions, particularly Egypt and Palestine. During this

time, the issue of Jewish nationalism in Palestine emerged as a debating issue, along with the claims of Arabs under British mandate.

India nationalist leaders including Jawaharlal Nehru and M.K Gandhi, while personally empathetic to the plight of the Jewish people in Europe, vehemently opposed the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Indian National Congress, the major nationalist movement, expressed its disapproval through resolutions, rejecting Zionist endeavours for an independent state in Palestine, which it perceived as being facilitated by British imperialism. The opposition extended to rejecting the partition of Palestine proposed by the Peel Commission. Despite this, Nehru played a role of facilitating Jewish migration to India, displaying a nuanced approach.

When the issue of partition of Palestine was presented to the United Nations, India, as member of United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), voiced its opposition to proposed partition plan. Despite India's resistance, the plan was ultimately approved by the UN General Assembly. Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948, even before the conclusion of British mandate. Faced with the establishment of new state, India had to articulate its position regarding the newly formed Jewish state.

Following the establishment of the state of Israel, the new nation sought international recognition, and India was officially requested for de jure recognition. While acknowledging the request, Prime Minister Nehru refrained from immediate recognition. In May 1948, when Israel submitted application for UN membership, though, India voted against it, however, Israel secured the UN membership. Subsequently Nehru faced pressure to reconsider India's stance on Israel, particularly as demands for diplomatic relations were raised by parties like Jan Sangh and Praja Socialist. Ultimately, India granted recognition to Israel on 17 September 1950, and later opened a consular office in Mumbai. Further moves of Israel to establish diplomatic ties were constrained by Nehru while pointing out electoral and financial reasons.

Nehru indented, as part of the ideological orientation of Asianism, to incorporate Israel into the broader Afro- Asian movement. However, this

proposition was faced opposition from Pakistan and Arab states. In the midst of this, during the Suez Crisis of 1956, Israel along with British and French troops launched an attack on Egypt – a country with which India had closer ties. This invasion reinforced India's perspective that Israel served as a prominent outpost of western interests. Moreover, the closure of Suez Canal was against the economic interest of India, as it serves as a strategic route to West Asia.

Despite India's initial reluctance to establish formal diplomatic relations, informal dialogues took place regarding agricultural development, and there were visits by scientist and delegates from both countries. These informal relations took more evident when India faced an attack on the part of China in 1962, and the Prime Minister Nehru sought support of world leaders. In response, Israel approved the sale of heavy mortars and ammunition to India. This discreet diplomatic channel marked the beginning of strategic interaction between the two states.

After the death of Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri assumed the role of the Prime Minister of India, and continued the conservative stance towards Israel. Instead, a notable shift during his period was that India welcomed a delegation of Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Following Shastri's demise, Indira Gandhi took over as Prime Minister of India and adopted a hostile foreign policy toward Israel, and maintained a Pro-Arab stance. In the event of the humiliation associated with Rabat Conference, where India denied representation due to compulsion of Pakistan. Because of this, there were political demands to reconsider India's pro-Arab stance. However, India maintained its traditional policy.

An unexpected incidence during this period was the Indo-Pak war over East Pakistan issue in 1971. Contrary to Indian expectations, most of the Arab states remained indifferent, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi supported Pakistan financially, and Jordan and Iran supplied weapons to Pakistan. In this context, Israel openly defended Indian position and arranged assistance to India. During this period, PLO was officially recognised and granted diplomatic privileges and immunities. During her second term also there was no significant shift in India's Israel policy.

During the period of Janata Coalition under Morarji Desai, in which Jana Sangh was a prominent presence, some pro Israeli moves were expected. But the Amidst of the Camp David Accord, between Israel and Egypt, irrespective of the Israeli attempts to establish diplomatic ties with India, there were little shift in India's relation with Israel.

During the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi, who assumed the charge of the Prime Minister of India after Indira Gandhi, there was a significant momentum in India Israel relations. Rajiv met with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres in 1985, signalled a new enthusiasm in Indo-Israel relationships. Research and Analysis wing (RAW) endeavoured to cooperate with Israeli security specialist during this period. Rajiv Gandhi openly engaged with Israeli leaders, and expressed willingness to reconsider India's Israel policy. However, he voted out in the 1989 General election, leading to a coalition under V.P. Singh, and later Chandra Shekhar. During this period, Iraq attacked Kuwait in August 1990, and in the collective security move under UN, India permitted US military aircrafts the refueling facilities. This stance shows India was ready to modify its previous global stance. Besides, during the Gulf war, despite Iraqi missile launches at Israel, no retaliatory move was taken, a decision that was widely appreciated.

After the collapse of the coalition government, during the election campaign Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by LTTE, and the Indian National Congress formed the government under P.V. Narasimha Rao. This period coincided with the global transformation marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the onset of globalisation, along with political shifts in Europe, and the growing emergence of US as a super power. In this era of structural dynamics, India had to revise its foreign policy stance towards global powers.

Besides, the growing security challenges emanating from an unstable neighbourhood, and the formidable presence of nuclear powered China and Pakistan, India has found itself compelled to reassess its foreign policy stance. The traditional Non-alignment approach, once considered a linchpin, proved impractical in the face of emerging threats. The economic security concerns and the

technological backwardness, underscored by the balance of payment crisis and the imperative of liberalisation, further fuelled the need for a more pragmatic foreign policy. In addition, the growing concerns of terrorism, food security and energy security questions also emerged as critical focal points for a policy shift towards major powers.

As part this strategy, India recognising the strategic and technological prowess of Israel, especially in the vacuum created by the collapse of Soviet Union, which had been a major supplier of India's military requirements. Realising the decreasing animosity between Arabs and Israel through negotiations, India decided to shift its estrangement towards Israel. On 29 January 1992, India established full diplomatic relation with Israel.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the bilateral ties between India and Israel has flourished and evolved, covering a wide array of national security aspects. This comprehensive engagement spans multiple sectors where India has faced challenges. The collaboration extends across agriculture and water management, science and technology, energy, defence, cybersecurity, space exploration, trade and commerce, food processing, artificial intelligence, ocean security, aerial surveillance, anti-terrorism cooperation, as well as initiatives to foster tourism and facilitate people-to-people contacts. The relationship has grown to encompass a diverse range of areas, reflecting the depth and breadth of the strategic partnership between the two nations.

India and Israel is widely discussed on defence cooperation. Indo-Israeli defence ties have deepened through substantial investment and technical collaboration in critical areas of the Indian defence such as military aircraft, reverse engineering, and weapons systems upgrades. A pivotal moment in this collaboration unfolded during the 1999 Kargil War when Israel, affirming its steadfast commitment as an arms supplier, sustained sales to India and provided crucial military support, thereby solidifying the bedrock of their defence relations. Israel emerged as a primary arms importer for India. This evolution has led to the establishment of a comprehensive military-security partnership, evident in joint

production initiatives, maritime exercises, intelligence sharing, and other collaborative endeavours. These multifaceted aspects display the robust and dynamic nature of their evolving collaboration.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India's relationship with Israel has undergone a notable transformation, moving away from historical discretion to adopt a more transparent and amicable approach. Prime Minister Modi's historic visit to Israel in 2017 has deepened strategic partnership, particularly evident in defence cooperation, where India has risen to become Israel's foremost arms importer, gaining access to cutting-edge technology. Economic collaboration has thrived across diverse sectors such as agriculture and technology, with a simultaneous intensification of efforts in cybersecurity and intelligence sharing.

Besides, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's de-hyphenated policy towards Israel and Palestine marks a departure from the historical practice of treating these relationships as interlinked. Under Modi's leadership, India has pursued an independent and robust engagement with Israel, emphasising strategic cooperation, economic collaboration, and public engagement. Simultaneously, India maintains a nuanced stance on the Palestinian issue, supporting a two-state solution while refraining from overtly criticising Israel in international forums. Modi's de-hyphenated approach reflects a diplomatic strategy that prioritises autonomy and pragmatism in engaging with these key players in the Middle East.

When examining the behavioural pattern of India, it resorted to a policy of estrangement and ignored Israel in its foreign policy towards West Asia, though the spirit of Asianism is an underlying principle of India's foreign policy. Irrespective of the absence of any direct conflict of interest between the two countries, it maintained the policy of estrangement. However, amidst of this policy of estrangement India sought military assistance from Israel when Indian security was at peril during war with neighbours. Nevertheless, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the area of cooperation covered varied and it became one of the most favoured nations of India in its security considerations.

The problem discussed across six chapters, excluding chapter 7, which includes the conclusion and findings, and chapter 8, dedicated to recommendations. The **chapter 1** presents a concise presentation of the problem, incorporating theoretical framework and methodology. In addition, this chapter includes the literature review and outlines the limitations of the study.

Chapter 2, presents the concept of national interest and its correlation with Foreign policy. It discusses about the development of foreign policy stance of India during the post- independence era, particularly in response to security threats confronted during the Cold War global landscape. Furthermore, the chapter explores the emergence of 'new foreign policy' in the post- Cold war context, analysing the shifts in the global and regional security landscape.

Chapter 3 corresponds to the theoretical framework, scrutinises the security challenges faced by India in the post-Cold War period. It examines the concept of national security and major security threats, confronted by India from external domains and from its neighbouring countries. In addition, it analyses the internal security challenges including economic, food, ocean, societal, energy and environmental aspects, all of which have the potential to challenge India's security. This examination elucidates the security threats faced by India, the necessity for a shift in foreign policy, and the forging of new alliances, and Israel as one of the choice as a security provider.

Chapter 4 provides an account of the evolution of India's Israel policy, spanning from the pre-independence ideological stance of Nehru and Gandhi to its establishment of diplomatic relation in 1992. This chapter traces the development of an anti-Israel and pro-Palestine standpoint of India, detailing its transformations over time. It also explores the efforts made by Israel to establish diplomatic ties with India and examines the factors that influenced India's estrangement policy towards Israel.

Chapter 5 intended to give a picture of comprehensive examination of India's shift in foreign policy towards Israel. It explores the global, regional, and domestic factors that contributed to this shift and facilitated the establishment of

bilateral ties. The chapter also analyses the international developments and their impact on the Indian security landscape, prompting a paradigm shift in foreign relations. Additionally, it analyses Israel's technological and defence advancements, emphasising their potential to provide security support for India during the post-Cold War landscape.

Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the bilateral relationship between India and Israel. It meticulously surveys the extensive cooperation between the two nations across various sectors, with a particular focus on defence and security engagements. It delves into the import of artillery, surveillance systems, missile defence systems, sensors, and systems for ocean security. Additionally, the chapter explores collaborative efforts in diverse fields such as agriculture, water management, environmental protection, health, space, energy, science and technology, commerce, and other areas of shared interest. Furthermore, the chapter scrutinises the multitude of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and agreements that have been signed between India and Israel. It also sheds light on the growing momentum of bilateral engagements, especially during the tenure of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Chapter 7 is the conclusive segment of discussion, presents the observations and key findings derived from the comprehensive analysis presented. This chapter presents key observations and major findings.

Chapter 8 is dedicated to presenting recommendations derived from the comprehensive study of the identified problem. This section provides suggestions, aiming to contribute valuable guidance for addressing the issues in future.

Based on the comprehensive presentation and analysis, major findings in the relationship between India and Israel, viewed through multiple theoretical perspectives, are as follows:

1.   **Historically India had no direct conflict of interest with West Asia:** India had longstanding connections, both in commerce and cultural exchanges

with West Asia. It suffered a set back due to the interference of British imperialistic agendas in both regions.

2. **India's opposition with Israel was ideological:** During the nationalist movement and after, even though India is not sharing territory with Israel; and there has been no interference in India's internal affairs or participation of in any military pacts against India, an ideological reservation emerged against Israel. It was due to India's firm opposition to the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine, particularly with British support. This opposition was not against Jews but was against wider imperialism. It was an opposition against using religion as a tool behind the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine soil without their consent. Furthermore, supporting Palestine in their struggle against imperialism by India is a part of wider opposition against imperialism.

3. **India was Empathetic towards Jews**: Despite ideological reservations, India actively cooperated with and provided significant support to Jewish refugees enduring hardships in Europe during World War II. This humanitarian gesture underscored India's commitment to alleviating human suffering, transcending ideological differences.

4. **Opposition of Indian national leaders driven by concerns related to societal security:** With a significant Muslim population actively opposing British imperialism and holding strong sentiments on the Palestine issue, Indian National Congress, perceived West Asian problems as part of an imperialist agenda. Despite sympathy for the Jewish cause, national leaders recognised that supporting it might jeopardise India's societal security and compromise the united struggle against British colonialism. This concern was evident in Gandhi's support for the Khilafat movement. During the pre-independence era, the primary focus was on nation-building and establishing a stable political system with a secular base and communal harmony.

5. **India had a Federal Solution to Palestine Problem:** India exhibited empathy towards the global struggles of the Jewish community, advocating

that the establishment of a state in Palestine should be achieved through the consent of the Palestinian people. Nehru supported the view that Palestine was primarily an Arab country and recognised that the Jews were an integral part of Palestine, and the Jewish religious rights should respect in independent Palestine. India proposed a federal solution to the issue, in which Jewish rights should be honoured. This stance displays India's support for democratic principles and the ideological stance of peace and security.

6. **Economic Security Concerns behind the Pro-Arab Stance:** As India was engrossed in its nation-building efforts, during the immediate post-independence period, and was addressing multiple economic security concerns. In which, Arab states played a crucial role by contributing significantly through remittances and providing support for India's oil security, further influenced India's cautious approach towards establishing diplomatic ties with Israel. This economic security concern was also evident during the Suez Canal crisis, which served as a strategic link to West Asia from India, in conjunction with strong relationship with Egypt.

7. **Fear of International Isolation:** As part of the formation of an Afro-Asian institutional framework, India demonstrated a keenness to include Israel in it. However, this endeavor faced obstacles, primarily from Pakistan, which undermined India's move and supported by Arab states. In light of the potential formation of an anti-Israel coalition during the Afro-Asian conference India decided to withdraw its plan of including Israel.

8. **Concerns about Pakistan's move**: India strongly opposed Israeli initiatives for the international recognition along with Arab countries. Simultaneously India refrained from establishing diplomatic ties with Israel due to the concerns that such a move might create an opportunity for Pakistan to garner support from Arab states on Kashmir issue.

9. **India's post-Cold War Security environment is confronts with multiple threats:** Indian security landscape grapples with a dual challenge - persistent traditional threats and emerging non-traditional risks. The enduring concerns

266

of territorial disputes, nuclear proliferation, and military imbalances with neighbouring countries continue to shape India's security strategy. Simultaneously, the rise of non-traditional threats, encompassing cybersecurity vulnerabilities, cross- border terrorism, and the far-reaching impacts of climate change, adds a layer of complexity. Besides, the emergence of challenges in space security, maritime domains, and information warfare further underscores the evolving nature of the threats faced.

10. **India had discreet strategic relation with Israel**: In each instance of external conflict involving neighbouring states, Israel played a notable role. During the Chinese attack of 1962, Israel provided ammunition support. Similarly, in the Indo-Pak war of 1971, it extended arms support to India.

11. **India's Security challenges reshaped India-Israel partnership**: Due to the fall of the Soviet Union, a crucial ally that had offered significant strategic and international support, India struggled with a significant technological shortfall for its military hardware at the end of the Cold War. In this context, critical gaps in India's military capabilities were filled by Israel's technological innovations and defence production know-how, which included small arms, mortars, aircraft, surveillance systems, and the modernisation of Soviet-supplied aircraft. Israel's expertise in cutting-edge technologies in a variety of fields met India's unique requirements, and this important partnership helped the recovery of India's defence capabilities during the post- Cold War period.

12. **US had a greater influence in Indo-Israel relations:** Historically, India's Non-aligned stance and the close ties of US with Israel created diplomatic complexities. However, with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. became instrumental in fostering improved relations between India and Israel. In the changed global scenario, the support of the US facilitated India's policy shift towards Israel in 1992 under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. Over time, the

three nations established common ground in defence, counter-terrorism, and technology, forming a cooperative triangular dynamic.

13. **India de-hyphenated Israel-Palestine Relations:** The de-hyphenation of Israel-Palestine relations by India marked a strategic realignment that not only safeguarded India's security but also fostered a balanced approach to its engagement with Israel and Palestine, with the consent of the Palestinian leadership. Amidst shifting sentiments of Arab states towards Israel, India managed to cultivate improved relations with Israel without undermining its longstanding ties with Palestine and other Arab nations. The de-hyphenation highlights India's commitment to maintaining constructive ties with both Israel and Palestine, demonstrating diplomatic finesse in adapting to evolving regional contexts.

14. **India-Israel relations helped to address India's multiple security challenges**: Indo-Israel cooperation has emerged as a cornerstone of India's strategic development, particularly in areas where India was previously lagging. The collaboration spans diverse sectors, significantly impacting India's security landscape. In the defence sector, joint ventures and technology transfers have propelled advancements. Surveillance capabilities heightened boarder and ocean security measures. Collaborative Research and Development, and space security cooperation stands out as a testament to shared technological prowess. Beyond traditional realms, cyber security cooperation addresses contemporary threats, ensuring robust digital defences. Economic collaboration flourished and health security cooperation has reinforced. Agriculture and water management partnerships marked as shared solutions for sustainable practices.

15. **Indian foreign policy always reflected a rational Choice**: During the post-Independence period, Indian decision to adopt the policy of Non- alignment was a rational choice to maintain a balanced stance with major powers to ensure support. This approach ensured the support from Afro-Asian nations in pursuit of India's multiple security challenges it confronted during this

period. The post- Cold war foreign policy shift of India, in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of US as a strong international actor, the policy shift towards Israel, an ally of US, was also a rational choice. Furthermore, the technological and security collaboration with Israel, without injuring the Arab relations was also a rational selection.

Validation of Hypotheses

(i)   *The trajectory of India's Israel policy has been predominantly been shaped by a complex interplay of historical, social, political and economic factors.*

The hypothesis suggests that India's stance towards Israel has been shaped by a complex interplay of historical, social, political, and economic factors, as explored within the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 4. Historically, India's cordial relations with West Asia during ancient times have strained under colonial rule. The nationalist movement, fueled by strong anti-imperialist sentiments, significantly influenced India's response to Israel's efforts for a Jewish state in Palestine with the support of the Western imperialist forces. Prominent leaders like M.K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, despite acknowledging Jewish suffering, adopted a negative stance influenced by the prevailing sentiment in India, particularly among the Muslim community, which strongly supported the Palestinian cause. During the post-independence era, economic and societal security concerns guided India's foreign policy. Israel, as a new nation, played a minimal role compared to established relationships with Arab states, further emphasising economic ties and oil security. In summary, India's trajectory regarding Israel has been intricately linked to historical relations, anti-imperialist sentiment, and post-independence priorities, with a negative stance rooted in historical and political contexts, influenced by the sentiments of the Indian Muslim community and perceived benefits of closer ties with Arab nations. Therefore, this hypothesis is a valid one.

(ii)   *The relationship between India and Israel has been significantly influenced by ideological and personal factors.*

India's foreign policy framework, formulated during the colonial era under the guidance of the Indian National Congress, which incorporated tenets like anti-imperialism, independent foreign policy, support for global liberation movements, promotion of international peace and security, and opposition to racialism as the guiding factors of foreign policy. In the context of Israel's efforts to establish a state in Palestine, India grappled with these foundational principles, asserting that the forceful creation of a Zionist state in Palestine with imperialist support was counter to India's ideological stance. This perspective, aligned with Gandhian principles, particularly Non-violence, guided India's initial response to Israel. A state based on religious nationalism was against the concept of secularism.

Jawaharlal Nehru, a pivotal architect of Indian foreign policy, maintained an anti-Zionist stance, influencing India's approach when Israel sought recognition and UN membership. Therefore, ideological considerations played a central role and personal beliefs, exemplified by leaders like Nehru, contributing to the trajectory of India's diplomatic relations with Israel.

Besides, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad's played a decisive role in moulding Jawaharlal Nehru's perspective on India's post-independence policy towards Israel. Nehru, guided by Azad, considered the pressure of the Muslim population in India when formulating policies and highlighted the factor of maintaining the diverse social fabric of the nation. Besides, Morarji Desai and Indira Gandhi were not personally interested to make a shift in Nehruvian foreign policy tradition. However, Rajiv Gandhi who initiated the policy shift, but was completed by Narasimha Rao in 1992 and, which later intensified under Narendra Modi period. This shows that personal and ideological factors had a great influence over India's Israel policy and therefore the hypothesis is a valid one.

(iii). *The paradigm shift in India's relation with Israel is the result of international dynamics by the end of the Cold War along with regional geopolitical imperatives.*

This hypothesis analysed in chapter four and five, which gives a picture that India's geopolitical landscape underwent a profound transformation in the post-Cold

War era, catalysed by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union. The loss of India's strategic alliance with the Soviet Union, a pivotal defence equipment supplier of India during the Cold War period, created uncertainty in arms supply and prompted a reassessment of geopolitical priorities. Simultaneously, the ascendance of the United States as a major global actor compelled India to recalibrate its stance, underscoring the importance of forging alliances to address evolving security concerns.

The changing dynamics were not limited to the global stage alone; regional factors played a significant role in shaping India's policy shift. The increasing military and economic prowess of China, coupled with its expanding influence in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, emerged as a considerable concern for India. Additionally, political instability in Pakistan, and its growing relation with China further influenced India's security considerations. Furthermore, China's growing sphere of influence in neighbouring states also contributed to India's reevaluation of its foreign policy due to security concerns.

Amid these complexities, the erosion of Non-alignment ideology prompted India to acknowledge the necessity for adaptability and engagement with powerful allies. The decision to establish diplomatic ties with Israel symbolised a strategic realignment, showcasing India's commitment to pursuing national interests in an ever-evolving multipolar world. This shift was propelled by a confluence of factors, including India's economic transformation, and ambitions to assume a more active role in the regional landscape. Therefore, this hypothesis is also a valid one.

(iv). *The security challenges India confronted after the Cold War period had a significant impact on India's relation with Israel.*

This hypothesis discussed in detail in chapter three. It discloses that the Indian security landscape during the post-Cold War era has been marked by a confluence of external and internal variables, presenting a complex array of challenges across military, political, economic, technological, and environmental dimensions. The rise of China, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the presence of dysfunctional states among India's neighbours all contribute to this

complexity. The significant concern lies in the growing support of Pakistan for terrorist groups aimed to destabilise India, coupled with Pakistan being a nuclear power. Developments in the Af- Pak region including political changes in Afghanistan, have further increased India's security tensions. Additionally, India, in its regional security landscape, experiences insurgencies, religious and communal tensions, socio-economic disparities, unemployment, environmental degradation, and resource scarcity. Internally conflicts among tribes, ethnic groups, and ideologies, particularly in the North-eastern region.

Furthermore, the global threats such as terrorism, armament, and epidemics are equally relevant security concerns for India. Simultaneously, trans-border tensions, proxy wars, drug trafficking, unauthorised infiltration, ocean security issues, cybersecurity concerns, and energy security questions have significantly influenced Indian foreign policy shift. The hybrid threats posed by neighbouring countries, coupled with their escalating politico-economic instability, present security challenges to India. Addressing these issues requires adaptive strategies and a holistic approach to ensure the nation's safety and stability, prompting the engagement with Israel. The increasing security challenges, globally and regionally compelled India for a foreign policy shift towards Israel, proves that this hypothesis is a valid one.

(v). *The engagement with Israel has a significant role in enhancing the security of India.*

This hypothesis discussed in detail in chapter six. It discloses that India - Israel relationship has emerged as a strategic and mutually beneficial partnership, notably in the realms of defence and security. This comprehensive collaboration has advanced through numerous Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) and agreements. It fortified India's national security through the acquisition of advanced defence equipment, including border security devices, communication systems, electronic warfare systems, missiles, radars, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Beyond defence, the multifaceted ties extend to joint military exercises, space exploration, medical research, cyber security, energy security and Research and Development (R&D) domains.

Furthermore, Israel's contributions in agriculture, water management, and counterterrorism, environmental protection have been particularly instrumental in India's security and development. The broad spectrum of cooperation between the two nations reflects the depth of the bilateral relationship and propelled India's technological advancements, diplomatic acumen, and self-reliance in defence production. This enduring collaboration not only strengthens India's security stance but also positions Israel as a key contributor to India's progress across diverse domains.

Besides, Israel has offered effective boarder management techniques and ocean surveillance tools. Moreover, it provided upgradation of old Soviet aircrafts. The collaboration has also enhanced India's defensive capability, allowing it to engage diplomatically with various regional partners without compromising its broader foreign policy objectives. This was evident during the Kargil conflict with Pakistan in 1999. Therefore, the analysis reveals that the relationship with Israel plays a decisive role as a reliable ally in technology and innovation, providing invaluable support to India in addressing post-Cold War security challenges. Therefore, the hypothesis has proven to be a valid.

Since the nationalist movement, India's diplomatic approach to Israel has been characterised by contradictions, arising from the dual objectives of maintaining social stability and internal security in its resistance against colonialism. The post-independence strategy towards Israel also took into account of India's economic interests with Arab states. However, during the post-Cold War period, Israel emerged as a reliable partner, capable to assist India in strengthening its security interests across various domains. Therefore, India's shift in policy towards Israel reflects a practical approach to foreign policy, skillfully balancing historical relationships with Palestine and the Arab world. Again, by aligning with the United States and Israel, India secured its security interests without compromising its foundational foreign policy principles.

CHAPTER 8
RECCOMMENDATIONS

The examination of 'Indo-Israel Relations in post-Cold War Era; An Analytical Study' focused by employing Securitisation, Defensive Realist and Rational Choice theories to analyse the shifts in diplomacy and changes in foreign policy between India and Israel. However, the scope of this analysis extended beyond the bilateral aspects, encompassing the intricate network of international actors, organisations, and nations that had a direct or indirect impact on the relationship. This comprehensive approach not only illuminates the complexities of diplomatic dynamics between India and Israel but also provides a strategic framework for navigating the evolving geopolitical landscape in the post-Cold War era. The study discloses various security challenges confronted by India during this period. In consideration of this thorough analysis, numerous recommendations are put forth to offer guidance for future policy decisions and research initiatives.

Policy Recommendations

1. The analysis reveals that there are rising security threats from the neighbouring countries such as cross-border terrorism and illegal migration. Therefore, it is crucial to enhance surveillance and strengthen security along Indian borders. By using advanced surveillance technologies and strategically deploying security personnel is essential to protect Indian borders to address these significant threats. To improve this, India should develop cutting edge technology domestically with the help of Israel to reduce the import cost.

2. The persistent threat India facing since its independence is the boundary issue. India should try to resolve boundary issues through diplomatic means. Proactive dialogue, mutual understanding, and cooperative problem-solving will strengthen relationships and contribute to regional stability.

3. The growth of China as a strong military and economic power in the region, and advances claims over many India territories should be properly addressed and settled through consultation. Additionally, the presence of China through its multiple projects of One Belt One Road and Pearl of Strings raises concern for Indian security. To address the situation more multilateral engagements should formed to counter the threat.

4. India is heavily relying on imports on technology from Israel especially in defence and allied fields. Instead, strong emphasis must be placed on internal research and development initiatives. By investing in and fostering domestic innovation, India can build a robust technological ecosystem, ensuring greater control and resilience in critical sectors. This proactive approach will not only bolster national security but also position India as a technological leader on the global stage.

5. To counter growing threats in the ocean region, and the increasing presence of China, it is crucial to establish a comprehensive surveillance system. This system should integrate satellite observations to enhance monitoring capabilities. For this India should engage more understanding with Israel.

6. India should try to enhance economic security by actively engaging with Arab states without disturbing ongoing relation with Israel. Emphasising a multilateral approach is important to achieving sustainable economic growth and addressing the fuel security issues.

7. To reduce the economic burden caused by dependence on fossil fuels, India should explore and invest in new alternative energy sources. Besides, increasing domestic production and adopting renewable energy can enhance fuel security and contribute to a more sustainable and cost-effective energy landscape. More fruitful discussions with Israel is necessary in the field of renewable energy sector.

8. India's diaspora represents a significant soft power, and their needs and aspirations should be attentively addressed. Effectively engaging with the

diaspora community can not only strengthen cultural ties but also foster positive international perceptions of India, contributing to its global influence and diplomatic standing. In the context of India Israel relations, more people -to-people contact with Israel should be developed.

Recommendations for further research

1. The analysis of the relationship between India and Israel in the post- Cold War period emphasis on the India's foreign policy practices through the securitisation aspects. However, their relationship's displays many facets, such as diplomatic, cultural, and economic and ideological. So there is scope for further research in these domains.

2. Due to the dynamic nature of the research area, which is closely tied to ongoing developments in West Asia and the Middle East, there is a continuous evolution in the foreign policy behaviours of various actors. The divergent standpoints are adopted by nations in response to regional changes provide a rich and evolving landscape for further research.

The study 'Indo-Israel Relations in post-Cold War Era; An Analytical Study' serves as a comprehensive exploration of the intricate dynamics of geopolitical shifts and their profound impact on the foreign policy of India towards Israel across different temporal frames. By recognising the evolving geopolitical context, this research sheds light on the transformations and the factors shaping India's responses to the dynamic landscape of regional challenges and opportunities.

Appendix I

MAP OF ISRAEL

Source: Israel Today / Political map Source of graphic: ILS International

Appendix 2

LIST OF INDIAN PRIME MINISTERS		
Sl.No	**Name of Prime Ministers**	**Period**
1	Jawaharlal Nehru	15th August 1947 – 27th May 1964
2	Gulzarilal Nanda (acting)	27 May 1964 – 9 June 1964
3	Lal Bahadur Shastri	9 June 1964 – 11 January 1966
4	Gulzarilal Nanda (acting)	11 January 1966 – 24 January 1966
5	Indira Gandhi	24 January 1966 – 24 March 1977
6	Morarji Desai	24 March 1977 – 28 July 1979
7	Charan Singh	28 July 1979 – 14 January 1980
8	Indira Gandhi	14 January 1980 – 31 October 1984
9	Rajiv Gandhi	31 October 1984 – 2 December 1989
10	V. P. Singh	2 December 1989 – 10 November 1990
11	Chandra Shekhar	10 November 1990 – 21 June 1991
12	P. V. Narasimha Rao	21 June 1991 – 16 May 1996
13	Atal Bihari Vajpayee	16 May 1996 – 1 June 1996
14	H. D. Deve Gowda	1 June 1996 – 21 April 1997
15	Inder Kumar Gujral	21 April 1997 – 19 March 1998
16	Atal Bihari Vajpayee	19 March 1998 – 22 May 2004
17	Manmohan Singh	22 May 2004 – 26 May 2014

APPENDIX -3									
FRAGILE STATE INDEX- ANNUAL REPORT - 2023									
LIST OF FRAGILE STATES OF INDIAN NEIGHBOURHOOD									
Country	Year	Rank	Demographic Pressure	Economic Inequality	Economy	Public Service	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	External Intervention
Afghanistan	2023	6th	9.2	8.2	9.6	10.0	8.7	9.7	7.7
Myanmar	2023	12th	7.0	7.3	7.6	9.1	9.3	9.1	7.3
Mali	2023	13th	8.8	7.2	7.5	8.9	7.5	9.6	9.5
Sri Lanka	2023	30th	7.2	6.0	8.3	6.0	8.4	6.8	7.9
Pakistan	2023	32nd	8.3	4.9	6.7	7.5	7.5	7.6	8.3
Bangladesh	2023	41st	7.7	5.9	5.1	7.9	7.3	6.8	4.6
Nepal	2023	55th	8.1	5.3	5.1	7.1	6.3	5.5	5.9
India	2023	73rd	8.5	5.8	6.2	7.3	7.5	6.0	3.9
Bhutan	2023	96th	5.4	4.3	5.6	5.6	5.0	2.7	6.5
China	2023	102nd	6.5	6.1	3.3	4.7	9.4	4.9	2.1
Maldives	2023	106th	5.2	2.6	5.2	5.4	6.9	4.9	5.6

Source : https://fragilestatesindex.org/2023/06/14/fragile-states-index-2023-annual-report/

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Books and Book Chapters

Abraham, I. (1998). *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State*, Zed Books, New York.

Agarwal, A. (2012). *Maritime Dimension's of India's Security: The Case of its Island Territories.* In Shukla, Nalinikant Jha & Subhash (eds.), *India's Foreign Policy: Emerging Challenges* (pp.274-283). New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

Ahmad, M. (1969). *Indo-Arab Relations.* Indian Council for Cultural Relations. Bombay.

Alden, C. (2017). Critiques of the rational actor model and foreign policy decision making. In W. R. Thompson & T. Capelos (Eds.), *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.474

Appadorai, A. (1981) *Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy: 1947-72,* Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books., New York

Baba, N. A. (2008).OIC and Pakistan's foreign policy: The Indian dimension. In R. N. Abhyankar (Ed.), *West Asia and the region: Defining India's role* (pp. 669–673).New Delhi, India: Academic Foundation.

Belluck, D.A., Hull R.N., Benjamin S.L., Alcorn.J., and Linkov, I. (2006). Environmental security, critical infrastructure and risk assessment: Definitions and current trends. In Morel, B. and Linkov, I. (eds.) *Environmental Security and Environmental Management*, (pp. 3–16), Springer.

Bhagwati, J. (2004). *In Defense of Globalisation*. Oxford University Press. New Delhi.

Blarel, N. (2015). *The Evolution of India's Israel Policy: Continuity, Change and Compromise Since 1922*.Oxford University Press: New Delhi.

Bloodgood, E. A. (2022). New Multilateralism: The United Nations and Governance in the Era of Non-state Actors. In K. Fontaine- Skronski, V. Thool, & N. Eschborn (Eds.), *Does the UN Model Still Work? Challenges and Prospects for the Future of Multilateralism* (pp. 57–77). https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004516489_006.

Brecher, M. (1963).*The new states of Asia: A political analysis*. Oxford University Press, London.

Brecher, M.(1959). *Nehru: A political Biography.* Oxford University Press, Bristol.

Buzan, B. (1991). *People, states and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era.* Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York.

Buzan, B. (2007). *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (*Second Edition). Lynne Rienner Publishers, London

Buzan, B., Waever, O, Wilde, J.D. (1998). *Security a New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner, Publishers, London.

Cohen, S.P. (2013). 'The World View of India's Strategic Elite'. In KanthiP. Bajpai, Harsh V. Pant (Eds.), *India's Foreign Policy: A Reader* (pp.51-81). Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Cox, M. and Stokes, D. (2012). *US Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press.

Dahiya, R. & Behuria, A.K. (2012).*India's Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades*. Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses. New Delhi.

Dev, A. (1989). *Jawaharlal Nehru: Years of Struggles,* National Book trust of India, New Delhi.

Dixit, J. N. (1996). *My south block years: Memoirs of a foreign secretary*. New Delhi, India: UBS Publishers.

Dixit, J.N. (1998*). India's foreign policy 1947-2003*. Picus, New Delhi.

Drysdale, P., King, A., & Triggs, A. (2023). Asia's economic and political security in a shifting global order. In S. Armstrong, T. Westland, & A. Triggs (Eds.), *Navigating Prosperity and Security in East Asia (*1st ed., pp. 215–232).ANU Press. Canberra.

Dubey, M. (2016) *India's Foreign Policy,* Orient Black swan Private Limited, Hyderabad.

Engelmeier, T.F. (2009). *Nation- Building and Foreign Policy in India: An Identity-Strategy Conflict.* Foundation Books. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/ UPO9788175968523

Frankel, J. (1970). *National Interest*. MacMillan.

Ganguly, S & Shoup, B. (2016). *Understanding Contemporary India*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685859732

Gerberg, I. (2008). *The Changing Nature of Israeli-Indian Relations (1948-2005).(Doctoral Dissertation).* Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Gibson, H. (1944). *The Road to Foreign Policy*. *Garden City*, New York. Published online by Oxford University Press in September 2013.

Givens, R. P. (2002). 1973 Yom Kippur War. In *Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign* (pp. 27–46). Air University Press. Alabama.

Gopal, K. & Sharma, S. (2007). *India and Israel: Towards Strategic Partnership.* Authors press, New Delhi.

Haidar, S. (2010). Nehru and the Shaping of India's Foreign Policy [Review of *War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years*, by S. Raghavan]. *Economic and Political Weekly*, *45*(20), 35–37.

Hall, I. (2019). *Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy*. Bristol University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvpwhf20.

Hasan, H. (1928). *A history of Persian Navigation*. Methuen. London.

Hasan, M. (1991). *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1885-1930.* Manohar Publications. New Delhi.

Heikal, M.H. (1973). *The Cairo Document: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and States men*. Double Day, New York; as cited in Blarel (2015).

Ikenberry, G. (2010). The restructuring of the international system after the Cold War. In M. Leffler & O. Westad (Eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War (*pp. 535-556). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521837217.026

Jaishankar, D. (2019). *The Indigenisation of India's Defence Industry.* Brookings India. New Delhi.

Jansen, G. H. (1971). *Zionism, Israel and the Asian Nationalism*. Institute for Palestinian Studies, Beirut.

Jeffery, W.G. (2000). *Globalisation and Inequality, Past and Present. The Political Economy of Inequality*. Frank Ackerman and et al. (Eds). Island Press, Washington.

Kaplan, M.A. (1957). *System and Process in International Politics.* Wiley. University of Michigan.

Karanjia, R.K. (1966). The Philosophy of Mr. Nehru, *Allen and Unwin*, London, p.58. As cited in Yaseen, E.M.M, in 'Indian Foreign policy and relation with West Asia' (2008).p.36.

Kasturirangan, K., Shaijumon, C.S. (2021). *Economics and Cost Benefit Analysis of Indian Space Programme.* In Suresh, B.N. (Ed.) Space and Beyond (pp.305-316). Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6510-0_14

Kaushik, P. D. (1986). *The Congress Ideology and Programme, 1920-1985: The Ideological Foundations of Indian National Congress under Gandhian Leadership and After*. Gitanjali Publishing House, New Delhi.

Kerr, P. (2007). 'Human Security', in Collins, A. (ed.) *Contemporary security studies* (pp. 91-108). Oxford University Press.

Khanna, V.N. (2012) *Foreign Policy of India*, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2010). *India's Israel Policy.* Colombia University Press. New York.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (1998). *India and Israel: Evolving Strategic Partnership*. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University.

Lippmann, W. (1943). *US Foreign Policy, Shield of the Republic*, Boston Mass.

Louw, M. H. H. (1978). *National Security a Modern Approach*. University of Pretoria, South Africa.

Mallempati, S. (2022). *Security Dynamics in India- Sri Lanka Relations- Post 2009.* Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.

Mallik, A. (2016). Role of Technology in International Affairs, *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, Pentagon Press New Delhi.

Mathaai, W. (2010).*The Challenge for Africa*, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, New York.

McReynolds, J. (Ed.). (2016). *China's Evolving Military Strategy.* Brookings Institution Press.

Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. W.W. Norton & Company. New York.

Michaely, M. (1975). The Israeli Economy: An Overview. Michael Michaely (Ed.), In *Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Israel* (p.1-26).National Bureau of Economic Research. URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4556

Micheal, D. & Sticklor, R. (2012). Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges. Micheal, D. & Sticklor (Eds.). R STIMSON, Washington DC.

Mishra, R. (2019). Regional Security Outlook: An Indian Perspective. In R. Huisken, K. Brett, A. Milner, R. Smith, P. Vermonte, & J. Wanandi (Eds.). *CSCAP regional security outlook + ARF- The next 25 years 2019* (pp.21–23) Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.

Mohan, C. R. (2014). Modi's India: towards a bolder international engagement. In R. Huisken, O. Cable, D. Ball, A. Milner, R. Sukma, & Y. Wanandi (Eds.), *CSCAP regional security outlook 2015,* (pp. 23–26). Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.

Mohan, C.R. (2003). *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. Viking, Penguin Books, New Delhi.

Mohan, R.C. (2013). *Beyond Non-alignment*. In Kanthi P. Bajpai, Harsh V. Pant (Eds.), *India's Foreign Policy: A Reader* (pp.27-50), Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Morgenthau, H.J.(1968). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Fourth Edition) Published by Alfred A. Knopf.

Mudium, P.R. (1994) *India and the Middle East*, British Academic Press, London.

Mukherjee, A. (2017). Indian Ocean Region Strategic Outlook. In S. Bateman, R. Gamage, & J. Chan (Eds.), *ASEAN and the Indian Ocean: The Key Maritime Links* (pp. 21-26). S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Naaz, F. (2005).*West Asia and India: Changing perspectives*. Shipra Publications, New Delhi,

Naidu, G. V. C. (2013). 'India and the Indian Ocean'. In A. K. Das (Ed.), *India-ASAEAN Defence Relations* (pp. 236–259).S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Nair, S. (2004). *Dynamics of Diplomacy Delayed; India and Israel,* Kalpaz Publications, New Delhi.

Nandy, P. (2020). *Revisiting India's Post- Cold War Foreign Policy: Since 1991 to the Present Day.* Arati Mitra for Avenel Press, Memari, Burdwan.

Nayar, B.R & Paul, T.V. (2003). *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status.* Cambridge University Press.

Nehru, J. (1987). *Glimpses of world history*. Oxford University Press: New Delhi, India.

Nowland, M. C. (2001). 1973 Yom Kippur War, Golan Heights Action. In *Eliminating the Rhetoric: An Evaluation of the Halt-Phase Strategy* (pp. 37–48). Air University Press, Alabama.

Pant, H. V. (2016). *Indian foreign policy: An overview.* Manchester University Press.

Pant, K.C. (1989). *Philosophy of Indian Defence*. In Jasjit Singh & Vatroslav Vekaric (Eds.), *Non-Provocative Defense: the Search for Equal Security*, Lancer International, New Delhi.

Prasad, B. (1960). *The Origin of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and World Affairs 1885-1947,* Bookland, Kolkatha.

Prasad, B. (1965). *Our Foreign Policy Legacy: A Study of British Indian Foreign Policy*. Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi.

Rafael, G. (1981). *Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy: A Personal Memoir.* Stein and Day, New York.

Rajiv, C.S.S. (2023). *The India Israel Strategic Partnership: Contours, Opportunities and Challenges.* Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi,

Rajiv, S.S.C, (2016). *The India –Israel Strategic Partnership. Contours, opportunities and Challenges.* Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Raman, B.R. (2008). *The Cowboys of RAW:Down Memory Lane.* New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and Distributors.

Rao, S. (1972). The Arab Israeli conflict: The Indian view. *Orient Longman Limited*: New Delhi, India.

Ratnagar, S. (2004). *Trading Encounters: From the Euphrates to the Indus in the Bronze Age.* Oxford University Press. New York.

Rosenau, J. N. (1968). *Political Science and Public Policy*. Chicago.

Rothschild, E. (2007). *What is Security? Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen* (Eds.) International Security, Vol.III, Sage Publications, New Delhi.

Routray, B.P. (2020, July 15). Northeastern India is seeing insurgencies. In T*he Rutledge Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, Structures and Doctrines*. Rutledge.

Sabharwal, M. (2012). India in South Asia: Strategic Role and Oppertunities in the 21st Century. Nalinikant Jha and Subhash Shukla (Eds.) In *India's Foreign Policy: Emerging Challenges*151-161. Pentagon Press, New Delhi.

Samuel, S., & Rajiv, C. (2016). India-Palestine: The Weight of History. In *Indian Responses to Israel's Gaza Operations* (pp. 25–28). Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Israel.

Saraogi, R. (2006). *Macro-management and Business Environment: Analysis of the 1991 Indian Economic Crisis.* In *Perspectives of Future Economists in South Asia* (pp. 43-53). University Library of Munich, Germany.

Sareen, T.R. (1999). 'Indian Response to the Holocaust', in Anil Bharathi and J.H. Voigt (eds.), *Jewish Exile in India,* (pp.1933-1945), Manohar, New Delhi.

Sarkar, A. (2010). India's Look East Policy:An Empirical Study. In M. B. Premashekhara, *Foreign Policy of India: Continuity and Change* (pp. 111-126). New Century Publications, New Delhi.

Sheehan, M. (2015).Defining Space Security. In Schrogl, K.U., Hays, P., Robinson, J., Moura, D., Giannopapa, C. (Eds.) *Handbook of Space Security* (pp07-21).Springer, New York.

Shimoni, G. (1977). *Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Jews: A Formative Factor in India's Policy Towards Israel.* The Leonard Davis Institute for International Studies. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, as quoted in Blarel (2015).

Simon, M.S. (2022). India's Internal Security: Issues, Challenges and Options, India Studies in Business and Economics. In Anshuman Behera & Itakanta Mishra (ed.), *Varying Dimensions of India's National Security*, (pp.107-120). Online (edition) https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197660331.001.0001,

Sitaraman, S. (2020). Are India and China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios. In A. L. Vuving (Ed.). *Thinking About Security in the Indo-Pacific* (pp. 283–306). Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Stritzel, H. (2014). Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School. In: Security in Translation. *New Security Challenges Series*. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137307576_2

Subrahmanyam, K. (1972). *Our National Security*, Economic and Scientific Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Suganami, H. (1989). *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals*. Cambridge University Press.

Surjit, M. (2015). Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy: Hard Realism?. In David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743538.013.8, accessed 28 Nov. 2022.

Sweijs, T., Cleven, W., Levi, M., Tabak, J., Speear, Z., & de Jonge, J. (2010). The Maritime Future of the Indian Ocean. In A. B. i Novosejt & HCSS & Taalcentrum Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (Eds.), *The Maritime Future of the Indian Ocean: Putting the G back into Great Power Politics* (pp. 15–40). Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

Tanchum, M. (2016). India's Central Asian Strategic Paradoxes: The Impact of Strategic Autonomy in the Emerging Asian Regional Architecture. In N. Goswami (Ed.), *'India's Approach to Asia Strategy, Geopolitics and Responsibility'*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

Thakur, R & Carlyle, A.T (1992). Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam. *Macmillan and St. Martin's Press*. New York.

Tharoor, S. (2017). *Inglorious Empire: What the British did to India*. Hurst, London.

Thomas, R. (1961). National Interest. In James. N. Rosenau, (Ed.). *International Politics and Foreign Policy*. New York

Vandana, A. (1996). *Theory of International Politics*. Vikas Publishing House. New Delhi.

Wald, S. S., & Kandel, A. (2017). *India, Israel and the Jewish People: Looking Ahead, Looking Back 25 Years after Normalization*. The Jewish People Policy Institute, Jerusalem.

Waltz, K. (1979).*Theory of International Politics*. Mc- Graw- Hill.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1989): The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory. In: *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Eds. Robert I. Rotberg, Theodore K. Rabb, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 39–52.

Ward, R.E. (1992). *India's Pro Arab Policy: A Study in Continuity*. Praeger, New York.

B. JOURNAL ARTICLES

Abadi, J. (1991). Israeli- Indian Relations Futile Attempts at Rapprochement. *Journal of Third World Studies*, 8 (2), 161–174.

Abadi, J. (2004). Israel's quest for recognition and acceptance in Asia. *Garrison state and diplomacy.* DOI:10.4324/9780203504147

Abhinandan, N. (2019). Changing Security Environment in Indian Ocean: Decoding the Indian Strategy. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, 14 (2), 137–148.

Abraham, I. (2008). From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-65. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 46 (2), 195–219.

Abraham, I. (2014). Diaspora as Foreign Policy. In *How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, and Geopolitics* (pp.73-106). Redwood City: Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804792684-006

Abraham, N., Terry, J., Rubenberg, C., Hajjar, L., & Shadroui, H. (1988). International Human Rights Organisations and the Palestine Question. *Middle East Report*, (*150)*, 12–20. https://doi.org/10.2307/3011963

Abubakar, I. W. (2012). The Health Care Sector and National Security in Nigeria: An Exploratory Perspective. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 21, 133–153

Adesina, O.S. (2017). Foreign Policy in an Era of Digital Diplomacy. *Cogent Social Sciences* 3: 1297175, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.1297175

Agunsola, L.A. (2005). Information and Communication Technologies and the Effects of Globalization: Twenty First Century 'Digital Slavery' for Developing Countries - Myth or Reality?. *The Electronic Journal of Academic and Special Librarianship at Digital Commons 1999-2009,* 1(10), 01-15.

Ahmad, S. B. (1973). India and Palestine 1896-1947: The Genesis of a Foreign Policy. *India Quarterly*, 29(4), 300-307.

Ahmar, M. (1984). Security Perceptions in the Indo-Pakistan Relationship. *Pakistan Horizon*, 37(1), 100–119.

Ahmed, J., & Mohapatra, N. (2021). Changing Trends of India's Foreign Policy in the 21 Century-An Analysis. *Turkish Online Journal of Qualitative Inquiry*, 12(7), 11757-11767.

Ahmed, R. Q., &Arif, M. (2017). Space Militarization in South Asia: India's Quest for Space Weapons and Implications for Pakistan. *Asian Survey*, 57(5), 813–832.

Akhimova, O., Trochinsky, V., Karpa, M; Ventsel,V. &Akimova, L. (2020). 'International experience of public administration in the area of national security'. *Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues,* 23 (3), 1-7.

Akhtar, S. (1969). The Rabat Summit Conference. *Pakistan Horizon*, 22(4), 336–340.

Alam, A. (2017). India, Non-alignment and Emerging Global Governance. *India Quarterly*, 73 (3), 273–291.

Alam, M. B. (2003). Research Note on India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine: an Overview. *Journal of Third World Studies*, 20(2), 127–135.

Andersen, W. K. (1990). Election 1989 in India: The Dawn of Coalition Politics? *Asian Survey*, 30 (6), 527–540.

Anjum, I. (2016). Implications of Indian Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) on Strategic Stability. *Policy Perspectives*, 13 (1), 97–114.

Appadorai, A. (1949). India's Foreign Policy. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 25 (1), 37–46.

Appadorai.A..(1955). The Bandung Conference, *India Quarterly*, 11(3), 207-235.

Arunkumar, C., & SakthiveL, P. (2017). Challenges To National Security In India. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, 21(1), 114–121.

Arunkumar, C., & Sakthivel, P. (2017). Challenges to National Security in India. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, 21(1), 114–121.

Ashraf, F. (1993). Indo-Israeli Relations. *Strategic Studies*, 16 (1/2), 99–106.

Ashraf, F. (2002).Maoist Uprising in Nepal. *Strategic Studies,* 22 (2), 62–80.

Ashwarya, S. (2021). Israel's Renewable Energy Strategy: A Review of its Stated Goals, Current Status, and Future Prospects. *Perceptions*, 25 (2), 321-340.

Ashwarya, S. (2022). The Palestine Issue and Israel: The Indira Gandhi Years. *Bristol University Press* , pp.84-101. https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921X16613279625169

Atherton, A. L. (1992). The Shifting Sands of Middle East Peace. *Foreign Policy*, *86*, 114–133.

Axworthy, L. (2001). Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First. *Global Governance*, 7(1), 19–23.

Babu, B. R. (2016). From National Security to Human Security: A Paradigm Shift in the Making. World Affairs: *The Journal of International Issues*, 20 (1), 30–41.

Bajia, D. S. (1997). The Concept of Nuclear Proliferation : Need for Reconsideration. *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs*, 10 (1), 47–50.

Balakrishnan, R. (2018). India and the Crime-Terrorism Nexus. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 10 (9), 11–17.

Bandyopadhyaya, J. (1977). The Non-aligned Movement and International Relations. *India Quarterly*, 33 (2), 137–164

Barak, O. (2005). The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2000. *Journal of Peace Research*, 42(6), 719–736.

Baral, J. K., & Mahanty, J. N. (1992). India and the Gulf Crisis: The Response of a Minority Government. *Pacific Affairs*, 65(3), 368–384.

Bartal, S. (2017). The Peel Commission Report of 1937 and the Origins of the Partition Concept. *Jewish Political Studies Review*, 28(1/2), 51–70.

Bartlett, V. (1960). The Awakening of the Afro-Asian Nations. *African Affairs*, 59 (235), 105–111.

Baru, S. (2013). India and the World: A Geo-economics Perspective. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 48(6), 37–41

Beasley, R. K., &Kaarbo, J. (2014).Explaining Extremity in the Foreign Policies of Parliamentary Democracies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58 (4), 729–740.

Bernstein, D., & Swirski, S. (1982). The Rapid Economic Development of Israel and the Emergence of the Ethnic Division of Labour. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 33(1), 64–85.

Beyar, R., Zeevi, B., Rechavi, G. (2012). Israel: a start-up life science nation. *Science Direct.* 389(10088), 2563-2569. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736 (17 30704-3

Bhambri, C. P. (1982). India's Foreign Policy. *Social Scientist,* 10 (10), 51–55.

Bhargava, G. S. (1978). India's Nuclear Policy. *India Quarterly*, 34 (2), 131–144.

Bhatia, B. M. (1984). World Food Security and Non-aligned Countries. *India Quarterly*, 40 (1), 46–56.

Bhatia, L. M. (1990). Nehru's Foreign Policy and Concept of Security. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, 1, 106–108.

Bhaumik, S. (2007, July 10).Insurgencies in India's North- East: Conflict, Co-option & Change. *East-West Center*, (pp 1-64).

Biger, G. (2008). The Boundaries of Israel—Palestine Past, Present, and Future: A Critical Geographical View. *Israel Studies*, *13*(1), 68–93.

Billy, G. J. (1993). Palmerston's Foreign Policy. History: *Reviews of New Books*, 23(1), p. 21. https://doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1994.9950893

Bindra, S. S. (2019). Analysing Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Perspective. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, *23*(3), 26–43.

Blank, S. (2005) Arms and Technology Transfer in Indo-Israeli Relations; *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 19(1) 200-241.

Blarel, N. (2017). Assessing US Influence over India–Israel Relations: A Difficult Equation to Balance?. *Strategic Analysis*, 41(4), 384-400.

Blarel, N. (2019). Coalition politics and the making of Indian foreign policy: a new research program. *India Review*, 18(5), 582-595.

Borah, M. (2020). Look East Policy and its Impact in North-East India. *Journal of University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,* 22 (12), 843-847.

Bozeman, A. B. (1958). India's Foreign Policy Today: Reflections upon Its Sources. *World Politics*, 10 (2), 256–273.

Brainbent, G. (1996). Public Administration and Development, International review of Administrative Sciences, 62(2) (pp.163-176) as quoted in Naidu, Y. G. (2006). 'Globalisation and its Impact on Indian Society'. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *67*(1), 65–76.

Brams, S. J., & Togman, J. M. (1996). Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair? *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *15* (1), 99–112.

Brecher, M. (1961). Israel and "Afro-Asia." *International Journal*, *16*(2), 107–137. https://doi.org/10.2307/40198479

Brooks, S. G., &Wohlforth, W. C. (2000).Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas. *International Security*, *25*(3), 5–53.

Browne, N. A. K. (2017). A Perspective on India–Israel Defence and Security Ties, *Strategic Analysis*, 41(4), 325–335.

Brunatti, A. D., & Malone, D. M. (2009). India's West Asia Approach: A Triumph of Bilateralism. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *4* (4), 43–61.

Bruun, K., & Halsall, J. (2016). Problematising internal security: Crime, community and social exclusion. Cogent Social Sciences, 2(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/ 23311886.2016.1178092

Buzan, B. (1984). Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case. *International Organization*, 38(4), 597–624.

Cable, V. (1995). What is International Economic Security? *International Affairs*. 71(2), 305–324.

Camilleri, J. A. (1994). Security: Old Dilemmas and New Challenges in the Post-Cold War Environment. *GeoJournal*, *34*(2), 135–145.

Caplan, N. (2002). The 1956 Sinai Campaign Viewed from Asia: Selections from Moshe Sharett's Diaries. *Israel Studies*, *7*(1), 81–103.

Chacko, P. (2015). The New Geo-Economics of a Rising India: State Transformation and the Recasting of Foreign Policy. *Journal of Contemporary Asia,*.45 (2), 326–344.

Chakravarty, P. R. (2018). India's Changing Global Priorities and the Role of the Act East Policy. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *13* (1), 51–61.

Chand, N. (2016). Indo-Israeli Land Defence Co-operation. Land Forces. (Issue.1), 2016. Retrieved from https://www.spslandforces.com/story/?id=400 on 20-09-2022

Chandra, B. (1991). Colonial India: British versus Indian Views of Development. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, *14* (1), 81–167.

Chari, P. R. (1979). Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review. *Asian Survey*, *19*(3), 230–244.

Chatterjee, S. (1987). India's Trade with the Emirates. *Economic and Political Weekly*, *22* (48), 2053–2055.

Chaturvedi, S. (2018). India's Approach to Multilateralism and Evolving Global Order. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *13* (2), 128–135.

Chaube, S. K. (1985). Gandhi and the Indian Freedom Movement. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *46* (4), 430–437.

Chopra, S. (1986). The Emerging Trends in the Non-aligned Movement. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *47*(2), 161–177.

Clark, A. M. (1995). Non-Governmental Organizations and their Influence on International Society. *Journal of International Affairs,* 48 (2), (pp.507–525).

Clark, D. H., & Reed, W. (2005). The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution. *American Journal of Political Science*, *49* (3), 609–624.

Cohen, J. B. (1955). India's Foreign Economic Policies. *World Politics*, *7* (4), 546–571.

Contractor, F. J., & Sagafi-Nejad, T. (1981). International Technology Transfer: Major Issues and Policy Responses. *Journal of International Business Studies*, *12* (2), 113–135.

Cordesman, Anthony H., and Joseph Kendall. (2016). the PLA Rocket force: Evolving Beyond the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) and Nuclear Dimension. *Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2016: A Comparative Analysis*. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2016.

Dalmia, T. & Malone, D. M. (2012). Historical influences on India's foreign policy. *International Journal*, *67*(4), 1029–1049.

Damodaran, A. K. (1983). Jawaharlal Nehru and Non-alignment. *India Quarterly*, *39*(1), 41–49.

Dana, T., & Jarbawi, A. (2017). A Century of Settler Colonialism in Palestine: Zionism's Entangled Project. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, *24*(1), 197–220.

Dasgupta, C. (2016). A Brief History of Panchsheel. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 51(1), 26–31.

Dasgupta, P. (1992). Betrayal of India's Israel Policy. *Economic and Political Weekly*, *27* (15/16), 767–772.

Dawisha, A. I. (1976). Foreign Policy Models and the Problem of Dynamism. *British Journal of International Studies*, *2* (2), 128–137.

Desai, N. (2006). India and its Diaspora. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *1*(4), 94–108.

Dethe, V.J. (2018). Nehru: Contribution to Indian Foreign Policy. *Journal of Emerging Technologies and Innovative Research*. 5(2), 1237-1241.

Devdutt. (1962). Non-alignment and India. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *23*(1/4), 380–397.

Dietl, R. (2008). Suez 1956: A European Intervention? *Journal of Contemporary History*, *43*(2), 259–278.

Dinh, V. T. (1976). Non-alignment and Cultural Imperialism. *The Black Scholar*, *8*(3), 39–49.

Doctor, A. H. (1990). India's Indian Ocean Policy. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *51*(3), 360–379

Droge, S. (2020). Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: What Role for the UN Security Council?. *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, SWP Research Paper, 19, June 2020 (pp. 01-38). https://doi.org/10.18449/2020RP06

Dwivedi, M. (2008). Cross Border Terrorism: Irritants in Indo-Pakistan Relations. *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs,* 21(1/2), 31–53.

Ebegbulem, J.C. (2010). National Interest: a Principal Factor in Foreign Policy Formulation, *African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies*, 5(1), 138-146.

Edirisuriya, P. (2017). The Rise and Grand Fall of Sri Lanka's Mahinda Rajapaksa: The End of an Era? *Asian Survey,* 57(2), 211–228.

Edwardes, M. (1965). Illusion and Reality in India's Foreign Policy. *International Affairs* 41(1), 48–58.

Englehart, N.A. (2016). Non-state Armed Groups as a Threat to Global Security: What Threat, Who's Security?.*Journal of Global Security Studies*, 1(2), 171–183.

Faleiro, E. (2018). India–Israel Relations. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, *22*(1), 170–172.

Farah, N. (1999). Indo-Israel relations: An evolutionary perspective. *Strategic Analysis*, 10 (12/2), 241-252.

Farah, N. (2000). Israel's Arms Industry, *Strategic Analysis*, IDSA, March 2000, 23(12). URL: https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_00naf01.html#note6.

Faridi, M. H. (2008). India's Role in the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations since 1990s. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *69*(3), 577–584.

Faruki, K. A. (1972). The Indo-Pakistan War, 1971, and the United Nations. *Pakistan Horizon*, *25*(1), 10–20.

Feigenbaum, E. A. (2010). India's Rise, America's Interest: The Fate of the U.S - Indian Partnership. *Foreign Affairs*, *89*(2), 76–91.

Fickett, L. P. (1993). The Rise and Fall of the Janata Dal. *Asian Survey*, *33*(12), 1151–1162. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645175

Filitov, A., & Williams, R. (2011). The End of the Cold War and the Dissolution of the USSR. *Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift Für Moderne Europäische Geschichte / Revue d'histoire Européenne Contemporaine*, *9*(3), 298–307.

Fita, E. (2012).Transformation of the concept of global security after the end of the cold war. *SEEU Review.* 08 (01), 151-163.

Fontera, R. M. (1960). Anti-Colonialism as a Basic Indian Foreign Policy. *The Western Political Quarterly*, *13*(2), 421–432.

Frangonikolopoulos, C.A. (1995).The policy and evolution of non-alignment: Past and Future. *Paradigms*, 9(1), 62-85.

Friedberg, A. L. (1991). The Changing Relationship between Economics and National Security. *Political Science Quarterly*, *106*(2), 265–276.

Gaan, N. (1992). Hopes and Realities in Indo-U.S. Relations : From a Cold War to a Post-Cold War Perspective. *India Quarterly*, *48*(4), 1–22.

Gaan, N., & Das, S. (2002). Indo-U.S. Relation towards a Rapprochement: From Post- Cold War to post September 11. *India Quarterly*, *58*(3/4), 177–204.

Gaddis, J. L. (1992). International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War. *International Security*, *17*(3), 5–58.

Ganapathi, M. (2017). Contours of India's Foreign Policy-An Overview. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *12*(1), 42–59.

Ganapathi, M. (2019). Act East in India's Foreign Policy. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal ,* 14, (3), 195-206.

Ganguly, S. & Pardesi, M.S.(2009). Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy, *India Review,* 8(1), https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480802665162

Ganguly, S. (1999). India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program. *International Security*, *23*(4), 148–177.

Ganguly, S. (2017). Has Modi Truly Changed India's Foreign Policy?. *The Elliott School of International Affairs. The Washington Quarterly*, 40(2),131–143.

Gauhar, A. (1966). The Tashkent Declaration. *Pakistan Horizon*, *19*(1), 13–25.

Ghosal, D. (2016). Strategic Hyphenation between India and Israel: The Major Areas of Cooperation and Constraints in the Post-Cold War Era. *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, 20*(1), 65–101.

Ghose, A. (1997). Negotiating the CTBT: India's Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament. *Journal of International Affairs*, *51*(1), 239–261.

Ghosh, A. (2006). Pathways Through Financial Crisis: India. *Global Governance*, *12*(4), 413–429.

Gimba, Z. & Ibrahim, S.G. (2018). A Review of External Factors That Determine Foreign Policy Formulation. *Indo-Iranian Journal of Scientific Research (IIJSR),* 2(1), 119-130.

Ginat, R. (2004). India and the Palestine Question: The Emergence of the Asio-Arab Bloc and India's Quest for Hegemony in the Post-Colonial Third World. *Middle Eastern Studies*, *40*(6), 189–218.

Golovics, J. (2017). Contemporary Realism in Theory and Practice: The Case of the Ukrainian Crisis. *Polgári Szemle,* 13(1–3), 362–369.

Gopal, B. (1991). Relevance of Non-alignment. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *52* (1), 54-73.

Gopal. P. (2017). India–Israel Defence Engagement: A Naval Perspective, *Strategic Analysis,* 41(4), 341-347.

Gordon, L. A. (1975). Indian Nationalist Ideas about Palestine and Israel. *Jewish Social Studies*, *37*(3/4), 221–234.

Gordon, R. (1973). Non-Cooperation and Council Entry, 1919 to 1920. *Modern Asian Studies*, *7*(3), 443–473.

Goswami, N. (2020). India's Space Program, Ambitions, and Activities. *Asia Policy*, 15(2), (pp. 43–49).

Griffith, I. L. (1993).From Cold War Geo-politics to Post-Cold War Geo-narcotics. *International Journal*, 49(1), 1–36.

Grizold, A. (1994). The Concept of National Security in the Contemporary World. *International Journal on World Peace*, 11(3), 37–53.

Gross, N. T. (1990). Israeli Economic Policies, 1948-1951: Problems of Evaluation. *The Journal of Economic History*, *50*(1), 67–83.

Gupta, A. K. (2008). Commentary on India's Soft Power and Diaspora. *International Journal on World Peace*, *25*(3), 61–68.

Gupta, A. K., & Balakrishnan, I. (2010). Sino-Sri Lankan Convergence : Threat Perceptions for India. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 71(1), 203–211.

Gupta, K. R. (2010). Indian Foreign Policy and Human Security: *A Comparative Perspective. Journal of Third World Studies*, 27(2), 3-20.

Guruprasad, B. R. (2018). Understanding India's International Space Cooperation Endeavour: Evolution, Challenges and Accomplishments. *India Quarterly*, *74*(4), 455–481.

Guruswamy, M. (2003). India-China Border Learning from History. *Economic and Political Weekly,* 38(39), 4101–4103.

Guzansky, Y. (2021, June 01). Changes in United Arab Emirates Foreign Policy: Significance for Israel and the Region. *Institute for National Security Studies,* No.1479. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/uae-foreign-policy/

Haddas, J. (2002). Evolution of the Relations between India and Israel. *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*.58 (15).

Hafeez, M. (2009). India-Israel relations. *Strategic Studies*, 29(4), 65-83

Hameed, S. (2009). Cultural Horizon of India's Foreign Policy: Relevance for its Neighbourhood. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *4*(4), 62–76.

Hamid, R. (1975). What is the PLO? *Journal of Palestine Studies*, *4*(4), 90–109.

Hampson, F. O., & Heinbecker, P. (2011). The "New" Multilateralism of the Twenty-First Century. *Global Governance*, *17*(3), 299–310.

Han, X. (1993). Sino-Israeli Relations. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, *22*(2), 62–77.

Hanes, W. T. (1993). On the Origins of the Indian National Congress: A Case Study of Cross-Cultural Synthesis. *Journal of World History*, *4*(1), 69–98.

Haqqi, S. A. H. (1956). Some Reflections on India's Foreign Policy. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *17*(1), 43–50.

Harshe, R. (1990). India's Non-Alignment: An Attempt at Conceptual Reconstruction. *Economic and Political Weekly*, *25*(7/8), 399–405.

Hasan, S. (2007). Sectional President's Address: The Evolution of India's Palestine policy: A Fall from the Heights? *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, *68*, 1125–1140.

Hasan, S. (2008). The Evolution of India's Palestine Policy: A Fall from the Heights? *Social Scientist*, *36*(1/2), 79–93.

Hassan, S. S. (1993). Gandhi, Jews and Zionism : A Reappraisal. *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, *54*, 748–751.

Heian-Engdal, M., Jensehaugen, J., & Waage, H. H. (2013). "Finishing the Enterprise": Israel's Admission to the United Nations. *The International History Review*, *35*(3), 465–485.

Hermann, C. F. (1990). Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, *34*(1), 3–21.

Hermann, C. F. (1990). Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, *34*(1), 3–21.

Hermann, M. G., & Hagan, J. D. (1998). International Decision Making: Leadership Matters. *Foreign Policy*, *110*, 124–137.

Hilali, A. Z. (2001). India's Strategic Thinking and its National Security Policy. *Asian Survey*, *41*(5), 737–764.

Hlongwa, L. (2020). China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative: A quest for sea power, *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, 48 (2), DOI: 10.5787/48-2-1258*

Holsty, K.J. (1967). *International Politics; A Framework for Analysis.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hal. As *cited* in Dawisha (1976). Foreign Policy Models and the Problem of Dynamism. *British Journal of International Studies,* 2 (2) 128-137.

Horimoto, T. (2017). Explaining India's Foreign. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Volume 17 , 463–496.

Hsiung, J. C. (1991). The Post-Cold-War World Order and the Gulf Crisis. *Asian Affairs*, *18*(1), 31–41.

Hudson, V. M., &Vore, C. S. (1995).Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 39 (2), 209–238.

Hughes, M. (2019). The Conduct of Operations: Glubb Pasha, the Arab Legion, and the First Arab–Israeli War, 1948–49. *War in History*, *26*(4), 539–562.

Hussain, A. (2006). Economic Diplomacy and its Significance for Foreign Policy. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *1*(4), 35-45.

Hussain,W.(2007).Ethno-Nationalism and the Politics of Terror in India's Northeast, South Asia. *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 30(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400701264043.

Inbar, E. (2004). The India-Israel Entente. *Orbis*, 48, winter. DOI:10.1016/j.*orbis*.2003.10.007.

Inbar, E. (2017). Israel and India: Looking Back and Ahead, *Strategic Analysis,* 41(4), 369-383.

Inbar, E. (2017, July 21). Modi's Visit- The View from Jerusalem. *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*. Perspectives Paper No. 536, pp-01-03.

Inbar, E., & Ningthoujum, A.S. (2012).Indo-Israeli Defense Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century. *The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.* Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 93, (pp.01-30).

Ivanov, I. (2013). Globalization and the Quest for a 'Smart' Foreign Policy. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, *6*(1), 49–57

Jain, B. M. (1995). Globalisation and India Challenges and Opportunities. *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs*, *8/9*(1/2), 71–79

Jain, V. K. (1978). The Role of the Arab Traders in Western India During Early Medieval Period. *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, *39*, 285–295.

Jalal, A. (1989). Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Cold War, 1947-1955. *The International History Review*, *11*(3), 409–433.

Jalil, G. Y. (2015). Indian Missile Defence Development: Implications for Deterrence Stability in South Asia. *Strategic Studies*, *35*(2), 29–46.

Jasse, R.L. (1991). The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism? *Middle Eastern Studies*, *27*(1), 140–156.

Jetly, R. (2010). India and China: Emerging Dynamics and Regional Security Perspectives. *Institute of South Asian Studies. Working Paper,* No.114 *(*pp.01-22)

Jha, G. (2008). India's Dialogue Partnership with ASEAN. *India Quarterly*, *64*(4), 1–34.

Jindal, N. (2002). Changing Dimensions of National Security, *India Quarterly*, 58(3/4) 93-112.

Jones, J.F. (2004). Human Security and Social Development. *Denver Journal of International Law & Policy,* 33(1), 92-103.

Kabi, D. B. (2002). Non-aligned Movement and the New World Order. *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, *63*, 1161–1169.

Kapur, H. (2008). India's Foreign Policy Under Rajiv Gandhi. *The Round Table*, 76 (304), 469-480.

Karmon, E. (2022).India's Counter-terrorism Cooperation with Israel, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 16 (2), 01-10.

Karsh, E. (2017). *The Six-Day War: An Inevitable Conflict*. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04623

Katoch, D.C. (2013). Combating Cross Border Terrorism: Need for a Doctrinal Approach. *CLAWS Journal*, winter 2013, p.1-14

Kaura, V. (2017). The Modi Government's Policy on Israel: The Rhetoric and Reality of De-hyphenation, *Strategic Assessment* 19 (4), 79-91.

Kaura,V. (2019). India's Israel Relations in the Modi Era: A Transformative Shift. *Israeli Affairs*. 1(1), 1-17.

Kaushik, S. K. (1997). India's Evolving Economic Model: A Perspective on Economic and Financial Reforms. *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, *56*(1), 69–84.

Kaye, D. D., Nader, A., & Roshan, P. (2011). A Brief History of Israeli-Iranian Cooperation and Confrontation. In *Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry* (pp. 9–18). RAND Corporation.

Keenleyside, T. A. (1987). Diplomatic Apprenticeship : Pre-independence Origins of Indian Diplomacy and its Relevance for the Post-independence Foreign Policy. *India Quarterly*, *43*(2), 97–120.

Kelsen, H. (1941). Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations. *The American Journal of International Law*, *35*(4), 605–617.

Kevany, S., Canyon, D., Baker, M., & Ostergard, R. (2020). The Nexus Between the Covid-19 Pandemic, International Relations, and International Security. *Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.* http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24856

Khan, M. Z. (2022). Strategic Posturing of China in IOR: Implications for Regional Peace and Stability. *Policy Perspectives*, 19(1), 13–33.

Khan, Z. A. (2012). China's Gwadar and India's Chahbahar: an analysis of Sino-India geo-strategic and economic competition. *Strategic Studies*, 32(33), 79–101.

Khan, Z.A. (2011). "Development in Indo-Israel Defence Relations since 9/11: Pakistan's Security Concern and Policy Options", *South Asian Studies* 26(1), 131-151.

Khanna, S. (1992). International Trade and Debt: India in the Eighties. *Social Scientist*, *20*(1/2), 47–62.

Khara, N.K. (2020). Diaspora and Foreign Policy: A Global Perspective. *International Journal of Political Science 6* (4), 12-20.

Khattak, M. U. R. (2019). Indian Military Modernisation: Implications for Pakistan. *Strategic Studies*, *39*(1), 20–40.

Khobragade, V. (2015). India's Engagement with the World, World Affairs: *The Journal of International Issues,* 19 (2), 44-59.

Kidwai, S. (1992).India's Security in Post-Cold War World. *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs,* 5(1/2), 63–67.

Kilic, F & Sheikh, A.M. (2018).India and Israel Defense Relationship in the Context of Offensive Realism. *Journal of Asian Studies, 6(8),* https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648564.

Kim, S. Y. (2006). Globalisation and Perceptions of Economic Insecurity. *Journal of International and Area Studies,* 13(2), 35–51.

Kimche, D. (1996). The Arab-Israeli Peace Process. *Security Dialogue*, *27*(2), 135–148.

Knos, Z. M. (1998). Global Environment Conflict in the Post-cold War Era: Linkage to an Extended Paradigm. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 5(1). DOI: 10.46743/1082-7307/1998.1191

Koblentz, G. D. (2010). Bio-security Reconsidered : Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses. *International Security*, *34*(4), 96–132.

Kochanek, S. A. (1980). India's Changing Role in the United Nations. *Pacific Affairs*, *53*(1), 48–68.

Kohli, M. (1988). India and South Asian Regional Cooperation. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *49*(3), 301–311.

Kohli, M. (1993). Disintegration of the Soviet Union : Implications for India. *India Quarterly*, *49*(3), 85–100.

Konwer, S. (2018). Hallmarks of Current Indian Foreign Policy. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *13*(3), 231–241.

Kostiner, J. (2009). Saudi Arabia and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Fluctuation of Regional Coordination. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, *36*(3), 417–429.

Kourvetaris, G. A. (1991). American Foreign Policy and the Gulf Crisis. *International Journal on World Peace*, *8*(4), 68–73.

Kozicki, R. (1958). India and Israel: A problem in Asian Politics. *Middle Eastern affairs*, 9(5), 162-172.

Kramer, M. (1999). Ideology and the Cold War. *Review of International Studies*, *25*(4), 539–576.

Krishna, G. (1968). The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920). *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1/2, 37–53.

Kumar, A. (2010). An Historical Perspective on Indian Foreign Policy. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, 14(1), 102-111.

Kumar, T. (2014). Israel and India: Strengthening the Partnership. Special Report, *Observer Research Foundation*, (07), 01-12.

Kumar. M. (2017). India-Israel Relations: Perceptions and Prospects. *Strategic Assessment,* 19(4), 93-102.

Kumaraswamy, P. R. (1995). India's Recognition of Israel, September 1950.*Middle Eastern Studies*, *31*(1), 124–138.

Kumaraswamy, P. R. (2018). Reading Modi's Visit to Israel. *India Quarterly*, *74*(1), 1–16.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (1995). India's Recognition of Israel, September 1950. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 31(1), 124-38.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2002) 'India and Israel: Emerging Partnership', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 25(4), 202.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2008). Realism replacing Rhetoric: Factors shaping India's Middle East Policy. *The Round Table*, 97 (397), 575–87.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2010).India-Israel Relations: Seeking Balance and Realism. *Israel Affairs,* 10(1/2), 254-272.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2023). Indo-Israeli relations: changes under Narendra Modi. *Global Discourse*, *13*(1), 70-83.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2004). Israel–India relations: seeking balance and realism. *Israel Affairs,* 10(1/2), 254-272.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (1996). The limitations of Indo-Israeli military cooperation. *Contemporary South Asia*, 5(1), 75-84.

Kumari, R. (2009). India's Nuclear Weapon Programme Present Capabilities. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *70*(1), 227–238.

Kuttab, D. (2015). Israel–Palestine Conflict and India's Role [Review of *From India to Palestine: Essays in Solidarity*, by G. Hariharan]. *Economic and Political Weekly*, *50*(19), 28–30.

Kydd, A.H & Walter, B.F. (2006).The Strategies of Terrorism, *International Security*, 31 (1) 49–80.

Labarge, B. L. (1988). The Israeli Defense Industry: Limits to Growth? *The Fletcher Forum*, *12*(2), 341–358.

Lahiry, S. (2013). India's Relationship with Its South Asian Neighbours: Contemporary Trends. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, *17*(4), 70–79.

Lahneman, W. J. (2003). Changing Power Cycles and Foreign Policy Role-Power Realignments: Asia, Europe, and North America. *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique*, *24*(1), 97–111.

Lal, D. (1967). Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-64. *Economic and Political Weekly*, *2*(19), 879–887.

Laos, N. K. (2000). International security in the post-Cold War era. *Journal of International Affairs*, 4 (4), 01-08.

Lebo, M. J., & Moore, W. H. (2003). Dynamic Foreign Policy Behavior. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *47*(1), 13–32.

Leffler, M. P. (1990). National Security. *The Journal of American History,* 77 (1), pp.143-152.

Levi, W. (1970). Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, *14*(1), 1–31. https://doi.org/10.2307/3013538

Levy, M. A. (1995). Is the Environment a National Security Issue? *International Security,* 20(2), 35–62.

Lüthi, L. M. (2016). The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold-War, 1961–1973. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *18*(4), 98–147.

Madaan, D. K, & Madan, D. K. (1995). India's New Economic Policy - A Macro Study. *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs*, *8/9*(1/2), 104–113.

Madhok, B. (1967). India's Foreign Policy-the Jana Sangh View. *India Quarterly*, *23*(1), 3–7.

Malik, J. M. (1991). India's Response to the Gulf Crisis: Implications for Indian Foreign Policy. *Asian Survey*, *31*(9), 847–861.

Malik, J. M. (1998). India Goes Nuclear: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications. *Contemporary South East Asia*, *20*(2), 191–215.

Manoharan, N. (2010). Post-Conflict India-Sri Lanka Relations: With Lions, Without Tigers. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal,* 5(3), 338–350.

Manoharan, N. (2013). India's Internal Security Situation: Threats and Responses. *India Quarterly*, 69 (4), 367–381.

Maoz, M. (2013). The Zionist/Jewish and Palestinian/Arab National Movements: The Question of Legitimacy—A Comparative Observation. *Israel Studies*, *18*(2), 30–40.

Marleku, A. (2013). National Interest and Foreign Policy: The Case of Kosovo. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences.* 4(3). Doi:10.5901/mjss.2013.v4n3p415.

Masaldan, P. N. (1948). Some Features of Indian Foreign Policy. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *9* (4), 36–40.

Mazumdar, A. (2005). Bhutan's Military Action against Indian Insurgents. Asian Survey, 45(4), 566–580.

Mazumdar, A. (2011). India's Search for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy: Domestic Constraints and Obstacles. *India Quarterly*, *67*(2), 165–182.

Mazumdar, A. (2011). India's Search for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy: Domestic Constraints and Obstacles. *India Quarterly*, *67*(2), 165–182.

McCallum, J. A. (1947). The Asian Relations Conference. *The Australian Quarterly*, *19*(2), 13–17.

Mehrish, B. N. (1975). Recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) : An Appraisal of India's Policy. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *36*(2), 137–160.

Mehrotra, L. (1992). India's Foreign Policy Options in a Changing World. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, *1*(1), 19–23.

Mehrotra, L. (2012). India's Look East Policy: Its Origin and Development. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *7*(1), 75–85.

Mekkawi, E. S. (2006). Image of India in the Arab World: Shapes and Shades. *India Quarterly*, *62*(4), 152–190.

Menon, R & Pandey, S. (2005). An Axis of Democracy? The Uncertain Future of Israeli-Indian Relations. *The National Interest, (80),* 29-36.

Milina, V. (2013). Energy Security: A Paradigm Shift. *Connections, the Quarterly Journal,* 12(4), 75–98.

Miller, R. (2003). Frank Aiken, the UN and the Six Day War, June 1967. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, *14*, 57–73.

Mishra, B. K. (2009). Security Implications of Greater India-Myanmar Interaction. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal,* 4(2), 81–96.

Mishra, M. K. (2006). India's Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council : Changing Power Realities and Notions of Security. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *67*(2), 343–354.

Mishra, M. K. (2014). India's Contribution to International Peace and Security: A Human Security Perspective. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, *18*(2), 20–33.

Mishra, R. (2023). From non-alignment to multi-alignment: assessing India's foreign policy shift. *The Round Table,* 112(1), 43–56.

Misra, K. P. (1961).India's Policy of Recognition of States and Governments. *The American Journal of International Law*, *55*(2), 398–424.

Mistry, D. (2001). The Geostrategic Implications of India's Space Program. *Asian Survey,* 41(6), 1023–1043.

Misty, D. (1998). India's Emerging Space Program. *Pacific Affairs,* 71(2), 151–174.

Mitra, S. K., & Schöttli, J. (2007). The New Dynamics of Indian Foreign Policy and Its Ambiguities. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, *18*, 19–34.

Mittal, R. (2013). Impact of Population Explosion on Environment, We School 'Knowledge Builder' - *The National Journal*. 1(1), 01-05).

Mohanasundram, K. (2008). Tamilnadu and LTTE: Changing Trends in Ethnic Relationship. *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 69, (pp.1161–1168).

Mohanty, J. N., & Mohanty, S. K. (2007). Pakistan's Kashmir Policy : The Smoke-screen of Fundamentalist Agenda ? *The Indian Journal of Political Science,* 68(1), 137–144.

Moon, B. E. (1985). Consensus or Compliance? Foreign-Policy Change and External Dependence. *International Organization*, *39*(2), 297–329.

Moore, R. J. (1983). Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand. *Modern Asian Studies*, *17*(4), 529–561.

Morgan, T. C., & Palmer, G. (2003). To Protect and to Serve: Alliances and Foreign Policy Portfolios. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *47*(2), 180–203.

Mueller, J. (2004). What Was the Cold War about? Evidence from Its Ending. *Political Science Quarterly*, *119*(4), 609–631.

Mukerji, A. K. (2018). The Impact of Multilateralism on India. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *13*(4), 335–344.

Mukherjee, R., & Malone, D. M. (2011). From High Ground to High Table: The Evolution of Indian Multilateralism. *Global Governance*, *17*(3), 311–329.

Mukherjee, R., & Malone, D. M. (2013). India and the UN Security Council: An Ambiguous Tale. *Economic and Political Weekly*, *48*(29), 110–117.

Muralidharan, S. (2006). Religion, Nationalism and the State: Gandhi and India's Engagement with Political Modernity. *Social Scientist*, *34*(3/4), 3–36.

Mustafa, M. Q. (2009). Are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe? *Strategic Studies*, 29(4), 84–94.

Naaz, F. (2000*). Indo-Israeli military cooperation. Strategic Analysis*, 24(5). 979-992.

Naaz, F. (2008). "Indo-Israel relations: An evolutionary perspective", *Strategic Analysis,* DOI: 10.1080/09700169908455044.

Naaz, F.(1999). Indo-Israel Relations:An Evolutionary Perspective. *Startegic Analysis,(23)*, 241-254.

Nadkarni, V. (1995). India and Russia: The End of a Special Relationship? *Naval War College Review*, *48*(4), 19–33

Nalapat, M.D. (2000). The Last Nehru: A Retrospective: A Decade after Rajiv's Fall. *Economic and Political Weekly*, *35*(6), 427–431.

Narwaria, S. S. (2015). Environmental Security in South Asia: An Analysis of India and Bangladesh. *The Journal of International Issues,* 19(2), 100–111.

Naseem, A. (2015). The Honeymoon Is Over: Maldives as a Growing Security Threat in the Indian Ocean. *Irish Studies in International Affairs, (*26), (pp.99–119).

Nataraj, G., & Sekhani, R. (2015). China's One Belt One Road: An Indian Perspective. *Economic and Political Weekly,* 50(49), 67–71.

Nath, M.K & Nath, M.K. (2004). Mapping North East on India's Foreign Policy : Looking Past, Present and beyond. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *65*(4), 636–652.

Niebuhr, R. (1959). The Cold War and the Nuclear Dilemma. *Cross Currents*, *9*(3), 212–224.

Ningthoujam, A. S. (2021). India-Israel Relations: Scaling Newer Heights. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *16*(3), 227–241.

Nobilo, M. (1988).The Concept of Security in the Terminology of International Relations. *Political Thought*, (pp.72-73), as quoted in Grizold, (1994) *International Journal on World Peace,* 11(3), 37–53.

Noor, S. (2004). Indo-Israel Relations: Repercussions for Pakistan. *Pakistan Horizon*, *57*(3), 91–104.

Noorani, A. G. (1978). Foreign Policy of the Janata Party Government. *Asian Affairs*, *5*(4), 216–228.

Nuechterlein, D. E. (1976). National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making. *British Journal of International Studies*, *2*(3), 246–266.

Onorato, M. G., Scheve, K., & Stasavage, D. (2014). Technology and the Era of the Mass Army. *The Journal of Economic History*, *74*(2), 449–481.

Oren, M. B. (1989). Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War, 1949-56. *Journal of Contemporary History*, *24*(2), 347–373.

Paikowsky, D. & Israel, I.B. (2011). India's Space Program: An Israeli Perspective on Regional Security. *India Review,* 10 (4), 394-405.

Palit, A. (2016). India's Act East Policy and Implications for Southeast Asia. *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 81–92. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814695671-009

Pande, N.K. (1973).Nehru's Palestine Policy. *Socialist India,*January,*23*, p.23

Pant, G. (2006). Energy Security and the Indian Foreign Policy. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *1*(1), 58–72.

Pant, H.V & Bommakanti, K. (2019). India's national security challenge, *International Affairs*, 95(4), 835–857.

Pant, H.V. (2004). India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 8(4), 60-73.

Panter-Brick, S. (2009). Gandhi's Views on the Resolution of the Conflict in Palestine: A Note. *Middle Eastern Studies*, *45*(1), 127–133.

Parikh, T.P & Patel, A.R. (2017). Cyber security: Study on Attack, Threat, Vulnerability. *International Journal of Research in Modern Engineering and Emerging Technology*, 5 (6), 01-07.

Parthasarathy, G. (2017). India's Foreign Policy and Security Challenges: Past and Present. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal,* 12(1), 74–82.

Pate, T. (2020). Re-(Modi)fying India's Israel Policy: An Exploration of Practical Geopolitical Reasoning Through Re-representation of 'India', 'Israel' and 'West Asia' Post-2014. *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, 7(1), 7–35.

Patnaik, U. (2014). India in the World Economy 1900 to 1935: The Inter-War Depression and Britain's Demise as World Capitalist Leader. *Social Scientist*, *42*(1/2), 13–35.

Petras, J. (1991). Gulf War and the New World Order. *Economic and Political Weekly*, *26*(9/10), 482–484.

Petsonk, C.A. (1990). The Role of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the Development of International Environmental Law. *American University International Law Review,* 05(2), 351-391.

Pfeiffer, T. (1991). Madrid Conference Revives Hopes for Mideast Peace. *Arms Control Today*, *21*(9), 21–21.

Pol, T (2019). A New Way Towards India and Israel Bilateral Relationship. *International Journal of Multi disciplinary Educational Research*. 8(6), 61-69.

Power, P. F. (1964). Indian Foreign Policy: The Age of Nehru. *The Review of Politics*, *26*(2), 257–286.

Prabha, K. (2001). Narco-Terrorism and India's Security. *Strategic Analysis,* 24 (10), Retrieved from https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_jan01prk01.html, accessed on 10, August, 2023.

Prabhakar, S. V. R. K., Issar, R., Bakar, A. B. A., & Yokoo, M. (2021, May 21). Mitigating transboundary risks by integrating risk reduction frameworks of health and DRR: A perspective from the COVID-19 pandemic. *Science Direct*, 63–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-85512-9.00014-0

Pradhan, S. (2010). India and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): An Economic and Political Perspective. *Strategic Analysis*, 34(1), 93-103.

Puroshotham, P. W., Puroshatham, P. W., & Prasad, M. V. (2009). Addressing Frontier-Terorism- India Needs Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *70*(2), 553–568.

Puthanpurayil, M. (2020). Shifting trajectory in India-Israel relations under Modi. *Israel Affairs*, 26 (3). 471-483

Quandt, W. B. (1986). Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East. *Political Science Quarterly*, *101*(3), 357–377.

Raghavan, P. S. (2017). The Making of India's Foreign Policy: From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *12*(4), 326–341.

Rahman, A.A.A. (2023). The Concept of National Security in the Period of Cold War and Post-Cold War. September 2023. *Journal of Law and Sustainable Development* 11(5). DOI:10.55908/sdgs.v11i5.766.

Rajan, M. S. (1969). The Impact of British Rule in India. *Journal of Contemporary History*, *4*(1), 89–102.

Ramkumar, M., Santosh, M., Mathew, J.M., & Siddiqui, N.A. (2021). India at Crosswords for Energy. *Geo-science Frontiers*, 12(6), DOI: 10.1016/j.gsf.2019.10.006

Ranjan, A. (2022). India's foreign policy: shift, adjustment and continuity. *The Round Table,* 111 (3),381-384.

Raska, M., and Bitzinger, R. A. (2020). Strategic Contours of China's Arms Transfers. *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 14(1), 91–116.

Ray, D. (2006). Genesis and Fruition of Indo-Israel Cooperation. In Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 66 (2005-2006), 1309-1315.

Ray, P. S. (2016). 'Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road': Effect on Global Supply Chains and Maritime Connectivity. *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 77, 828–834.

Ray, P. S. (2018). Chabahar Deal: an India-Iran Historical and Geo-strategic Issue in 21st Century: an Analysis. *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, *79*, 704–712.

Relia, S., Mitra, A., & Ramasami, T. (2014).Science and Technology Perspectives for India's Foreign Policy. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *9*(2), 158–172.

Rhodes, C.C. (1933). Foreign Policy. *The Political Quarterly,* 4(4) 513. As quoted in Ahmed, J. (2020). The Theoretical Significance of Foreign Policy in International Relations- An Analysis. *Journal of Critical Reviews*, 7 (2).

Richter, J. G. (1992). Perpetuating the Cold War: Domestic Sources of International Patterns of Behavior. *Political Science Quarterly*, *107*(2), 271–301.

Ripsman, N. M., & Paul, T. V. (2005). Globalization and the National Security State: A Framework for Analysis. *International Studies Review*, 7(2), 199–227.

Rubin, U. (2017). Israel's defence industries – an overview, *Defence Studies,* 17(3), 228-241,

Rubinoff, A. G. (1995). Normalization of India-Israel relations: Stillborn for forty years. *Asian Survey, 35*(5), 487–505.

Sakthivel, P., & Sakthival, P. (2010). Terrorism in India : the Unholy Neighbours. *The Indian Journal of Political Science,* 71(1), 153–162.

Saliba, N. E. (1972). Impact of the Indo-Pakistani War on the Middle East. *World Affairs*, *135*(2), 129–137

Samuel, W. L. (1999). The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance. *Middle East Journal*, *53*(3), 364–378.

Sandra, D. (2012). India and Sri Lanka's Civil War: The Failure of Regional Conflict Management in South Asia. *Asian Survey*, 52(3), 595–616.

Sanjian, A. (1997). The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact. *Middle Eastern Studies*, *33*(2), 226–266.

Santos, F.L.B.D. (2018). Good Bye Nehru: Indian Foreign Policy Under Globalisation, *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations,* 7(13), 217-244.

Sarkar, T. (2010). Infiltration from Bangladesh: a Sub-continental Dimension. *The Indian Journal of Political Science,* 71(2), 683–686.

Sarkar, T. (2012). India - Bhutan Relations. *The Indian Journal of Political Science,* 73(2), 347–352.

Sarmah, M. (2021). Is China's Territorial Claim on Arunachal Pradesh Justifiable? *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues,* 25(4), 78–89.

Sau, R. (1992). Making of a Payments Crisis: India 1991. *Economic and Political Weekly*, *27*(33), 1741–1745.

Schlesinger, J. (1992). Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, *72*(1), 17–28.

Scott, D. (2009) India's "Extended Neighborhood" Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power. *India Review*, 8(2), 107-143.

Segal, J. M. (1991). The Gulf War and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *World Policy Journal*, *8*(2), 351–362.

Sen, G. (2016). Theoretical Moorings of India's Foreign Policymaking: Nehru to Modi. *India International Centre Quarterly*, *43*(2), 9–21.

Sen, M. K. (1949). India's Foreign Policy. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *10*(1/2), 32–40.

Senanayake, H. (2018). Causes behind the 1st Asian Relations Conference-1947 New Delhi, India. January, 2018, *Research Gate,* DOI:10.13140/RG.2.2.36790.80968

Shah, M. A. (2021). India's West Asia Policy: Limits of Bilateralism. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, *25*(4), pp. 60–77.

Shah, M.A & Tabraz. (2020). India's Israel Policy: From Nehru to Modi. *Journal of Critical Reviews,* 7 (9), 872-878

Shain, Y. & Barth, A. (2003). Diasporas and International Relations Theory. *International Organization*, *57*(3), 449–479.

Shanmukhappa, S. (2016). Globalisation and its Impact on Indian Economy: Developments and Challenges. *International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts*. 4(4), 962-934.

Sharma, A. & Bing, D.(2015) India–Israel relations: the evolving partnership, *Israel Affairs,* 21(4), 620-632.

Sharma, J. P. (1992). India and Israel : A Study of Evolution in Relations (1948 - 92). In *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, (*53)*, 593–597

Sharma, R. (1989). Nehru's World-View: an Alternative to the Superpowers' Model of International Relations. *India Quarterly*, *45*(4), 324–332.

Sharma, S. P. (1965). The India-China Border Dispute: An Indian Perspective. *The American Journal of International Law,* 59(1), 16–47.

Sherman, J. (1997). Niche Carving: Subsystem Upgrades Catapult Israel Defence Industries to New Heights. *Armed Forces Journal*, 134 (12), 34.

Sherman, M & Sondhi, M.L. (1999). Indo-Israeli Strategic Cooperation as a US National Interest. *Ariel Center for Policy Research*, Policy Paper No. 89, 1–11.

Shichor, Y. (1998). Israel's military transfers to China and Taiwan. *Survival*, *Global Politics and Strategy*, 40 (1), 68-91.

Shlaim, A. (1987). Britain and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, *16*(4), 50–76.

Shlaim, A. (1995). The Debate about 1948. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *27*(3), 287–304.

Shupe, M. C., Wright, W. M., Hipel, K. W., & Fraser, N. M. (1980). Nationalisation of the Suez Canal: A Hyper Game Analysis. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *24*(3), 477–493.

Sibal, K. (2019). The Role of Military Diplomacy In India's Foreign Policy. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues,* 23(1), 24–37.

Sikri, R. (2011). The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations. *Journal of International Affairs*, 64(2), 55–71.

Singh, A. K. (2014). Concept of National Security: An Overview. *Journal of Emerging Technologies and Innovative Research*, 2(12), 1920-26.

Singh, B. (2015). India's Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century: Shifting Paradigm. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *76*(2), 237–244.

Singh, B. P. (2015). India's Look East Policy: an Assessment. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *76*(1), 101–116.

Singh, G. (2006). India at the Rabat Islamic Summit (1969). *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *1*(2), 105–120.

Singh, M.C. (2012). Indians and Israelis: Beyond Strategic Partnership. *Israel Studies*, 17(3), 22-44.

Singh, S. C. (1964). India and the United Nations. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *25*(3/4), 85–89.

Singh, S. N. (1984). Why India goes to Moscow for Arms. *Asian Survey*, *24*(7), 707–720.

Singh, S. N. (2008). Emerging Frontiers of India's Foreign Policy. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *3*(1), 27–39.

Singh, S. P. (2004). Indo-Arab Relations in the light of Palestine Problem (1930 to 1945). *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*,*(65)*, 1025–1030.

Singh, S. R. (2001). India and Israel: Towards Greater Co-operation. *India Quarterly*, *57*(4), 113–148.

Singh, V., Shukla, S., & Singh, A. (2021). The principal factors responsible for biodiversity loss. *Open Journal of Plant Science*, 6(1), 011-014.

Sinha, D. (2017). International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and India-Pakistan Disputes. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *12*(3), 202–214.

Sitaraman, S. (2015). Tangible–Intangible Factors Interaction on Hostility Escalation and Rivalry Endurance: The Case of India–Pakistan Rivalry. *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, *2*(2), 154–179.

Siwach, R. S. (2003). India's Security in the 21st Century: Challenges, Management and Futuristic Directions. *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs*, *16*(1/2), 145–158.

Snyder, J. C. (1994). US-Pakistan Relations and the Post- Cold War Security Order: Sustaining an Alliance of Interests. *Strategic Studies*, *17*(1/2), 68–89.

Sobin, J. M. (1991). The China-Israel Connection: New Motivations for Rapprochement. *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, *15*(1), 111–125.

Sreenivasan, T. P. (2009). India at the United Nations: More Give than Take. *India Quarterly*, *65*(4), 475–481.

Srinath, T.M. (2020). Transfer of Technology in Indian Defence Manufacture - Elements and Challenges. *Journal of Management Research and Analysis*, 7(1), 6-10.

Srivastava, R. K. (1970). India-Israel relations. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *31*(3), 238–264.

Staniland, P. (2020). The BJP and Indian Foreign Policy [Review of *Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy*, by I. Hall's]. *Asia Policy*, *15*(2), 172–175.

Stengel, F.A & Baumaan, R. (2017). Non- State Actors and Foreign Policy. *Research Gate*. September, 2017. DOI:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.456

Subedi, S. P. (1994). India-Nepal Security Relations and the 1950 Treaty: Time for New Perspectives. *Asian Survey*, 34(3), 273–284.

Sunil Kumar. (2017). Indo-Israeli Relations: A Quest for Great-Power Status since 1991. *Jewish Political Studies Review*, 28 (3/4) 38-45.

Suri, G. (2016). India's Maritime Security Concerns and the Indian Ocean Region. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, *11*(3), 238–252.

Swain, P. C. (2008). Dynamics of the Indian Party System : The Emergence of Competitive Multi party Coalitions. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *69*(1), 59–70.

Swamy, S. (1982). The secret friendship between India and Israel. *Sunday,* 10(21), 18-23.

Talbott, S. (1995).The New Geopolitics: Defending Democracy in the Post-Cold War Era. *The World Today*, *51*(1), 7–10.

Telhami, S. (1993). Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War. *Political Science Quarterly*, *108*(3), 437–452.

Thakur, H. K. (2023). Contesting China in the Maldives: India's foreign policy challenge. *The Round Table,* 112(4), 421-437.

Thakur, K. K. (2013). British Colonial Exploitation of India and Globalisation. *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, (74), 405–415.

Thakur, R. (1992). India after Non-alignment. *Foreign Affairs,* 71(2), 165-182.

Thakur, R. (1993). The Impact of the Soviet Collapse on Military Relations with India. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *45*(5), 831–850.

Thakur, R. (1993). The Impact of the Soviet Collapse on Military Relations with India. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *45*(5), 831–850.

Timberg, T. A. (1998). The Impact of Indian Economic Liberalisation on U.S -India Relations. *SAIS Review (1989-2003)*, *18*(1), 123–136.

Tripathi, D. (1988). India's Foreign Policy: The Rajiv Factor. *The World Today*, *44*(7), 112–114.

Tripathi, S. (2013 a). India's Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Scenario. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, *17*(1), 38–51.

Tripathy, S. (2013 b). India's Policy Towards Palestine: A Historical Perspective. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *74*(1), 159–172.

Ullman, R.H. (1983). Redefining Security. *International Security*, 8(1), 1983, 149-156.

Van der Mey, L.M. (1994) The India—China conflict: Explaining the outbreak of war 1962. *Diplomacy & Statecraft,* 5(1), 183-199.

Vasudevan, P. (1983). Prospects for Non –Alignment: India's Role, *India Quarterly*, 39(1) 50-62.

Vedza, K. (2011).Cyber Crime & its Categories. Indian Journal of Applied Research. 3(5),130-133.

Vereté, M. (1970). The Balfour Declaration and Its Makers. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 6(1), 48–76.

Verma, D. P. (1989). Jawaharlal Nehru: Panchsheel and Indian's Constitutional Vision of International Order. *India Quarterly*, *45*(4), 301–323.

Vyshnevska, O., Melnyk, I., Sarapina, O., Pinchuk, T., & Yeremian, O. (2020). Global community security: Manifestations, priorities, and threats. *Ukrainian Journal of Ecology,* 10(5), 259-265.

Wallerstein, I. (1993). The World-System after the Cold War. *Journal of Peace Research*, *30*(1), 1–6.

Waltz, K.N. (1996). International Politics is not foreign policy, *Security Studies*, Vol.6 Issue (1) 54-57.

Wani, P. Suhas., Mukund, D., Patil and Singh, D. (2019).Strengthening Food Security through Technologies. *National Security*, Vol. II (2) 170-190.

Wazir, I. & Wahdat, R. (2022).National Goals in Foreign Policy. *Integrated Journal for Research in Arts and Humanities,* 2(4), 45-50.

Wedgwood, R. (1998). The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. *The American Journal of International Law*, *92*(4), 724–728.

Weiner, M. (1971). The 1971 Elections and the Indian Party System. *Asian Survey*, *11*(12), 1153–1166.

Welch, D. A. (1992). The Politics and Psychology of Restraint: Israeli Decision-Making in the Gulf War. *International Journal*, *47*(2), 328–369.

Wilson, P., Zhang, Y., Knudsen, T. B., Sharp, P., & Navari, C. (2016). The English School in retrospect and prospect: Barry Buzan's An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach [Review of An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach, by B. Buzan]. Cooperation and Conflict, 51(1), 94–136.

Wish, N. B. (1980). Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions. *International Studies Quarterly*, *24*(4), 532–554.

Wright, H. M. (1967). "Imperialism": The Word and its Meaning. *Social Research*, *34*(4), 660–674.

Yadav, A., & Rana, S. (2020). Indo- Chine Face off: A failure to Democracy. *International Journal of Legal Science and Innovation.* 2 (1), 895-907.

Yadav, R.S. (1993). NAM in the New World Order. *India Quarterly*, 49(3), 53-70

Yadav, R.S. (2008). India's Energy Security. *India Quarterly,* 64(3) 1-27.

Yilmaz, M.E. (2008). "The New World Order": An Outline of the Post-Cold War Era. *Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations*. 7(4), Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/19517

Yolcu, F.H. (2016). An Assessment of Israel's Position in the 1991 Gulf War. *Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 3(1), 165-186.

Yuan, J.-D. (2001). India's Rise after Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments. *Asian Survey*, *41*(6), 978–1001.

Zaidi, A. M. & Zaidi, S.G. (1977). *The Encyclopedia of the Indian National Congress*. New Delhi, as quoted in Hasan, S. (2007). Sectional President's Address: The Evolution of India's Palestine Policy: A Fall From the Heights? *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, *68*, 1125–1140.

Zhang, H. & Chen, S. (2022). Overview of research on marine resources and economic development. *Marine Economics and Management*, 5(1), 69-83.

C. INTERNET SOURCES

Abdi, B. (2018, January 03). 'Cabinet approves MoU between India and Israel for cooperation in Oil and Gas Sector'. *ET Energy world.* Retrieved from https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/oil-and-gas/cabinet-approves-mou-between-india-and-israel-on-cooperation-in-oil-and-gas-sector/62353415, accessed on 02, January 2023.

Abhayankar, R. (2012). The Evolution and Future of Indo-Israel Relations. (Research Paper No.06). *S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies*, Tel Aviv University. Retrieved from https://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/abraham/india-israel.pdf, accessed on 03, April 2023

Adhikari, N. (2021, December, 29). Border security challenges: Complicated and menacing. Retrieved from https://thehimalayantimes.com/opinion/border-security-challenges-complicated-and-menacing, accessed on 12 August, 2023.

Afterman, G. and Janardhan, N. (2023, March 28). India and Israel can be pivotal in Re-globalising Asia. *Observer Research Foundation*. Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-and-israel-can-be-pivots-in-reglobalising-asia/, accessed on 02, June 2023.

Ahmed, S, N. (2023, June 06). Enriching the Defence Contours of India-Maldives Relations. *Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis,* Retrieved from https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Enriching-the-Defence-Contours-of-India-Maldives-Relations-NSAhmed-060623, accessed on 12, October 2023.

Albrecht, P., & Podder, S. (2020). India and UN Peacekeeping. In Protection of Civilians from the Perspective of the Soldiers who protect: Ghana and India in United Nations Peacekeeping (pp. 47–60). Danish Institute for International Studies. DIIS Report No. 2020:04. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10419/249923 accessed on 22, October 2022.

Alterman, J.B & Mohan, R.C. (2022, December 13). India's Middle East Strategy. *Centre for Strategic and International Studies.* Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/indias-middle-east-strategy, accessed on 22 July 2023.

Arora, R. (2022, February 09). Semiconductors - at the Core of Artificial Intelligence Technologies. Retrieved from https://indiaai.gov.in/article/semiconductors-at-the-core-of-artificial-intelligence-technologies, accessed on 10 January 2023.

Ashok, A. (2020, November 18). 'Pakistan's State Sponsored Terrorism: An Unholy Alliance of Decades'. *Centre for Land Warfare Studies*. Retrieved from https://www.claws.in/pakistans-state-sponsored-terrorism-an-unholy- accessed on 02, January 2022.

Bajoria, J. (2008, November 07). RAW: India's External Intelligence Agency. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/raw-indias-external-intelligence-agency, accessed 22, July 2023.

Balasubramaniam, T.K & Murugesan, A.K. (2020, June 08). China's Rising Missile and Naval Capabilities in the Indo-Pacific Region: Security Implications for India and Its Allies. *Journal of Indo- Pacific Affairs.* Retrieved from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2210972/chinas-rising-missile-and-naval-capabilities-in-the-indo-pacific-region-securit/, accessed on 23 September 2022.

Banerjee, A. (2022, December 30). The role of technology in diplomacy: How has technology changed the way that diplomats communicate and work with one another?. Retrieved from https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/role-technology-diplomacy-how-has-changed-way-work-one-mr-a-banerjee, accessed on 03, June 2023.

Bano, S. (2020, August 29). Indian Militarization of Outer Space: Security Implications for Pakistan. Retrieved from https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/08/29/indian-militarization-of-outer-space-security-implications-for-pakistan/ accessed on 06, June 2023.

Banoth, S.P. (2023, October 02).The 'Tibet factor' in the India China Border Dispute. *Centre for Joint Warfare Studies.* Retrieved from https://cenjows.in/the-tibet-factor-in-the-india-china-border-dispute/, accessed 10, November 2023.

Baru, S. (2008, November, 14). India and the World – Economics and Politics of the Manmohan Singh Doctrine in Foreign Policy. *ISAS Working Paper* No. 53. Retrieved from https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/media/isas_papers/Working%20Paper%2053%20-%20Email%20, accessed on 07 August 2023.

Baru, S. (2017). Smart Border Management: Indian Coastal and Maritime Security. *FICCI, PWC India,* September 2017. Retrieved from https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2017/smart-border-management-indian-coastal-and-maritime-security accessed on 22 July 2022.

Baruah, D.M. (2020, June 30). India in the Indo-Pacific: Delhi Theatre of Opportunity. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved from

https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/30/india-in-indo-pacific-new-delhi-s-theater-of-opportunity-pub-82205, accessed on 22 September 2023.

Basu, N. (2019, February 24). OIC invite to India as 'guest of honour' comes 50 years after major snub at launch. *Diplomacy.* Retrieved from https://theprint.in/diplomacy/oic-invite-to-india-as-guest-of-honour-comes-50-years-after-major-snub-at-launch/19 accessed on 10 October 2022.

Behera, L.K. (2023). Securing India: Significance of Geo-economics and Innovation in India's Foreign Policy and Strategic Competition with China, *Working Paper*, April 2023 (p.1-33). Retrieved from https://ucigcc.org/publication/working-papers/geoeconomics-and-innovation-in-indias-strategic-competition-with-china/ accessed on 10, July 2023.

Benaskeur, A; Irandoust, H. (2007). Sensor management for tactical surveillance operations. Defence R&D Canada- Valcartier Technical Memorandum. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA475273.pdf, accessed on 30, June 2022.

Benn, A. (2000, June 26). Advani's visit boosts India-Israel ties, but Tel Aviv may be averse to aiding directly, India Today. Retrieved from Retrieved from Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/diplomacy/story/20000626-advanis-visit-boosts-india-israel-ties-but-tel-aviv-may-be-averse-to-aiding-directly-777777-2000-06- accessed on 13 July 2022.

Bhandari, A., Fernandes, B., & Agarwal, A. (2020). Chinese Investments in India. Gateway House. Retrieved from https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Chinese-Investments-in-India-Report_2020_Final.pdf, accessed on 12, February, 2022.

Bhatia, S. (1977, December 31). Indo-Egypt relations: A friend in need. *India Today.* Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/economy/story/19771231-indo-egypt-relations-a-friend-in-need-823976-2014-0, accessed on 20, November 2022.

Bhatt, V. (2021). Indo-Israel Water Management and Innovations in Agriculture. *Research Gate.* XCII (pp.1-10), Retrieved from https://www. researchgate.net /publication/353484460_Indo-Israel_Water_Management_and_Innovations_ in_Agriculture, accessed on 20 August 2023.

Bhattacharjee, D. (2016, October 17). *"Israeli Space Program – The Challenges Ahead", Indian Council of World Affairs,* Retrieved from https://www.icwa.in/ show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=1781&lid=776, accessed on 12, January 2023.

Bhattacherjee, K. (2017, May 27). *With Nehru writing to its PM, Israel gave arms to India in 1962. The Hindu.* Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/with-nehru-writing-to-its-pm-israel-gave-arms-to-india-in-1962/article185, accessed on 23, July 2023.

Blakemore, E. (2022, March 23).Cold War Facts and Information. National Geographic. Retrieved from, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/cold-war, accessed on 26, February 2023.

Bommakanthi, K. & Patil, S. (2022, May 12). Explained: India's Arms Import from Russia. *Raisina Debates*. Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-arms-imports-from-russia/, accessed on 28, July 2023.

Borah, J. (2015, May 08). India and Asian Leadership. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/india-and-asian-leadership/, accessed on 11, September 2022.

Bosler, M. & Bostick, R. (2023, June 07). Israel's Biggest Opportunity Is AI, Economy Minister Says. *Bloomberg*. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-06/israel-s-biggest-opportunity-now-is-ai-economy-minister-sa, accessed on 20, February 2023.

Brands, H & Suri, J. (2016). History and the Foreign Policy: Making the Relationship Work. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. Retrieved from https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/04/history-foreign-policy-making-relationship-work/, accessed on 03, March 2023.

Brooks, R. (2017, February 03). How David Became a Goliath: The Secret of Israel's Military Success. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/books/review/weapon-wizards-yaakov-katz-amir-bohbot.html, accessed on 08, March 2023.

Burton, G. (2019, August 06). India's 'Look West Policy in the Middle East under Modi. *Middle East Institute*. Retrieved from https://www.mei.edu/publications/indias-look-west-policy-middle-east-under-modi. Accessed on 13, May 2023.

Cafiero, G. (2023, September 17). Three years on, how have the Abraham Accords helped the UAE?. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/17/three-years-on-how-have-the-abraham-accords-done-for-the-uae, accessed on 06 October 2023.

Cai, P. (2017, March 22). Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative. *Lowy Institute*. Retrieved from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-china-s-belt-road-initiative, accessed on 29, October 2022.

Charret, C. (2009). A Critical Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the Normative Dilemma of Writing Security. *International Catalan Institute for Peace*. Retrieved from https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/5569613.pdf, accessed on 10, March 2023.

Chathurvedy, R.R. (2017). India-Israel Relations under Narendra Modi: A Robust Partnership in the Making. Institute of South Asian Studies. Retrieved from https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/430-india-israel-relations-under-narendra-modi-a-robust-partnership-in-the-ma, accessed on 20, August 2023.

Chaturvedy, R. R. (2017). India-Israel Relations under Modi: A Robust Partnership in the Making. *Institute of South Asian Studies*. Journal No. 430, July, (pp.01–08). Retrieved from https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/430-india-israel-relations-under-narendra-modi-a-robust-partnership-in-the-ma, accessed on 20, March 2023.

Chaudhari, D.R. (2022, August 24). 'India pushes for renewable energy initiative with Central Asia: invites region to join International Solar Alliance', *The Economic Times*. Retrieved from https://econom ictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/renewables

/india-pushes-for-renewable-energy-initiative-with-central-asia-invites-region-to-join-international-solar-alliance/a, accessed on 10, March 2023.

Chaudhari, K. (2003, August 15). Bhutan's Resolve. *The Frontline.* Retrieved from https://frontline.thehindu.com/other/article30218230.ece, accessed on 06, July 2023.

Chauhan, P. (2016, April 29). 'India as Net Security Provider in the Indian Ocean and beyond'. *Centre for International Maritime Security*. Retrieved from https://cimsec.org/india-net-security-provider-indian-ocean-beyond/, accessed on 08, May 2023.

Chiang, M. (2021, July 07). The Era of 'Tech Diplomacy' is here. *Forbes.* Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/mungchiang/2021/07/07/the-era-of-tech-diplomacy-is-here/, accessed on 24, July 2023.

Ciprut, J. V. (2017, July 11). *Israel and India: Is the Sky the Limit? Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*. Retrieved from https://besacenter.org/israel-india-collaboration/, accessed on 12, April 2023.

Crossette, B. (1991 January 30). India in an Uproar over Refueling of US Aircraft. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/30/world/india-in-an-uproar-over-refueling-of-us-aircraft.html, accessed on 18, August 2023.

Davis, L.E (2003). Globalisation's Security Implications. *Issue Paper RAND Corporation* (pp.01-08). Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP245.html, accessed on 06, June 2023.

Debory, B., & Sinha, A. (2023, June 13). Opinion: 9 Ways India's Foreign Policy Has Evolved in 9 Years. NDTV. Retrieved from https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/9-ways-indias-foreign-policy-has-evolved-in-9-years-4116701, accessed on 20, October 2023.

Deshpande, P.P. (2022 July 27). A critical review of foreign policy of India since 1947 till date, Part- I, *Times of India*. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/truth-lies-and-politics/a-critical-review-of-foreign-policy-of-india-since-1947-till-date-part-i/, accessed on 10, November 2022.

Deshpande, P.P. (2023, July 31). China's Belt and Road initiative with likely implications for India and the world, *Times of India*. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/truth-lies-and-politics/chinas-belt-road-initiative-with-likely-implications-fo, accessed on 06, October 2023.

Dewaal, A. (2020, December 9). Food as a Weapon of War and the Nobel Peace Prize for the World Food Program: Calling out the Culprits. Retrieved from https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2020/12/09/food-as-a-weapon-of-war-and-the-nobel-peace-prize-for-the-world-food-program-calling-out-the-culprits/, accessed on 10, April 2023.

Dio, N. (2016, December 14). Indian foreign policy: a paradigm shift?. *Gate way House*, Retrieved from https://www.gatewayhouse.in/indian-foreign-policy-a-paradigm-shift/ accessed on 13, October 2022.

Donnellon, G. (2023, May 18). India and China's rivalry in reshaping South Asia. *The Strategist*. Retrieved from https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-chinas-rivalry-is-reshaping-south-asia/ accessed on 10, September 2023.

Dormandy, X. (2007, November 05).India's Foreign Policy. *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*. Retrieved from https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/indias-foreign-policy, accessed on 28, October 2022.

Dutta, P.K. (2017, October 20). This day in 1962: China-India war started with synchronised attack on Ladakh, Arunachal. *India Today*. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-china-war-1962-20-october-aksai-chin-nefa-arunchal-pradesh-1067703-2017-10-20, accessed on 17, April 2023.

Dutta, P.K. (2018, January 15). 'Can Israel's Mossad help RAW neutralise ISI's terror Proteges'?, India Today. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/can-israel-s-mossad-help-raw-neutralise-isi-s-terror-proteges-1145888-201, accessed on 23, April 2023.

Dutta, P.K. (2020, June 22). How China Captured Aksai Chin. *India Today*. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/how-china-captured-aksai-chin-1691562-2020-06-22, accessed on 20, April 2023.

Dutta, S. (2000). Security of India's Northeast: External Linkage. *Strategic Analysis*: *A Monthly Journal of the IDSA. 24(8).* Retrieved from https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_nov00das01.html accessed on 10, October 2022.

Duvereux, S. (2012). Social Protection for Enhanced Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa *United Nations Development Programme* Retrieved from https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/africa/Social-Protection-Food-Security.pdf , accessed on 06, May 2023.

Egozi, A. (2013, August 02). The Israeli Defence Industries. *Defence Review Asia.* Retrieved from https://defencereviewasia.com/the-israeli-defence-industries/ accessed on 06, March 2023.

Erickson, A. S., & Collins, G. (2015, June 18). China, Indian Ocean, Dragon Tracks: Emerging Chinese Access Points in the Indian Ocean Region. Retrieved from https://amti.csis.org/dragon-tracks-emerging-chinese-access-points-in-the-indian-ocean-region/, accessed on 10 March 2023.

Eroukhmanoff, C. (2018, January 14). Securitisation Theory: An Introduction. *E-international Relations.* Retrieved from https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/securitisation-theory-an-introduction/, accessed on 11, July 2023.

Essa, A. (2022, May 31). India and Israel: The arms trade in charts and numbers. *Middle East Eye*. Retrieved from https://www.globalresearch.ca/india-israel-arms-trade-charts-numbers/5782585, accessed on 20, August 2023.

Ethiranjan, A. (2020, September 17). 'China debt dogs Maldives' Bridge to Prosperity', *BBC* Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52743072, accessed on 15, March 2023.

Fabin, E. (2023). Israeli Arms Trade Doubles in a decade, Hit a New Record of $ 12.5 billion in 2022. *Times of Israel.* Retrieved from https://www.timesofisrael.com

/israeli-arms-sales-doubled-in-a-decade-hit-new-record-of-12-5-billion-in-2022/,accessed on 13, September 2023.

Fannigan, C. (2019, March 20). Security Challenges along the India-Myanmar border. *London School of Economics.* Retrieved from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2019/03/20/security-challenges-along-the-india-myanmar-border/, accessed on 06, August, 2023.

Fishman, R. H. B. (2016). 'Israel's Health and Medicine: Israel's Innovation in Medical Technology'. *Jewish Virtual Library,* Retrieved from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israeli-innovations-in-medical-technology, accessed on 06, September 2023.

Gilani, I. (2020, May 31). India's Boarder Dispute with Neighbours. *Andolu Ajancy.* Retrieved from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/indias-border-dispute-with-neighbors/1859854, accessed on 11, October 2022.

Gill, G (2023). Israel's Approach to Building Cyber Capabilities: Lessons for the Indian Armed Forces. *Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.* Retrieved from https://policycommons.net/artifacts/3894974/israels-approach-to-building-cyber-capabilities/4701300/, accessed on 09, September 2023.

Girisankar, S.B. (2020, May 28). Addressing India's Concern over the OBOR (One Belt One Road) Initiative through a Liberal Perspective. *The Diplomatist.* Retrieved from https://diplomatist.com/2020/05/28/addressing-indias-concern-over-the-obor-one-belt-one-road-initiative-through-a, accessed on 07, July, 2023.

Goodman, M.P. (2023, May 31). G-7 Gives First Definition to 'Economic Security'. *Centre for Strategic and International Studies.* Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis /g7-gives-first-definition-economic-security, accessed 28, June, 2023.

Goodman, M.P., Reynolds, M., and Fittipaldi, J. (2022, May 17). Economic Security in Emerging Markets a Look at India, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-security-emerging-markets-look-india-vietnam-and-indonesia, accessed 28, June 2023.

Gorawantschy, B., and Böhme, M. M. (2010). India: Internal and External Security-Current Challenges to the Government. *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.* Retrieved from https://www.kas.de/en/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/indien-innere-und-aeussere-sicherheit-a, accessed on 10, July 2023

Gosh, P.K. (2015).'How Beneficial are Joint Exercise by Military?' Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/research/how-beneficial-are-joint-exercises-by-the-military/, accessed on 23, July 2023.

Gupta, A. K. (2017). Modi in Israel: Diplomacy and Development. *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.* Retrieved from https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/547- PM-Modis-Visit-to-Israel-Gupta-final.pdf, accessed on 06, October 2023.

Gupta, S. (2020, January, 23).India Increases Tech Surveillance on Ladakh LAC with Israeli Heron drones. *Hindustan Times*. Retrieved from https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/surveillance-shored-up-forces-added-in-ladakh/story-e1GBA1qGwodVr1lm2L4LMJ.html, accessed on 09, September, 2023.

Haque, A. (2017, May 17). Jawaharlal Nehru-The architect of India's foreign policy. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jawaharlal-nehru-the-architect-of-indias-foreign-policy/articleshow/58767014.cms, accessed on 11, November 2022.

Harold, S.W (2018). Defeat, Not Merely Compete, China's views of military aerospace goals and requirements in relation to the United States'. Santa Monica, CA: *RAND Corporation.* Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2588.html, accessed on 10, May 2023.

Hussain, H. (2017, August 21). Remembering the arson attack on the Al- Aqsa Mosque. *Middle East Monitor*. Retrieved from https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170821-remembering-the-arson-attack-on-al-aqsa-mosque/, accessed on 25, July 2023.

Ians. (2019, January 29). India hailed for giving refuge to Jews fleeing Nazi genocide. *Business Standard*. Retrieved from https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/india-hailed-for-giving-refuge-to-jews-fleeing-nazi-genocide-1, accessed on 25, February 2023.

Ians. (2021, April 30). 'Myanmar Drug Surge worry for neighbours including India'. WION. Retrieved from https://www.wionews.com/india-news/myanmar-drug-surge-worry-for-neighbours-including-india-381602, accessed on 10, September 2023.

Inbar, E. (2017, July 01). Modi Is Coming to Jerusalem. *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*. Retrieved from https://besacenter.org/modi-jerusalem/, accessed on 09, July 2023.

Inbar, E. (2017, June 07). The Background to the First Ever Visit to Israel by an Indian Prime Minister. *Asia Pacific Bulletin,* No.333, Retrieved from https://medium.com/asia-pacific-bulletin/the-background-to-the-first-ever-visit-to-israel-by-an-indian-prime-minister-63f81f13407, accessed on 09, July, 2023.

International Energy Agency. (2023, August 03). Emergency Response and Energy Security. Retrieved from https://www.iea.org/about/emergency-response-and-energy-security, accessed from 09, October 2023.

International Maritime Organisation (2023, June 08). IMO and its role in protecting the world's oceans, Retrieved from https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/oceans-default.aspx, 18, September 2023.

Israel, I.B. (2021, June 28). How did Israel became a Global Cyber Power?. *Israel Forbes.* Retrieved from https://forbes.co.il/e/how-did-israel-become-a-global-cyber-power/, accessed on 13, August 2023.

ISRO. (2023, April, 26). Israel Space Agency. Retrieved from https://www.isro.gov.in/Israel%20Space%20Agency.html, accessed on 16, August 2023.

Jaghory, D. (2022, July 14). Cyber security in Israel: Fortifying Digital Defenses amid Elevated Risks. NASDAQ. Retrieved from https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/cybersecurity-in-israel%3A-fortifying-digital-defenses-amid-elevated-risks, accessed on 20, October 2023.

Jain, B. (2022, July 06). 'Israel Focuses on Training next-gen to drive its Cyber Systems'. *Times of India.* Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/israel-focuses-on-training-next-gen-to-drive-its-cyber-systems/articleshow/92610619.cms, accessed on 13, January 2023.

Jash, A. (2022). India–China Boundary Dispute: Progress on Disengagement, but De-escalation Remains Far-fetched. *IAI Commentary*, Issue 22I48, Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=4285631, accessed on 17 August 2023.

Jayaprakash, N.D. (2005, June 05). India and the Bandung Conference of 1955-II. *Peoples Democracy*, 24 (23). Retrieved from https://archives.peoplesdemocracy.in/2005/0605/06052005_bandung%20conf.html, accessed on 10, December 2022.

Jayswal, P.J. (2022, November 03). Paradigm Shift in India's Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi. Retrieved from https://organiser.org/2022/11/03/97745/analysis/indias-foreign-policy-has-undergone-a-paradigm-shift/,accessed on 13, April 2023.

Jha, R. (2017, November 23). India and Israel: Cooperation on Water Management, *The Economic Times*. Retrieved from https://m.economictimes.com/news/economy/agriculture/india-israel-cooperation-on-water-management/articleshow/61767010.cms, accessed on 29, July 2023.

Jindal, D. & Soliman, M. (2023, July 06) Understanding the Growth of Indo-Israeli Strategic Cyber Partnership. *Middle East Institute*. Retrieved from https://www.mei.edu/publications/understanding-growing-indo-israeli-strategic-cyber-partnership, accessed on 30, July 2023.

Jochheim, U., & Lobo, R. B. (2023). Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific: Major players' strategic perspectives. Retrieved from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/751398/EPRS_BRI(2023)751398_EN.pdf, accessed on 18, November 2023.

Jorisch, A. (2021, December, 19). Israel has a number of technologies worth exploring for the benefit of India. *The Week,* accessed on 10 March 2023.

Joshi, M. (2018, February 16). Success of Modi's 'Act West' policy opens doors to Gulf potential. *Observer Research Foundation*. Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/ research/success-modi-act-west-policy-opens-doors-gulf-potential/, accessed on 12, May 2023.

Kakkar, H. (2023, February 07). Defence Spending a Part of National Development. Retrieved from https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/defence-spending-a-part-of-national-development-1503152851.html, accessed on 12, March 2023.

Kakkar, H. (2023, February 14). India's Changing Security Threats. Retrieved from https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/indias-changing-security-threats-1503154525.html, accessed on 10, May 2023.

Kapoor, A. (2023, June 28). Need of Integrated Space Defence Program in India. *Geospatial World.* Retrieved from Retrieved fromhttps://www.geospatialworld.net/prime/special-features/indian-space-development-program/, accessed on 18 August 2023.

Kapoor, A. (2023, June 28). Need of Integrated Space Defence Program in India. Retrieved fromhttps://www.geospatialworld.net/prime/special-features/indian-space-development-program/, accessed on 28, August 2023.

Kapoor, V.K. (2017). Modernisation of Artillery in the Indian Army. Retrieved from https://spslandforces.com/story/?id=463&h=Modernisation-of-Artillery-in-the-Indian-Army, accessed on 02, February 2023.

Karve, A.R. (2018, November 29). Maritime security: a decade after 26/11. Retrieved from https://www. gatewayhouse.in/maritime-security-after-2611/, accessed on 18, September 2023.

Katoch, P. (2020, May 21). 'That's The Dragon in Nepal's Shadow. Retrieved from http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/thats-the-dragon-in-nepals-shadow/,accessed on 01, August 2023.

Katoch, P.C. (2022). Israel quietly embeds AI systems in deadly military operations. Retrieved from https://www.spslandforces.com/story/?id=816&h=Indo-Israel-Defence-Cooperation, accessed on 20, February 2023.

Kaushiki, N. (2022, April 25). Blending Multialignment with Multilateralism. Retrieved fromhttps://www.dailypioneer.com/2022/columnists/blending-multialignment-with-multilateralism.html, accessd on 18, January 2023.

Kennedy, G & Pant, H.V. (2016, August 08). Indian Navy's Maritime Security Strategy: An Assessment. Retrieved from https://maritimeindia.org/indian-navys-maritime-security-strategy-an-assessment/, accessed on 24, August 2023.

Kesavan, K.V. (2020) India's Act East Policy and Regional Cooperation, *Observer Research Foundation,* Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-act-east-policy-and-regional-cooperation-61375/, accessed on 30, May 2023.

Khakurel, H. (2015). Nepal- India Open Boarder Challenges and Prospects. *Master of Militay Studies.* (pp. 01- 39). Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/ trecms/pdf/AD1175898.pdf, accessed on 30, September 2023.

Kugelman, M. (2023, January 19). China has Become India's Greatest Threat. *Foreign Policy.*
Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/19/india-china-military-threat-security-pakistan/, accessed on 12, July 2023.

Kumar, J. (2014, November 13). The Saga of India-Israel Intelligence Cooperation. *Indian Defence Review.* Retrieved from http://www.indiandefencereview.com/the-saga-of-india-israel-intelligence-co-operation/, accessed on 29, September 2023.

Kumar, R. (2017, July, 09). 'India-Israel Relations: Not Sky, Principles Should Be The Limit'. *Out look.* Retrieved from https://www.outlookindia.com/ website/story/india-israel-relations-not-sky-principles-should-be-the-limit/299519, accessed on 20, September, 2023.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (1998). Strategic Partnership between Israel and India. *Middle East Review of International Affairs.* 2(2) Retrieved from https://ciaotest.cc.columbia. edu/olj/meria/meria598_kumaraswamy.html, accessed on 23, August 2023.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2011). Relations with Israel: UPA and the Left. *Middle East Institute,* New Delhi. Issue No. 16, 15 April 2011, Retrieved from http://www.mei.org.in/archives-occassional-paper/relations-with-israel-the-upa-and-the-indian-left/issue-no-16/it-is-easier-to, accessed on 18, August 2022.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2017). Modi in Israel. *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs,* Retrieved from https://fount.aucegypt.edu/faculty_journal_articles/4057, accessed on 20, September 2022.

Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2019, October 11). Modi Transforms India's approach in the Middle East. *East Asia Forum.* Retrieved from https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/10/11/modi-transforms-indias-approach-to-the-middle-east/, accessed 20, May 2023.

Kuo, M.A (2017, August 01). China, India, and Israel's Strategic Calculus. *The Diplomat.* Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/china-india-and-israels-strategic-calculus/,accessed on 10, April, 2022.

Kuruwita, R. (2023, July 12). Israel's Role in Sri Lanka's Dirty War. *The Diplomat.* Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2023/07/israels-role-in-sri-lankas-dirty-war/, accessed on 06, August, 2023.

Kweera, R. (2023, May 06). Drones: An Emerging Threat on the Volatile India-Pakistan Border. *The Diplomat.* Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/drones-an-emerging-threat-on-the-volatile-india-pakistan-border/, accessed on 06 August, 2023.

Lal, N. (2009, April 21). India's eye in the sky takes the aim. *Asia Times.* Retrieved from https://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/India-Israel-Palestine/Lal-Neeta/Indias-eye-in-the-sky-takes-aim, accessed on 12, February 2022.

Lee, K. (2012, February 16). Globalisation: What is it and how does it affect health? *The Medical Journal of Australia.* Retrieved from https://www.mja.com.au/journal/2004/180/4/globalisation-what-it-and-how-does-it-affect-health, accessed on 22 January 2023.

Madan, T. (2016, February 11). Why India and Israel are bringing their relationship out from "under the carpet". *Brookings.* Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/02/11/why-india-and-israel-are-bringing-their-relationship-out-from-under-the-carpet/, accessed on 12, March 2022.

Madhav, R. (2014). Brooks Report: Four Failures that led to the 1962 debacle. *Rediff.com* Retrieved from https://www.rediff.com/news/column/brooks-report-four-failures-that-led-to-the-1962-debacle/20140321.htm, accessed on 25, January 2023.

Mahajan, S. (2018, March, n.d). Foreign Policy of Colonial India: 1900-1947. *Research Gate.* Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 326110132_Foreign_Policy_of_Colonial_India_1900-1947, accessed on 12, January 2023.

Mahapatra, D. (2022, April 6). India's Non- Aligned Movement. *Times of India.* Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/periscope/indias-non-aligned-moment/ accessed on 11, November 2022.

Majunath, K.S. & Anand, B. (2013). India's Credible Minimum Deterrence: A Report. *IPCS Special Report,* Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/100223/IPCS-Special-Report-13.pdf, accessed on 06, June 2023.

Manhas, N.S. (2023). India's Responses to Rising Drone Attacks on its Territory. *Terrorism Monitor ,*21(13). Retrieved from https://jamestown.org/program/indias-responses-to-rising-drone-attacks-on-its-territory/, accessed on 23, September 2023.

Mansoor, T. (2022). How PM Modi Transformed India's Relations with Gulf Nations. *Outlook.* Retrieved from https://www.outlookindia.com/national/how-pm-modi-transformed-india-s-relations-with-arab-gulf-news-206830, accessed on 16, August 2023.

Matheson, A. (2021). Health Security Is the New Pillar of National Security in Order for Nations Around the Globe to Thrive in the 21st Century. Retrieved from https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/22/305/Allan-Matheson.pdf, accessed on 22, March 2023.

Mathew, W.M. (2021, February 21). India, Palestine and the Balfour Declaration. *Balfour Project*. Retrieved from https://balfourproject.org/india-palestine/, accessed on 12, March 2023.

Mathur, R. (2019). History Revisited: How political parties fared in 1980 Lok Sabha election. *Zee News*. Retrieved from https://zeenews.india.com/tags/history-of-lok-sabha-elections.html, accessed on 18, April 2023.

Mc Cullum, S. (2023, August 03). What are semiconductors and how are they used?. *BBC News*. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-66394406, accessed on 20, February 2023.

Menon & Rumer. (2022). India A New Chapter. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/20/russia-and-india-new-chapter-pub-87958, accessed on 20, March 2023.

Ministry of External Affairs. (2006). Present Dimensions of the Indian Foreign Policy. *Shanghai Institute of International Studies.* Retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?2078/Present+Dimensions+of+the+Indian+Foreign+Policy++Address+by+Foreign+Secretary+Mr+Shyam+Saran+at+Shan, accessed on 12, June 2022.

Ministry of External Affairs. (2015, August 15). India-Sri Lanka Relations. Retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/SrilankaBrief_August2015.pdf, accessed on 15, August 2023.

Mishra, D. (2018, September 13). India and Israel Should Build an Intelligence Co-operation Framework. *The Jerusalem Post.* Retrieved from https://www.jpost.com/opinion/india-and-israel-should-build-an-intelligence-cooperation-framework-567187, accessed on 19, June 2023.

Mishra, V. (2023. May 09). The transcending arc of India-US relations since Pokhran II. *Raisina Debates. Observer Research Foundation.* Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-transcending-arc-of-india-us-relations-since-pokhran-ii/, accessed on 17, September 2023.

Miskel, J.F. (2002). National Interest: Grand Purposes or Catchphrases?. *Naval War College Review, autumn 2002, Vol. LV.No.4.* Retrieved from https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2438&context=nwc-review, accessed on 13, July 2023.

Misra, J.N. (2019, December 10). Looking West: India's Relation with West Asia, from the Lecture in Central University of Kerala. *Ministry of External Affairs, India*, Retrieved from https://fsi.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?865, accessed on 07, September 2022.

Misra, J.N. (2019, October 10). Looking West: India's relations with West Asia. *Ministry of External Affairs,* India. Retrieved from https://fsi.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?865, accessed on 03, March 2023.

Mitra, A. (1991 July 15). Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: How Plot was hatched and executed by LTTE. *India Today*. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in /magazine/investigation/story/19910715-rajiv-gandhi-assassination-ltte-supremo-pirabhak, accessed on 22, August 2023.

Mitra, R. (2022, January 19). The China India Cold War in Maldives. *The Diplomat.* Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/the-china-india-cold-war-in-maldives/, accessed on 28, September 2023.

Mohan, R.C. (2006). India's New Foreign policy Strategy. *Cambridge Endowment for International Peace.* Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/ files/mohan.pdf, accessed on 09, December 2022.

Mohan, R.C. (2013, October 09). A moment for Asian solidarity. *Indian Express*. Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/a-moment-for-asian-solidarity/. accessed on 16, August 2022.

Mohan, R.C. (2019, March 1). 'OIC invitation to India is an opportunity to expand relationships in Muslim world', Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/article/ opinion/columns/organisation-of-islamic-cooperation-summit-sushma-swaraj-5605698/, accessed on 08, October 2022.

Mohan, V. (2022, August 1). Reenergizing Indian Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Analyzing the Security Problem through Bilateral and Multilateral Arrangements. *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.* Retrieved from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/ JIPA/Display/Article/3111112/reenergizing-indian-security-in-the-indian-ocean-region-analyzing-the-security/, accessed on 17, April 2023.

Morrow, D & Carriere, M. (1999). The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan. *The Non Proliferation Review*. Retrieved from https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/morrow64.pdf, accessed on 10, February 2023.

Muheleisen, M. (2018). The Long and the Short of the Digital Revolution. Finance and Development. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 329515181_The_Long_and_Short_of_The_Digital_Revolution, accessed on 19, August 2023.

Mukharjee, R. (2019). Indo-Pak Relations. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net /publication/338208413_India-Pakistan_Relations, accessed on 13, July 2023.

Mukherjee, M. (2021, June 13). Nehru's Word: Zionist aggression against Palestinians is wrong. *National Heralad.* Retrieved from https://www.nationalheraldindia. com/india/nehrus-word-zionist-aggression-against-palestinians-is-wrong, accessed on 02, July 2022.

Mukherjee, R & Malone, D.M. (2011). Indian Foreign Policy and Contemporary Security Challenges, *International Affairs.* Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/227734908_Indian_foreign_policy_and_contemporary_security_challen g, accessed on 08, March 2023.

Muralidharaan, M.P. (2022). Significance of Joint Maritime Exercises. *Indian Defence Review.* 37(4). Retrieved from http://www.indiandefencereview.com/ news/significance-of-joint-maritime-exercises/, accessed on 22, September 2023.

Mwale, S. (2022, July 14). Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. *The Diplomatic Insight.* Retrieved from https://thediplomaticinsight.com/diplomacy-and-foreign-policy/, accessed on 12, December 2022.

Nachiappan, K. (2023, March 20). India's Geo-Economic Foreign Policy. *The India Forum.* Retrieved from https://www.theindiaforum.in/international-affairs/indias-geo-economic-foreign-policy, accessed on 16, August 2023.

Nair, J.S. (2023, September 07). The Indian Space Programme. Retrieved from https://www.livelaw.in/lawschool/articles/the-indian-space-program-237249, accessed on 10, October 2023

Najjar, F & Alsaafin, L. (2018, February 10). Modi visits Ramallah, backs independent Palestine state. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/10/modi-visits-ramallah-backs-independent-palestine-state, accessed on 19, September 2023.

Nauydu, S.K. (2016, November 07). Nehru's India & the Suez Crisis of 1956. *Centre for the Advanced Study of India.* Retrieved from https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/ swapnakonanayudu2016, accessed on 10, December 2022.

Nayar, K.P. (2016, September 29). India's Steadfast Friend in Israel. *The Telegraph Online.* Retrieved from https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/india-s-steadfast-friend-in-israel/cid/1495981, accessed on 29, July 2023.

Nayyar, A. (2023, July, 23). The challenges that India's agriculture domain faces. *The Times of India.* Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/the-challenges-that-indias-agriculture-domain-faces/, accessed on 20, September 2023.

Ninjthoujam, A. (2020, July 21). The Future of Indo-Israeli Arms Trade. *The Jerusalem Institute of Strategy and Security.* Retrieved from https://jiss.org.il/en/ningthoujam-the-future-of-india-israel-arms-trade/, accessed on 03, October 2023.

Nitin, G. (2021, January 04). Hambantota: The Growing Nightmare for India. *Modern Diplomacy.* Retrieved from https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/01/24/hambantota-the-growing-nightmare-for-india/, accessed on 03, September 2023.

Opall, B. & Jayaraman, K.S. (2005, November 14). Israel Chooses Indian PSLV to Launch New Spy Satellite. *Space News.* Retrieved from https://spacenews.com/israel-chooses-indian-pslv-launch-new-spy-satellite/, accessed on 28, September 2023.

Ossa, R. (2023). Pillar of Economic Security. *International Monetary Fund.* Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2023/06/pillar-of-economic-security-ralph-ossa, accessed on 13, August 2023.

Ozcan, B. A. (2023). Defining Environmental Security as a National Security Issue. *Research Gate.* Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/370060937_Defining_Environmental_Security_as_a_National_Securit y_I, accessed on 03, September 2023.

Panagariya, A. (2014). India in the 1980s and 1990s: A Triumph of Reforms, *IMF Working Paper.* WP/04/43, Retrieved from https://www.imf. org/ external /pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0443.pdf, accessed on 22 March 2023.

Panda, J. P. & Baruah, A. G. (2019). Foreseeing India-China Relations: The 'Compromised Context' of Rapprochement. *East-West Center.* Retrieved from https://www. eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/ewc_api-n138_final_web_version.pdf, accessed on 17 June 2023.

Pant, H,V. & Mishra, V. (2022, July 27). The U.S.'s search for a new role in West Asia. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-uss-search-for-a-new-role-in-west-asia/article65685556.ece on 10 January 2023.

Pant, H.V. & Mishra,V. (2022, September 26). A ground plan for India's reformed multilateralism'. *Observer Research Foundation.* Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/research/a-ground-plan-for-indias-reformed-multilateralism/ *accessed* , accessed on 11 July 2023.

Pant, H.V. & Sahu, A. (2019, September 04). Israel's arms sales to India: Bedrock of a strategic partnership. *Observer Research Foundation.* Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/research/israels-arms-sales-to-india-bedrock-of-a-strategic-partnership-55101/, 09, September 2023.

Pant, H.V. & Shivamurthy, A.G. (2022, August17). As turbulence looms in South Asia, India emerges as an anchor. *Observer Research Foundation.* Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/research/as-turbulence-looms-in-south-asia-india-emerges-as-an-anchor/ , accessed on 03, September 2023.

Pant, H.V. (2014). Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates Its Rise in the International System, *Palgrave Macmillan.* Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310493852_Contemporary_debates_in_In dian_foreign_and_security_policy_India_negotiates_its_rise_in_the_international_s ystem, accessed on 23, July 2023.

Pant, M. (2023, July 26). India's space economy could potentially touch $100 billion by 2040, says new global report. *Business Today.* Retrieved from https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/in-focus/story/indias-space-economy-could-potentially-touch-100-billion-by-2040-says-new-global-report-391400-2023-07-26, accessed on 22, October 2023

Pant, H. V. and Sahu, A. (2019). Israel's Arms Sales to India: Bedrock of a Strategic Partnership. *ORF Issue Brief No. 311*, Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/

research/israels-arms-sales-to-india-bedrock-of-a-strategic-partnership-55101/, accessed on 12, September 2023

Parnjpe, S. (2007).India and Maritime Security Issues in the Indian Ocean Region. *FINS Journal of Diplomacy & Strategy*. Retrieved from https://finsindia.org/about-journal.html, accessed on 18, August 2023

Pathak. (2023, January 30). Role of intelligence in protecting country against security threats.Retrieved from https://www.bizzbuzz.news /politics/role-of-intelligence-in-protecting-country-against-security-threats-1194586, accessed on 11, August 2023.

Patil, S. (2022, June 7). The Deepening of India- Israel Defence Ties. *Raisana Debates*. Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-deepening-of-india-israel-defence-ties/, accessed on 06, September 2023

Peedikayil, T.A., Aswathi, K., & Medha, B. (2020, October 20). India's Realist Foreign Policy: Present-Day Relevance. *The Diplomatist*. Retrieved from https://diplomatist.com/2020/10/20/indias-realist-foreign-policy-present-day-relevance/, accessed on 06, March 2023.

Perlez, J., Sanger, D.E & Sohmitt, E. (2010, December 1). 'Nuclear Fuel Memos Expose Wary Dance with Pakistan'. *CNBC News*. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna40439751, accessed on 11, July 2023.

Pillar, P.R. (2001, September 01). Terrorism Goes Global: Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach Worldwide. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/terrorism-goes-global-extremist-groups-extend-their-reach-worldwide, accessed on 07, July 2023.

Pradan, S.D. (2022, January 09). Key features of Indian foreign policy under PM Modi. *The Times of India*. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/key-features-of-indian-foreign-policy-under-pm-modi/, accessed on 10 March 2023.

Prazeres, T., Bohl, D., & Zhang, P. (2021, May 12). China-LAC Trade: Four Scenarios in 2035. Retrieved from https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33534.pdf, accessed on 18, July 2023.

Pronisaka, K. (2007). Energy and security: regional and global dimensions, *Stock home Peace Research Institute*. Retrieved from https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2007/06, accessed on 23, September 2023.

Rai, D. (2022, June 6). Why Gulf Countries are Crucial for India's Economy? *India Today*. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/diu/story/why-gulf-nations-are-crucial-indian-economy-trade-relations-1959093-2022-06-06, accessed on 29, March 2023.

Rai, P and Kumar, S. (2017). The Decline of the Congress Party in Indian Politics. *Economic & Political Weekly*, 52(12), Retrieved from https://www.epw.in/journal/2017/12/web-exclusives/decline-congress-party-indian-politics.html, accessed on 10, August 2023.

Raja, S.H. (2019, September 19). Determinants of Foreign Policy: A New Framework. Retrieved from https://shahidhraja.medium.com/foreign-policy-determinants-and-tools-1e6655c14263, accessed on 11, March 2023.

Rajagopalan, R.P. (2022, September 01). India's Space Priorities are shifting towards National Security. *CARNEGIE.* Retrieved from https: //www.files.ethz.ch/isn/ 196855/pb_indias-space-security-policy_alele.pdf., accessed on 11, September 2023.

Rajagopalan, R.P. (2023, February 02). India's Defence Budget gets a small hike. *Observer Research Foundation.* Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias- defence-budget-gets-a-small-hike/, accessed on 18, August 2023.

Rajiv, S.S.C. (2017, March 15). Modi's Act West Policy in Motion. Retrieved from https://spmrf.org/modis-act-west-policy-motion/ accessed on 28 July 2023.

Ramana, S. (2008, May). Where Phalcons Dare: India-Israel Defence Relations. *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.* Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/ isn/57301/IPCS-IssueBrief-No68.pdf, accessed on 20, September 2023.

Ramo, S. (1989). National Security and Our Technology Edge. *Harvard Business Review*, Retrieved from https://hbr.org/1989/11/national-security-and-our-technology-edge, accessed on 06, September 2023.

Ranasinghe, S.D. (2012, October 08).India's Internal and External Security Challenges. *Asia Pacific Security Magazine.* Retrieved from https://www. asiapacificsecuritymagazine. com/indias-internal-and-external-security-challenges/, accessed on 10, April 2023.

Rauch, C. (2008). Farewell Non-Alignment? Constancy and change of foreign policy in post-colonial India (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Reports, 85). Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Retrieved from https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-284519, accessed on 08, May 2022.

Reynolds, E. (2020). World Food Programme wins Nobel Peace Prize for fight against 'hunger as a weapon of war'. *CNN.* Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/09/world/nobel-peace-prize-winner-2020-intl/index.html, accessed on 03, August 2023.

Riedel, B. (2019, October 23). 25 years on, Remembering the path to peace for Jordan and Israel. *Brookings*. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/25-years-on-remembering-the-path-to-peace-for-jordan-and-israel/, accessed on 25, February 2023.

Riyan, M. (2021, January 07). An Evolving Twentieth-Century Profession: Technology after World War II. Retrieved from https://mwi.usma.edu/an-evolving-twentieth-century-profession-technology-after-world-war-ii/, accessed on 11, July 2023.

Rose, F. A. (2011, July 20). Defining Space Security. *Space News.* Retrieved from https://spacenews.com/defining-space-security/, accessed on 10, April 2023.

Roy, D. (2020, September 10). China's Pandemic Diplomacy. *East-West Center.* Retrieved from https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/chinas-pandemic-diplomacy, accessed on 07, August 2023.

Roy, N. (2018*). Realism in the study of International relations in India. Observer Research Foundation.* Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/research/realism-in-the-study-of-international-relations-in-india-43817/, accessed on 03, December 2022.

Roy. A. (2021, February 17). Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean: Governance perspectives for sustainable development in the region. *Observer Research Foundation*. Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/research/blue-economy-in-the-indian-ocean-governance-perspectives-for-sustainable-development-in-the-region-47449/, accessed on 11, August 2023.

Roy. S. (2022, August 3). Flagging terror threat, India pledges support to Maldives. Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/article/india/flagging-terror-threat-india-pledges-support-to-maldives-8066781/, accessed on 08, August 2023.

Ruser, N. & Grewal, B. (2023, January 8). The escalation on the India-China border. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/explained-the-escalation-on-the-india-china-border/article66350993.ece, accessed on 22, August 2023.

Sachdev, A.K. (2019). Indo-Israel Defence: Cooperation and Future Prospects. *India Defence Review*. January- March 2019. Retrieved from http://www.indian defencereview. com/news/indo-israel-defence-cooperation-and-future-prospects/, accessed on 02, August 2023.

Sagar, P.R. (2021, October 19). India boosts its tech surveillance on China border. *The Week.* .https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2021/10/19/india-boosts-its-tech, accessed on 22, July 2023.

Sahoo, N. (2014). Decoding Modi's Foreign Policy. *Carnegie.* Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/23/decoding-modi-s-foreign-policy-pub-56711, accessed on 11, September 2023.

Salzman, R.S. (2016). Techno-Diplomacy for the Twenty-first Century: Lessons of U.S.-Soviet Space Co-operation for US-Russian co-operation in the arctic. *Carneige.* Retrieved from https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/ 10/Techno-Diplomacy-for-the-Twenty-First-, accessed on 19, August 2023.

Samuel, S. (2017, June 05). How the Six-Day War Transformed Religion. *The Atlantic,* Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/how-the-six-day-war-changed-religion/528981/, accessed on 22 January 2023.

Sarkar, S. (1991). The Gulf War and India. The Middle East Research and Information Project: Critical Coverage of Middle East since 1971. https://merip.org/1991/05/the-gulf-war-and-india/, accessed on 07, February 2023.

Sarker, Hossin,N.I, Xiaohua,A. & Sarkar, K. (2018). One Belt One Road Initiative of China: Implication for Future of Global Development. *Modern Economy*.9 (4), April 2018. Retrieved from https://www.scirp.org/journal/ paperinformation. aspx?paperid=83814, accessed on 18, September 2023.

Sattar, H. (2015, March 12). China and Pakistan's All Weather Friendship. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/china-and-pakistans-all-weather-friendship/, accessed on 21, September 2023.

Sharma, B.K. (2022, October 31). India's Foreign Policy in Evolving Geo-Political Scenario. Retrieved from https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/india-s-foreign-policy-in-evolving-geopolitical/, accessed on 13, July 2023.

Sharma, J.C. (2013 December 03). 'India's Foreign Policy, National Security & Development'. Ministry of External Affairs, India. Retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/foreign-policy.htm, accessed on 26, June 2023.

Sharma, S. (2022, August 07). Role of Muslim's in India's Freedom Struggle. *News Click.* Retrieved from https://www.newsclick.in/role-muslims-indias-freedom-struggle, accessed on 20, January 2023.

Shaw, D. (2018, September 13). Making of Indian Foreign Policy. *Distinguished Lectures.* Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?764, accessed on 08, January 2023.

Siddiqua, A., Hahladakis, J.N. & Al-Attiya, W.A.K.A. (2022). An overview of the environmental pollution and health effects associated with waste land filling and open dumping. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-022-21578-z, accessed on 22, August 2023.

Sikri, R, (2017, February 17). India's Foreign Policy – Determinants, Issues and Challenges. *Ministry of External Affairs*, *India.* Retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?632, accessed on 12, November 2022.

Simha, R.K.(2017, February 09). How the Islamic Alliance Led by Pakistan's Raheel Sharif could Pose a Threat to India. *Geopolitics.* Retrieved from http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/how-the-islamic-alliance-led-by-pakistans-raheel-sharif-could-pose-a-threat-to-india/, accessed on 22, February 2023.

Simmons, A. D. (2007). Globalization and its effect on national security. *Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table, spring 2007.* Gale Academic One File, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A191817982/AONE?u=googlescholar&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=806ce576, accessed 20, December 2022.

Singh, A. (2021, September 17). Israel's Contemporary Achievements and Emerging Trends in Defence Research and Development. *The Defence Horizon Journal.* Retrieved from https://www.thedefencehorizon.org/post/israel-emerging-trend-defence-research-development, accessed on 18, July 2023.

Singh, A. (2022, June 3). India and Abraham Accords: Prospects and Opportunities. *Asia in Global Affairs,* Retrieved from https://www.asiainglobalaffairs.in/reflections/india-and-the-abraham-accords-2022-prospects-and-opportunities/, accessed on 11, July 2023.

Singh, B. (2022, August 04). India's cybersecurity and its impact on the economy. *Gateway House.* Retrieved from https://www.gatewayhouse.in/indias-cybersecurity-and-its-impact-on-the-economy/, accessed on 18, September 2023.

Singh, M. & Thakkar, C. (2022, February 08).The Real Story Behind India and Israel's Surprising Alliance, *Haaretz, Israeli News.* Retrieved from

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-02-08/ty-article-opinion/.premium/the-real-story-behind-india-and-israel, accessed on 24, June 2023.

Singh, M. (2022). India-Israel Relations: The Influence of Third Parties. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362404010_6_India-Israel_Relations_The_Influence_of_Third_Parties, accessed on 06, July 2023.

Singh, M.C. (2012). Beyond Strategic Partnerships: Indian and Israeli relations. *Israel studies.* Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236780935_Indians_and_Israelis_Beyond_Strategic_Partnerships, accessed on 16, August 2023.

Singh, R.S.N. (2014, December 26). The Threat Perceptions of India. *Indian Defence Review.* Retrieved from http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/threat-perception-of-india/, accessed on 04, June 2023.

Singh, S. (2016, February 5). Infact: Pathankot Attack Expose Challenges in Securing Air Force bases. The Indian Express. Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/in-fact-pathankot-attacks, accessed on 27, July 2023.

Singh, S. (2022, February 24). India, Israel seeks to take space ties to new heights. *Times of India.* Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-israel-seek-to-take-space-ties-to-new-heights/articleshow/89784373.cms, accessed on 19, September 2023.

Singh, S.V. (2022, March 11). Submarines, tanks, fighters, even basic rifles: Long list of Russian imports Indian forces use. *The Print,* Retrieved from https://theprint.in/defence/submarines-tanks-fighters-even-basic-rifles-long-list-of-russian-imports-indian-forces-use/867530/, accessed on 18, July 2023.

Singh, U. (2023, March 22). Parliament Session: Contribution of agriculture sector in GDP reducing, farmers' income growing. Retrieved from https://newsonair.com/2023/03/22/parliament-session-contribution-of-agriculture-sector-in-gdp-reducing-farmers-i, accessed on 02, July 2023.

Sklar, D. (2016, March 19). Mahatma Gandhi on Zionism and the Holocaust. *Jewish Currents.* Retrieved on 10, June 2022. Retrieved from https://jewishcurrents.org/mahatma -gandhi-on-zionism-and-the-holocaust, accessed on 28, December 2022.

Smith, C, (2012, October 16). Personality in Foreign Policy Decision- Making. *E-International Relations.* Retrieved from https://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/16/personality-in- foreign-policy-decision-making/, accessed on 11, March 2023.

Smith, M.J. (2022). New Opportunities: India and United States in the Changing Middle East. Retrieved from https://orfamerica.org/newresearch/new-opportunities-india-and-the-united-states-in-a-changing-middle-east, accessed on 11, July 2023.

Snedden, C. (2016). *Shifting Geo-politics in the Greater South Asia Region. Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.* Retrieved from https://dkiapcss.edu/ shifting-geo-politics-in-the-greater-south-asia-region/, accessed on 12, March 2023.

Srivastava, S. (2017, November 22). Israeli Technology to Transform Indian Agriculture. *Times of India/ Tech.* Retrieved from https://m.economictimes.com/tech/

internet/israeli-technology-to-transform-indian-agriculture/articleshow/6175291, accessed on 09, September 2023.

Sudow, T. (2017, March 17). Israel on Cutting Edge of Digital Health: A Unique Partnership takes Root. *The Times of Israel*. Retrieved from https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/israel-on-cutting-edge-of-digital-health-a-unique-partnership-takes-root/, accessed on 10, February, 2023.

Sullivan, K. (2014). *Is India a Responsible Nuclear Power? S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.* Retrieved from https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/is-india-a-responsible-nuclear/, accessed on 28, August 2023.

Suri, N. and Sethi, H. (2022, September 12). 30 years of bilateral ties: What Indo-Israeli relations look like. *Raisina Debates*. Observer Research Foundation. Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/30-years-of-bilateral-ties-what-indo-israeli-relations-look-like/, accessed on 13, September 2023.

Tarapore, A. (2021, May 5). The Crisis after the Crisis: How Ladakh will Shape India's Competition with China. *Lowy Institute*. Retrieved from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/ publications/crisis-after-crisis-how-ladakh-will-shape-india-s-competition-china, accessed on 08, August 2023.

Tellis, A.J. (2012, March). The Menace that is Laskar-e- Taiba, *Carnage Endowment For International Peace.* Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf, accessed on 06, September 2023.

Thapar, R. (1964, July 4). Growing Up With Shastri. *Economic and Political Weekly.* Retrieved from https://www.epw.in/system/ files/pdf/1964_16/27/growing_up_with_shastri.pdf, accessed on 13, January 2023.

Timossi, A.J. (2015, May 15). Revisiting the 1955 Bandung Asian-African Conference and its Legacy. *South Bulletin,* Retrieved from https://www.southcentre.int/question/revisiting-the-1955-bandung-asian-african-conference-and-its-legacy/, accessed on 12, December 2022.

Tourangbam, M. (2022, March 22). The New Geometry of India's Foreign Policy. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/the-new-geometry-of-indias-foreign-policy/, accessed on 28, January 2023.

Tripathi, S. (2008, February 29). Gandhi and the Jews. *Prospect*. Retrieved from https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/asia/india/52242/gandhi-and-the-jews, accessed on 12, December 2022.

Tuli, J.K. (2022, January 02). India, Neighbors and Missed Opportunities. *The Times of India.* Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/world-india-politics/india-neighbors-and-missed-opportunities/, accessed on 13, August 2023.

Vakil, S and Quilliam, N. (2023, March 23). The Abraham Accords and Israel - UAE Normalisation. Retrieved from https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/03/abraham-accords-and-israel-uae-normalization, accessed on 28, August 2023.

Vasudeva, P.K. (2018, January 30). 'Sri Lanka's Handing Over Hambantota Port to China has Enormous Ramifications', *Indian Defence Review.* Retrieved from

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/sri-lankas-handing-over-hambantota-port-to-china-has-enormous-ramifications/, accessed on 12, September 2023.

Verma, S.N, (2020). Indian Diaspora: Analysis of Its Advantage to the Home Country and to the World. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=irbe, accessed on 12 , September 2023.

Wane, T. (2016). What is Economic Diplomacy? How Does It Work?. Retrieved from https://afsa.org/what-economic-diplomacy-and-how-does-it-work, accessed on 24, July 2023.

Wani, A. (2022, September 20). Taliban's Afghanistan: An Emerging Security Challenge for India and Central Asia. *Observer Research Foundation.* Retrieved from https://www.orfonline.org/research/talibans-afghanistan/, accessed on 12, August 2023.

Wheeler, R.E.M. (1945).Iran and India in Pre-Islamic Times: *A Lecture, Archeological Survey of India.* Retrieved from https://asi.nic.in/Ancient_India/Ancient_India_Volume_4/article_5.pdf, accessed on 08, January 2023.

Woetzel, J. & Jeongjmin. (2019, October 11). We're entered the Asian Century and there is no turning Back. *World Economic Forum.* Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/10/has-world-entered-asian-century-what-does-it-mean/, accessed on 10, September2023.

Yegar, M. (2010, November 16).The Normalisation of Relation Between India and Israel. *Indian Defence Review.* Retrieved from http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/the-normalization-of-relations-between-india-and-israel-ii/, accessed on 08, July 2023.

Yousuf, D. (2022, February 11). 'The Strategic Alliance of Trans-Border Insurgent Groups: A reason for the turmoil in North-East'. *Centre for Land and Water Studies.* Retrieved from https://www.claws.in/the-strategic-alliance-of-trans-border-insurgent-groups-a-reason-for-the-turmoil-in-north-east/, accessed on 13, August 2023.

Yueh, L. (2020). Economic Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Principles and Challenges. *London School of Economics and Political Science.* Retrieved from https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/LSE-IDEAS-Economic-Diplomacy-in-the-21st-Century.pdf, accessed on 25, May 2023.

Ziering, W.N & Suriyamongkol, M. (2016, June 25-27). Relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement in Southeast Asia: Security, Solidarity and Symbolism. *International Studies Association Asia-Pacific Regional Conference.* Hong Kong. Retrieved from http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/8584a3c2-8959-4711-a148-a6d5c94836d8.pdf, accessed on 11, October 2023.

D. DOCUMENTS

Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, (4 December 1947) Part I, 2(5), p. 1261.

Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, (20 August 1948), Vol.6 (1), pp.380-81.

Foreign Affairs Record, No-5, May 1982, pp. 152-154

Lok Sabha (Debates), 11, June 1967.Vol.4, p.3292-5

Lok Sabha (Debates), 17, November 1969, 4(33), p.430.

Lok Sabha (Debates), 8 August 1956, Vol.7, Pt 2, 2536-44, New Delhi, Government of India.

Lok Sabha (Debates), (March 1957), Vol.1, No.8, 800-803, Government of India, New Delhi.

Middle East Records, 1960; Vol1, p.304

Ministry of External Affairs. *India, Bangladesh Documents, vol. 2* (New Delhi, 1971), p. 154

Rajya Sabha (Debates), 31 March 1971, Vol. 75, p. 123-24

The Resolution No.118 of United Nations General Assembly, Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112088, accessed on 20 March 2022.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 340, 1972. UN Digital Library System, Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/93468

United Nations, General Assembly. Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine Question. Sub committee- 2, published by Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1967.

E. REPORTS

Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, (1956-57), New Delhi, Government of India

Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, (1979-80), New Delhi, Government of India

Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, (1990-91), New Delhi, Government of India

Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, (2004-05), New Delhi, Government of India

Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, (2019-20), New Delhi, Government of India

Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, (2020-21), New Delhi, Government of India

Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, (2021-22), New Delhi, Government of India

Annual Report, United States Congress 2019

Asian Development Bank (n.d). Asia 2050: Realising the Asian Century: Executive Summary.

Chinese Investment in India, Report No. 3, Map No. 10, February 2020.

Food and Agriculture Organisation.(2006). *Policy Brief.* Issue 02, June 2006. (pp. 1-4)

Global Food Security (GFS) Index 2021.

Global Nutrition Report (2022).

Global Risk Report 2022.

Global Risk Report. (2020, January 15). World Economic Forum.

Government of India, Energy Statistics (2020)

Human Development Report (1994), Published for UNDP, New York, Oxford University Press.

IPCC. (2014). *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change'.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, USA, (pp. 755-791).

Israeli High-Tech, Situation Report, 2022.

Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (India) (2013).India's Cybersecurity policy.

Ministry of External Affairs, India. *Documents of the Gatherings of Non-aligned Countries, 1961-1979*, New Delhi, 1981, p.21.

Planning Commission (August 2006), Integrated Energy Policy: Expert Committee Report, New Delhi.

Report of Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014).

Report of International Labour Organisation (ILO), '*Economic Security for a Better World'* (2004).

Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India, 2 (10), 10 October 1956

Report of the Proceedings and documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March- April 1947.

Report of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994.

Report, DDR&D, Directorate of Defence Research and Development, Ministry of Defence, Israel.

Report, Ministry of External Affairs, (2023, July 24).Second Meeting of Maldives-India Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, Countering Violent Extremism and De-radicalisation. *https://mea.gov.in/press- releases.* New Delhi*,* Government of India

Report, World Bank Group in China. (2022). *Facts and Figures.* Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview

Report, World Health Organisation. (2007, December 19). The world health report 2007: a safer future: global public health security in the 21st century. https://www.who.int/publications-detail-redirect/9789241563444

The Chinese Investment India Report (2020)

UN Security Council Resolution (2004) on terrorism

United Nations Organisation, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1948).

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948

World Bank Group in China (2020)

World Bank Group in China (2020) in its report

World Bank Group in China (2020) in its report

World Health Report, 2007,

F. MEDIA REPORTS

Al Jazeera. (2023, January 25). India, Pakistan came close to a nuclear war in 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/25/india-pakistan-came-close-to-a-nuclear-war-in-2019-pompeo alliance-of-decades/, accessed on 12, July 2023.

Arunachal Times. (2023, September 27). India puts spotlight on complex web of security challenges facing Indo-Pacific. https://arunachaltimes.in/index.php/2023/09/27/india-puts-spotlight-on-complex-web-of-security-challenges-facing-i, accessed on 06, October 2023.

BBC News, (21, May 1991). Bomb Kills India's Former Leader Rajiv Gandhi. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/21/newsid_2504000/2504739.stm, on 20, February 2023.

Economic and Political Weekly. (2010). India's Look East Policy (Editorial). *45*(48), 8–8.

Economic Times. (2023, March 05). World's largest Army, Navy: How China has ramped up its defense capabilities, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/how-to/worlds-largest-army-navy-how-china-has-ramped-up-its-defense-capabilities/articleshow/98426138.cms, accessed on 18, October 2023.

India Today. (2017, May 14). 'Opposed to China's CPEC that passes through PoK, India boycotts Belt and Road initiative'. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/one-belt-one-road-pakistan-occupied-kashmir-china-cpec-beijing-976918-2017-05-13, accessed on 16, September 2023.

NDTV. (2017, May17). Indian Naval Ships Visit Israel Ahead Of PM Modi's Visit. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indian-naval-ships-visit-israel-ahead-of-pm-modis-visit-1692470

New Delhi Times. (2018, March 05). Non-Aligned Movement strengthening Multilateralism. https://www.newdelhitimes.com/non-aligned-movement-strengthening-multilateralism/

Reuters. (2017, September, 4). 'India to bid for Israel oil-and-gas exploration blocks-minister says'. https://www.reuters.com/article/india-israel-oil-idUKL4N1LL3K9

Reuters. (2014, March 24). Israel's Brain Storm gets U.S. patent for stem cell technology. . https://www.reuters.com/article/brainstorm-cell-patent-idUKL5N0MK0JD20140324

Reuters. (2022, January 12). China accelerates construction along disputed border with Bhutan. *Business Today.* https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/trends/story/china-accelerates-construction-along-disputed-border-with-bhutan

Reuters. (2023, August 10). India's imports from China across at least 25 major commodity groups rise on the year. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indias-imports-china-across-least-25-major-commodity-groups-rise-year-2023-08-09/

The Economic Times. (2016, December 11). Hostile neighbours push India, Israel to forge space ties. https://m.economictimes.com/news/science/hostile-neighbours-push-india-israel-forge-space-ties/articleshow/55

The Economic Times. (2017, February 28). Open borders with Nepal, Bhutan pose security threat.https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/open-borders-with-nepal-bhutan-pose-security-threat/articleshow/57387053.cms

The Economic Times (2018, July 12). Maldives, India in talks for setting up counter-terror system. Retrieved from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/maldives-india-in-talks-for-setting-up-counter-terror-system/a 10, August 2023.

The Economic Times. (2021, May 01). India pursued assertive foreign policy in 2020, says US Defence Intelligence Agency. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-pursued-assertive-foreign-policy-in-2020-says-us-defen,

The Economic Times. (2023, May 10). Indian economy benefited from diaspora: RBI's Michael Patra. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/indian-economy-benefited-from-diaspora-rbis-michael-patra/articleshow/100140191.cms,

The Hindu (2012, September 03). 'India Faces Threat from Almost all its Neighbours'. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-faces-threats-from-almost-all-its-neighbours/article3851365.ece

The Hindu (2014, May 10). 'Raising the Bogy of Illegal Migration'. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/raising-the-bogey-of-illegal-immigration/article5993925.

The New York Times (1973, December 2). 'Ben-Gurion, Symbol of the Tough State of Israel, Achieved a Lifelong Dream'. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/02/archives/bengurion-symbol-of-the-tough-state-of-israel-achieved-a-lifelong.ht, on 18, January 2023.

Time Magazine (2023, May 10). 'Wiki Leaks Shows Insecurity over Pakistan Nukes'. https://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2034088_2034097_2033921,00.htm,

Times of India (2011, December 18). India-China war: No records of Nehru writing for Israeli help. https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/ india/india-china-war-no-records-of-nehru-writing-for-israeli-help/articleshow/11,

Times of India, (2005, August 19). States that have failed or are failing surround India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-is-surrounded-by-failed-or-failing-states/articleshow/1205049.cms,

Times of India, (2022, December 10). India at 75: A growing force securing a position on the international scene. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India/India-at-75.cms.

Times of India. (2022, December 10). India at 75: Rising Power Finds its Place on Global Stage. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-at-75-rising-power-finding-its-place-on-global-stage/articleshow/96131813.cms,

Times of India. (2021, August 9). 'India's national security challenges becoming complex: Rajnath Singh'. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indias-national-security-challenges-becoming-complex-rajnath-singh/articleshow/85451935.cms

Times of India. (2022, June 03). 8 years of NDA Govt: Jaishankar highlights transformation in India's Foreign Policy under PM Modi's Leadership. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/8-years-of-nda-govt-jaishankar-highlights-transformation-in-indias-foreign-policy-under-pm-modis-leadership/articleshow/91981958.

Times of India. (2023, October 30). China accelerates activities to dominate the Indian Ocean: Implications for India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/china-accelerates-activities-to-dominate-the-indian-ocea

Times of Israel. (2023, July 31). 'India terror suspects said to have plotted attack on Mumbai Chabad House'. https://www.timesofisrael.com/india-terror-suspects-said-to-have-plotted-attack-on-mumbai-chabad-house/

Times of Israel. (2023, March, 12). Global Health Challenges: Meet Israeli Health Tech Solutions. https://www.timesofisrael.com/spotlight/global-health-challenges-meet-israeli-healthtech-solutions/

The Economic Times. (2023, July 17). Israel quietly embeds AI systems in deadly military operations. Retrieved from

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/israel-quietly-embeds-ai-systems-in-deadly-military-operatio

The Economic Times. (2017, November 22). Israeli technology to transform Indian agriculture https://www.reuters.com/article/brainstorm-cell-patent-idUKL5N0MK0JD20140324.